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authorJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>2007-06-04 19:05:57 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>2007-06-07 13:42:46 -0700
commit4aa2e62c45b5ca08be2d0d3c0744d7585b56e860 (patch)
tree16649593d55f3df4dac54227fcda28bb4fb49f17 /net/xfrm
parentb00b4bf94edb42852d55619af453588b2de2dc5e (diff)
xfrm: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPD
Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete()) However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks patch. This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and SPD. It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial. If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error without removing anything. This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the entire database. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm')
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c63
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c46
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c9
3 files changed, 110 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 64a375178c5..157bfbd250b 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -834,11 +834,67 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_byid);
-void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+static inline int
+xfrm_policy_flush_secctx_check(u8 type, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
{
- int dir;
+ int dir, err = 0;
+
+ for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) {
+ struct xfrm_policy *pol;
+ struct hlist_node *entry;
+ int i;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pol, entry,
+ &xfrm_policy_inexact[dir], bydst) {
+ if (pol->type != type)
+ continue;
+ err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(pol);
+ if (err) {
+ xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid,
+ audit_info->secid,
+ AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, 0,
+ pol, NULL);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = xfrm_policy_bydst[dir].hmask; i >= 0; i--) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pol, entry,
+ xfrm_policy_bydst[dir].table + i,
+ bydst) {
+ if (pol->type != type)
+ continue;
+ err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(pol);
+ if (err) {
+ xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid,
+ audit_info->secid,
+ AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD,
+ 0, pol, NULL);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+#else
+static inline int
+xfrm_policy_flush_secctx_check(u8 type, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ int dir, err = 0;
write_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
+
+ err = xfrm_policy_flush_secctx_check(type, audit_info);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) {
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
struct hlist_node *entry;
@@ -891,7 +947,9 @@ void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
xfrm_policy_count[dir] -= killed;
}
atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
+out:
write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
+ return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_flush);
@@ -2583,4 +2641,3 @@ restore_state:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_migrate);
#endif
-
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 372f06eb8bb..85f3f43a6cc 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -391,12 +391,48 @@ int xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_delete);
-void xfrm_state_flush(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+static inline int
+xfrm_state_flush_secctx_check(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
{
- int i;
- int err = 0;
+ int i, err = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= xfrm_state_hmask; i++) {
+ struct hlist_node *entry;
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(x, entry, xfrm_state_bydst+i, bydst) {
+ if (xfrm_id_proto_match(x->id.proto, proto) &&
+ (err = security_xfrm_state_delete(x)) != 0) {
+ xfrm_audit_log(audit_info->loginuid,
+ audit_info->secid,
+ AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA,
+ 0, NULL, x);
+
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+#else
+static inline int
+xfrm_state_flush_secctx_check(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int xfrm_state_flush(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ int i, err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock);
+ err = xfrm_state_flush_secctx_check(proto, audit_info);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
for (i = 0; i <= xfrm_state_hmask; i++) {
struct hlist_node *entry;
struct xfrm_state *x;
@@ -419,8 +455,12 @@ restart:
}
}
}
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm_state_lock);
wake_up(&km_waitq);
+ return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_flush);
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index b14c7e590c3..c06883bf620 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1418,10 +1418,13 @@ static int xfrm_flush_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct km_event c;
struct xfrm_usersa_flush *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_audit audit_info;
+ int err;
audit_info.loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid;
audit_info.secid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid;
- xfrm_state_flush(p->proto, &audit_info);
+ err = xfrm_state_flush(p->proto, &audit_info);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
c.data.proto = p->proto;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
@@ -1582,7 +1585,9 @@ static int xfrm_flush_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
audit_info.loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid;
audit_info.secid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid;
- xfrm_policy_flush(type, &audit_info);
+ err = xfrm_policy_flush(type, &audit_info);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
c.data.type = type;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;