security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()

Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

2 files changed, 15 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 0101e847603..33e51e78c2d 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -486,17 +486,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+/**
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+int capable(int cap)
 {
-	if (security_capable(t, cap) == 0) {
-		t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+	if (has_capability(current, cap)) {
+		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
 		return 1;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-
-int capable(int cap)
-{
-	return __capable(current, cap);
-}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 082b3fcb32a..356699a96d5 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_ptrace(current, task, mode);
+	return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
 }
 
 bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
@@ -499,8 +499,7 @@ repeat:
 			goto repeat;
 		}
 
-		ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current,
-				      PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+		ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
 
 		/*
 		 * Set the ptrace bit in the process ptrace flags.