Merge branch 'audit.b10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current

* 'audit.b10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  [PATCH] Audit Filter Performance
  [PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing
  [PATCH] More user space subject labels
  [PATCH] Reworked patch for labels on user space messages
  [PATCH] change lspp ipc auditing
  [PATCH] audit inode patch
  [PATCH] support for context based audit filtering, part 2
  [PATCH] support for context based audit filtering
  [PATCH] no need to wank with task_lock() and pinning task down in audit_syscall_exit()
  [PATCH] drop task argument of audit_syscall_{entry,exit}
  [PATCH] drop gfp_mask in audit_log_exit()
  [PATCH] move call of audit_free() into do_exit()
  [PATCH] sockaddr patch
  [PATCH] deal with deadlocks in audit_free()

33 files changed, 1142 insertions, 275 deletions

diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
index 506462ef36a..fd7eaf7866e 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ int do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
 		if (entryexit)
-			audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax),
+			audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax),
 						regs->eax);
 		/* Debug traps, when using PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, must be sent only
 		 * on the syscall exit path. Normally, when TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is
@@ -720,14 +720,13 @@ int do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 	ret = is_sysemu;
 out:
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit)
-		audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386, regs->orig_eax,
+		audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386, regs->orig_eax,
 				    regs->ebx, regs->ecx, regs->edx, regs->esi);
 	if (ret == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	regs->orig_eax = -1; /* force skip of syscall restarting */
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax),
-				regs->eax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax), regs->eax);
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
index aee14fafd13..00e0118e717 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
 
 	/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
 
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 9887c8787e7..e61e15e28d8 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ syscall_trace_enter (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
 			arch = AUDIT_ARCH_IA64;
 		}
 
-		audit_syscall_entry(current, arch, syscall, arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
+		audit_syscall_entry(arch, syscall, arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
 	}
 
 }
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
 
 		if (success != AUDITSC_SUCCESS)
 			result = -result;
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, success, result);
+		audit_syscall_exit(success, result);
 	}
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index f3106d0771b..9b4733c1239 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static inline int audit_arch(void)
 asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 {
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit)
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->regs[2]),
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->regs[2]),
 		                   regs->regs[2]);
 
 	if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 	}
  out:
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit)
-		audit_syscall_entry(current, audit_arch(), regs->regs[2],
+		audit_syscall_entry(audit_arch(), regs->regs[2],
 				    regs->regs[4], regs->regs[5],
 				    regs->regs[6], regs->regs[7]);
 }
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
index bcb83574335..4a677d1bd4e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		do_syscall_trace();
 
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_entry(current,
+		audit_syscall_entry(
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
 				    AUDIT_ARCH_PPC,
 #else
@@ -556,8 +556,7 @@ void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
 #endif
 
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(current,
-				   (regs->ccr&0x1000)?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS,
+		audit_syscall_exit((regs->ccr&0x1000)?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS,
 				   regs->result);
 
 	if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index 37dfe33dab7..8f36504075e 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ asmlinkage void
 syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 {
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit)
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->gprs[2]), regs->gprs[2]);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->gprs[2]), regs->gprs[2]);
 
 	if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
 		goto out;
@@ -761,8 +761,7 @@ syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 	}
  out:
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit)
-		audit_syscall_entry(current, 
-				    test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_S390:AUDIT_ARCH_S390X,
+		audit_syscall_entry(test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_S390:AUDIT_ARCH_S390X,
 				    regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2, regs->gprs[3],
 				    regs->gprs[4], regs->gprs[5]);
 }
diff --git a/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 49e6dedd027..d31975e6d6f 100644
--- a/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int syscall_exit_p)
 		if (unlikely(tstate & (TSTATE_XCARRY | TSTATE_ICARRY)))
 			result = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
 
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, result, regs->u_regs[UREG_I0]);
+		audit_syscall_exit(result, regs->u_regs[UREG_I0]);
 	}
 
 	if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
@@ -677,8 +677,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int syscall_exit_p)
 
 out:
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !syscall_exit_p)
-		audit_syscall_entry(current,
-				    (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ?
+		audit_syscall_entry((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ?
 				     AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC :
 				     AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC64),
 				    regs->u_regs[UREG_G1],
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
index 60d2eda995c..9a77fb3c269 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -275,15 +275,13 @@ void syscall_trace(union uml_pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
 		if (!entryexit)
-			audit_syscall_entry(current,
-                                            HOST_AUDIT_ARCH,
+			audit_syscall_entry(HOST_AUDIT_ARCH,
 					    UPT_SYSCALL_NR(regs),
 					    UPT_SYSCALL_ARG1(regs),
 					    UPT_SYSCALL_ARG2(regs),
 					    UPT_SYSCALL_ARG3(regs),
 					    UPT_SYSCALL_ARG4(regs));
-		else audit_syscall_exit(current,
-                                        AUDITSC_RESULT(UPT_SYSCALL_RET(regs)),
+		else audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(UPT_SYSCALL_RET(regs)),
                                         UPT_SYSCALL_RET(regs));
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
index da8e7903d81..2d50024c9f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -600,12 +600,12 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
 		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
-			audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
+			audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
 					    regs->orig_rax,
 					    regs->rbx, regs->rcx,
 					    regs->rdx, regs->rsi);
 		} else {
-			audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
+			audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
 					    regs->orig_rax,
 					    regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
 					    regs->rdx, regs->r10);
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
+		audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
 
 	if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 	     || test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 1c47c59058c..b74c148f14e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE	1305	/* Audit system configuration change */
 #define AUDIT_SOCKADDR		1306	/* sockaddr copied as syscall arg */
 #define AUDIT_CWD		1307	/* Current working directory */
+#define AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM	1311	/* IPC new permissions record type */
 
 #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
@@ -145,6 +146,11 @@
 #define AUDIT_PERS	10
 #define AUDIT_ARCH	11
 #define AUDIT_MSGTYPE	12
+#define AUDIT_SE_USER	13	/* security label user */
+#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE	14	/* security label role */
+#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE	15	/* security label type */
+#define AUDIT_SE_SEN	16	/* security label sensitivity label */
+#define AUDIT_SE_CLR	17	/* security label clearance label */
 
 				/* These are ONLY useful when checking
 				 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -287,10 +293,10 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms;
 				/* Public API */
 extern int  audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
 extern void audit_free(struct task_struct *task);
-extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch,
+extern void audit_syscall_entry(int arch,
 				int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
 				unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3);
-extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code);
+extern void audit_syscall_exit(int failed, long return_code);
 extern void audit_getname(const char *name);
 extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
 extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
@@ -314,7 +320,8 @@ extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial);
 extern int  audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid);
 extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
+extern int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
+extern int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
 extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
 extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
@@ -323,8 +330,8 @@ extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
 #else
 #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_syscall_entry(t,ta,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_syscall_entry(ta,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_syscall_exit(f,r) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0)
 #define __audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -333,7 +340,8 @@ extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
 #define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
 #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0)
 #define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; })
-#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_obj(i) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_set_perm(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
@@ -366,7 +374,7 @@ extern void		    audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
 extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
 extern int  audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
-				 void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid);
+			 void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid);
 #else
 #define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
diff --git a/include/linux/netlink.h b/include/linux/netlink.h
index f8f3d1c927f..87b8a5703eb 100644
--- a/include/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/linux/netlink.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms
 	__u32			dst_group;
 	kernel_cap_t		eff_cap;
 	__u32			loginuid;	/* Login (audit) uid */
+	__u32			sid;		/* SELinux security id */
 };
 
 #define NETLINK_CB(skb)		(*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index aaa0a5cdbf7..1bab48f6aea 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -869,11 +869,6 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
  *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
  *	@flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @ipc_getsecurity:
- *      Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into
- *      @buffer.  @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 
- *      required.  @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return 
- *      number of bytes used/required on success.
  *
  * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
  * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1223,7 +1218,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 
 	int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
-	int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size);
 
 	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
 	void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1887,11 +1881,6 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
 }
 
-static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
-	return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size);
-}
-
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
 {
 	return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg);
@@ -2532,11 +2521,6 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4047bcde448
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_H
+#define _LINUX_SELINUX_H
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule;
+struct audit_context;
+struct inode;
+struct kern_ipc_perm;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ *	@field: the field this rule refers to
+ *	@op: the operater the rule uses
+ *	@rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ *	@rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ *	Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
+ *	will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+                            struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ *	This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ *	If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ *	@ctxid: the context ID to check
+ *	@field: the field this rule refers to
+ *	@op: the operater the rule uses
+ *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ *	@actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ *	Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ *	-errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
+                             struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+                             struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
+ *	@callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
+ *
+ *	This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
+ *	upon policy reloads.  This callback should rebuild all existing rules
+ *	using selinux_audit_rule_init().
+ */
+void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
+
+/**
+ *	selinux_task_ctxid - determine a context ID for a process.
+ *	@tsk: the task object
+ *	@ctxid: ID value returned via this
+ *
+ *	On return, ctxid will contain an ID for the context.  This value
+ *	should only be used opaquely.
+ */
+void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid);
+
+/**
+ *     selinux_ctxid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
+ *     @ctxid: security context ID to be converted.
+ *     @ctx: address of context string to be returned
+ *     @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
+ *
+ *     Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the context
+ *     string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call
+ *     kfree() on it after use.
+ */
+int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
+/**
+ *     selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
+ *     @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
+ *     @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
+ *
+ *     Returns nothing
+ */
+void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
+
+/**
+ *     selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
+ *     @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
+ *     @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
+ *
+ *     Returns nothing
+ */
+void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid);
+
+/**
+ *     selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
+ *     @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
+ *     @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
+ *
+ *     Returns nothing
+ */
+void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
+
+
+#else
+
+static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
+                                          char *rulestr,
+                                          struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+{
+	return -ENOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
+                                           struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+                                           struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid)
+{
+	*ctxid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+       *ctx = NULL;
+       *ctxlen = 0;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = 0;
+}
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_H */
diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 48a7f17a723..7d1340ccb16 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
  * mostly rewritten, threaded and wake-one semantics added
  * MSGMAX limit removed, sysctl's added
  * (c) 1999 Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
+ *
+ * support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
  */
 
 #include <linux/capability.h>
@@ -447,6 +450,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
 	if (msg_checkid(msq,msqid))
 		goto out_unlock_up;
 	ipcp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	err = audit_ipc_obj(ipcp);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock_up;
+
 	err = -EPERM;
 	if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid && 
 	    current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -460,7 +468,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IPC_SET:
 	{
-		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+		err = audit_ipc_set_perm(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp);
+		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock_up;
 
 		err = -EPERM;
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 642659cd596..7919f8ece6b 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
  * (c) 2001 Red Hat Inc <alan@redhat.com>
  * Lockless wakeup
  * (c) 2003 Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
+ *
+ * support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
  */
 
 #include <linux/config.h>
@@ -820,6 +823,11 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}	
 	ipcp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	err = audit_ipc_obj(ipcp);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
 	if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid && 
 	    current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 	    	err=-EPERM;
@@ -836,7 +844,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
 		err = 0;
 		break;
 	case IPC_SET:
-		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+		err = audit_ipc_set_perm(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp);
+		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		ipcp->uid = setbuf.uid;
 		ipcp->gid = setbuf.gid;
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 1c2faf62bc7..80989685190 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  * Shared /dev/zero support, Kanoj Sarcar <kanoj@sgi.com>
  * Move the mm functionality over to mm/shmem.c, Christoph Rohland <cr@sap.com>
  *
+ * support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
  */
 
 #include <linux/config.h>
@@ -542,6 +544,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
 		if(err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 
+		err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_unlock;
+
 		if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
 			err = -EPERM;
 			if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
@@ -594,6 +600,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
 		if(err)
 			goto out_unlock_up;
 
+		err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_unlock_up;
+
 		if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
 		    current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid && 
 		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
@@ -627,12 +637,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
 		err=-EINVAL;
 		if(shp==NULL)
 			goto out_up;
-		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid,
-					setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm))))
-			goto out_unlock_up;
 		err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid);
 		if(err)
 			goto out_unlock_up;
+		err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_unlock_up;
+		err = audit_ipc_set_perm(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_unlock_up;
 		err=-EPERM;
 		if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
 		    current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid && 
diff --git a/ipc/util.c b/ipc/util.c
index b3dcfad3b4f..8193299f45f 100644
--- a/ipc/util.c
+++ b/ipc/util.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
  *	      Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
  * Oct 2002 - One lock per IPC id. RCU ipc_free for lock-free grow_ary().
  *            Mingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mar 2006 - support for audit of ipc object properties
+ *            Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
  */
 
 #include <linux/config.h>
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
@@ -464,8 +467,10 @@ void ipc_rcu_putref(void *ptr)
  
 int ipcperms (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {	/* flag will most probably be 0 or S_...UGO from <linux/stat.h> */
-	int requested_mode, granted_mode;
+	int requested_mode, granted_mode, err;
 
+	if (unlikely((err = audit_ipc_obj(ipcp))))
+		return err;
 	requested_mode = (flag >> 6) | (flag >> 3) | flag;
 	granted_mode = ipcp->mode;
 	if (current->euid == ipcp->cuid || current->euid == ipcp->uid)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c8ccbd09048..df57b493e1c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
 
 /* No auditing will take place until audit_initialized != 0.
  * (Initialization happens after skb_init is called.) */
@@ -227,49 +230,103 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
 	}
 }
 
-static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old		 = audit_rate_limit;
-	audit_rate_limit = limit;
-	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
+	int old	= audit_rate_limit;
+
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+		int rc;
+		if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+			return rc;
+		else
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+				limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+		kfree(ctx);
+	} else
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			audit_rate_limit, old, loginuid);
+			limit, old, loginuid);
+	audit_rate_limit = limit;
 	return old;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old		 = audit_backlog_limit;
-	audit_backlog_limit = limit;
-	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+	int old	= audit_backlog_limit;
+
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+		int rc;
+		if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+			return rc;
+		else
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+			    "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+				limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+		kfree(ctx);
+	} else
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			audit_backlog_limit, old, loginuid);
+			limit, old, loginuid);
+	audit_backlog_limit = limit;
 	return old;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old		 = audit_enabled;
+	int old = audit_enabled;
+
 	if (state != 0 && state != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	audit_enabled = state;
-	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+		int rc;
+		if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+			return rc;
+		else
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+				state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+		kfree(ctx);
+	} else
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			audit_enabled, old, loginuid);
+			state, old, loginuid);
+	audit_enabled = state;
 	return old;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old		 = audit_failure;
+	int old = audit_failure;
+
 	if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	audit_failure = state;
-	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+
+	if (sid) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+		int rc;
+		if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+			return rc;
+		else
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+				state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+		kfree(ctx);
+	} else
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 			"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			audit_failure, old, loginuid);
+			state, old, loginuid);
+	audit_failure = state;
 	return old;
 }
 
@@ -387,7 +444,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
 
 static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 {
-	u32			uid, pid, seq;
+	u32			uid, pid, seq, sid;
 	void			*data;
 	struct audit_status	*status_get, status_set;
 	int			err;
@@ -413,6 +470,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	pid  = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid;
 	uid  = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->uid;
 	loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid;
+	sid  = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid;
 	seq  = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
 	data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
 
@@ -433,25 +491,43 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		status_get   = (struct audit_status *)data;
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) {
-			err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled, loginuid);
+			err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled,
+							loginuid, sid);
 			if (err < 0) return err;
 		}
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE) {
-			err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure, loginuid);
+			err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure,
+							 loginuid, sid);
 			if (err < 0) return err;
 		}
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
 			int old   = audit_pid;
+			if (sid) {
+				char *ctx = NULL;
+				u32 len;
+				int rc;
+				if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+						sid, &ctx, &len)))
+					return rc;
+				else
+					audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+						AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+						"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+						status_get->pid, old,
+						loginuid, ctx);
+				kfree(ctx);
+			} else
+				audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+					"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+					  status_get->pid, old, loginuid);
 			audit_pid = status_get->pid;
-			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-				  audit_pid, old, loginuid);
 		}
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT)
-			audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit, loginuid);
+			audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit,
+							 loginuid, sid);
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT)
 			audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit,
-							loginuid);
+							loginuid, sid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
@@ -465,8 +541,23 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
 			if (ab) {
 				audit_log_format(ab,
-						 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
-						 pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
+						 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
+						 pid, uid, loginuid);
+				if (sid) {
+					char *ctx = NULL;
+					u32 len;
+					if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+							sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+						audit_log_format(ab, 
+							" ssid=%u", sid);
+						/* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+					} else
+						audit_log_format(ab, 
+							" subj=%s", ctx);
+					kfree(ctx);
+				}
+				audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.1024s'",
+					 (char *)data);
 				audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
 				audit_log_end(ab);
 			}
@@ -480,7 +571,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
 		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
 					   uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
-					   loginuid);
+					   loginuid, sid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
@@ -490,7 +581,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
 		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
 					   uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
-					   loginuid);
+					   loginuid, sid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		sig_data.uid = audit_sig_uid;
@@ -564,6 +655,11 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
 	skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue);
 	audit_initialized = 1;
 	audit_enabled = audit_default;
+
+	/* Register the callback with selinux.  This callback will be invoked
+	 * when a new policy is loaded. */
+	selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
+
 	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index bc5392076e2..6f733920fd3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -54,9 +54,11 @@ enum audit_state {
 
 /* Rule lists */
 struct audit_field {
-	u32			type;
-	u32			val;
-	u32			op;
+	u32				type;
+	u32				val;
+	u32				op;
+	char				*se_str;
+	struct selinux_audit_rule	*se_rule;
 };
 
 struct audit_krule {
@@ -86,3 +88,5 @@ extern void		    audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
 extern void		    audit_log_lost(const char *message);
 extern void		    audit_panic(const char *message);
 extern struct mutex audit_netlink_mutex;
+
+extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index d3a8539f3a8..7c134906d68 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include "audit.h"
 
 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
@@ -42,6 +43,13 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
 
 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
 {
+	int i;
+	if (e->rule.fields)
+		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+			kfree(f->se_str);
+			selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+		}
 	kfree(e->rule.fields);
 	kfree(e);
 }
@@ -52,9 +60,29 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 	audit_free_rule(e);
 }
 
+/* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	struct audit_field *fields;
+
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!entry))
+		return NULL;
+
+	fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!fields)) {
+		kfree(entry);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	entry->rule.fields = fields;
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
  * buffer. */
-static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+static char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
 {
 	char *str;
 
@@ -84,7 +112,6 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
 {
 	unsigned listnr;
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
-	struct audit_field *fields;
 	int i, err;
 
 	err = -EINVAL;
@@ -108,23 +135,14 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
 		goto exit_err;
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (unlikely(!entry))
-		goto exit_err;
-	fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (unlikely(!fields)) {
-		kfree(entry);
+	entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
+	if (!entry)
 		goto exit_err;
-	}
-
-	memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule));
-	memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field));
 
 	entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
 	entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
 	entry->rule.action = rule->action;
 	entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
-	entry->rule.fields = fields;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
 		entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
@@ -150,15 +168,20 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
 
-		if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto exit_free;
-		}
-
 		f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
 		f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
 		f->val = rule->values[i];
 
+		if (f->type & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS ||
+		    f->type == AUDIT_SE_USER ||
+		    f->type == AUDIT_SE_ROLE ||
+		    f->type == AUDIT_SE_TYPE ||
+		    f->type == AUDIT_SE_SEN ||
+		    f->type == AUDIT_SE_CLR) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto exit_free;
+		}
+
 		entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
 
 		/* Support for legacy operators where
@@ -188,8 +211,9 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 	int err = 0;
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
 	void *bufp;
-	/* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */
+	size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
 	int i;
+	char *str;
 
 	entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
 	if (IS_ERR(entry))
@@ -207,10 +231,35 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 
 		f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
 		f->type = data->fields[i];
+		f->val = data->values[i];
+		f->se_str = NULL;
+		f->se_rule = NULL;
 		switch(f->type) {
-		/* call type-specific conversion routines here */
-		default:
-			f->val = data->values[i];
+		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+			if (IS_ERR(str))
+				goto exit_free;
+			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+			err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+						      &f->se_rule);
+			/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+			 * become valid after a policy reload. */
+			if (err == -EINVAL) {
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+				       "\'%s\' is invalid\n",  str);
+				err = 0;
+			}
+			if (err) {
+				kfree(str);
+				goto exit_free;
+			} else
+				f->se_str = str;
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -286,7 +335,14 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 		data->fields[i] = f->type;
 		data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
 		switch(f->type) {
-		/* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+				audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+			break;
 		default:
 			data->values[i] = f->val;
 		}
@@ -314,7 +370,14 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
 			return 1;
 
 		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
-		/* call type-specific comparison routines here */
+		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+			if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+				return 1;
+			break;
 		default:
 			if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
 				return 1;
@@ -328,6 +391,81 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Duplicate selinux field information.  The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+ * re-initialized. */
+static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+					   struct audit_field *sf)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	char *se_str;
+
+	/* our own copy of se_str */
+	se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(IS_ERR(se_str)))
+	    return -ENOMEM;
+	df->se_str = se_str;
+
+	/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
+	ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+				      &df->se_rule);
+	/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+	 * become valid after a policy reload. */
+	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+		       "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Duplicate an audit rule.  This will be a deep copy with the exception
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over.  The selinux specific fields
+ * will be updated in the copy.  The point is to be able to replace the old
+ * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
+{
+	u32 fcount = old->field_count;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	struct audit_krule *new;
+	int i, err = 0;
+
+	entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
+	if (unlikely(!entry))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	new = &entry->rule;
+	new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
+	new->flags = old->flags;
+	new->listnr = old->listnr;
+	new->action = old->action;
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+		new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
+	new->buflen = old->buflen;
+	new->field_count = old->field_count;
+	memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
+
+	/* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+	 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
+	for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
+		switch (new->fields[i].type) {
+		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+			err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+						       &old->fields[i]);
+		}
+		if (err) {
+			audit_free_rule(entry);
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate.  Protected by
  * audit_netlink_mutex. */
 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
@@ -448,9 +586,10 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
  * @data: payload data
  * @datasz: size of payload data
  * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
  */
 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
-			 size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid)
+			 size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	int *dest;
@@ -493,9 +632,23 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
 		err = audit_add_rule(entry,
 				     &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			"auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n",
-			loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+		if (sid) {
+			char *ctx = NULL;
+			u32 len;
+			if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+				/* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+				audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				 "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+				 loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+			} else
+				audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				 "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+				 loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+			kfree(ctx);
+		} else
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+				loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
 
 		if (err)
 			audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -511,9 +664,24 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
 		err = audit_del_rule(entry,
 				     &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			"auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n",
-			loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+		if (sid) {
+			char *ctx = NULL;
+			u32 len;
+			if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+				/* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+				audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+					"auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+					 loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+			} else
+				audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+					"auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+					 loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+			kfree(ctx);
+		} else
+			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+				loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
 
 		audit_free_rule(entry);
 		break;
@@ -628,3 +796,62 @@ unlock_and_return:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return result;
 }
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields.  Returns 1 if there
+   are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
+static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
+ * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * updated rule. */
+int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
+	int i, err = 0;
+
+	/* audit_netlink_mutex synchronizes the writers */
+	mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+			if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+				continue;
+
+			nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule);
+			if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
+				/* save the first error encountered for the
+				 * return value */
+				if (!err)
+					err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
+				audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+				list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+			} else {
+				list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
+			}
+			call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7f160df21a2..1c03a4ed1b2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ struct audit_names {
 	uid_t		uid;
 	gid_t		gid;
 	dev_t		rdev;
-	char		*ctx;
+	u32		osid;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
 	uid_t			uid;
 	gid_t			gid;
 	mode_t			mode;
-	char 			*ctx;
+	u32			osid;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -167,7 +168,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			      struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
-	int i, j;
+	int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+	u32 sid;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -257,6 +259,27 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (ctx)
 				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+			/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+			   a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
+			   match for now to avoid losing information that
+			   may be wanted.   An error message will also be
+			   logged upon error */
+			if (f->se_rule) {
+				if (need_sid) {
+					selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
+					need_sid = 0;
+				}
+				result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				                                  f->op,
+				                                  f->se_rule,
+				                                  ctx);
+			}
+			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARG0:
 		case AUDIT_ARG1:
 		case AUDIT_ARG2:
@@ -329,7 +352,6 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 						      int return_valid,
 						      int return_code)
@@ -391,9 +413,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 #endif
 
 	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
-		char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
-		context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
-		kfree(p);
 		if (context->names[i].name)
 			__putname(context->names[i].name);
 	}
@@ -416,11 +435,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 			dput(axi->dentry);
 			mntput(axi->mnt);
 		}
-		if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
-			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
-			if (axi->ctx)
-				kfree(axi->ctx);
-		}
 
 		context->aux = aux->next;
 		kfree(aux);
@@ -506,7 +520,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	ssize_t len = 0;
@@ -518,7 +532,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx)
 		goto error_path;
 
@@ -536,47 +550,46 @@ error_path:
 	return;
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+	struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
-	get_task_comm(name, current);
+	/* tsk == current */
+
+	get_task_comm(name, tsk);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
 
-	if (!mm)
-		return;
-
-	/*
-	 * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
-	 * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
-	 */
-	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	vma = mm->mmap;
-	while (vma) {
-		if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
-		    vma->vm_file) {
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
-					 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
-					 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
-			break;
+	if (mm) {
+		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		vma = mm->mmap;
+		while (vma) {
+			if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+			    vma->vm_file) {
+				audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+						 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+						 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+				break;
+			}
+			vma = vma->vm_next;
 		}
-		vma = vma->vm_next;
+		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 	}
-	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, call_panic = 0;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
 	const char *tty;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+	/* tsk == current */
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
 	audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
@@ -587,8 +600,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
 				 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
 				 context->return_code);
-	if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
-		tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+	if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+		tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
 	else
 		tty = "(none)";
 	audit_log_format(ab,
@@ -607,12 +620,12 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		  context->gid,
 		  context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
 		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
-	audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
+	audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
 	for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
 
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
@@ -620,8 +633,39 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		case AUDIT_IPC: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab, 
-					 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
-					 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
+				 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
+				 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+			if (axi->osid != 0) {
+				char *ctx = NULL;
+				u32 len;
+				if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+						axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+					audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+							axi->osid);
+					call_panic = 1;
+				} else
+					audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+				kfree(ctx);
+			}
+			break; }
+
+		case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab,
+				" new qbytes=%lx new iuid=%u new igid=%u new mode=%x",
+				axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+			if (axi->osid != 0) {
+				char *ctx = NULL;
+				u32 len;
+				if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+						axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+					audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+							axi->osid);
+					call_panic = 1;
+				} else
+					audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+				kfree(ctx);
+			}
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -649,7 +693,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	}
 
 	if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
 		if (ab) {
 			audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -659,7 +703,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		unsigned long ino  = context->names[i].ino;
 		unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
 
-		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+		ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
@@ -685,32 +729,35 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 					 context->names[i].gid, 
 					 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), 
 					 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
-		if (context->names[i].ctx) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
-					context->names[i].ctx);
+		if (context->names[i].osid != 0) {
+			char *ctx = NULL;
+			u32 len;
+			if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+				context->names[i].osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+						context->names[i].osid);
+				call_panic = 2;
+			} else
+				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+			kfree(ctx);
 		}
 
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
+	if (call_panic)
+		audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
  * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
  *
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
  */
 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context;
 
-	/*
-	 * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
-	 * then the task has no external references anymore, and
-	 * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
-	 * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
-	 * contexts as well, via RCU.)
-	 */
 	context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return;
@@ -719,8 +766,9 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 
 	 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 
 	 * in the context of the idle thread */
+	/* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
 
 	audit_free_context(context);
 }
@@ -743,10 +791,11 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
  * be written).
  */
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
 			 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
 			 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
 {
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
 	enum audit_state     state;
 
@@ -824,22 +873,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
  * free the names stored from getname().
  */
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
 {
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct audit_context *context;
 
-	get_task_struct(tsk);
-	task_lock(tsk);
 	context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
-	task_unlock(tsk);
 
-	/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
-	 * called __put_task_struct. */
 	if (likely(!context))
-		goto out;
+		return;
 
 	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-		audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+		audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
 
 	context->in_syscall = 0;
 	context->auditable  = 0;
@@ -854,8 +899,6 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 		audit_free_aux(context);
 		tsk->audit_context = context;
 	}
- out:
-	put_task_struct(tsk);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -936,40 +979,11 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 #endif
 }
 
-void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+static void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	int len = 0;
-
-	if (!suffix)
-		goto ret;
-
-	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
-	if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-		goto ret;
-	if (len < 0) 
-		goto error_path;
-
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ctx) 
-		goto error_path;
 
-	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
-	if (len < 0)
-		goto error_path;
-
-	kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
-	context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
-	goto ret;
-
-error_path:
-	if (ctx)
-		kfree(ctx);
-	audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
-ret:
-	return;
+	selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &context->names[idx].osid);
 }
 
 
@@ -1155,40 +1169,37 @@ uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
 	return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
 }
 
-static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
+	struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	int len = 0;
 
 	if (likely(!context))
-		return NULL;
-
-	len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
-	if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-		goto ret;
-	if (len < 0)
-		goto error_path;
-
-	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!ctx)
-		goto error_path;
+		return 0;
 
-	len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
-	if (len < 0)
-		goto error_path;
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!ax)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	return ctx;
+	ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
+	ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
+	ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
+	selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
 
-error_path:
-	kfree(ctx);
-	audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
-ret:
-	return NULL;
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+	ax->d.next = context->aux;
+	context->aux = (void *)ax;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
  * @qbytes: msgq bytes
  * @uid: msgq user id
  * @gid: msgq group id
@@ -1196,7 +1207,7 @@ ret:
  *
  * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
  */
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1212,9 +1223,9 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, str
 	ax->uid = uid;
 	ax->gid = gid;
 	ax->mode = mode;
-	ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
+	selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
 
-	ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
 	context->aux = (void *)ax;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index f86434d7b3d..e95b9328221 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/futex.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h> /* for audit_free() */
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -910,6 +911,8 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
 	if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
 		compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
 #endif
+	if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
+		audit_free(tsk);
 	exit_mm(tsk);
 
 	exit_sem(tsk);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index d2fa57d480d..ac8100e3088 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
 	WARN_ON(tsk == current);
 
-	if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
-		audit_free(tsk);
 	security_task_free(tsk);
 	free_uid(tsk->user);
 	put_group_info(tsk->group_info);
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index b8ea61f357e..3862e73d14d 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/scm.h>
@@ -1156,6 +1157,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 	NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;
 	NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
 	NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context);
+	selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
 	memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
 
 	/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index 0ce12dfc7a7..02948b622bd 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ int move_addr_to_user(void *kaddr, int klen, void __user *uaddr, int __user *ule
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if(len)
 	{
+		if (audit_sockaddr(klen, kaddr))
+			return -ENOMEM;
 		if(copy_to_user(uaddr,kaddr,len))
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index fd99429278e..8ccccccc12a 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -563,11 +563,6 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
 static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -976,7 +971,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
-	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 688c0a267b6..faf2e02e441 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
 
-selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o exports.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index ac5d69bb337..a300702da52 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ out:
 int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 {
 	struct avc_callback_node *c;
-	int i, rc = 0;
+	int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
 	unsigned long flag;
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
@@ -813,15 +813,16 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 
 	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
 		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
-			rc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
-					 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
-			if (rc)
-				goto out;
+			tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+			                    0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+			/* save the first error encountered for the return
+			   value and continue processing the callbacks */
+			if (!rc)
+				rc = tmprc;
 		}
 	}
 
 	avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
-out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ae4c73eb308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/ipc.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+	if (selinux_enabled)
+		*ctxid = tsec->sid;
+	else
+		*ctxid = 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	if (selinux_enabled)
+		return security_sid_to_context(ctxid, ctx, ctxlen);
+	else {
+		*ctx = NULL;
+		*ctxlen = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
+{
+	if (selinux_enabled) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+		*sid = isec->sid;
+		return;
+	}
+	*sid = 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
+{
+	if (selinux_enabled) {
+		struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+		*sid = isec->sid;
+		return;
+	}
+	*sid = 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
+{
+	if (selinux_enabled) {
+		struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+		*sid = tsec->sid;
+		return;
+	}
+	*sid = 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b61b9554bc2..3cf368a1644 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4052,13 +4052,6 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
 }
 
-static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
-	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
-
-	return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
-}
-
 /* module stacking operations */
 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
@@ -4321,7 +4314,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
-	.ipc_getsecurity =		selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
 	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 84047f69f9c..7bc5b6440f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  *
  *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  */
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -385,6 +385,34 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `str'.  This function will allocate temporary memory with the
+ * given constraints of gfp_mask.
+ */
+int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	char *tmpstr, *freestr;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
+	   the value of tmpstr */
+	tmpstr = freestr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+	if (!tmpstr) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(':', &tmpstr, context,
+		                        NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+		kfree(freestr);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
  * Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
  */
 static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 03de697c805..fbb42f07dd7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  *
  *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  */
 
 #ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
 		       struct sidtab *s,
 		       u32 def_sid);
 
+int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
 int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 			struct policydb *newp,
 			struct context *context);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 61492485de8..7177e98df7f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -7,12 +7,13 @@
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  *
  *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *	Support for context based audit filters.
  *
  * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
  *
  * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -1811,3 +1812,235 @@ out:
 	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
 	return rc;
 }
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+	u32 au_seqno;
+	struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+{
+	if (rule) {
+		context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+		kfree(rule);
+	}
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+                            struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+{
+	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+	struct role_datum *roledatum;
+	struct type_datum *typedatum;
+	struct user_datum *userdatum;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+		if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
+		if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* only the above fields are valid */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tmprule)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
+
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
+		if (!userdatum)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
+		if (!roledatum)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
+		if (!typedatum)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+
+	if (rc) {
+		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+		tmprule = NULL;
+	}
+
+	*rule = tmprule;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
+                             struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+                             struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+	struct context *ctxt;
+	struct mls_level *level;
+	int match = 0;
+
+	if (!rule) {
+		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		          "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
+		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		          "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
+		match = -ESTALE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ctxid);
+	if (!ctxt) {
+		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+		          "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		          ctxid);
+		match = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+	   without a match */
+	switch (field) {
+	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+		switch (op) {
+		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+			match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+			match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+		switch (op) {
+		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+			match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		level = (op == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
+		         &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+		switch (op) {
+		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+			match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+			                     level);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+			match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+			                      level);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+			                       level) &&
+			         !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+			                       level));
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+			match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+			                      level);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+			match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+			                      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+			         !mls_level_eq(level,
+			                       &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+			match = mls_level_dom(level,
+			                      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return match;
+}
+
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+                               u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
+		err = aurule_callback();
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+	                       SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+	if (err)
+		panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+	return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
+{
+	aurule_callback = callback;
+}