Merge commit 'v3.14' into next

15 files changed, 93 insertions, 53 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e9c6ac724fe..beb86b500ad 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT
 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
 	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
-	default 32768 if ARM
+	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
 	default 65536
 	help
 	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 9323bbeba29..ad0d4de6994 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -757,7 +757,8 @@ static void cap_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-					  struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+					  struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+					  gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 7c2a0a71049..d3b6d2cd3a0 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static void set_majmin(char *str, unsigned m)
 		sprintf(str, "%u", m);
 }
 
-static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
-			      struct cftype *cft, struct seq_file *m)
+static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
-	struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css);
+	struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m));
 	struct dev_exception_item *ex;
 	char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN];
 
@@ -679,7 +678,7 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
 	},
 	{
 		.name = "list",
-		.read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read,
+		.seq_show = devcgroup_seq_show,
 		.private = DEVCG_LIST,
 	},
 	{ }	/* terminate */
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d46cbc5e335..2fb2576dc64 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1000,7 +1000,11 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle_iterator(const void *object,
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
-	BUG_ON(key != ctx->match_data);
+	/* We might get a keyring with matching index-key that is nonetheless a
+	 * different keyring. */
+	if (key != ctx->match_data)
+		return 0;
+
 	ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EDEADLK);
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 15b6928592e..919cad93ac8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1317,9 +1317,11 @@ void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 
-int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+			       struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx);
+	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d5d67c93b65..869c2f1e0da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -233,6 +233,14 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+	isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
+	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+}
+
 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -243,8 +251,16 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 		list_del_init(&isec->list);
 	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 
-	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+	/*
+	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+	 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
+	 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+	 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+	 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+	 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+	 */
+	call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
 }
 
 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -652,7 +668,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
-					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
+					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2491,7 +2507,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
 		len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
-		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2895,7 +2912,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 			struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -3052,7 +3069,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (!value || !size)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -5527,7 +5544,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			str[size-1] = 0;
 			size--;
 		}
-		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 			if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 				struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -5636,7 +5653,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index b1dfe104945..078e553f52f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 
 struct inode_security_struct {
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode object */
-	struct list_head list;	/* list of inode_security_struct */
+	union {
+		struct list_head list;	/* list of inode_security_struct */
+		struct rcu_head rcu;	/* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
+	};
 	u32 task_sid;		/* SID of creating task */
 	u32 sid;		/* SID of this object */
 	u16 sclass;		/* security class of this object */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 8ed8daf7f1e..ce7852cf526 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
-	u32 *out_sid);
+			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 48c3cc94c16..9f0584710c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 332ac8a80cf..2df7b900e25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/inet_diag.h>
 #include <linux/xfrm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
 
 #include "flask.h"
 #include "av_permissions.h"
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
 {
 	{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
 	{ DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+	{ SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY,	NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
 };
 
 static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 170b4b123ac..c71737f6d1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -731,11 +731,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -817,11 +819,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		objname = namebuf;
 	}
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -878,11 +882,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -934,7 +940,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -994,11 +1000,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index c0f49884212..9c5cdc2caae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -3338,10 +3338,10 @@ static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	buf[0] = ft->stype;
-	buf[1] = ft->ttype;
-	buf[2] = ft->tclass;
-	buf[3] = otype->otype;
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype);
+	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+	buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+	buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype);
 
 	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
 	if (rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index fc5a63a05a1..4bca49414a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1232,6 +1232,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	struct context context;
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	/* An empty security context is never valid. */
+	if (!scontext_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		int i;
 
@@ -1285,16 +1289,18 @@ out:
  * @scontext: security context
  * @scontext_len: length in bytes
  * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
  *
  * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
  * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
-					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2948,25 +2954,21 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	int match = 0;
 
-	if (!rule) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
 		match = -ESTALE;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
-	if (!ctxt) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			  sid);
 		match = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 0462cb3ff0a..98b042630a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
  */
 static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+				   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+				   gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
 	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -282,9 +283,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
-	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
+	return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d814e35987b..14f52be78c7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3616,9 +3616,8 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
 
-	if (!rule) {
-		audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
-			  "Smack: missing rule\n");
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}