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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700
commit2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e (patch)
tree6a09ce761173a966718f9009514dcc90bd9947b7 /security
parent9064171268d838b8f283fe111ef086b9479d059a (diff)
parent87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman: "The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with the mount namespace. The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes. Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted yama: Better permission check for ptraceme pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init. scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c4
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 23414b93771..13c88fbcf03 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -347,10 +347,8 @@ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
/* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
switch (ptrace_scope) {
case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(parent)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!has_ns_capability(parent, current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
rc = -EPERM;
- rcu_read_unlock();
break;
case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
rc = -EPERM;