diff options
author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2007-08-09 20:16:22 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2007-10-09 18:31:57 -0400 |
commit | 21fcd02be34f73bbc94db267b4db6ccd7332923d (patch) | |
tree | 9adfcbd850a83fe22e809d401e18fdd98586db94 /net/sunrpc/auth_gss | |
parent | c175b83c4c4be72535c5c12abc155e29a08323a0 (diff) |
svcgss: move init code into separate function
We've let svcauth_gss_accept() get much too long and hairy. The
RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT and RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT cases share very little
with the other cases, so it's very natural to split them off into a
separate function.
This will also nicely isolate the piece of code we need to parametrize
to authenticating gss-protected NFSv4 callbacks on behalf of the NFS
client.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 144 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 67 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 7da7050f06c..73940df6c46 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -631,7 +631,8 @@ svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o) return 0; } -/* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success. +/* + * Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success. * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number) * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp. */ @@ -961,6 +962,78 @@ gss_write_init_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsi *rsip) } /* + * Having read the cred already and found we're in the context + * initiation case, read the verifier and initiate (or check the results + * of) upcalls to userspace for help with context initiation. If + * the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result. + * Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall. + */ +static int svcauth_gss_handle_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp) +{ + struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; + struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; + struct xdr_netobj tmpobj; + struct rsi *rsip, rsikey; + + /* Read the verifier; should be NULL: */ + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4) + return SVC_DENIED; + if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL) + return SVC_DENIED; + if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0) + return SVC_DENIED; + + /* Martial context handle and token for upcall: */ + *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; + if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) + return SVC_DENIED; + memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey)); + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) + return SVC_DROP; + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_DENIED; + } + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_DROP; + } + + /* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */ + rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey); + rsi_free(&rsikey); + if (!rsip) + return SVC_DROP; + switch (cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) { + case -EAGAIN: + case -ETIMEDOUT: + case -ENOENT: + /* No upcall result: */ + return SVC_DROP; + case 0: + /* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */ + if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip)) + return SVC_DROP; + if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + return SVC_DROP; + svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS); + if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle)) + return SVC_DROP; + if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + return SVC_DROP; + svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status); + svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status); + svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN); + if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token)) + return SVC_DROP; + } + return SVC_COMPLETE; +} + +/* * Accept an rpcsec packet. * If context establishment, punt to user space * If data exchange, verify/decrypt @@ -974,11 +1047,9 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; u32 crlen; - struct xdr_netobj tmpobj; struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data; struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc; struct rsc *rsci = NULL; - struct rsi *rsip, rsikey; __be32 *rpcstart; __be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len; int ret; @@ -1023,30 +1094,14 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)) goto auth_err; - /* - * We've successfully parsed the credential. Let's check out the - * verifier. An AUTH_NULL verifier is allowed (and required) for - * INIT and CONTINUE_INIT requests. AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS is required for - * PROC_DATA and PROC_DESTROY. - * - * AUTH_NULL verifier is 0 (AUTH_NULL), 0 (length). - * AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS verifier is: - * 6 (AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS), length, checksum. - * checksum is calculated over rpcheader from xid up to here. - */ *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; switch (gc->gc_proc) { case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: - if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4) - goto auth_err; - if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL) - goto auth_err; - if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0) - goto auth_err; - break; + return svcauth_gss_handle_init(rqstp, gc, authp); case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: + /* Look up the context, and check the verifier: */ *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&gc->gc_ctx); if (!rsci) @@ -1067,51 +1122,6 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) /* now act upon the command: */ switch (gc->gc_proc) { - case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: - case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: - *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; - if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) - goto auth_err; - memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey)); - if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) - goto drop; - *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; - if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) { - kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); - goto auth_err; - } - if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) { - kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); - goto drop; - } - - rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey); - rsi_free(&rsikey); - if (!rsip) { - goto drop; - } - switch(cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) { - case -EAGAIN: - case -ETIMEDOUT: - case -ENOENT: - goto drop; - case 0: - if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip)) - goto drop; - if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) - goto drop; - svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS); - if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle)) - goto drop; - if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE) - goto drop; - svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status); - svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status); - svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN); - if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token)) - goto drop; - } - goto complete; case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) goto auth_err; @@ -1158,7 +1168,7 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) goto out; } auth_err: - /* Restore write pointer to original value: */ + /* Restore write pointer to its original value: */ xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat); ret = SVC_DENIED; goto out; |