diff options
author | Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> | 2014-07-16 14:33:29 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2014-07-28 10:01:38 +0200 |
commit | f4be073db878d0e79f74bc36f1642847781791a0 (patch) | |
tree | 27af2c38ab25f889f0e850ce856aaf41a15add57 /kernel | |
parent | 5030c69755416d19516c0a61cd988a0e0062e041 (diff) |
perf: Check permission only for parent tracepoint event
There's no need to check cloned event's permission once the
parent was already checked.
Also the code is checking 'current' process permissions, which
is not owner process for cloned events, thus could end up with
wrong permission check result.
Reported-by: Alexander Yarygin <yarygin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Yarygin <yarygin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1405079782-8139-1-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c index 5d12bb407b4..4b9c114ee9d 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c @@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event, return ret; } + /* + * We checked and allowed to create parent, + * allow children without checking. + */ + if (p_event->parent) + return 0; + + /* + * It's ok to check current process (owner) permissions in here, + * because code below is called only via perf_event_open syscall. + */ + /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */ if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) { if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |