diff options
| author | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2012-06-05 15:28:30 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2012-07-13 15:49:23 -0700 |
| commit | 1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e (patch) | |
| tree | fc4b9a2ca7c643a30cbe2260886fdbd969bf2b50 /security/smack/smackfs.c | |
| parent | eb982cb4cf6405b97ea1f9e1d10864981f269d46 (diff) | |
Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN
Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.
This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack/smackfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 3686db7e2c6..21529658662 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -595,13 +595,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - /* * Must have privilege. * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL, @@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -1090,7 +1089,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>" * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>" */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -1267,7 +1266,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[80]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1334,7 +1333,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[80]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1412,7 +1411,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[80]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1503,7 +1502,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char *data; int rc = count; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1586,7 +1585,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); int rc = count; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* @@ -1664,7 +1663,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[32]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1885,7 +1884,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* * Must have privilege. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL, |