diff options
| author | Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> | 2011-01-19 12:06:50 +0530 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi> | 2011-01-19 14:40:43 -0200 |
| commit | 8556edd32f01c50a3c99e44dc2c3b1252ea59605 (patch) | |
| tree | b0e9d426b7a17ad201c782d4e0c09fbddfe81730 /net/bluetooth | |
| parent | 65cf686ee102b7eb0477a4bab82ff227071a0258 (diff) | |
Bluetooth: Create a unified auth_type evaluation function
The logic for determining the needed auth_type for an L2CAP socket is
rather complicated and has so far been duplicated in
l2cap_check_security as well as l2cap_do_connect. Additionally the
l2cap_check_security code was completely missing the handling of
SOCK_RAW type sockets. This patch creates a unified function for the
evaluation and makes l2cap_do_connect and l2cap_check_security use that
function.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/l2cap.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c index 4fd88eb0a46..ae227bf2556 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c @@ -305,33 +305,44 @@ static void l2cap_chan_del(struct sock *sk, int err) } } -/* Service level security */ -static inline int l2cap_check_security(struct sock *sk) +static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct sock *sk) { - struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn; - __u8 auth_type; + if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) { + switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) { + case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: + return HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING_MITM; + case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: + return HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING; + default: + return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; + } + } else if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) { + if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) + l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP; - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) { if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM; + return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM; else - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; - - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) - l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP; + return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; } else { switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) { case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: - auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM; - break; + return HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM; case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: - auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING; - break; + return HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING; default: - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; - break; + return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; } } +} + +/* Service level security */ +static inline int l2cap_check_security(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn; + __u8 auth_type; + + auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(sk); return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level, auth_type); @@ -1068,39 +1079,7 @@ static int l2cap_do_connect(struct sock *sk) err = -ENOMEM; - if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) { - switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) { - case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: - auth_type = HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING_MITM; - break; - case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: - auth_type = HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING; - break; - default: - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; - break; - } - } else if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) { - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM; - else - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; - - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) - l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP; - } else { - switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) { - case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: - auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM; - break; - case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: - auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING; - break; - default: - auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING; - break; - } - } + auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(sk); hcon = hci_connect(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level, auth_type); |