diff options
| author | Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 2012-09-03 15:28:30 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 2012-09-03 15:34:51 +0200 |
| commit | ace1fe1231bdfffd60b5e703aa5b7283fbf98dbd (patch) | |
| tree | 06c7492a8f3cc65f916768616ca24c6bc7171761 /fs/namei.c | |
| parent | ce9f3f31efb88841e4df98794b13dbac8c4901da (diff) | |
| parent | a2dc375e12334b3d8f787a48b2fb6172ccfb80ae (diff) | |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
This merges (3f509c6 netfilter: nf_nat_sip: fix incorrect handling
of EBUSY for RTCP expectation) to Patrick McHardy's IPv6 NAT changes.
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namei.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index db76b866a09..a856e7f7b6e 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) /** * sb_permission - Check superblock-level permissions * @sb: Superblock of inode to check permission on + * @inode: Inode to check permission on * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC) * * Separate out file-system wide checks from inode-specific permission checks. @@ -656,6 +657,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1; /** * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations * @link: The path of the symlink + * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data * * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled, * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is @@ -678,7 +680,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd) /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */ inode = link->dentry->d_inode; - if (current_cred()->fsuid == inode->i_uid) + if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid)) return 0; /* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */ @@ -687,7 +689,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd) return 0; /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */ - if (parent->i_uid == inode->i_uid) + if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid)) return 0; path_put_conditional(link, nd); @@ -757,7 +759,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link) /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, * otherwise, it must be a safe source. */ - if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) || + if (uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) || safe_hardlink_source(inode) || capable(CAP_FOWNER)) return 0; |