Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris.

Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
  integrity: do zero padding of the key id
  KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys
  KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid
  KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching
  KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys
  X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description
  KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
  selinux: normalize audit log formatting
  selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID
  ima: detect violations for mmaped files
  ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement
  ima: added ima_policy_flag variable
  ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate()
  ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option
  ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init()
  PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs
  PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
  KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys
  KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling
  ...

37 files changed, 912 insertions, 593 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 245c6d92065..b76235ae478 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
 #
 config INTEGRITY
-	def_bool y
-	depends on IMA || EVM
+	bool "Integrity subsystem"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option enables the integrity subsystem, which is comprised
+	  of a number of different components including the Integrity
+	  Measurement Architecture (IMA), Extended Verification Module
+	  (EVM), IMA-appraisal extension, digital signature verification
+	  extension and audit measurement log support.
+
+	  Each of these components can be enabled/disabled separately.
+	  Refer to the individual components for additional details.
+
+if INTEGRITY
 
 config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	boolean "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
-	depends on INTEGRITY && KEYS
+	depends on KEYS
 	default n
 	select SIGNATURE
 	help
@@ -17,9 +29,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
 	  usually only added from initramfs.
 
+config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+	default n
+        select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+        select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+        select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+        select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	help
+	  This option enables digital signature verification using
+	  asymmetric keys.
+
 config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
-	depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+	depends on AUDIT
 	default y
 	help
 	  In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
@@ -32,17 +56,7 @@ config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	  be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
 	  command line.
 
-config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
-	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
-	default n
-        select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
-        select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
-        select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
-        select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
-	help
-	  This option enables digital signature verification using
-	  asymmetric keys.
-
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+
+endif   # if INTEGRITY
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 0793f4811cb..8d1f4bf5108 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
 integrity-y := iint.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 9eae4809006..4fec1816a2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
 	struct key *key;
 	char name[12];
 
-	sprintf(name, "id:%x", keyid);
+	sprintf(name, "id:%08x", keyid);
 
 	pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name);
 
@@ -45,8 +46,8 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
 	}
 
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-		pr_warn("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
-			name, PTR_ERR(key));
+		pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
+				   name, PTR_ERR(key));
 		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
 			/* Hide some search errors */
 		case -EACCES:
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index d606f3d12d6..df586fa00ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 config EVM
 	boolean "EVM support"
-	depends on SECURITY
 	select KEYS
 	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
@@ -12,10 +11,6 @@ config EVM
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-if EVM
-
-menu "EVM options"
-
 config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
 	bool "FSUUID (version 2)"
 	default y
@@ -47,6 +42,3 @@ config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
 	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
 	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
 
-endmenu
-
-endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 3bcb80df4d0..9685af330de 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -126,14 +126,15 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
 				GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
-		if (rc == 0)
-			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; /* empty */
-		else if (rc == -ENODATA) {
+		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		if (rc == -ENODATA) {
 			rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
 			if (rc > 0)
 				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
 			else if (rc == 0)
 				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
+		} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 		}
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -284,6 +285,13 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+			return 0;
+	}
 out:
 	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
@@ -352,7 +360,6 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		return;
 
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
-	return;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -372,7 +379,6 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	return;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -414,7 +420,6 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 
 	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
 		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	return;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 08758fbd496..e099875643c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
 #
 config IMA
 	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
-	depends on SECURITY
-	select INTEGRITY
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 57da4bd7ba0..8ee997dff13 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME "ima"
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n"
 
+/* current content of the policy */
+extern int ima_policy_flag;
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
@@ -90,10 +93,7 @@ extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
-void ima_cleanup(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
-void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
-int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
@@ -110,8 +110,6 @@ void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
-int ima_init_template(void);
-
 /*
  * used to protect h_table and sha_table
  */
@@ -151,12 +149,6 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
-/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
- * integrity data associated with an inode.
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
-
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
 
@@ -164,20 +156,22 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		     int flags);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
+void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
 void ima_delete_rules(void);
 
 /* Appraise integrity measurements */
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE	0x01
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX	0x02
-#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES	0x04
-#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE	0x08
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_LOG	0x04
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES	0x08
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE	0x10
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len);
+			     int xattr_len, int opened);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -193,7 +187,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
 					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-					   int xattr_len)
+					   int xattr_len, int opened)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d9cd5ce14d2..86885979918 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -179,11 +179,6 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
 }
 
-int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
-{
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
-}
-
 /*
  * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
  *
@@ -330,10 +325,9 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
 {
 	char *pathname = NULL;
 
-	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
-	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (*pathbuf) {
-		pathname = d_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+		pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
 		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
 			kfree(*pathbuf);
 			*pathbuf = NULL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 86bfd5c5df8..922685483bd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
 		ima_appraise = 0;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
+		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
 		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
 	return 1;
@@ -183,7 +185,7 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len)
+			     int xattr_len, int opened)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
 	char *cause = "unknown";
@@ -192,8 +194,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
 
-	if (!ima_appraise)
-		return 0;
 	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
@@ -202,8 +202,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			goto out;
 
 		cause = "missing-hash";
-		status =
-		    (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+		status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+		if (opened & FILE_CREATED) {
+			iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -315,7 +318,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	int must_appraise, rc;
 
-	if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
+	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
 	    || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
 		return;
 
@@ -353,7 +356,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
 	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 0bd732843fe..d34e7dfc111 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -80,24 +80,24 @@ static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 {
 	mm_segment_t old_fs;
 	char __user *buf = addr;
-	ssize_t ret;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
 		return -EBADF;
-	if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read)
-		return -EINVAL;
 
 	old_fs = get_fs();
 	set_fs(get_ds());
 	if (file->f_op->read)
 		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else
+	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
 		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
+		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
 	set_fs(old_fs);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int ima_init_crypto(void)
+int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
 
@@ -116,7 +116,10 @@ static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo)
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+	if (algo < 0 || algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+	if (algo != ima_hash_algo) {
 		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
 			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
@@ -200,7 +203,10 @@ static struct crypto_ahash *ima_alloc_atfm(enum hash_algo algo)
 	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ima_ahash_tfm;
 	int rc;
 
-	if ((algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) || !tfm) {
+	if (algo < 0 || algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+	if (algo != ima_hash_algo || !tfm) {
 		tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
 		if (!IS_ERR(tfm)) {
 			if (algo == ima_hash_algo)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index e8f9d70a465..9164fc8cac8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int ima_used_chip;
  * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
  * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
  */
-static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -72,17 +72,23 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 
 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
 					 NULL, 0, &entry);
-	if (result < 0)
-		return;
+	if (result < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
+		goto err_out;
+	}
 
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 				    boot_aggregate_name);
-	if (result < 0)
+	if (result < 0) {
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
-	return;
+		audit_cause = "store_entry";
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	return 0;
 err_out:
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
 			    audit_cause, result, 0);
+	return result;
 }
 
 int __init ima_init(void)
@@ -98,6 +104,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
 		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
 
+	rc = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	rc = ima_init_crypto();
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -105,7 +115,10 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+	rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	ima_init_policy();
 
 	return ima_fs_init();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2917f980bf3..62f59eca32d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -77,42 +77,39 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
  *	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
  */
-static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
+				     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     int must_measure,
+				     char **pathbuf,
+				     const char **pathname)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
-	char *pathbuf = NULL;
-	const char *pathname;
-
-	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
-		return;
 
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
-			struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-			iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+			if (!iint)
+				iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
 			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
 			if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
 				send_tomtou = true;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) &&
-		    ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK))
+		if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && must_measure)
 			send_writers = true;
 	}
 
 	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
 		return;
 
-	pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+	*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf);
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(file, pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
-	kfree(pathbuf);
 }
 
 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -124,11 +121,13 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
-	    iint->version != inode->i_version) {
-		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
-			ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+		if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
+		    (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+			if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+				ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 }
@@ -154,19 +153,20 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
-			       int mask, int function)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
+			       int opened)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
-	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
 	int xattr_len = 0;
+	bool violation_check;
 
-	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
@@ -174,19 +174,33 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
 	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
-	if (!action)
+	violation_check = ((function == FILE_CHECK || function == MMAP_CHECK) &&
+			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+	if (!action && !violation_check)
 		return 0;
 
 	must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
 	/*  Is the appraise rule hook specific?  */
-	_func = (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) ? FILE_CHECK : function;
+	if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
+		function = FILE_CHECK;
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
-	if (!iint)
-		goto out;
+	if (action) {
+		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+		if (!iint)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (violation_check) {
+		ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
+					 &pathbuf, &pathname);
+		if (!action) {
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+	}
 
 	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
@@ -199,15 +213,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
 	if (!action) {
 		if (must_appraise)
-			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, _func);
+			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
 	template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
-	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
-		if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-			xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
-	} else
+	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
+		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
 		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
@@ -217,23 +229,26 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
-	pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+	if (!pathname)	/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
+		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
 				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
-					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname,
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
-	kfree(pathbuf);
+
 out_digsig:
 	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
 		rc = -EACCES;
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+out_free:
+	kfree(pathbuf);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	kfree(xattr_value);
 	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
 		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
@@ -253,7 +268,7 @@ out:
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
-		return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+		return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -272,10 +287,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
  */
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file,
-				   (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
-				   bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
-				   MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -288,12 +300,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
 {
-	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL,
+	return process_measurement(file,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
-				   FILE_CHECK);
+				   FILE_CHECK, opened);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
@@ -316,7 +327,7 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 #endif
 		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -327,7 +338,7 @@ int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
 		return 0;
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
@@ -336,14 +347,10 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 
 	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
 	error = ima_init();
-	if (error)
-		goto out;
-
-	error = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
-	if (error)
-		goto out;
-	ima_initialized = 1;
-out:
+	if (!error) {
+		ima_initialized = 1;
+		ima_update_policy_flag();
+	}
 	return error;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 07099a8bc28..cdc620b2152 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
 #define DONT_APPRAISE	0x0008
 #define AUDIT		0x0040
 
+int ima_policy_flag;
+
 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
@@ -295,6 +297,26 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 	return action;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
+ * loaded policy.  Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
+ * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
+ * can be made earlier.
+ */
+void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
+{
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+	ima_policy_flag = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
+			ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
+	}
+
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
  *
@@ -341,6 +363,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
 
 	if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
 		ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
+		ima_update_policy_flag();
 		cause = "complete";
 		result = 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index a076a967ec4..e854862c933 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -152,24 +152,6 @@ out:
 	return result;
 }
 
-static int init_defined_templates(void)
-{
-	int i = 0;
-	int result = 0;
-
-	/* Init defined templates. */
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) {
-		struct ima_template_desc *template = &defined_templates[i];
-
-		result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
-						   &(template->fields),
-						   &(template->num_fields));
-		if (result < 0)
-			return result;
-	}
-	return result;
-}
-
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 {
 	if (!ima_template)
@@ -178,13 +160,11 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 	return ima_template;
 }
 
-int ima_init_template(void)
+int __init ima_init_template(void)
 {
-	int result;
-
-	result = init_defined_templates();
-	if (result < 0)
-		return result;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
 
-	return 0;
+	return template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+					 &(template->fields),
+					 &(template->num_fields));
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 19b8e314ca9..c0379d13dbe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x04000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x08000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
@@ -116,7 +117,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
  * integrity data associated with an inode.
  */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index c2f91a0cf88..b6adb94f6d5 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -33,11 +33,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
  */
 struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
 	.name			= "big_key",
-	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	.preparse		= big_key_preparse,
 	.free_preparse		= big_key_free_preparse,
 	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
-	.match			= user_match,
 	.revoke			= big_key_revoke,
 	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
 	.describe		= big_key_describe,
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 5fe443d120a..db9675db102 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -970,7 +970,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
 	.name = "encrypted",
 	.instantiate = encrypted_instantiate,
 	.update = encrypted_update,
-	.match = user_match,
 	.destroy = encrypted_destroy,
 	.describe = user_describe,
 	.read = encrypted_read,
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 5f20da01fd8..b8960c4959a 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -107,20 +107,16 @@ extern int iterate_over_keyring(const struct key *keyring,
 				int (*func)(const struct key *key, void *data),
 				void *data);
 
-typedef int (*key_match_func_t)(const struct key *, const void *);
-
 struct keyring_search_context {
 	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
 	const struct cred	*cred;
-	key_match_func_t	match;
-	const void		*match_data;
+	struct key_match_data	match_data;
 	unsigned		flags;
-#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE	0x0001	/* [as type->def_lookup_type] */
-#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK	0x0002	/* Skip state checks */
-#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK	0x0004	/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
-#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME	0x0008	/* Don't update times */
-#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0010	/* Don't check permissions */
-#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0020	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK	0x0001	/* Skip state checks */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK	0x0002	/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME	0x0004	/* Don't update times */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM	0x0008	/* Don't check permissions */
+#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP	0x0010	/* Give an error on excessive depth */
 
 	int (*iterator)(const void *object, void *iterator_data);
 
@@ -131,6 +127,8 @@ struct keyring_search_context {
 	struct timespec		now;
 };
 
+extern bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key,
+			    const struct key_match_data *match_data);
 extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 				    struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
 
@@ -152,7 +150,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 					struct key *dest_keyring,
 					unsigned long flags);
 
-extern int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target);
+extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,
+				      const struct key_match_data *match_data);
 extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 				 key_perm_t perm);
 #define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE	0x01
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6d0cad16f00..e17ba6aefdc 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	}
 
 	key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate ||
+	if (!index_key.type->instantiate ||
 	    (!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse))
 		goto error_put_type;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index e26f860e5f2..eff88a5f5d4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
 		return ret;
 	if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (type[0] == '.')
+		return -EPERM;
 	type[len - 1] = '\0';
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 8314a7d2104..8177010174f 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
 	.preparse	= keyring_preparse,
 	.free_preparse	= keyring_free_preparse,
 	.instantiate	= keyring_instantiate,
-	.match		= user_match,
 	.revoke		= keyring_revoke,
 	.destroy	= keyring_destroy,
 	.describe	= keyring_describe,
@@ -512,6 +511,15 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
 
 /*
+ * By default, we keys found by getting an exact match on their descriptions.
+ */
+bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key,
+		     const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	return strcmp(key->description, match_data->raw_data) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * Iteration function to consider each key found.
  */
 static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
@@ -545,7 +553,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
 	}
 
 	/* keys that don't match */
-	if (!ctx->match(key, ctx->match_data)) {
+	if (!ctx->match_data.cmp(key, &ctx->match_data)) {
 		kleave(" = 0 [!match]");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -585,8 +593,7 @@ skipped:
  */
 static int search_keyring(struct key *keyring, struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
 {
-	if ((ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE) ==
-	    KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) {
+	if (ctx->match_data.lookup_type == KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) {
 		const void *object;
 
 		object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys,
@@ -627,7 +634,7 @@ static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring,
 	/* Check to see if this top-level keyring is what we are looking for
 	 * and whether it is valid or not.
 	 */
-	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ||
+	if (ctx->match_data.lookup_type == KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ||
 	    keyring_compare_object(keyring, &ctx->index_key)) {
 		ctx->skipped_ret = 2;
 		ctx->flags |= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK;
@@ -885,16 +892,25 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
 		.index_key.type		= type,
 		.index_key.description	= description,
 		.cred			= current_cred(),
-		.match			= type->match,
-		.match_data		= description,
-		.flags			= (type->def_lookup_type |
-					   KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK),
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
 	};
+	key_ref_t key;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (!ctx.match)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	if (type->match_preparse) {
+		ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
-	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
+	key = keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
+
+	if (type->match_free)
+		type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
+	return key;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
 
@@ -1014,7 +1030,7 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
 
 	/* We might get a keyring with matching index-key that is nonetheless a
 	 * different keyring. */
-	if (key != ctx->match_data)
+	if (key != ctx->match_data.raw_data)
 		return 0;
 
 	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK);
@@ -1031,14 +1047,14 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
 static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
 {
 	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-		.index_key	= A->index_key,
-		.match_data	= A,
-		.iterator	= keyring_detect_cycle_iterator,
-		.flags		= (KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT |
-				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
-				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME |
-				   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM |
-				   KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP),
+		.index_key		= A->index_key,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= A,
+		.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.iterator		= keyring_detect_cycle_iterator,
+		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM |
+					   KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP),
 	};
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index d3f6f2fd21d..972eeb336b8 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		.index_key.type		= key->type,
 		.index_key.description	= key->description,
 		.cred			= current_cred(),
-		.match			= lookup_user_key_possessed,
-		.match_data		= key,
-		.flags			= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
-					   KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
+		.match_data.cmp		= lookup_user_key_possessed,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= key,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
 	};
 
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 0cf8a130a26..bd536cb221e 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -489,9 +489,10 @@ found:
 /*
  * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.
  */
-int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
+bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key,
+			       const struct key_match_data *match_data)
 {
-	return key == target;
+	return key == match_data->raw_data;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -516,9 +517,9 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
 			  key_perm_t perm)
 {
 	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
-		.match	= lookup_user_key_possessed,
-		.flags	= (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
-			   KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
+		.match_data.cmp		= lookup_user_key_possessed,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
 	};
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	struct key *key;
@@ -673,7 +674,7 @@ try_again:
 		ctx.index_key.type		= key->type;
 		ctx.index_key.description	= key->description;
 		ctx.index_key.desc_len		= strlen(key->description);
-		ctx.match_data			= key;
+		ctx.match_data.raw_data		= key;
 		kdebug("check possessed");
 		skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
 		kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 26a94f18af9..bb4337c7ae1 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -513,9 +513,9 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 		.index_key.type		= type,
 		.index_key.description	= description,
 		.cred			= current_cred(),
-		.match			= type->match,
-		.match_data		= description,
-		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	};
 	struct key *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -525,6 +525,14 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 	       ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
 	       callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
 
+	if (type->match_preparse) {
+		ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
 	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
 
@@ -537,7 +545,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				key_put(key);
 				key = ERR_PTR(ret);
-				goto error;
+				goto error_free;
 			}
 		}
 	} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
@@ -547,12 +555,15 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 		 * should consult userspace if we can */
 		key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 		if (!callout_info)
-			goto error;
+			goto error_free;
 
 		key = construct_key_and_link(&ctx, callout_info, callout_len,
 					     aux, dest_keyring, flags);
 	}
 
+error_free:
+	if (type->match_free)
+		type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
 error:
 	kleave(" = %p", key);
 	return key;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 842e6f410d5..6639e2cb885 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -44,12 +44,12 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
 	.read		= request_key_auth_read,
 };
 
-int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 }
 
@@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
 		.index_key.type		= &key_type_request_key_auth,
 		.index_key.description	= description,
 		.cred			= current_cred(),
-		.match			= user_match,
-		.match_data		= description,
-		.flags			= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+		.match_data.cmp		= key_default_cmp,
+		.match_data.raw_data	= description,
+		.match_data.lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	};
 	struct key *authkey;
 	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 6b804aa4529..c0594cb07ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1096,7 +1096,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
 	.name = "trusted",
 	.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
 	.update = trusted_update,
-	.match = user_match,
 	.destroy = trusted_destroy,
 	.describe = user_describe,
 	.read = trusted_read,
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index eee340011f2..36b47bbd3d8 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
  */
 struct key_type key_type_user = {
 	.name			= "user",
-	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	.preparse		= user_preparse,
 	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
 	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.update			= user_update,
-	.match			= user_match,
 	.revoke			= user_revoke,
 	.destroy		= user_destroy,
 	.describe		= user_describe,
@@ -48,12 +46,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
  */
 struct key_type key_type_logon = {
 	.name			= "logon",
-	.def_lookup_type	= KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
 	.preparse		= user_preparse,
 	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
 	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
 	.update			= user_update,
-	.match			= user_match,
 	.revoke			= user_revoke,
 	.destroy		= user_destroy,
 	.describe		= user_describe,
@@ -139,16 +135,6 @@ error:
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
 
 /*
- * match users on their name
- */
-int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
-{
-	return strcmp(key->description, description) == 0;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_match);
-
-/*
  * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
  * - called with the key sem write-locked
  */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ada0d0bf346..8426a2aa8dc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2097,6 +2097,41 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 
 /* binprm security operations */
 
+static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			    const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
+			    const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
+{
+	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
+	int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
+		return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
+
+	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
+		return 0; /* No change in credentials */
+
+	/*
+	 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
+	 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
+	 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
+	 * of the current SID.
+	 */
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+	if (rc) {
+		/*
+		 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+		 * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
+		 * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
+		 */
+		if (nnp)
+			return -EPERM;
+		else
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
@@ -2133,14 +2168,10 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
 		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
 
-		/*
-		 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
-		 * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
-		 */
-		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
-			return -EPERM;
-		if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
-			return -EACCES;
+		/* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2148,15 +2179,19 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 					     &new_tsec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
+		 * transition.
+		 */
+		rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
 	}
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
 	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
-	if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
-	    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
-		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
-
 	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
@@ -4270,15 +4305,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
-				    u32 peer_sid,
+static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
+				    char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
 				    struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int err;
 	u32 if_sid;
 	u32 node_sid;
 
-	err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
+	err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 	err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
@@ -4371,8 +4406,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
-		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
-					       peer_sid, &ad);
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
 		if (err) {
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
 			return err;
@@ -4690,10 +4725,9 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EINVAL) {
-			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-				  "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
-				  " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
-				  nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+			WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_nlmsg_perm: unrecognized netlink message:"
+				  " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
+				  sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
 			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
 				err = 0;
 		}
@@ -4711,7 +4745,8 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				       const struct net_device *indev,
 				       u16 family)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -4737,14 +4772,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
+	ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
 	ad.u.net->family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	if (peerlbl_active) {
-		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
-					       peer_sid, &ad);
+		err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
+					       addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
 		if (err) {
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
 			return NF_DROP;
@@ -4773,7 +4808,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 					 const struct net_device *out,
 					 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
-	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET);
 }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
@@ -4783,7 +4818,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 					 const struct net_device *out,
 					 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
-	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
+	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET6);
 }
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
 
@@ -4871,11 +4906,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return NF_ACCEPT;
 }
 
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 const struct net_device *outdev,
 					 u16 family)
 {
 	u32 secmark_perm;
 	u32 peer_sid;
+	int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4956,6 +4993,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 			case PF_INET6:
 				if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
 					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
 			default:
 				return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 			}
@@ -4987,7 +5025,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 		u32 if_sid;
 		u32 node_sid;
 
-		if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
+		if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
 		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
 				 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
@@ -5009,7 +5047,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 					   const struct net_device *out,
 					   int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
-	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET);
 }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
@@ -5019,7 +5057,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 					   const struct net_device *out,
 					   int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
-	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
+	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET6);
 }
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
 
@@ -6033,7 +6071,7 @@ security_initcall(selinux_init);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
 
-static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
 	{
 		.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute,
 		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
@@ -6054,12 +6092,8 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
 		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV4,
 		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
 		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
-	}
-};
-
+	},
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-
-static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
 	{
 		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute,
 		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
@@ -6073,32 +6107,24 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
 		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
 		.hooknum =	NF_INET_FORWARD,
 		.priority =	NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
-	}
-};
-
+	},
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
+};
 
 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
 {
-	int err = 0;
+	int err;
 
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
-		goto out;
+		return 0;
 
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
 
-	err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
+	err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
 	if (err)
-		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
+		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-	err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
-	if (err)
-		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
-#endif	/* IPV6 */
-
-out:
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
@@ -6108,10 +6134,7 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
 {
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
 
-	nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-	nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
-#endif	/* IPV6 */
+	nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
index 57c6eae81ea..c7214544409 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netif.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
 #define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
 
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
 void sel_netif_flush(void);
 
-int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid);
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid);
 
 #endif	/* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 078e553f52f..81fa718d5cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 #include "avc.h"
 
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ struct ipc_security_struct {
 };
 
 struct netif_security_struct {
+	struct net *ns;			/* network namespace */
 	int ifindex;			/* device index */
 	u32 sid;			/* SID for this interface */
 };
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index 50ce177d71a..e607b4473ef 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
 
 /**
  * sel_netif_hashfn - Hashing function for the interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
  * @ifindex: the network interface
  *
  * Description:
@@ -52,13 +53,14 @@ static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE];
  * bucket number for the given interface.
  *
  */
-static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(int ifindex)
+static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
 {
-	return (ifindex & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+	return (((uintptr_t)ns + ifindex) & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1));
 }
 
 /**
  * sel_netif_find - Search for an interface record
+ * @ns: the network namespace
  * @ifindex: the network interface
  *
  * Description:
@@ -66,15 +68,15 @@ static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(int ifindex)
  * If an entry can not be found in the table return NULL.
  *
  */
-static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(int ifindex)
+static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns,
+					       int ifindex)
 {
-	int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ifindex);
+	int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex);
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
-		/* all of the devices should normally fit in the hash, so we
-		 * optimize for that case */
-		if (likely(netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex))
+		if (net_eq(netif->nsec.ns, ns) &&
+		    netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex)
 			return netif;
 
 	return NULL;
@@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
 	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
 		return -ENOSPC;
 
-	idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ifindex);
+	idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ns, netif->nsec.ifindex);
 	list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
 	sel_netif_total++;
 
@@ -120,6 +122,7 @@ static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
 
 /**
  * sel_netif_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network interface using the policy
+ * @ns: the network namespace
  * @ifindex: the network interface
  * @sid: interface SID
  *
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
  * failure.
  *
  */
-static int sel_netif_sid_slow(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 {
 	int ret;
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
@@ -140,7 +143,7 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 	/* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't
 	 * currently support containers */
 
-	dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, ifindex);
+	dev = dev_get_by_index(ns, ifindex);
 	if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 		       "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow(),"
@@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-	netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
 	if (netif != NULL) {
 		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
 		ret = 0;
@@ -163,6 +166,7 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
+	new->nsec.ns = ns;
 	new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex;
 	ret = sel_netif_insert(new);
 	if (ret != 0)
@@ -184,6 +188,7 @@ out:
 
 /**
  * sel_netif_sid - Lookup the SID of a network interface
+ * @ns: the network namespace
  * @ifindex: the network interface
  * @sid: interface SID
  *
@@ -195,12 +200,12 @@ out:
  * on failure.
  *
  */
-int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
+int sel_netif_sid(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 {
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
 	if (likely(netif != NULL)) {
 		*sid = netif->nsec.sid;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -208,11 +213,12 @@ int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	return sel_netif_sid_slow(ifindex, sid);
+	return sel_netif_sid_slow(ns, ifindex, sid);
 }
 
 /**
  * sel_netif_kill - Remove an entry from the network interface table
+ * @ns: the network namespace
  * @ifindex: the network interface
  *
  * Description:
@@ -220,13 +226,13 @@ int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid)
  * table if it exists.
  *
  */
-static void sel_netif_kill(int ifindex)
+static void sel_netif_kill(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
 {
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
-	netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex);
+	netif = sel_netif_find(ns, ifindex);
 	if (netif)
 		sel_netif_destroy(netif);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
@@ -257,11 +263,8 @@ static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
 {
 	struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
 
-	if (dev_net(dev) != &init_net)
-		return NOTIFY_DONE;
-
 	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
-		sel_netif_kill(dev->ifindex);
+		sel_netif_kill(dev_net(dev), dev->ifindex);
 
 	return NOTIFY_DONE;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 2aa9d172dc7..a1d3944751b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
 	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-		  "security_validate_transition:  denied for"
+		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
 		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
 		  o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 			audit_log(current->audit_context,
 				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 				  "op=security_bounded_transition "
-				  "result=denied "
+				  "seresult=denied "
 				  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
 				  old_name, new_name);
 		}
@@ -1351,8 +1351,8 @@ static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
 	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-		  "security_compute_sid:  invalid context %s"
-		  " for scontext=%s"
+		  "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
+		  " scontext=%s"
 		  " tcontext=%s"
 		  " tclass=%s",
 		  n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
@@ -2607,8 +2607,10 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
 		if (rc) {
 			if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
-				audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-					  "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
+				audit_log(current->audit_context,
+					  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+					  "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
+					  "invalid_context=%s", s);
 				kfree(s);
 			}
 			goto out_unlock;
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
index e69de9c642b..b065f978941 100644
--- a/security/smack/Kconfig
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -12,3 +12,19 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK
 	  of other mandatory security schemes.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	bool "Reporting on access granted by Smack rules"
+	depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Enable the bring-up ("b") access mode in Smack rules.
+	  When access is granted by a rule with the "b" mode a
+	  message about the access requested is generated. The
+	  intention is that a process can be granted a wide set
+	  of access initially with the bringup mode set on the
+	  rules. The developer can use the information to
+	  identify which rules are necessary and what accesses
+	  may be inappropriate. The developer can reduce the
+	  access rule set once the behavior is well understood.
+	  This is a superior mechanism to the oft abused
+	  "permissive" mode of other systems.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 020307ef097..b828a379377 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define SMK_CIPSOLEN	24
 
 struct superblock_smack {
-	char		*smk_root;
-	char		*smk_floor;
-	char		*smk_hat;
-	char		*smk_default;
-	int		smk_initialized;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_root;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_floor;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_hat;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_default;
+	int			smk_initialized;
 };
 
 struct socket_smack {
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct socket_smack {
  * Inode smack data
  */
 struct inode_smack {
-	char			*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
 	struct mutex		smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct task_smack {
 struct smack_rule {
 	struct list_head	list;
 	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
-	char			*smk_object;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_object;
 	int			smk_access;
 };
 
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct smk_netlbladdr {
 	struct list_head	list;
 	struct sockaddr_in	smk_host;	/* network address */
 	struct in_addr		smk_mask;	/* network mask */
-	char			*smk_label;	/* label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;	/* label */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ struct smk_port_label {
  */
 #define MAY_TRANSMUTE	0x00001000	/* Controls directory labeling */
 #define MAY_LOCK	0x00002000	/* Locks should be writes, but ... */
+#define MAY_BRINGUP	0x00004000	/* Report use of this rule */
 
 /*
  * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
@@ -200,9 +201,9 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 #define MAY_NOT		0
 
 /*
- * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxatl)
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxatlb)
  */
-#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 6
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 7
 
 /* SMACK data */
 struct smack_audit_data {
@@ -226,23 +227,23 @@ struct smk_audit_info {
 /*
  * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
  */
-struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *);
 
 /*
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
  */
 int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
-int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
-int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
-int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *, struct smack_known *,
+	       int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, struct smack_known *,
+	       u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
 char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
 int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
-char *smk_import(const char *, int);
 struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
 void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
 struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
-u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
 
 /*
  * Shared data.
@@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
-extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
+extern struct smack_known smack_cipso_option;
 extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
@@ -281,9 +282,9 @@ static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
 }
 
 /*
- * Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an inode blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
 	return sip->smk_inode;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index f97d0842e62..5b970ffde02 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
-		if (srp->smk_object == object_label &&
+		if (srp->smk_object->smk_known == object_label &&
 		    srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
 			may = srp->smk_access;
 			break;
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 
 /**
  * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
- * @subject_known: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
- * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @subject: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
+ * @object: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
  * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : a pointer to the audit data
  *
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
  *
  * Smack labels are shared on smack_list
  */
-int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
-		int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
+	       int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
 	int may = MAY_NOT;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
 	 *
 	 * A star subject can't access any object.
 	 */
-	if (subject_known == &smack_known_star) {
+	if (subject == &smack_known_star) {
 		rc = -EACCES;
 		goto out_audit;
 	}
@@ -142,28 +142,28 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
 	 * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
 	 * An internet subject can access any object.
 	 */
-	if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
-	    subject_known == &smack_known_web)
+	if (object == &smack_known_web ||
+	    subject == &smack_known_web)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
 	 */
-	if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+	if (object == &smack_known_star)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
 	 * with the same label.
 	 */
-	if (subject_known->smk_known == object_label)
+	if (subject->smk_known == object->smk_known)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A hat subject can read any object.
 	 * A floor object can be read by any subject.
 	 */
 	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
-		if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known)
+		if (object == &smack_known_floor)
 			goto out_audit;
-		if (subject_known == &smack_known_hat)
+		if (subject == &smack_known_hat)
 			goto out_audit;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -174,27 +174,38 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
 	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
 	 */
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	may = smk_access_entry(subject_known->smk_known, object_label,
-				&subject_known->smk_rules);
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+			       &subject->smk_rules);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
+	if (may <= 0 || (request & may) != request) {
+		rc = -EACCES;
 		goto out_audit;
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	/*
+	 * Return a positive value if using bringup mode.
+	 * This allows the hooks to identify checks that
+	 * succeed because of "b" rules.
+	 */
+	if (may & MAY_BRINGUP)
+		rc = MAY_BRINGUP;
+#endif
 
-	rc = -EACCES;
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
-		smack_log(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, request,
-				rc, a);
+		smack_log(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+			  request, rc, a);
 #endif
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smk_tskacc - determine if a task has a specific access to an object
- * @tsp: a pointer to the subject task
- * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @tsp: a pointer to the subject's task
+ * @obj_known: a pointer to the object's label entry
  * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : common audit data
  *
@@ -203,24 +214,25 @@ out_audit:
  * non zero otherwise. It allows that the task may have the capability
  * to override the rules.
  */
-int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *subject, char *obj_label,
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
 	       u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(subject);
+	struct smack_known *sbj_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
 	int may;
 	int rc;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check the global rule list
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(skp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
-	if (rc == 0) {
+	rc = smk_access(sbj_known, obj_known, mode, NULL);
+	if (rc >= 0) {
 		/*
 		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
 		 * it can further restrict access.
 		 */
-		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
-					&subject->smk_rules);
+		may = smk_access_entry(sbj_known->smk_known,
+				       obj_known->smk_known,
+				       &tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (may < 0)
 			goto out_audit;
 		if ((mode & may) == mode)
@@ -237,14 +249,15 @@ int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *subject, char *obj_label,
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
-		smack_log(skp->smk_known, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+		smack_log(sbj_known->smk_known, obj_known->smk_known,
+			  mode, rc, a);
 #endif
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
- * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @obj_known: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
  * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : common audit data
  *
@@ -253,11 +266,12 @@ out_audit:
  * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
  * to override the rules.
  */
-int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
+	       u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 
-	return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_label, mode, a);
+	return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_known, mode, a);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -328,6 +342,13 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	struct smack_audit_data *sad;
 	struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+	/*
+	 * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
+	 */
+	if (result > 0)
+		result = 0;
+#endif
 	/* check if we have to log the current event */
 	if (result != 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
 		return;
@@ -544,27 +565,6 @@ unlockout:
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_import - import a smack label
- * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
- * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
- *
- * Returns a pointer to the label in the label list that
- * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
- */
-char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
-{
-	struct smack_known *skp;
-
-	/* labels cannot begin with a '-' */
-	if (string[0] == '-')
-		return NULL;
-	skp = smk_import_entry(string, len);
-	if (skp == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	return skp->smk_known;
-}
-
-/**
  * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
  * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
  *
@@ -590,19 +590,3 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return &smack_known_invalid;
 }
-
-/**
- * smack_to_secid - find the secid associated with a Smack label
- * @smack: the Smack label
- *
- * Returns the appropriate secid if there is one,
- * otherwise 0
- */
-u32 smack_to_secid(const char *smack)
-{
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
-
-	if (skp == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	return skp->smk_secid;
-}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 69e5635d89e..d515ec25ae9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -54,6 +54,151 @@
 
 LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (mode & MAY_READ)
+		s[i++] = 'r';
+	if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
+		s[i++] = 'w';
+	if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
+		s[i++] = 'x';
+	if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
+		s[i++] = 'a';
+	if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		s[i++] = 't';
+	if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
+		s[i++] = 'l';
+	if (i == 0)
+		s[i++] = '-';
+	s[i] = '\0';
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
+		       struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s\n",
+		sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
+			  int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n",
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
+		acc, current->comm, note);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	struct task_smack *otsp = task_security(otp);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n",
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, otsp->smk_task->smk_known, acc,
+		current->comm, otp->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %s) %s\n",
+		sskp->smk_known, (char *)file->f_security, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+		current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+				int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %s) %s\n",
+		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+		current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
 /**
  * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
  * @ip: a pointer to the inode
@@ -87,11 +232,11 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
 
 /**
  * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
- * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
  *
  * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
  */
-struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 
@@ -99,7 +244,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
 	if (isp == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
-	isp->smk_inode = smack;
+	isp->smk_inode = skp;
 	isp->smk_flags = 0;
 	mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
 
@@ -178,20 +323,20 @@ static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
 /**
  * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
  * @tracer: tracer process
- * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced,
- *                the pointer must originate from smack structures
+ * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
  * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
  *
  * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
  */
-static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
+				 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
 				 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
-	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tracer_known;
 
 	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
 		smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -200,12 +345,12 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
 	}
 
 	tsp = task_security(tracer);
-	skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
 
 	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
 	    (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
 	     smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
-		if (skp->smk_known == tracee_label)
+		if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
 			rc = 0;
 		else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
 			rc = -EACCES;
@@ -215,13 +360,15 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
 			rc = -EACCES;
 
 		if (saip)
-			smack_log(skp->smk_known, tracee_label, 0, rc, saip);
+			smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
+				  tracee_known->smk_known,
+				  0, rc, saip);
 
 		return rc;
 	}
 
 	/* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
-	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -250,7 +397,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 
 	skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
 
-	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
+	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -273,8 +420,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 
 	skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
 
-	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
-				   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
+	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -318,10 +464,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	if (sbsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
-	sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
-	sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
-	sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
 	/*
 	 * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
 	 */
@@ -405,7 +551,6 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *op;
 	char *commap;
-	char *nsp;
 	int transmute = 0;
 	int specified = 0;
 
@@ -421,38 +566,38 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 
 		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
-			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_hat = nsp;
+			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			if (skp != NULL) {
+				sp->smk_hat = skp;
 				specified = 1;
 			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
-			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_floor = nsp;
+			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			if (skp != NULL) {
+				sp->smk_floor = skp;
 				specified = 1;
 			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
 				   strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
-			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_default = nsp;
+			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			if (skp != NULL) {
+				sp->smk_default = skp;
 				specified = 1;
 			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
-			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			if (skp != NULL) {
+				sp->smk_root = skp;
 				specified = 1;
 			}
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
-			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
-			if (nsp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
+			if (skp != NULL) {
+				sp->smk_root = skp;
 				transmute = 1;
 				specified = 1;
 			}
@@ -469,8 +614,8 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
 		 */
 		skp = smk_of_current();
-		sp->smk_root = skp->smk_known;
-		sp->smk_default = skp->smk_known;
+		sp->smk_root = skp;
+		sp->smk_default = skp;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Initialize the root inode.
@@ -507,6 +652,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -546,7 +692,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
 		if (likely(tracer != NULL))
 			rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
-						   isp->smk_task->smk_known,
+						   isp->smk_task,
 						   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
 						   __func__);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -607,7 +753,7 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp->smk_known);
+	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
 	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
@@ -627,8 +773,8 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
- * @inode: the inode
- * @dir: unused
+ * @inode: the newly created inode
+ * @dir: containing directory object
  * @qstr: unused
  * @name: where to put the attribute name
  * @value: where to put the attribute value
@@ -642,8 +788,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
-	char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+	struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+	struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
 	int may;
 
 	if (name)
@@ -651,7 +797,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 
 	if (value) {
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
+		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
+				       &skp->smk_rules);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		/*
@@ -666,13 +813,13 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 			issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
 		}
 
-		*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_NOFS);
+		*value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (*value == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
 	if (len)
-		*len = strlen(isp) + 1;
+		*len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -688,7 +835,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
-	char *isp;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -697,11 +844,13 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
 	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(old_dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 
 	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
 		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
 		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(new_dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -728,6 +877,7 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
 	 */
 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
@@ -735,6 +885,7 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -759,6 +910,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
 	 */
 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
@@ -766,6 +918,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -773,10 +926,10 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
- * @old_inode: the old directory
- * @old_dentry: unused
- * @new_inode: the new directory
- * @new_dentry: unused
+ * @old_inode: unused
+ * @old_dentry: the old object
+ * @new_inode: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
  *
  * Read and write access is required on both the old and
  * new directories.
@@ -789,7 +942,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
 	int rc;
-	char *isp;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
@@ -797,11 +950,13 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
 	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(old_dentry->d_inode, MAY_READWRITE, rc);
 
 	if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
 		isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
 		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(new_dentry->d_inode, MAY_READWRITE, rc);
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -819,6 +974,7 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+	int rc;
 
 	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
 	/*
@@ -832,7 +988,9 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 		return -ECHILD;
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -845,6 +1003,8 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
 	/*
 	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
 	 */
@@ -853,12 +1013,14 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
- * @mnt: unused
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
  * @dentry: the object
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
@@ -867,21 +1029,24 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct path path;
+	int rc;
 
 	path.dentry = dentry;
 	path.mnt = mnt;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
  * @dentry: the object
  * @name: name of the attribute
- * @value: unused
- * @size: unused
+ * @value: value of the attribute
+ * @size: size of the value
  * @flags: unused
  *
  * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
@@ -923,7 +1088,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		rc = -EPERM;
 
 	if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
-		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
 		if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
 		    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
 			rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -932,8 +1097,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
-	if (rc == 0)
+	if (rc == 0) {
 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -963,9 +1130,9 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 		if (skp != NULL)
-			isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
+			isp->smk_inode = skp;
 		else
-			isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+			isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 		if (skp != NULL)
@@ -993,11 +1160,14 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1033,6 +1203,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1070,14 +1241,14 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
 	struct socket *sock;
 	struct super_block *sbp;
 	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
-	char *isp;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
 	int ilen;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
 		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
-		ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
-		*buffer = isp;
+		ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
+		*buffer = isp->smk_known;
 		return ilen;
 	}
 
@@ -1095,15 +1266,15 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
-		isp = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
+		isp = ssp->smk_in;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
-		isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
+		isp = ssp->smk_out;
 	else
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
+	ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
 	if (rc == 0) {
-		*buffer = isp;
+		*buffer = isp->smk_known;
 		rc = ilen;
 	}
 
@@ -1122,13 +1293,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 				    size_t buffer_size)
 {
-	int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+	int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
 
-	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
+	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
 		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
-		return len;
-	}
-	return -EINVAL;
+
+	return len;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1140,7 +1310,7 @@ static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 
-	*secid = smack_to_secid(isp->smk_inode);
+	*secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1179,7 +1349,7 @@ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	file->f_security = skp->smk_known;
+	file->f_security = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1214,11 +1384,15 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 
-	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
 		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
 
-	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
+	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
 		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1233,10 +1407,13 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
-	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1266,12 +1443,14 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
 		break;
 	case F_SETOWN:
 	case F_SETSIG:
 		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -1298,7 +1477,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	struct smack_known *mkp;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
-	char *osmack;
+	struct smack_known *okp;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	int may;
 	int mmay;
@@ -1324,18 +1503,19 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	 * to that rule's object label.
 	 */
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
-		osmack = srp->smk_object;
+		okp = srp->smk_object;
 		/*
 		 * Matching labels always allows access.
 		 */
-		if (mkp->smk_known == osmack)
+		if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
 			continue;
 		/*
 		 * If there is a matching local rule take
 		 * that into account as well.
 		 */
-		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known, osmack,
-					&tsp->smk_rules);
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+				       okp->smk_known,
+				       &tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (may == -ENOENT)
 			may = srp->smk_access;
 		else
@@ -1352,8 +1532,8 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
 		 * can't have as much access as current.
 		 */
-		mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack,
-						&mkp->smk_rules);
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+					&mkp->smk_rules);
 		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
 			rc = -EACCES;
 			break;
@@ -1362,8 +1542,8 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
 		 * potential access, too.
 		 */
-		tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack,
-						&tsp->smk_rules);
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
 			mmay &= tmay;
 
@@ -1394,7 +1574,7 @@ static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	file->f_security = skp->smk_known;
+	file->f_security = skp;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1423,14 +1603,15 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
 
 	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
-	skp = smk_find_entry(file->f_security);
-	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+	skp = file->f_security;
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
-	smack_log(file->f_security, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+	smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1442,6 +1623,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
  */
 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 {
+	int rc;
 	int may = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
@@ -1455,7 +1637,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 		may |= MAY_WRITE;
 
-	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1477,12 +1661,15 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+		file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 	rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
 
@@ -1621,7 +1808,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 	struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
 
-	tsp->smk_forked = smk_find_entry(isp->smk_inode);
+	tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
 	tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1639,10 +1826,13 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
-	return smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1796,6 +1986,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+	int rc;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
@@ -1803,15 +1994,20 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
-	if (secid == 0)
-		return smk_curacc(tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (secid == 0) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
 	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
 	 * we can't take privilege into account.
 	 */
 	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
-	return smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1845,7 +2041,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
 
-	isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
+	isp->smk_inode = skp;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1903,7 +2099,7 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 *
 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
 */
-static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+static struct smack_known *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
 {
 	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
 	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
@@ -1920,7 +2116,7 @@ static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
 		if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
 		    (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
 			/* we have found the special CIPSO option */
-			if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
+			if (snp->smk_label == &smack_cipso_option)
 				return NULL;
 			return snp->smk_label;
 		}
@@ -1985,13 +2181,13 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int rc;
 	int sk_lbl;
-	char *hostsp;
+	struct smack_known *hkp;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
-	if (hostsp != NULL) {
+	hkp = smack_host_label(sap);
+	if (hkp != NULL) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 		struct lsm_network_audit net;
 
@@ -2002,7 +2198,8 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 #endif
 		sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
-		rc = smk_access(skp, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	} else {
 		sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
 		rc = 0;
@@ -2103,18 +2300,19 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	unsigned short port = 0;
-	char *object;
+	struct smack_known *object;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 #endif
 
 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
 		skp = smack_net_ambient;
-		object = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
+		object = ssp->smk_in;
 	} else {
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
-		object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+		object = smack_net_ambient;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2141,7 +2339,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
 		if (spp->smk_port != port)
 			continue;
-		object = spp->smk_in->smk_known;
+		object = spp->smk_in;
 		if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
 			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
 		break;
@@ -2158,7 +2356,9 @@ auditout:
 	else
 		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
 #endif
-	return smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 port check", skp, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2190,7 +2390,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
-		nsp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
+		nsp->smk_inode = skp;
 		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2332,7 +2532,7 @@ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	msg->security = skp->smk_known;
+	msg->security = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2353,9 +2553,9 @@ static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the smack value
  */
-static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
-	return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
+	return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2369,7 +2569,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	isp->security = skp->smk_known;
+	isp->security = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2395,14 +2595,17 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
  */
 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
 {
-	char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
 #endif
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2477,9 +2680,9 @@ static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the smack value
  */
-static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
-	return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
+	return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2493,7 +2696,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	isp->security = skp->smk_known;
+	isp->security = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2519,14 +2722,17 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
  */
 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
 {
-	char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
 #endif
-	return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2612,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	kisp->security = skp->smk_known;
+	kisp->security = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2633,11 +2839,11 @@ static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
  * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
  * @msq: the object
  *
- * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
  */
-static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
-	return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
+	return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2649,14 +2855,17 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
  */
 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
 {
-	char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
 #endif
-	return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2749,15 +2958,18 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
  */
 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
 {
-	char *isp = ipp->security;
+	struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
 	int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
 	ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
 #endif
-	return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2767,9 +2979,9 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
  */
 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
 {
-	char *smack = ipp->security;
+	struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
 
-	*secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
+	*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2786,7 +2998,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
-	char *final;
+	struct smack_known *final;
 	char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
 	int transflag = 0;
 	int rc;
@@ -2826,8 +3038,8 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
 			 * options.
 			 */
-			sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_star.smk_known;
-			sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+			sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
+			sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
 		}
 		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
@@ -2857,7 +3069,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 *
 		 * Cgroupfs is special
 		 */
-		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		final = &smack_known_star;
 		break;
 	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
 		/*
@@ -2865,7 +3077,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
 		 * pty with respect.
 		 */
-		final = ckp->smk_known;
+		final = ckp;
 		break;
 	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
 		/*
@@ -2879,7 +3091,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
 		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
 		 */
-		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		final = &smack_known_star;
 		/*
 		 * No break.
 		 *
@@ -2898,7 +3110,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
 		 */
 		if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
-			final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+			final = &smack_known_star;
 			break;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -2915,7 +3127,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
 		if (skp != NULL)
-			final = skp->smk_known;
+			final = skp;
 
 		/*
 		 * Transmuting directory
@@ -2964,7 +3176,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	}
 
 	if (final == NULL)
-		isp->smk_inode = ckp->smk_known;
+		isp->smk_inode = ckp;
 	else
 		isp->smk_inode = final;
 
@@ -3089,9 +3301,13 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
 		smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
-		rc = smk_access(skp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-		if (rc == 0)
-			rc = smk_access(okp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+		rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+			rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
+						MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -3117,8 +3333,8 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
-	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
@@ -3130,8 +3346,9 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		return 0;
 
-	skp = ssp->smk_out;
-	return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3345,7 +3562,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		 * This is the simplist possible security model
 		 * for networking.
 		 */
-		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+					MAY_WRITE, rc);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
 		break;
@@ -3488,7 +3707,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr;
 	struct iphdr *hdr;
-	char *hsp;
+	struct smack_known *hskp;
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3525,7 +3744,8 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
 	 * here. Read access is not required.
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3543,10 +3763,10 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
 	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	hsp = smack_host_label(&addr);
+	hskp = smack_host_label(&addr);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	if (hsp == NULL)
+	if (hskp == NULL)
 		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
 	else
 		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
@@ -3598,7 +3818,7 @@ static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
 
-	key->security = skp->smk_known;
+	key->security = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3629,6 +3849,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
 	int request = 0;
+	int rc;
 
 	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	if (keyp == NULL)
@@ -3653,7 +3874,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 		request = MAY_READ;
 	if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
 		request = MAY_WRITE;
-	return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -3684,6 +3907,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
  */
 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char **rule = (char **)vrule;
 	*rule = NULL;
 
@@ -3693,7 +3917,9 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
+	skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
+	if (skp)
+		*rule = skp->smk_known;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3812,7 +4038,12 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
  */
 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	*secid = smack_to_secid(secdata);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+
+	if (skp)
+		*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	else
+		*secid = 0;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 3c720ff1059..bce4e8f1b26 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -131,14 +131,17 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
 
 struct smack_parsed_rule {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
-	char			*smk_object;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_object;
 	int			smk_access1;
 	int			smk_access2;
 };
 
 static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
 
-const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
+struct smack_known smack_cipso_option = {
+	.smk_known	= SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION,
+	.smk_secid	= 0,
+};
 
 /*
  * Values for parsing cipso rules
@@ -304,6 +307,10 @@ static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string)
 		case 'L':
 			perm |= MAY_LOCK;
 			break;
+		case 'b':
+		case 'B':
+			perm |= MAY_BRINGUP;
+			break;
 		default:
 			return perm;
 		}
@@ -335,7 +342,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len);
+		rule->smk_object = smk_import_entry(object, len);
 		if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else {
@@ -355,7 +362,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
 			return -ENOENT;
-		rule->smk_object = skp->smk_known;
+		rule->smk_object = skp;
 	}
 
 	rule->smk_access1 = smk_perm_from_str(access1);
@@ -594,13 +601,15 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 	 * anything you read back.
 	 */
 	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
-	    strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
+	    strlen(srp->smk_object->smk_known) >= max)
 		return;
 
 	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
 		return;
 
-	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject->smk_known, srp->smk_object);
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s",
+		   srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+		   srp->smk_object->smk_known);
 
 	seq_putc(s, ' ');
 
@@ -616,6 +625,8 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 		seq_putc(s, 't');
 	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_LOCK)
 		seq_putc(s, 'l');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_BRINGUP)
+		seq_putc(s, 'b');
 
 	seq_putc(s, '\n');
 }
@@ -1067,7 +1078,7 @@ static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	for (maskn = 0; temp_mask; temp_mask <<= 1, maskn++);
 
 	seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
-		hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label);
+		hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label->smk_known);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1147,10 +1158,10 @@ static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new)
 static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp;
+	struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
 	struct sockaddr_in newname;
 	char *smack;
-	char *sp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *data;
 	char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	int rc;
@@ -1213,15 +1224,15 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
 	 */
 	if (smack[0] != '-') {
-		sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
-		if (sp == NULL) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+		if (skp == NULL) {
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto free_out;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* check known options */
-		if (strcmp(smack, smack_cipso_option) == 0)
-			sp = (char *)smack_cipso_option;
+		if (strcmp(smack, smack_cipso_option.smk_known) == 0)
+			skp = &smack_cipso_option;
 		else {
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 			goto free_out;
@@ -1244,9 +1255,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	/* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
 	found = 0;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
-		if (skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
-		    skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list) {
+		if (snp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
+		    snp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr) {
 			found = 1;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -1254,26 +1265,26 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
 
 	if (found == 0) {
-		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (skp == NULL)
+		snp = kzalloc(sizeof(*snp), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (snp == NULL)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 		else {
 			rc = 0;
-			skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
-			skp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
-			skp->smk_label = sp;
-			smk_netlbladdr_insert(skp);
+			snp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+			snp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+			snp->smk_label = skp;
+			smk_netlbladdr_insert(snp);
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
 		 * wasn't the special CIPSO option */
-		if (skp->smk_label != smack_cipso_option)
+		if (snp->smk_label != &smack_cipso_option)
 			rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
-					&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
+					&snp->smk_host.sin_addr, &snp->smk_mask,
 					PF_INET, &audit_info);
 		else
 			rc = 0;
-		skp->smk_label = sp;
+		snp->smk_label = skp;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1281,10 +1292,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
 	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
 	 */
-	if (rc == 0 && sp != smack_cipso_option)
+	if (rc == 0 && skp != &smack_cipso_option)
 		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
-			&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
-			smack_to_secid(skp->smk_label), &audit_info);
+			&snp->smk_host.sin_addr, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = count;
@@ -1677,7 +1688,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (data == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1880,7 +1891,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else if (res != -ENOENT)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
+	/*
+	 * smk_access() can return a value > 0 in the "bringup" case.
+	 */
+	data[0] = res >= 0 ? '1' : '0';
 	data[1] = '\0';
 
 	simple_transaction_set(file, 2);
@@ -2228,7 +2242,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (data == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;