diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-07-20 21:21:46 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-07-20 21:21:46 -0700 |
commit | 14b395e35d1afdd8019d11b92e28041fad591b71 (patch) | |
tree | cff7ba9bed7a38300b19a5bacc632979d64fd9c8 /net/sunrpc/auth_gss | |
parent | 734b397cd14f3340394a8dd3266bec97d01f034b (diff) | |
parent | 5108b27651727b5aba0826e8fd7be71b42428701 (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-2.6.27' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
* 'for-2.6.27' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (51 commits)
nfsd: nfs4xdr.c do-while is not a compound statement
nfsd: Use C99 initializers in fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
lockd: Pass "struct sockaddr *" to new failover-by-IP function
lockd: get host reference in nlmsvc_create_block() instead of callers
lockd: minor svclock.c style fixes
lockd: eliminate duplicate nlmsvc_lookup_host call from nlmsvc_lock
lockd: eliminate duplicate nlmsvc_lookup_host call from nlmsvc_testlock
lockd: nlm_release_host() checks for NULL, caller needn't
file lock: reorder struct file_lock to save space on 64 bit builds
nfsd: take file and mnt write in nfs4_upgrade_open
nfsd: document open share bit tracking
nfsd: tabulate nfs4 xdr encoding functions
nfsd: dprint operation names
svcrdma: Change WR context get/put to use the kmem cache
svcrdma: Create a kmem cache for the WR contexts
svcrdma: Add flush_scheduled_work to module exit function
svcrdma: Limit ORD based on client's advertised IRD
svcrdma: Remove unused wait q from svcrdma_xprt structure
svcrdma: Remove unneeded spin locks from __svc_rdma_free
svcrdma: Add dma map count and WARN_ON
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 72 |
5 files changed, 66 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile index f3431a7e33d..4de8bcf26fa 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS) += auth_rpcgss.o auth_rpcgss-objs := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \ - gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o gss_krb5_crypto.o + gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o rpcsec_gss_krb5-objs := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \ - gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o + gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3) += rpcsec_gss_spkm3.o diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index 1d52308ca32..c93fca20455 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -83,8 +83,6 @@ out: return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(krb5_encrypt); - u32 krb5_decrypt( struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, @@ -118,8 +116,6 @@ out: return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(krb5_decrypt); - static int checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data) { @@ -161,8 +157,6 @@ out: return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_checksum); - struct encryptor_desc { u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */ struct blkcipher_desc desc; @@ -262,8 +256,6 @@ gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_encrypt_xdr_buf); - struct decryptor_desc { u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */ struct blkcipher_desc desc; @@ -334,5 +326,3 @@ gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, return xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc); } - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_decrypt_xdr_buf); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c index 5f1d36dfbcf..b8f42ef7178 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id; char cksumdata[16]; struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; - unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start; + unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; s32 now; u32 seq_send; @@ -87,36 +87,36 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, now = get_seconds(); - token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, 24); + token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8); ptr = token->data; - g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, 24, &ptr); + g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8, &ptr); - *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff); - *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG&0xff); + /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ + ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); + ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff); - /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ - krb5_hdr = ptr - 2; - msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24; + msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8; - *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); - memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4); + *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); + memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4); - if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum)) + if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8); + memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8); spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); seq_send = ctx->seq_send++; spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, - seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8)) + seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + ptr + 8)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c index d91a5d00480..066ec73c84d 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c @@ -92,30 +92,30 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, read_token->len)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG>>8)&0xff)) || - (*ptr++ != ( KG_TOK_MIC_MSG &0xff)) ) + if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || + (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff))) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ - signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8); + signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); + sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff)) + if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum)) + if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, 16)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, /* do sequencing checks */ - if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, &seqnum)) + if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index b00b1b42630..ae8e69b59c4 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ out: return 0; } -static inline void -make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize) +static void +make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) { static u64 i = 0; u64 *q = (u64 *)p; @@ -102,8 +102,22 @@ make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize) * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I * don't care enough. */ - BUG_ON(blocksize != 8); - *q = i++; + /* initialize to random value */ + if (i == 0) { + i = random32(); + i = (i << 32) | random32(); + } + + switch (conflen) { + case 16: + *q++ = i++; + /* fall through */ + case 8: + *q++ = i++; + break; + default: + BUG(); + } } /* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with. @@ -122,7 +136,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, char cksumdata[16]; struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; int blocksize = 0, plainlen; - unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start; + unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; s32 now; int headlen; struct page **tmp_pages; @@ -149,26 +163,26 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, buf->len += headlen; BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); - g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 24 + plainlen, &ptr); + g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + plainlen, &ptr); - *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff); - *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG&0xff); + /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ + ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); + ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff); - /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ - krb5_hdr = ptr - 2; - msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24; + msg_start = ptr + 24; - *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); - memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4); - *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(SEAL_ALG_DES); + *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); + memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4); + *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = htons(SEAL_ALG_DES); make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize); /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */ tmp_pages = buf->pages; buf->pages = pages; - if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, buf, + if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; buf->pages = tmp_pages; @@ -176,7 +190,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8); + memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8); spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); seq_send = kctx->seq_send++; @@ -185,7 +199,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum * and encrypt at the same time: */ if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, - seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8))) + seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize, @@ -219,38 +233,38 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) buf->len - offset)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) || - (*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) ) + if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || + (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff))) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ /* get the sign and seal algorithms */ - signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8); + signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); + sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff)) + if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, - ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base)) + ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, buf, - ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum)) + if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf, + ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ @@ -262,8 +276,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) /* do sequencing checks */ - if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, - &seqnum)) + if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, + &direction, &seqnum)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || @@ -274,7 +288,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); - data_start = ptr + 22 + blocksize; + data_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + blocksize; orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); |