diff options
author | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> | 2013-09-20 22:32:55 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-09-24 10:39:58 -0400 |
commit | 8c27bd75f04fb9cb70c69c3cfe24f4e6d8e15906 (patch) | |
tree | 28156d5d01cd4393da57eb328db87d784bdd4260 /net | |
parent | 61f860c356c3d15b6cf48ef35beea664921dec1e (diff) |
tcp: syncookies: reduce cookie lifetime to 128 seconds
We currently accept cookies that were created less than 4 minutes ago
(ie, cookies with counter delta 0-3). Combined with the 8 mss table
values, this yields 32 possible values (out of 2**32) that will be valid.
Reducing the lifetime to < 2 minutes halves the guessing chance while
still providing a large enough period.
While at it, get rid of jiffies value -- they overflow too quickly on
32 bit platforms.
getnstimeofday is used to create a counter that increments every 64s.
perf shows getnstimeofday cost is negible compared to sha_transform;
normal tcp initial sequence number generation uses getnstimeofday, too.
Reported-by: Jakob Lell <jakob@jakoblell.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 24 |
2 files changed, 17 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c index 14a15c49129..b6ea2979a2b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ __u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req) static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, - __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, - __u32 data) + __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data) { /* * Compute the secure sequence number. @@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the * MSS into the second hash value. */ - + u32 count = tcp_cookie_time(); return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) @@ -114,22 +113,21 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of * range. This must be checked by the caller. * - * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within - * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value - * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails. + * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than + * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past. + * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails. */ static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, - __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff) + __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq) { - __u32 diff; + u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time(); /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */ cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */ diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS); - if (diff >= maxdiff) + if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE) return (__u32)-1; return (cookie - @@ -173,7 +171,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), - jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind); + mssind); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence); @@ -189,13 +187,6 @@ __u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp) } /* - * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted. - * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and - * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential - * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here. - */ -#define COUNTER_TRIES 4 -/* * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie. * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not. */ @@ -204,9 +195,7 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, { __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, - th->source, th->dest, seq, - jiffies / (HZ * 60), - COUNTER_TRIES); + th->source, th->dest, seq); return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c index bf63ac8a49b..13ca0a0ea68 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c +++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c @@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ static __u16 const msstab[] = { 9000 - 60, }; -/* - * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted. - * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and - * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential - * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here. - */ -#define COUNTER_TRIES 4 - static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req, struct dst_entry *dst) @@ -86,8 +78,9 @@ static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *dadd static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, - __u32 count, __u32 data) + __u32 data) { + u32 count = tcp_cookie_time(); return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) @@ -96,15 +89,14 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr, static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport, - __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, - __u32 maxdiff) + __be16 dport, __u32 sseq) { - __u32 diff; + __u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time(); cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS); - if (diff >= maxdiff) + if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE) return (__u32)-1; return (cookie - @@ -125,8 +117,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, *mssp = msstab[mssind]; return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source, - th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), - jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind); + th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), mssind); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_init_sequence); @@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ int __cookie_v6_check(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, { __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, - th->source, th->dest, seq, - jiffies / (HZ * 60), COUNTER_TRIES); + th->source, th->dest, seq); return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; } |