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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-07-20 21:21:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-07-20 21:21:46 -0700
commit14b395e35d1afdd8019d11b92e28041fad591b71 (patch)
treecff7ba9bed7a38300b19a5bacc632979d64fd9c8 /net/sunrpc/auth_gss
parent734b397cd14f3340394a8dd3266bec97d01f034b (diff)
parent5108b27651727b5aba0826e8fd7be71b42428701 (diff)
Merge branch 'for-2.6.27' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
* 'for-2.6.27' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (51 commits) nfsd: nfs4xdr.c do-while is not a compound statement nfsd: Use C99 initializers in fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c lockd: Pass "struct sockaddr *" to new failover-by-IP function lockd: get host reference in nlmsvc_create_block() instead of callers lockd: minor svclock.c style fixes lockd: eliminate duplicate nlmsvc_lookup_host call from nlmsvc_lock lockd: eliminate duplicate nlmsvc_lookup_host call from nlmsvc_testlock lockd: nlm_release_host() checks for NULL, caller needn't file lock: reorder struct file_lock to save space on 64 bit builds nfsd: take file and mnt write in nfs4_upgrade_open nfsd: document open share bit tracking nfsd: tabulate nfs4 xdr encoding functions nfsd: dprint operation names svcrdma: Change WR context get/put to use the kmem cache svcrdma: Create a kmem cache for the WR contexts svcrdma: Add flush_scheduled_work to module exit function svcrdma: Limit ORD based on client's advertised IRD svcrdma: Remove unused wait q from svcrdma_xprt structure svcrdma: Remove unneeded spin locks from __svc_rdma_free svcrdma: Add dma map count and WARN_ON ...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss')
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c10
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c26
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c16
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c72
5 files changed, 66 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
index f3431a7e33d..4de8bcf26fa 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS) += auth_rpcgss.o
auth_rpcgss-objs := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \
- gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o gss_krb5_crypto.o
+ gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o
rpcsec_gss_krb5-objs := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \
- gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o
+ gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3) += rpcsec_gss_spkm3.o
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index 1d52308ca32..c93fca20455 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -83,8 +83,6 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(krb5_encrypt);
-
u32
krb5_decrypt(
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
@@ -118,8 +116,6 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(krb5_decrypt);
-
static int
checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
{
@@ -161,8 +157,6 @@ out:
return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_checksum);
-
struct encryptor_desc {
u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
@@ -262,8 +256,6 @@ gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_encrypt_xdr_buf);
-
struct decryptor_desc {
u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
@@ -334,5 +326,3 @@ gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
return xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc);
}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_decrypt_xdr_buf);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
index 5f1d36dfbcf..b8f42ef7178 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
- unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start;
+ unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start;
s32 now;
u32 seq_send;
@@ -87,36 +87,36 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
now = get_seconds();
- token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, 24);
+ token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8);
ptr = token->data;
- g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, 24, &ptr);
+ g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8, &ptr);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG&0xff);
+ /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
+ ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff);
- /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
- krb5_hdr = ptr - 2;
- msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24;
+ msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8;
- *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5);
- memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
+ *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5);
+ memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4);
- if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum))
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8);
+ memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8);
spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
seq_send = ctx->seq_send++;
spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
- seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8))
+ seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+ ptr + 8))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
index d91a5d00480..066ec73c84d 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -92,30 +92,30 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
read_token->len))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
- (*ptr++ != ( KG_TOK_MIC_MSG &0xff)) )
+ if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff)))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
- signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
+ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
+ sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
+ if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum))
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, 16))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8))
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8))
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
/* do sequencing checks */
- if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, &seqnum))
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
index b00b1b42630..ae8e69b59c4 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ out:
return 0;
}
-static inline void
-make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize)
+static void
+make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen)
{
static u64 i = 0;
u64 *q = (u64 *)p;
@@ -102,8 +102,22 @@ make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize)
* uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I
* don't care enough. */
- BUG_ON(blocksize != 8);
- *q = i++;
+ /* initialize to random value */
+ if (i == 0) {
+ i = random32();
+ i = (i << 32) | random32();
+ }
+
+ switch (conflen) {
+ case 16:
+ *q++ = i++;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 8:
+ *q++ = i++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
}
/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
@@ -122,7 +136,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
char cksumdata[16];
struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
- unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start;
+ unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start;
s32 now;
int headlen;
struct page **tmp_pages;
@@ -149,26 +163,26 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
buf->len += headlen;
BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
- g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 24 + plainlen, &ptr);
+ g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used,
+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + plainlen, &ptr);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff);
- *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG&0xff);
+ /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
+ ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff);
- /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
- krb5_hdr = ptr - 2;
- msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24;
+ msg_start = ptr + 24;
- *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5);
- memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4);
- *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(SEAL_ALG_DES);
+ *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5);
+ memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4);
+ *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = htons(SEAL_ALG_DES);
make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize);
/* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
tmp_pages = buf->pages;
buf->pages = pages;
- if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, buf,
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf,
offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
buf->pages = tmp_pages;
@@ -176,7 +190,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8);
+ memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8);
spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
seq_send = kctx->seq_send++;
@@ -185,7 +199,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset,
/* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
* and encrypt at the same time: */
if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
- seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)))
+ seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize,
@@ -219,38 +233,38 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
buf->len - offset))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) ||
- (*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) )
+ if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff)))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
/* get the sign and seal algorithms */
- signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8);
+ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
+ sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff))
+ if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
- ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
+ ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base))
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, buf,
- ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum))
+ if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf,
+ ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8))
+ if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8))
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
@@ -262,8 +276,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
/* do sequencing checks */
- if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
- &seqnum))
+ if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8,
+ &direction, &seqnum))
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
@@ -274,7 +288,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
* better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
- data_start = ptr + 22 + blocksize;
+ data_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + blocksize;
orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);