[PATCH] s390: in-kernel crypto rename

Replace all references to z990 by s390 in the in-kernel crypto files in
arch/s390/crypto.  The code is not specific to a particular machine (z990) but
to the s390 platform.  Big diff, does nothing..

Signed-off-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

1 files changed, 284 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a38bb2a3eef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the DES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, IBM Corporation
+ * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier (tspat@de.ibm.com)
+ *
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include "crypt_s390.h"
+#include "crypto_des.h"
+
+#define DES_BLOCK_SIZE 8
+#define DES_KEY_SIZE 8
+
+#define DES3_128_KEY_SIZE	(2 * DES_KEY_SIZE)
+#define DES3_128_BLOCK_SIZE	DES_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+#define DES3_192_KEY_SIZE	(3 * DES_KEY_SIZE)
+#define DES3_192_BLOCK_SIZE	DES_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+struct crypt_s390_des_ctx {
+	u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[DES_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx {
+	u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[DES3_128_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx {
+	u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 key[DES3_192_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+static int
+des_setkey(void *ctx, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des_ctx *dctx;
+	int ret;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	//test if key is valid (not a weak key)
+	ret = crypto_des_check_key(key, keylen, flags);
+	if (ret == 0){
+		memcpy(dctx->key, key, keylen);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void
+des_encrypt(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des_ctx *dctx;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	crypt_s390_km(KM_DEA_ENCRYPT, dctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void
+des_decrypt(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des_ctx *dctx;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	crypt_s390_km(KM_DEA_DECRYPT, dctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des",
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct crypt_s390_des_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(des_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{ .cipher = {
+	.cia_min_keysize	=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_max_keysize	=	DES_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_setkey		= 	des_setkey,
+	.cia_encrypt		=	des_encrypt,
+	.cia_decrypt		=	des_decrypt } }
+};
+
+/*
+ * RFC2451:
+ *
+ *   For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or
+ *   complementation keys.  Any weakness is obviated by the use of
+ *   multiple keys.
+ *
+ *   However, if the two  independent 64-bit keys are equal,
+ *   then the DES3 operation is simply the same as DES.
+ *   Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this property.
+ *
+ */
+static int
+des3_128_setkey(void *ctx, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx *dctx;
+	const u8* temp_key = key;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	if (!(memcmp(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE))) {
+
+		*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++,	temp_key += DES_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = crypto_des_check_key(temp_key, DES_KEY_SIZE, flags);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	memcpy(dctx->key, key, keylen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+des3_128_encrypt(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx *dctx;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	crypt_s390_km(KM_TDEA_128_ENCRYPT, dctx->key, dst, (void*)src,
+			DES3_128_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void
+des3_128_decrypt(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx *dctx;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	crypt_s390_km(KM_TDEA_128_DECRYPT, dctx->key, dst, (void*)src,
+			DES3_128_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des3_128_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des3_ede128",
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES3_128_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(des3_128_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{ .cipher = {
+	.cia_min_keysize	=	DES3_128_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_max_keysize	=	DES3_128_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_setkey		= 	des3_128_setkey,
+	.cia_encrypt		=	des3_128_encrypt,
+	.cia_decrypt		=	des3_128_decrypt } }
+};
+
+/*
+ * RFC2451:
+ *
+ *   For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or
+ *   complementation keys.  Any weakness is obviated by the use of
+ *   multiple keys.
+ *
+ *   However, if the first two or last two independent 64-bit keys are
+ *   equal (k1 == k2 or k2 == k3), then the DES3 operation is simply the
+ *   same as DES.  Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this
+ *   property.
+ *
+ */
+static int
+des3_192_setkey(void *ctx, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+	struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx *dctx;
+	const u8* temp_key;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	temp_key = key;
+	if (!(memcmp(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+	    memcmp(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
+	    					DES_KEY_SIZE))) {
+
+		*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++, temp_key += DES_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = crypto_des_check_key(temp_key, DES_KEY_SIZE, flags);
+		if (ret < 0){
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+	memcpy(dctx->key, key, keylen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+des3_192_encrypt(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx *dctx;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	crypt_s390_km(KM_TDEA_192_ENCRYPT, dctx->key, dst, (void*)src,
+			DES3_192_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void
+des3_192_decrypt(void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx *dctx;
+
+	dctx = ctx;
+	crypt_s390_km(KM_TDEA_192_DECRYPT, dctx->key, dst, (void*)src,
+			DES3_192_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des3_192_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"des3_ede",
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	DES3_192_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(des3_192_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{ .cipher = {
+	.cia_min_keysize	=	DES3_192_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_max_keysize	=	DES3_192_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_setkey		= 	des3_192_setkey,
+	.cia_encrypt		=	des3_192_encrypt,
+	.cia_decrypt		=	des3_192_decrypt } }
+};
+
+
+
+static int
+init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KM_DEA_ENCRYPT) ||
+	    !crypt_s390_func_available(KM_TDEA_128_ENCRYPT) ||
+	    !crypt_s390_func_available(KM_TDEA_192_ENCRYPT)){
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+	ret |= (crypto_register_alg(&des_alg) == 0)? 0:1;
+	ret |= (crypto_register_alg(&des3_128_alg) == 0)? 0:2;
+	ret |= (crypto_register_alg(&des3_192_alg) == 0)? 0:4;
+	if (ret){
+		crypto_unregister_alg(&des3_192_alg);
+		crypto_unregister_alg(&des3_128_alg);
+		crypto_unregister_alg(&des_alg);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "crypt_s390: des_s390 loaded.\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit
+fini(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&des3_192_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&des3_128_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&des_alg);
+}
+
+module_init(init);
+module_exit(fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS("des");
+MODULE_ALIAS("des3_ede");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DES & Triple DES EDE Cipher Algorithms");