diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-04-07 09:51:36 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-04-07 09:51:36 -0700 |
commit | d6a624eef128c97b35fcea47cd00ef22f005e7aa (patch) | |
tree | e547bfbbddc2ffa872949cc3bfe95a03d38a3783 /kernel | |
parent | f21fec96ead90eae7bcb3c847e8115c119c5dc62 (diff) | |
parent | 620f6e8e855d6d447688a5f67a4e176944a084e8 (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer fixlet from James Morris.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
sysctl: fix write access to dmesg_restrict/kptr_restrict
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 52b3a06a02f..4ab11879aeb 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK -static int proc_dmesg_restrict(struct ctl_table *table, int write, +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); #endif @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .data = &dmesg_restrict, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &one, }, @@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .data = &kptr_restrict, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dmesg_restrict, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &two, }, @@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, } #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK -static int proc_dmesg_restrict(struct ctl_table *table, int write, +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |