diff options
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/mach-ux500/board-mop500.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/rtc/rtc-coh901331.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/dcache.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/gfs2/glock.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bit_spinlock.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/list_bl.h | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 36 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/avc.h | 18 |
9 files changed, 90 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-ux500/board-mop500.c b/arch/arm/mach-ux500/board-mop500.c index af913741e6e..6e1907fa94f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-ux500/board-mop500.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-ux500/board-mop500.c @@ -178,16 +178,15 @@ static struct i2c_board_info __initdata mop500_i2c0_devices[] = { .irq = NOMADIK_GPIO_TO_IRQ(217), .platform_data = &mop500_tc35892_data, }, -}; - -/* I2C0 devices only available prior to HREFv60 */ -static struct i2c_board_info __initdata mop500_i2c0_old_devices[] = { + /* I2C0 devices only available prior to HREFv60 */ { I2C_BOARD_INFO("tps61052", 0x33), .platform_data = &mop500_tps61052_data, }, }; +#define NUM_PRE_V60_I2C0_DEVICES 1 + static struct i2c_board_info __initdata mop500_i2c2_devices[] = { { /* lp5521 LED driver, 1st device */ @@ -425,6 +424,8 @@ static void __init mop500_uart_init(void) static void __init mop500_init_machine(void) { + int i2c0_devs; + /* * The HREFv60 board removed a GPIO expander and routed * all these GPIO pins to the internal GPIO controller @@ -448,11 +449,11 @@ static void __init mop500_init_machine(void) platform_device_register(&ab8500_device); - i2c_register_board_info(0, mop500_i2c0_devices, - ARRAY_SIZE(mop500_i2c0_devices)); - if (!machine_is_hrefv60()) - i2c_register_board_info(0, mop500_i2c0_old_devices, - ARRAY_SIZE(mop500_i2c0_old_devices)); + i2c0_devs = ARRAY_SIZE(mop500_i2c0_devices); + if (machine_is_hrefv60()) + i2c0_devs -= NUM_PRE_V60_I2C0_DEVICES; + + i2c_register_board_info(0, mop500_i2c0_devices, i2c0_devs); i2c_register_board_info(2, mop500_i2c2_devices, ARRAY_SIZE(mop500_i2c2_devices)); } diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-coh901331.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-coh901331.c index 316f484999b..80f9c88214c 100644 --- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-coh901331.c +++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-coh901331.c @@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static int __init coh901331_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } clk_disable(rtap->clk); + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, rtap); rtap->rtc = rtc_device_register("coh901331", &pdev->dev, &coh901331_ops, THIS_MODULE); if (IS_ERR(rtap->rtc)) { @@ -227,11 +228,10 @@ static int __init coh901331_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto out_no_rtc; } - platform_set_drvdata(pdev, rtap); - return 0; out_no_rtc: + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL); out_no_clk_enable: clk_put(rtap->clk); out_no_clk: diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c index d600a0af3b2..22a0ef41bad 100644 --- a/fs/dcache.c +++ b/fs/dcache.c @@ -109,16 +109,6 @@ static inline struct hlist_bl_head *d_hash(struct dentry *parent, return dentry_hashtable + (hash & D_HASHMASK); } -static inline void spin_lock_bucket(struct hlist_bl_head *b) -{ - bit_spin_lock(0, (unsigned long *)&b->first); -} - -static inline void spin_unlock_bucket(struct hlist_bl_head *b) -{ - __bit_spin_unlock(0, (unsigned long *)&b->first); -} - /* Statistics gathering. */ struct dentry_stat_t dentry_stat = { .age_limit = 45, @@ -334,10 +324,10 @@ void __d_drop(struct dentry *dentry) else b = d_hash(dentry->d_parent, dentry->d_name.hash); - spin_lock_bucket(b); + hlist_bl_lock(b); __hlist_bl_del(&dentry->d_hash); dentry->d_hash.pprev = NULL; - spin_unlock_bucket(b); + hlist_bl_unlock(b); dentry_rcuwalk_barrier(dentry); } @@ -1594,9 +1584,9 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) tmp->d_inode = inode; tmp->d_flags |= DCACHE_DISCONNECTED; list_add(&tmp->d_alias, &inode->i_dentry); - spin_lock_bucket(&tmp->d_sb->s_anon); + hlist_bl_lock(&tmp->d_sb->s_anon); hlist_bl_add_head(&tmp->d_hash, &tmp->d_sb->s_anon); - spin_unlock_bucket(&tmp->d_sb->s_anon); + hlist_bl_unlock(&tmp->d_sb->s_anon); spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode); @@ -2076,10 +2066,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(d_delete); static void __d_rehash(struct dentry * entry, struct hlist_bl_head *b) { BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(entry)); - spin_lock_bucket(b); + hlist_bl_lock(b); entry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS; hlist_bl_add_head_rcu(&entry->d_hash, b); - spin_unlock_bucket(b); + hlist_bl_unlock(b); } static void _d_rehash(struct dentry * entry) diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glock.c b/fs/gfs2/glock.c index f07643e21bf..7a4fb630a32 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glock.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/glock.c @@ -93,14 +93,12 @@ static unsigned int gl_hash(const struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, static inline void spin_lock_bucket(unsigned int hash) { - struct hlist_bl_head *bl = &gl_hash_table[hash]; - bit_spin_lock(0, (unsigned long *)bl); + hlist_bl_lock(&gl_hash_table[hash]); } static inline void spin_unlock_bucket(unsigned int hash) { - struct hlist_bl_head *bl = &gl_hash_table[hash]; - __bit_spin_unlock(0, (unsigned long *)bl); + hlist_bl_unlock(&gl_hash_table[hash]); } static void gfs2_glock_dealloc(struct rcu_head *rcu) diff --git a/include/linux/bit_spinlock.h b/include/linux/bit_spinlock.h index e612575a259..b4326bfa684 100644 --- a/include/linux/bit_spinlock.h +++ b/include/linux/bit_spinlock.h @@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ static inline void bit_spin_lock(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) preempt_disable(); #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) while (unlikely(test_and_set_bit_lock(bitnum, addr))) { - while (test_bit(bitnum, addr)) { - preempt_enable(); + preempt_enable(); + do { cpu_relax(); - preempt_disable(); - } + } while (test_bit(bitnum, addr)); + preempt_disable(); } #endif __acquire(bitlock); diff --git a/include/linux/list_bl.h b/include/linux/list_bl.h index 5bad17d1acd..31f9d75adc5 100644 --- a/include/linux/list_bl.h +++ b/include/linux/list_bl.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #define _LINUX_LIST_BL_H #include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/bit_spinlock.h> /* * Special version of lists, where head of the list has a lock in the lowest @@ -114,6 +115,16 @@ static inline void hlist_bl_del_init(struct hlist_bl_node *n) } } +static inline void hlist_bl_lock(struct hlist_bl_head *b) +{ + bit_spin_lock(0, (unsigned long *)b); +} + +static inline void hlist_bl_unlock(struct hlist_bl_head *b) +{ + __bit_spin_unlock(0, (unsigned long *)b); +} + /** * hlist_bl_for_each_entry - iterate over list of given type * @tpos: the type * to use as a loop cursor. diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 9da6420e205..1d027e29ce8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) * @avd: access vector decisions * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit * @a: auxiliary audit data + * @flags: VFS walk flags * * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance * with the policy. This function is typically called by @@ -481,9 +482,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released * before calling the auditing code. */ -void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, +int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a) + struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a, + unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data stack_data; u32 denied, audited; @@ -515,11 +517,24 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, else audited = requested & avd->auditallow; if (!audited) - return; + return 0; + if (!a) { a = &stack_data; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE); } + + /* + * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry. This is because + * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU + * safe. Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes + * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation + * happened a little later. + */ + if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) && + (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)) + return -ECHILD; + a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass; a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested; a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid; @@ -529,6 +544,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback; a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback; common_lsm_audit(a); + return 0; } /** @@ -793,6 +809,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data + * @flags: VFS walk flags * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions @@ -802,14 +819,19 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or * another -errno upon other errors. */ -int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata) +int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata, + unsigned flags) { struct av_decision avd; - int rc; + int rc, rc2; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd); - avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata); + + rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, + flags); + if (rc2) + return rc2; return rc; } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a73f4e46377..f7cf0ea6fae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1446,8 +1446,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, } rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) - avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); + if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { + int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); + if (rc2) + return rc2; + } return rc; } @@ -1467,7 +1470,8 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode, u32 perms, - struct common_audit_data *adp) + struct common_audit_data *adp, + unsigned flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -1487,7 +1491,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, ad.u.fs.inode = inode; } - return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); + return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing @@ -1504,7 +1508,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt; ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry; - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to @@ -1540,7 +1544,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) - rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); + rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); out: return rc; @@ -2103,7 +2107,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, file = file_priv->file; inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode, - FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { + FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) { drop_tty = 1; } } @@ -2649,10 +2653,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag if (!mask) return 0; - /* May be droppable after audit */ - if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU) - return -ECHILD; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); ad.u.fs.inode = inode; @@ -2661,7 +2661,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad); + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) @@ -3209,7 +3209,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL); + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0); } /* task security operations */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 5615081b73e..e77b2ac2908 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ struct avc_cache_stats { void __init avc_init(void); -void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, +int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, - struct common_audit_data *a); + struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags); #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, @@ -66,9 +66,17 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, unsigned flags, struct av_decision *avd); -int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct common_audit_data *auditdata); +int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct common_audit_data *auditdata, + unsigned); + +static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct common_audit_data *auditdata) +{ + return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0); +} u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); |