Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next

13 files changed, 101 insertions, 118 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 245c6d92065..b76235ae478 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
 #
 config INTEGRITY
-	def_bool y
-	depends on IMA || EVM
+	bool "Integrity subsystem"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option enables the integrity subsystem, which is comprised
+	  of a number of different components including the Integrity
+	  Measurement Architecture (IMA), Extended Verification Module
+	  (EVM), IMA-appraisal extension, digital signature verification
+	  extension and audit measurement log support.
+
+	  Each of these components can be enabled/disabled separately.
+	  Refer to the individual components for additional details.
+
+if INTEGRITY
 
 config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	boolean "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
-	depends on INTEGRITY && KEYS
+	depends on KEYS
 	default n
 	select SIGNATURE
 	help
@@ -17,9 +29,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
 	  usually only added from initramfs.
 
+config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
+	default n
+        select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+        select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+        select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+        select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	help
+	  This option enables digital signature verification using
+	  asymmetric keys.
+
 config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
-	depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+	depends on AUDIT
 	default y
 	help
 	  In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
@@ -32,17 +56,7 @@ config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	  be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
 	  command line.
 
-config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
-	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
-	default n
-        select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
-        select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
-        select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
-        select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
-	help
-	  This option enables digital signature verification using
-	  asymmetric keys.
-
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+
+endif   # if INTEGRITY
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 0793f4811cb..8d1f4bf5108 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
 integrity-y := iint.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 9eae4809006..37e0d98517a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
@@ -45,8 +46,8 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
 	}
 
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-		pr_warn("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
-			name, PTR_ERR(key));
+		pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
+				   name, PTR_ERR(key));
 		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
 			/* Hide some search errors */
 		case -EACCES:
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index d606f3d12d6..df586fa00ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 config EVM
 	boolean "EVM support"
-	depends on SECURITY
 	select KEYS
 	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
@@ -12,10 +11,6 @@ config EVM
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-if EVM
-
-menu "EVM options"
-
 config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
 	bool "FSUUID (version 2)"
 	default y
@@ -47,6 +42,3 @@ config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
 	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
 	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
 
-endmenu
-
-endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 3bcb80df4d0..9685af330de 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -126,14 +126,15 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
 				GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc <= 0) {
-		if (rc == 0)
-			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; /* empty */
-		else if (rc == -ENODATA) {
+		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		if (rc == -ENODATA) {
 			rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
 			if (rc > 0)
 				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
 			else if (rc == 0)
 				evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
+		} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 		}
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -284,6 +285,13 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+			return 0;
+	}
 out:
 	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
@@ -352,7 +360,6 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		return;
 
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
-	return;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -372,7 +379,6 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	return;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -414,7 +420,6 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 
 	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
 		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	return;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 08758fbd496..e099875643c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
 #
 config IMA
 	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
-	depends on SECURITY
-	select INTEGRITY
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 57da4bd7ba0..8e4bb883fc1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -90,10 +90,7 @@ extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
-void ima_cleanup(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
-void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
-int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 			   const char *op, struct inode *inode,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
@@ -110,8 +107,6 @@ void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
-int ima_init_template(void);
-
 /*
  * used to protect h_table and sha_table
  */
@@ -151,12 +146,6 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
-/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
- * integrity data associated with an inode.
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
-
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
 
@@ -177,7 +166,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len);
+			     int xattr_len, int opened);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -193,7 +182,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
 					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-					   int xattr_len)
+					   int xattr_len, int opened)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d9cd5ce14d2..65c41a968cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -330,10 +330,9 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
 {
 	char *pathname = NULL;
 
-	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
-	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
+	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (*pathbuf) {
-		pathname = d_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
+		pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
 		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
 			kfree(*pathbuf);
 			*pathbuf = NULL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 86bfd5c5df8..013ec3f0e42 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			     int xattr_len)
+			     int xattr_len, int opened)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
 	char *cause = "unknown";
@@ -192,8 +192,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
 
-	if (!ima_appraise)
-		return 0;
 	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
@@ -202,8 +200,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			goto out;
 
 		cause = "missing-hash";
-		status =
-		    (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+		status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+		if (opened & FILE_CREATED) {
+			iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 0bd732843fe..d34e7dfc111 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -80,24 +80,24 @@ static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 {
 	mm_segment_t old_fs;
 	char __user *buf = addr;
-	ssize_t ret;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
 		return -EBADF;
-	if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read)
-		return -EINVAL;
 
 	old_fs = get_fs();
 	set_fs(get_ds());
 	if (file->f_op->read)
 		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else
+	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
 		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
+		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
 	set_fs(old_fs);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int ima_init_crypto(void)
+int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
 
@@ -116,7 +116,10 @@ static struct crypto_shash *ima_alloc_tfm(enum hash_algo algo)
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm = ima_shash_tfm;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+	if (algo < 0 || algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+	if (algo != ima_hash_algo) {
 		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
 			rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
@@ -200,7 +203,10 @@ static struct crypto_ahash *ima_alloc_atfm(enum hash_algo algo)
 	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ima_ahash_tfm;
 	int rc;
 
-	if ((algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) || !tfm) {
+	if (algo < 0 || algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		algo = ima_hash_algo;
+
+	if (algo != ima_hash_algo || !tfm) {
 		tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
 		if (!IS_ERR(tfm)) {
 			if (algo == ima_hash_algo)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2917f980bf3..673a37e92ba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -124,11 +124,13 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
-	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
-	    iint->version != inode->i_version) {
-		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
-			ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+		if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
+		    (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+			if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+				ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 }
@@ -154,15 +156,15 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
-			       int mask, int function)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
+			       int opened)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
-	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 
@@ -180,7 +182,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
 	/*  Is the appraise rule hook specific?  */
-	_func = (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) ? FILE_CHECK : function;
+	if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
+		function = FILE_CHECK;
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
@@ -199,15 +202,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
 	if (!action) {
 		if (must_appraise)
-			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, _func);
+			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
 	template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
-	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
-		if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-			xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
-	} else
+	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
+		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
 		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
@@ -217,14 +218,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		goto out_digsig;
 	}
 
-	pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+	pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
 				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
 	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
-					      xattr_value, xattr_len);
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname,
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
 		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ out:
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
-		return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+		return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -272,10 +273,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
  */
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file,
-				   (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
-				   bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
-				   MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -288,12 +286,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
 {
 	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL,
+	return process_measurement(file,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
-				   FILE_CHECK);
+				   FILE_CHECK, opened);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
@@ -316,7 +314,7 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
 #endif
 		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -327,7 +325,7 @@ int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
 		return 0;
 	}
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index a076a967ec4..e854862c933 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -152,24 +152,6 @@ out:
 	return result;
 }
 
-static int init_defined_templates(void)
-{
-	int i = 0;
-	int result = 0;
-
-	/* Init defined templates. */
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates); i++) {
-		struct ima_template_desc *template = &defined_templates[i];
-
-		result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
-						   &(template->fields),
-						   &(template->num_fields));
-		if (result < 0)
-			return result;
-	}
-	return result;
-}
-
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 {
 	if (!ima_template)
@@ -178,13 +160,11 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 	return ima_template;
 }
 
-int ima_init_template(void)
+int __init ima_init_template(void)
 {
-	int result;
-
-	result = init_defined_templates();
-	if (result < 0)
-		return result;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
 
-	return 0;
+	return template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+					 &(template->fields),
+					 &(template->num_fields));
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 19b8e314ca9..c0379d13dbe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x04000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x08000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
@@ -116,7 +117,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
  * integrity data associated with an inode.
  */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0