Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

author: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> 2009-09-11 08:04:49 +1000
committer: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> 2009-09-11 08:04:49 +1000
commit: a3c8b97396ef42edfb845788ba6f53b2a93ce980 (patch)
tree: 530c5bdbc534618311dab3e0af245835af56db0f /security
parent: 74fca6a42863ffacaf7ba6f1936a9f228950f657 (diff)
parent: 9f0ab4a3f0fdb1ff404d150618ace2fa069bb2e1 (diff)
36 files changed, 1290 insertions, 460 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index b56e7f9ecbc..95ecc06392d 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= lsm_audit.o
-endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 88f752e8152..fce07a7bc82 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -386,6 +391,10 @@ static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
 
+static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -396,6 +405,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -701,10 +715,26 @@ static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
 
+
+
 static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 				  struct flowi *fl)
 {
 }
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cap_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -792,6 +822,20 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 			 unsigned long flags)
@@ -815,6 +859,13 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+				     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				     struct key *key)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -854,7 +905,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 
 void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
@@ -940,11 +991,14 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
@@ -992,6 +1046,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
@@ -1020,6 +1077,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
@@ -1038,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e3097c0a131..fe30751a6cd 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
  *			   another
  * @child: The process to be accessed
  * @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
  * granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 747a464943a..74d5447d7df 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-y := \
+	gc.o \
 	key.o \
 	keyring.o \
 	keyctl.o \
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c766c68a63b..792c0a611a6 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
 		return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
 
+	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1e616aef55f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/* Key garbage collector
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Delay between key revocation/expiry in seconds
+ */
+unsigned key_gc_delay = 5 * 60;
+
+/*
+ * Reaper
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long);
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *);
+static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0);
+static DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
+static key_serial_t key_gc_cursor; /* the last key the gc considered */
+static unsigned long key_gc_executing;
+static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+
+/*
+ * Schedule a garbage collection run
+ * - precision isn't particularly important
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
+{
+	unsigned long expires;
+	time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+
+	kenter("%ld", gc_at - now);
+
+	gc_at += key_gc_delay;
+
+	if (now >= gc_at) {
+		schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+	} else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
+		expires = jiffies + (gc_at - now) * HZ;
+		mod_timer(&key_gc_timer, expires);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * The garbage collector timer kicked off
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
+{
+	kenter("");
+	key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+	schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring
+ * - return true if we altered the keyring
+ */
+static bool key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+	__releases(key_serial_lock)
+{
+	struct keyring_list *klist;
+	struct key *key;
+	int loop;
+
+	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+		goto dont_gc;
+
+	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
+	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+	if (!klist)
+		goto dont_gc;
+
+	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+		key = klist->keys[loop];
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+		    (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit))
+			goto do_gc;
+	}
+
+dont_gc:
+	kleave(" = false");
+	return false;
+
+do_gc:
+	key_gc_cursor = keyring->serial;
+	key_get(keyring);
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
+	key_put(keyring);
+	kleave(" = true");
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collector for keys
+ * - this involves scanning the keyrings for dead, expired and revoked keys
+ *   that have overstayed their welcome
+ */
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct rb_node *rb;
+	key_serial_t cursor;
+	struct key *key, *xkey;
+	time_t new_timer = LONG_MAX, limit;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &key_gc_executing)) {
+		key_schedule_gc(current_kernel_time().tv_sec);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+	if (limit > key_gc_delay)
+		limit -= key_gc_delay;
+	else
+		limit = key_gc_delay;
+
+	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+	if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&key_serial_tree))
+		goto reached_the_end;
+
+	cursor = key_gc_cursor;
+	if (cursor < 0)
+		cursor = 0;
+
+	/* find the first key above the cursor */
+	key = NULL;
+	rb = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+	while (rb) {
+		xkey = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (cursor < xkey->serial) {
+			key = xkey;
+			rb = rb->rb_left;
+		} else if (cursor > xkey->serial) {
+			rb = rb->rb_right;
+		} else {
+			rb = rb_next(rb);
+			if (!rb)
+				goto reached_the_end;
+			key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!key)
+		goto reached_the_end;
+
+	/* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
+	for (;;) {
+		if (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry < new_timer)
+			new_timer = key->expiry;
+
+		if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
+		    key_gc_keyring(key, limit)) {
+			/* the gc ate our lock */
+			schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+			goto no_unlock;
+		}
+
+		rb = rb_next(&key->serial_node);
+		if (!rb) {
+			key_gc_cursor = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+	}
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+no_unlock:
+	clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+	if (new_timer < LONG_MAX)
+		key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+
+	kleave("");
+	return;
+
+reached_the_end:
+	key_gc_cursor = 0;
+	goto out;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 9fb679c66b8..24ba0307b7a 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -124,11 +124,18 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 					struct key *dest_keyring,
 					unsigned long flags);
 
-extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 				 key_perm_t perm);
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE	0x01
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL	0x02
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK	0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
 
+extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
+extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t expiry_at);
+
 /*
  * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way
  */
@@ -194,6 +201,7 @@ extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
 extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
 				size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
 
 /*
  * debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 4a1297d1ada..08531ad0f25 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
+		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
 
 		if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
 			awaken = 1;
@@ -642,10 +643,8 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
 	goto error;
 
  found:
-	/* pretend it doesn't exist if it's dead */
-	if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0 ||
-	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
-	    key->type == &key_type_dead)
+	/* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
+	if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
 		goto not_found;
 
 	/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
@@ -890,6 +889,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
  */
 void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 {
+	struct timespec now;
+	time_t time;
+
 	key_check(key);
 
 	/* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
@@ -902,6 +904,14 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 	    key->type->revoke)
 		key->type->revoke(key);
 
+	/* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
+	now = current_kernel_time();
+	time = now.tv_sec;
+	if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
+		key->revoked_at = time;
+		key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at);
+	}
+
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 
 } /* end key_revoke() */
@@ -958,8 +968,10 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
 	for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
 		key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
 
-		if (key->type == ktype)
+		if (key->type == ktype) {
 			key->type = &key_type_dead;
+			set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
+		}
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
@@ -984,6 +996,8 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
 	up_write(&key_types_sem);
 
+	key_schedule_gc(0);
+
 } /* end unregister_key_type() */
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 7f09fb897d2..74c96852459 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error3;
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
-		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+					   KEY_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -233,9 +234,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	unsigned long lflags;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -309,7 +312,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -337,10 +340,16 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
-		goto error;
+		if (ret != -EACCES)
+			goto error;
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+		if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+			goto error;
+		}
 	}
 
 	key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
@@ -363,7 +372,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -389,13 +398,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -423,13 +432,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, 0);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -465,7 +474,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *tmpbuf;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
 		 * authorisation token handy */
@@ -474,7 +483,8 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 			if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
 				key_put(instkey);
 				key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
-							  0, 1, 0);
+							  KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+							  0);
 				if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 					goto okay;
 			}
@@ -558,7 +568,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	}
 
 	/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -567,7 +577,8 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	/* get the destination keyring if specified */
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
-		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+					   KEY_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -637,7 +648,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	long ret;
 
 	/* find the key first */
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0, 0);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = -ENOKEY;
 		goto error;
@@ -700,7 +711,8 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 	if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
 		goto error;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -805,7 +817,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
 	if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
 		goto error;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -847,7 +860,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
 	if (ringid > 0) {
-		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dkref))
 			return PTR_ERR(dkref);
 		*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1083,7 +1096,8 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	time_t expiry;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -1101,6 +1115,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	}
 
 	key->expiry = expiry;
+	key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 	key_put(key);
@@ -1170,7 +1185,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *context;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1182,7 +1197,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		key_put(instkey);
 
-		key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 	}
@@ -1213,6 +1228,105 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
+ * parent process
+ * - the keyring must exist and must grant us LINK permission
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT)
+ */
+long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *me, *parent;
+	const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
+	struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+	key_ref_t keyring_r;
+	int ret;
+
+	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
+		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+
+	/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
+	 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
+	 * our parent */
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	cred = cred_alloc_blank();
+	if (!cred)
+		goto error_keyring;
+
+	cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+	keyring_r = NULL;
+
+	me = current;
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	parent = me->real_parent;
+	ret = -EPERM;
+
+	/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
+	if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the parent must be single threaded */
+	if (atomic_read(&parent->signal->count) != 1)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
+	 * there's no point */
+	mycred = current_cred();
+	pcred = __task_cred(parent);
+	if (mycred == pcred ||
+	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+		goto already_same;
+
+	/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
+	 * SUID/SGID */
+	if (pcred-> uid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	    pcred->euid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	    pcred->suid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	    pcred-> gid	!= mycred->egid	||
+	    pcred->egid	!= mycred->egid	||
+	    pcred->sgid	!= mycred->egid)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
+	if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
+	 * keyring from this process */
+	ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
+					     key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto not_permitted;
+
+	/* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
+	 * that */
+	oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+
+	/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
+	 * restarting */
+	parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
+	cred = NULL;
+	set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	if (oldcred)
+		put_cred(oldcred);
+	return 0;
+
+already_same:
+	ret = 0;
+not_permitted:
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return ret;
+
+error_keyring:
+	key_ref_put(keyring_r);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * the key control system call
@@ -1298,6 +1412,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 					   (char __user *) arg3,
 					   (size_t) arg4);
 
+	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 3dba81c2eba..ac977f661a7 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1000,3 +1000,88 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
 	}
 
 } /* end keyring_revoke() */
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a key is dead
+ */
+static bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
+{
+	return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+		(key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect garbage from the contents of a keyring
+ */
+void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+{
+	struct keyring_list *klist, *new;
+	struct key *key;
+	int loop, keep, max;
+
+	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
+	if (!klist)
+		goto just_return;
+
+	/* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
+	keep = 0;
+	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
+		if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit));
+			keep++;
+
+	if (keep == klist->nkeys)
+		goto just_return;
+
+	/* allocate a new keyring payload */
+	max = roundup(keep, 4);
+	new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new)
+		goto just_return;
+	new->maxkeys = max;
+	new->nkeys = 0;
+	new->delkey = 0;
+
+	/* install the live keys
+	 * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life
+	 */
+	keep = 0;
+	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+		key = klist->keys[loop];
+		if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
+			if (keep >= max)
+				goto discard_new;
+			new->keys[keep++] = key_get(key);
+		}
+	}
+	new->nkeys = keep;
+
+	/* adjust the quota */
+	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+			    sizeof(struct keyring_list) +
+			    KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep);
+
+	if (keep == 0) {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
+		kfree(new);
+	} else {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new);
+	}
+
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+	call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
+	kleave(" [yes]");
+	return;
+
+discard_new:
+	new->nkeys = keep;
+	keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
+just_return:
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" [no]");
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 769f9bdfd2b..9d01021ca0c 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -91,59 +91,94 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
 
-static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+	n = rb_next(n);
 	while (n) {
 		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
-		if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+		if (key->user->user_ns == user_ns)
 			break;
 		n = rb_next(n);
 	}
 	return n;
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n));
+	return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r)
+static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
-	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
-	return __key_serial_next(n);
-}
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+	struct key *minkey = NULL;
 
-static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
+	while (n) {
+		struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+		if (id < key->serial) {
+			if (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)
+				minkey = key;
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		} else if (id > key->serial) {
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		} else {
+			minkey = key;
+			break;
+		}
+		key = NULL;
+	}
 
+	if (!minkey)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (minkey->user->user_ns == user_ns)
+			return minkey;
+		n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
+		if (!n)
+			return NULL;
+		minkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+	}
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+	__acquires(key_serial_lock)
 {
-	struct rb_node *_p;
-	loff_t pos = *_pos;
+	key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
+	struct key *key;
 
 	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
 
-	_p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree);
-	while (pos > 0 && _p) {
-		pos--;
-		_p = key_serial_next(_p);
-	}
-
-	return _p;
+	if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	key = find_ge_key(pos);
+	if (!key)
+		return NULL;
+	*_pos = key->serial;
+	return &key->serial_node;
+}
 
+static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+	struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+	return key->serial;
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
-	(*_pos)++;
-	return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+	struct rb_node *n;
 
+	n = key_serial_next(v);
+	if (n)
+		*_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+	return n;
 }
 
 static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+	__releases(key_serial_lock)
 {
 	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
 }
@@ -174,11 +209,9 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
 	if (key->expiry == 0) {
 		memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
-	}
-	else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+	} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
 		memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
-	}
-	else {
+	} else {
 		timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
 
 		if (timo < 60)
@@ -218,9 +251,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-
 	return 0;
-
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
@@ -246,6 +277,7 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
 	struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
 	return __key_user_next(n);
 }
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users
@@ -253,10 +285,10 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
 static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	return seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+	__acquires(key_user_lock)
 {
 	struct rb_node *_p;
 	loff_t pos = *_pos;
@@ -270,17 +302,16 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 	}
 
 	return _p;
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
 	(*_pos)++;
 	return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
-
 }
 
 static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+	__releases(key_user_lock)
 {
 	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 276d27882ce..5c23afb31ec 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
  * - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
  * - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
  */
-key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			  key_perm_t perm)
 {
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ try_again:
 	switch (id) {
 	case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
 		if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
-			if (!create)
+			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
 				goto error;
 
 			ret = install_thread_keyring();
@@ -521,7 +522,7 @@ try_again:
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
 		if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
-			if (!create)
+			if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
 				goto error;
 
 			ret = install_process_keyring();
@@ -642,7 +643,14 @@ try_again:
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (!partial) {
+	/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
+	 * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
+	if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
 		ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
 		switch (ret) {
 		case -ERESTARTSYS:
@@ -660,7 +668,8 @@ try_again:
 	}
 
 	ret = -EIO;
-	if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+	if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
+	    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
 		goto invalid_key;
 
 	/* check the permissions */
@@ -702,7 +711,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
 	/* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
 	 * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
 	 * ENOMEM */
-	if (!is_single_threaded(current))
+	if (!current_is_single_threaded())
 		return -EMLINK;
 
 	new = prepare_creds();
@@ -760,3 +769,51 @@ error:
 	abort_creds(new);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Replace a process's session keyring when that process resumes userspace on
+ * behalf of one of its children
+ */
+void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+{
+	const struct cred *old;
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
+		return;
+
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
+	current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	if (!new)
+		return;
+
+	old = current_cred();
+	new->  uid	= old->  uid;
+	new-> euid	= old-> euid;
+	new-> suid	= old-> suid;
+	new->fsuid	= old->fsuid;
+	new->  gid	= old->  gid;
+	new-> egid	= old-> egid;
+	new-> sgid	= old-> sgid;
+	new->fsgid	= old->fsgid;
+	new->user	= get_uid(old->user);
+	new->group_info	= get_group_info(old->group_info);
+
+	new->securebits	= old->securebits;
+	new->cap_inheritable	= old->cap_inheritable;
+	new->cap_permitted	= old->cap_permitted;
+	new->cap_effective	= old->cap_effective;
+	new->cap_bset		= old->cap_bset;
+
+	new->jit_keyring	= old->jit_keyring;
+	new->thread_keyring	= key_get(old->thread_keyring);
+	new->tgcred->tgid	= old->tgcred->tgid;
+	new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
+
+	security_transfer_creds(new, old);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index b611d493c2d..5e05dc09e2d 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
+
 ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -20,7 +22,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -28,7 +32,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_maxbytes,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -36,7 +42,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_root_maxkeys,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{
 		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -44,7 +52,19 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 		.data = &key_quota_root_maxbytes,
 		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
 		.mode = 0644,
-		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &one,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
+	},
+	{
+		.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+		.procname = "gc_delay",
+		.data = &key_gc_delay,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+		.mode = 0644,
+		.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1 = (void *) &zero,
+		.extra2 = (void *) &max,
 	},
 	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
 };
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 94b868494b3..500aad0ebd6 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 	}
 
 	switch (a->type) {
+	case LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT:
+		return;
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
 		audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
 		break;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674fbfc7..c4c673240c1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -684,6 +684,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -699,6 +704,11 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
 }
 
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+}
+
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
@@ -709,6 +719,11 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
+}
+
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
 	return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
@@ -959,6 +974,24 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
+
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
+
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
@@ -1112,6 +1145,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 	security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
 }
 
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1218,6 +1269,13 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
 }
 
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+				   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				   struct key *key)
+{
+	return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
+}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b2ab6085983..e3d19014259 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @av: access vector
  */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 {
 	const char **common_pts = NULL;
 	u32 common_base = 0;
@@ -492,23 +492,35 @@ out:
 	return node;
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
-				       struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
-				       char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-	if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
-	if (port)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
+			 ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
+			ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
-				       __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-	if (addr)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
-	if (port)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -532,13 +544,10 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
  */
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	u32 denied, audited;
-	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
 	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
 	if (denied) {
 		audited = denied;
@@ -551,144 +560,20 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
 			return;
 	}
-
-	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
-	if (!ab)
-		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
-	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-	avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
-	if (a && a->tsk)
-		tsk = a->tsk;
-	if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+	if (!a) {
+		a = &stack_data;
+		memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
 	}
-	if (a) {
-		switch (a->type) {
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
-			audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id);
-			break;
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
-			audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
-			break;
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
-			if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
-				struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
-				if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
-					audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-							 &a->u.fs.path);
-				} else {
-					audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-					audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-				}
-				inode = dentry->d_inode;
-			} else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
-				struct dentry *dentry;
-				inode = a->u.fs.inode;
-				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
-				if (dentry) {
-					audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-					audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-					dput(dentry);
-				}
-			}
-			if (inode)
-				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
-						 inode->i_sb->s_id,
-						 inode->i_ino);
-			break;
-		case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
-			if (a->u.net.sk) {
-				struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
-				struct unix_sock *u;
-				int len = 0;
-				char *p = NULL;
-
-				switch (sk->sk_family) {
-				case AF_INET: {
-					struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-
-					avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
-							    inet->sport,
-							    "laddr", "lport");
-					avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
-							    inet->dport,
-							    "faddr", "fport");
-					break;
-				}
-				case AF_INET6: {
-					struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-					struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
-
-					avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
-							    inet->sport,
-							    "laddr", "lport");
-					avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
-							    inet->dport,
-							    "faddr", "fport");
-					break;
-				}
-				case AF_UNIX:
-					u = unix_sk(sk);
-					if (u->dentry) {
-						struct path path = {
-							.dentry = u->dentry,
-							.mnt = u->mnt
-						};
-						audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-								 &path);
-						break;
-					}
-					if (!u->addr)
-						break;
-					len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
-					p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
-					audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
-					if (*p)
-						audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
-					else
-						audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
-					break;
-				}
-			}
-
-			switch (a->u.net.family) {
-			case AF_INET:
-				avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
-						    a->u.net.sport,
-						    "saddr", "src");
-				avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
-						    a->u.net.dport,
-						    "daddr", "dest");
-				break;
-			case AF_INET6:
-				avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
-						    a->u.net.sport,
-						    "saddr", "src");
-				avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
-						    a->u.net.dport,
-						    "daddr", "dest");
-				break;
-			}
-			if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
-				struct net_device *dev;
-
-				/* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
-				dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
-						       a->u.net.netif);
-				if (dev) {
-					audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
-							 dev->name);
-					dev_put(dev);
-				}
-			}
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-	avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	audit_log_end(ab);
+	a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
+	a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+	a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
+	a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
+	common_lsm_audit(a);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -956,7 +841,7 @@ out:
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		 u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc;
@@ -970,3 +855,9 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
 {
 	return avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
+
+void avc_disable(void)
+{
+	if (avc_node_cachep)
+		kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8d8b69c5664..417f7c99452 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
  *					   Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *			    <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- *		Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *	Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  *		       Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  *
@@ -448,6 +448,10 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 	    sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 		sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 
+	/* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+	if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
 	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -1479,14 +1483,14 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       int cap, int audit)
 {
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	u16 sclass;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
 	int rc;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
 	ad.tsk = tsk;
 	ad.u.cap = cap;
 
@@ -1525,12 +1529,14 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			  struct inode *inode,
 			  u32 perms,
-			  struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid;
 
+	validate_creds(cred);
+
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1539,7 +1545,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	if (!adp) {
 		adp = &ad;
-		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 	}
 
@@ -1555,9 +1561,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 				  u32 av)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
@@ -1577,11 +1583,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -1612,7 +1618,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1621,7 +1627,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1665,7 +1671,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int rc;
@@ -1673,7 +1679,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
@@ -1708,7 +1714,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1719,7 +1725,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1761,7 +1767,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			       struct super_block *sb,
 			       u32 perms,
-			       struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+			       struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1855,12 +1861,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 				     unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -2139,7 +2145,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
 	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2232,7 +2238,7 @@ extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 					    struct files_struct *files)
 {
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2266,7 +2272,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -2515,7 +2521,7 @@ out:
 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2526,7 +2532,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
 		return 0;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
@@ -2534,9 +2540,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
@@ -2711,12 +2717,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+
+	/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+		ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+			      ATTR_FORCE);
+		if (!ia_valid)
+			return 0;
+	}
 
-	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
-			       ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
@@ -2756,7 +2768,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -2770,7 +2782,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2915,6 +2927,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		return rc;
 
 	isec->sid = newsid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2939,11 +2952,6 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
-	if (!mask) {
-		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
 		mask |= MAY_APPEND;
@@ -2954,10 +2962,20 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
 	if (!mask)
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
 		return 0;
 
+	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+		/* No change since dentry_open check. */
+		return 0;
+
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -3220,12 +3238,29 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 }
 
 /*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+	if (!tsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsec;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-	cred->security = NULL;
+
+	BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+	cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
 	kfree(tsec);
 }
 
@@ -3249,6 +3284,17 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+	*tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3292,6 +3338,11 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+	return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3409,7 +3460,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
 	int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
 	struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -3490,7 +3541,7 @@ out:
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
 	u8 nexthdr;
 	int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -3561,7 +3612,7 @@ out:
 
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
-static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
 			     char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
 	char *addrp;
@@ -3643,7 +3694,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
 			   u32 perms)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid;
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -3653,7 +3704,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
 		goto out;
 	sid = task_sid(task);
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
 	err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 
@@ -3740,7 +3791,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		char *addrp;
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
@@ -3769,7 +3820,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
-				AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+				COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 				ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net.family = family;
 				err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
@@ -3802,7 +3853,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
-		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 		ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = family;
 
@@ -3836,7 +3887,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
 	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
-		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
@@ -3861,7 +3912,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
 		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
-		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -3951,13 +4002,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int err;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3983,13 +4034,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int err;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -4002,7 +4053,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 
 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
 				    u32 peer_sid,
-				    struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+				    struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int err;
 	u32 if_sid;
@@ -4030,10 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4071,7 +4122,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4095,7 +4146,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return 0;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4309,6 +4360,59 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 	fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	/* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+	 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+	 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+	 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+			    NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+	 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+	 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+	 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+	 * protocols were being used */
+
+	/* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
+	 * the sockcreate SID here */
+
+	sksec->sid = current_sid();
+	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int err;
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	sksec->sid = sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = 0;
@@ -4353,7 +4457,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	int err;
 	char *addrp;
 	u32 peer_sid;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 netlbl_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4370,7 +4474,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
 		return NF_DROP;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4458,7 +4562,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 proto;
 
@@ -4466,7 +4570,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4490,7 +4594,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	u32 secmark_perm;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct sock *sk;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4549,7 +4653,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4619,13 +4723,13 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
 	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
 	ad.u.cap = capability;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
@@ -4684,12 +4788,12 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 			u32 perms)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4709,7 +4813,7 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4719,7 +4823,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4739,12 +4843,12 @@ static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4783,7 +4887,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4804,7 +4908,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4828,14 +4932,14 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = task_sid(target);
 	int rc;
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 	msec = msg->security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4850,7 +4954,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4860,7 +4964,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4880,12 +4984,12 @@ static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4942,7 +5046,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4952,7 +5056,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -4972,12 +5076,12 @@ static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5195,7 +5299,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 
 		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
 		error = -EPERM;
-		if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
 			error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
@@ -5252,6 +5356,32 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 	kfree(secdata);
 }
 
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *	called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+						ctx, true);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
@@ -5323,7 +5453,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.name =				"selinux",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset =			selinux_capset,
@@ -5396,10 +5526,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.dentry_open =			selinux_dentry_open,
 
 	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer =		selinux_cred_transfer,
 	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
+	.kernel_module_request =	selinux_kernel_module_request,
 	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
 	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
 	.task_getsid =			selinux_task_getsid,
@@ -5448,6 +5581,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
+	.inode_notifysecctx =		selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
+	.inode_setsecctx =		selinux_inode_setsecctx,
+	.inode_getsecctx =		selinux_inode_getsecctx,
 
 	.unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
 	.unix_may_send =		selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
@@ -5477,6 +5613,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.tun_dev_create =		selinux_tun_dev_create,
+	.tun_dev_post_create = 		selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
+	.tun_dev_attach =		selinux_tun_dev_attach,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
@@ -5691,6 +5830,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
+	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+	avc_disable();
+
 	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
 	security_ops = secondary_ops;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index 8377a4ba3b9..abedcd704da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7c1ae..2b683ad83d2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192ee95..0546d616cca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,6 +423,28 @@
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
 #define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
 #define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
 #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
@@ -508,6 +530,7 @@
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ                       0x00000002UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD                        0x00000004UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE                    0x00000008UL
+#define SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST                    0x00000010UL
 #define CAPABILITY__CHOWN                         0x00000001UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE                  0x00000002UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH               0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index d12ff1a9c0a..e94e82f7381 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
 #include <asm/system.h>
@@ -36,48 +37,6 @@ struct inode;
 struct sock;
 struct sk_buff;
 
-/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
-struct avc_audit_data {
-	char    type;
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS   1
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET  2
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP  3
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC  4
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
-	union 	{
-		struct {
-			struct path path;
-			struct inode *inode;
-		} fs;
-		struct {
-			int netif;
-			struct sock *sk;
-			u16 family;
-			__be16 dport;
-			__be16 sport;
-			union {
-				struct {
-					__be32 daddr;
-					__be32 saddr;
-				} v4;
-				struct {
-					struct in6_addr daddr;
-					struct in6_addr saddr;
-				} v6;
-			} fam;
-		} net;
-		int cap;
-		int ipc_id;
-	} u;
-};
-
-#define v4info fam.v4
-#define v6info fam.v6
-
-/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-	{ memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
-
 /*
  * AVC statistics
  */
@@ -98,7 +57,9 @@ void __init avc_init(void);
 
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+	       struct av_decision *avd,
+	       int result,
+	       struct common_audit_data *a);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -108,7 +69,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
@@ -127,13 +88,13 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		     u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		     u16 tclass, u32 perms);
 
-/* Shows permission in human readable form */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av);
-
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
 int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
 extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
 
+/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
+void avc_disable(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 21ec786611d..7ab9299bfb6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -77,3 +77,4 @@
     S_(NULL)
     S_(NULL)
     S_("kernel_service")
+    S_("tun_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 882f27d66fa..f248500a1e3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_PEER                                    68
 #define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             69
 #define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          74
+#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              75
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index b4b5b9b2f0b..8d7384280a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				u16 family,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+				struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int level,
 				     int optname);
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      u16 family,
-					      struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+					      struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 289e24b39e3..13128f9a3e5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+			struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+			struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2e984413c7b..e68823741ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
 				u16 family,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int rc;
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 500e6f78e11..ff17820d35e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
  *
  *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
  *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
  * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
@@ -279,6 +284,95 @@ mls_ops:
 }
 
 /*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+	struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+	char **permission_names = args;
+
+	BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+	permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+				    struct context *tcontext,
+				    u16 tclass,
+				    u32 permissions,
+				    const char *reason)
+{
+	struct common_datum *common_dat;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *tclass_name;
+	char *scontext_name = NULL;
+	char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+	char *permission_names[32];
+	int index, length;
+	bool need_comma = false;
+
+	if (!permissions)
+		return;
+
+	tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+	/* init permission_names */
+	if (common_dat &&
+	    hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+			dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* audit a message */
+	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+			     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+	if (!ab)
+		goto out;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+			 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+			 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+		u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+		if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+				 need_comma ? "," : "",
+				 permission_names[index]
+				 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+		need_comma = true;
+	}
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+	/* release scontext/tcontext */
+	kfree(tcontext_name);
+	kfree(scontext_name);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
@@ -347,28 +441,12 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 	}
 
 	if (masked) {
-		struct audit_buffer *ab;
-		char *stype_name
-			= policydb.p_type_val_to_name[source->value - 1];
-		char *ttype_name
-			= policydb.p_type_val_to_name[target->value - 1];
-		char *tclass_name
-			= policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
-
 		/* mask violated permissions */
 		avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
-		/* notice to userspace via audit message */
-		ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
-				     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
-		if (!ab)
-			return;
-
-		audit_log_format(ab, "av boundary violation: "
-				 "source=%s target=%s tclass=%s",
-				 stype_name, ttype_name, tclass_name);
-		avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, masked);
-		audit_log_end(ab);
+		/* audit masked permissions */
+		security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+					tclass, masked, "bounds");
 	}
 }
 
@@ -480,7 +558,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
 		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
 					  constraint->expr)) {
-			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
 		}
 		constraint = constraint->next;
 	}
@@ -499,8 +577,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!ra)
-			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
-							PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+			avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+					  PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -687,6 +765,26 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 		}
 		index = type->bounds;
 	}
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char *old_name = NULL;
+		char *new_name = NULL;
+		int length;
+
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+					      &old_name, &length) &&
+		    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+					      &new_name, &length)) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context,
+				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+				  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+				  "result=denied "
+				  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+				  old_name, new_name);
+		}
+		kfree(new_name);
+		kfree(old_name);
+	}
 out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 72b18452e1a..f3cb9ed731a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+				struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int i, rc = 0;
 	struct sec_path *sp;
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-					struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+					struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 243bec175be..c6e9acae72e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
 {
 	memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
 	a->a.type = type;
-	a->a.function = func;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func;
 }
 
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 513dc1aa16d..0f9ac814690 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -240,8 +240,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
-	struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
-	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", ad->function,
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+			 ad->smack_audit_data.function,
 			 sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
@@ -274,11 +275,11 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
 		return;
 
-	if (a->function == NULL)
-		a->function = "unknown";
+	if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL)
+		a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown";
 
 	/* end preparing the audit data */
-	sad = &a->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+	sad = &a->smack_audit_data;
 	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
 	sad->subject = subject_label;
 	sad->object  = object_label;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182078c..acae7ef4092 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	char *sp, *tsp;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1080,6 +1080,22 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	cred->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
@@ -1117,6 +1133,18 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	new->security = old->security;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
  * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
@@ -1638,6 +1666,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
 		nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -2464,7 +2493,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	/*
 	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
 	 */
-	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
 		return 0;
 
 	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
@@ -3029,10 +3058,31 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+
+	if (len < 0)
+		return len;
+	*ctxlen = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.name =				"smack",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		smack_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
 	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
 
@@ -3073,9 +3123,11 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
 
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		smack_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
 	.cred_commit =			smack_cred_commit,
+	.cred_transfer =		smack_cred_transfer,
 	.kernel_act_as =		smack_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	smack_kernel_create_files_as,
 	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
@@ -3155,6 +3207,9 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
+	.inode_notifysecctx =		smack_inode_notifysecctx,
+	.inode_setsecctx =		smack_inode_setsecctx,
+	.inode_getsecctx =		smack_inode_getsecctx,
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index fdd1f4b8c44..3c8bd8ee0b9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1285,6 +1285,36 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 }
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	/* Is there an active domain? */
+	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+		if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+			continue;
+		if (domain->is_deleted ||
+		    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		domain->is_deleted = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
  *
  * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 6d6ba09af45..31df541911f 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -339,8 +339,6 @@ const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
 const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
 /* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
 const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
-/* Delete a domain. */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data);
 /* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
 int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 /*
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 1d8b1696057..fcf52accce2 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -717,38 +717,6 @@ int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
 	return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
 }
 
-/* Domain create/delete handler. */
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
- *
- * @domainname: The name of domain.
- *
- * Returns 0.
- */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
-{
-	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
-	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
-
-	name.name = domainname;
-	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
-	down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-	/* Is there an active domain? */
-	list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
-		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
-		if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
-			continue;
-		if (domain->is_deleted ||
-		    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
-			continue;
-		domain->is_deleted = true;
-		break;
-	}
-	up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
  *
@@ -818,13 +786,11 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
  *
- * @bprm:           Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
- * @next_domain:    Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
  */
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-			    struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain)
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	/*
 	 * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
@@ -946,9 +912,11 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 		tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
 				       TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
  out:
+	if (!domain)
+		domain = old_domain;
+	bprm->cred->security = domain;
 	tomoyo_free(real_program_name);
 	tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name);
-	*next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
 	tomoyo_free(tmp);
 	return retval;
 }
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 3194d09fe0f..9548a0984cc 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 #include "tomoyo.h"
 #include "realpath.h"
 
+static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	new->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -25,6 +31,15 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+	 * we don't need to duplicate.
+	 */
+	new->security = old->security;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -61,14 +76,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
 	 * using current domain.
 	 */
-	if (!domain) {
-		struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
-		int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
-
-		if (!retval)
-			bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
-		return retval;
-	}
+	if (!domain)
+		return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
 	/*
 	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
 	 * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
@@ -268,7 +277,9 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
  */
 static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
 	.name                = "tomoyo",
+	.cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer	     = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
 	.bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
 	.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
index 0fd588a629c..cd6ba0bf706 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 			    struct path *path2);
 int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 				    struct file *filp);
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-			    struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
 /* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
author	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>	2009-09-11 08:04:49 +1000
committer	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>	2009-09-11 08:04:49 +1000
commit	a3c8b97396ef42edfb845788ba6f53b2a93ce980 (patch)
tree	530c5bdbc534618311dab3e0af245835af56db0f /security
parent	74fca6a42863ffacaf7ba6f1936a9f228950f657 (diff)
parent	9f0ab4a3f0fdb1ff404d150618ace2fa069bb2e1 (diff)