diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2012-07-19 11:17:30 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2012-07-19 11:17:30 -0700 |
commit | abaa72d7fd9a20a67b62e6afa0e746e27851dc33 (patch) | |
tree | ebe4134fcc93a6e205e6004b3e652d7a62281651 /Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt | |
parent | 67da22d23fa6f3324e03bcd0580b914b2e4afbf3 (diff) | |
parent | 3e4b9459fb0e149c6b74c9e89399a8fc39a92b44 (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt b/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt index cb705ec69ab..f7be84fba91 100644 --- a/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt +++ b/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt @@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ bits will no longer change the uid or gid; file capabilities will not add to the permitted set, and LSMs will not relax constraints after execve. +To set no_new_privs, use prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0). + +Be careful, though: LSMs might also not tighten constraints on exec +in no_new_privs mode. (This means that setting up a general-purpose +service launcher to set no_new_privs before execing daemons may +interfere with LSM-based sandboxing.) + Note that no_new_privs does not prevent privilege changes that do not involve execve. An appropriately privileged task can still call setuid(2) and receive SCM_RIGHTS datagrams. |