diff options
author | Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> | 2009-04-23 19:32:25 -0400 |
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committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2009-04-28 13:54:28 -0400 |
commit | 335c54bdc4d3bacdbd619ec95cd0b352435bd37f (patch) | |
tree | 922de1595031ab24a31ba263c1f07bf876797b05 /crypto/Kconfig | |
parent | ea068bad27cefc71ab03230dbf01a8f8d98da5ba (diff) |
NFSD: Prevent a buffer overflow in svc_xprt_names()
The svc_xprt_names() function can overflow its buffer if it's so near
the end of the passed in buffer that the "name too long" string still
doesn't fit. Of course, it could never tell if it was near the end
of the passed in buffer, since its only caller passes in zero as the
buffer length.
Let's make this API a little safer.
Change svc_xprt_names() so it *always* checks for a buffer overflow,
and change its only caller to pass in the correct buffer length.
If svc_xprt_names() does overflow its buffer, it now fails with an
ENAMETOOLONG errno, instead of trying to write a message at the end
of the buffer. I don't like this much, but I can't figure out a clean
way that's always safe to return some of the names, *and* an
indication that the buffer was not long enough.
The displayed error when doing a 'cat /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist' is
"File name too long".
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/Kconfig')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions