diff options
author | Hidetoshi Seto <[seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com]> | 2009-08-06 14:51:57 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> | 2009-09-14 16:18:54 -0700 |
commit | 1726b0883dd08636705ea55d577eb0ec314ba427 (patch) | |
tree | 9fea054fe26a2849865017fb5163aa944315e1b9 /arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S | |
parent | 68cb14c7c46d9204ba451a534f15a8bc12c88e28 (diff) |
[IA64] kdump: Mask INIT first in panic-kdump path
Summary:
Asserting INIT might block kdump if the system is already going to
start kdump via panic.
Description:
INIT can interrupt anywhere in panic path, so it can interrupt in
middle of kdump kicked by panic. Therefore there is a race if kdump
is kicked concurrently, via Panic and via INIT.
INIT could fail to invoke kdump if the system is already going to
start kdump via panic. It could not restart kdump from INIT handler
if some of cpus are already playing dead with INIT masked. It also
means that INIT could block kdump's progress if no monarch is entered
in the INIT rendezvous.
Panic+INIT is a rare, but possible situation since it can be assumed
that the kernel or an internal agent decides to panic the unstable
system while another external agent decides to send an INIT to the
system at same time.
How to reproduce:
Assert INIT just after panic, before all other cpus have frozen
Expected results:
continue kdump invoked by panic, or restart kdump from INIT
Actual results:
might be hang, crashdump not retrieved
Proposed Fix:
This patch masks INIT first in panic path to take the initiative on
kdump, and reuse atomic value kdump_in_progress to make sure there is
only one initiator of kdump. All INITs asserted later should be used
only for freezing all other cpus.
This mask will be removed soon by rfi in relocate_kernel.S, before jump
into kdump kernel, after all cpus are frozen and no-op INIT handler is
registered. So if INIT was in the interval while it is masked, it will
pend on the system and will received just after the rfi, and handled by
the no-op handler.
If there was a MCA event while psr.mc is 1, in theory the event will
pend on the system and will received just after the rfi same as above.
MCA handler is unregistered here at the time, so received MCA will not
reach to OS_MCA and will result in warmboot by SAL.
Note that codes in this masked interval are relatively simpler than
that in MCA/INIT handler which also executed with the mask. So it can
be said that probability of error in this interval is supposed not so
higher than that in MCA/INIT handler.
Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Haren Myneni <hbabu@us.ibm.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S b/arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S index 903babd22d6..32f6fc131fb 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/relocate_kernel.S @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ GLOBAL_ENTRY(relocate_new_kernel) srlz.i ;; mov ar.rnat=r18 - rfi + rfi // note: this unmask MCA/INIT (psr.mc) ;; 1: //physical mode code begin |