diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/sctp/constants.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/sctp/structs.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/endpointola.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 31 |
4 files changed, 11 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/sctp/constants.h b/include/net/sctp/constants.h index c29707d654c..a7dd5c50df7 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/constants.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/constants.h @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ enum { SCTP_MAX_GABS = 16 }; * to which we will raise the P-MTU. */ #define SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT 512 /* MTU size ... if no mtu disc */ -#define SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS 2 /* How many secrets I keep */ + #define SCTP_SECRET_SIZE 32 /* Number of octets in a 256 bits. */ #define SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 /* size of a SLA-1 signature */ diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h index fdeb85a970f..0e0f9d2322e 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h @@ -1236,10 +1236,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { * Discussion in [RFC1750] can be helpful in * selection of the key. */ - __u8 secret_key[SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS][SCTP_SECRET_SIZE]; - int current_key; - int last_key; - int key_changed_at; + __u8 secret_key[SCTP_SECRET_SIZE]; /* digest: This is a digest of the sctp cookie. This field is * only used on the receive path when we try to validate diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 1a9c5fb7731..73aad3d16a4 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy; /* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */ - get_random_bytes(&ep->secret_key[0], SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); - ep->last_key = ep->current_key = 0; - ep->key_changed_at = jiffies; + get_random_bytes(ep->secret_key, sizeof(ep->secret_key)); /* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys); @@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { - int i; - SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); - for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) - memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + memset(ep->secret_key, 0, sizeof(ep->secret_key)); /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index e1c5fc2be6b..a193f3bc814 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1589,8 +1589,6 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie; struct scatterlist sg; int headersize, bodysize; - unsigned int keylen; - char *key; /* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including * any padding. @@ -1650,12 +1648,11 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, /* Sign the message. */ sg_init_one(&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize); - keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE; - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags = 0; - if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) || + if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, ep->secret_key, + sizeof(ep->secret_key)) || crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, cookie->signature)) goto free_cookie; } @@ -1682,8 +1679,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( int headersize, bodysize, fixed_size; __u8 *digest = ep->digest; struct scatterlist sg; - unsigned int keylen, len; - char *key; + unsigned int len; sctp_scope_t scope; struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb; struct timeval tv; @@ -1718,34 +1714,21 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( goto no_hmac; /* Check the signature. */ - keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE; sg_init_one(&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize); - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key]; desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac; desc.flags = 0; memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) || + if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, ep->secret_key, + sizeof(ep->secret_key)) || crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM; goto fail; } if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) { - /* Try the previous key. */ - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key]; - memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) || - crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) { - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) { - /* Yikes! Still bad signature! */ - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG; - goto fail; - } + *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG; + goto fail; } no_hmac: |