Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
 "Nothing all that exciting; a new module-from-fd syscall for those who
  want to verify the source of the module (ChromeOS) and/or use standard
  IMA on it or other security hooks."

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  MODSIGN: Fix kbuild output when using default extra_certificates
  MODSIGN: Avoid using .incbin in C source
  modules: don't hand 0 to vmalloc.
  module: Remove a extra null character at the top of module->strtab.
  ASN.1: Use the ASN1_LONG_TAG and ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH constants
  ASN.1: Define indefinite length marker constant
  moduleparam: use __UNIQUE_ID()
  __UNIQUE_ID()
  MODSIGN: Add modules_sign make target
  powerpc: add finit_module syscall.
  ima: support new kernel module syscall
  add finit_module syscall to asm-generic
  ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM
  security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
  module: add flags arg to sys_finit_module()
  module: add syscall to load module from fd

6 files changed, 43 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index b14a30c234b..0fe5a026aef 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -967,6 +972,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 6ee8826662c..3b2adb794f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		     int flags);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index b356884fb3e..0cea3db2165 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -100,12 +100,12 @@ err_out:
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP, MODULE_CHECK)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP | MODULE_CHECK
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 73c9a268253..45de18e9a6f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -280,6 +280,27 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
+/**
+ * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
+ *
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * Return code is based upon measurement appraisal.
+ */
+int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!file)
+		rc = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	else
+		rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+					 MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
+	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
+}
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c7dacd2eab7..af7d182d5a4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 };
 
 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
@@ -401,6 +402,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8dcd4ae10a5..daa97f4ac9d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -820,6 +820,16 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_module_check(file);
+}
+
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {