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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-06-10 10:05:36 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-06-10 10:05:36 -0700 |
| commit | fad0701eaa091beb8ce5ef2eef04b5e833617368 (patch) | |
| tree | 788297c7b05b167599265013ef8ec473a0d367fe /Documentation | |
| parent | d53b47c08d8fda1892f47393de8eeab4e34b3188 (diff) | |
| parent | f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c (diff) | |
Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/Smack.txt | 10 |
2 files changed, 11 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index f1c5cc9d17a..4c3efe43480 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description: [fowner]] lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] - option: [[appraise_type=]] + option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt index 5ea996f21d6..b6ef7e9dba3 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt @@ -204,6 +204,16 @@ onlycap these capabilities are effective at for processes with any label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file. +ptrace + This is used to define the current ptrace policy + 0 - default: this is the policy that relies on smack access rules. + For the PTRACE_READ a subject needs to have a read access on + object. For the PTRACE_ATTACH a read-write access is required. + 1 - exact: this is the policy that limits PTRACE_ATTACH. Attach is + only allowed when subject's and object's labels are equal. + PTRACE_READ is not affected. Can be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. + 2 - draconian: this policy behaves like the 'exact' above with an + exception that it can't be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. revoke-subject Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access rules with that subject label. |