diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 210 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 197 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 379 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 30 |
9 files changed, 827 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/intel_txt.txt b/Documentation/intel_txt.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f40a1f03001 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/intel_txt.txt @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +Intel(R) TXT Overview: +===================== + +Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel(R) Trusted Execution +Technology (Intel(R) TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that +provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms. + +Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT). + +Intel TXT in Brief: +o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) +o Data protection in case of improper shutdown +o Measurement and verification of launched environment + +Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some +non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems +based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell +Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, +PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets. + +For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/. +This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, +which has been updated for the new released platforms. + +Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few +years, some of which are: + LinuxTAG 2008: + http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag/ + details.html?talkid=110 + TRUST2008: + http://www.trust2008.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/ + 3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf + IDF 2008, Shanghai: + http://inteldeveloperforum.com.edgesuite.net/shanghai_2008/ + aep/PROS003/index.html + IDFs 2006, 2007 (I'm not sure if/where they are online) + +Trusted Boot Project Overview: +============================= + +Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre- kernel/VMM module that +uses Intel TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS +kernel/VMM. + +It is hosted on SourceForge at http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot. +The mercurial source repo is available at http://www.bughost.org/ +repos.hg/tboot.hg. + +Tboot currently supports launching Xen (open source VMM/hypervisor +w/ TXT support since v3.2), and now Linux kernels. + + +Value Proposition for Linux or "Why should you care?" +===================================================== + +While there are many products and technologies that attempt to +measure or protect the integrity of a running kernel, they all +assume the kernel is "good" to begin with. The Integrity +Measurement Architecture (IMA) and Linux Integrity Module interface +are examples of such solutions. + +To get trust in the initial kernel without using Intel TXT, a +static root of trust must be used. This bases trust in BIOS +starting at system reset and requires measurement of all code +executed between system reset through the completion of the kernel +boot as well as data objects used by that code. In the case of a +Linux kernel, this means all of BIOS, any option ROMs, the +bootloader and the boot config. In practice, this is a lot of +code/data, much of which is subject to change from boot to boot +(e.g. changing NICs may change option ROMs). Without reference +hashes, these measurement changes are difficult to assess or +confirm as benign. This process also does not provide DMA +protection, memory configuration/alias checks and locks, crash +protection, or policy support. + +By using the hardware-based root of trust that Intel TXT provides, +many of these issues can be mitigated. Specifically: many +pre-launch components can be removed from the trust chain, DMA +protection is provided to all launched components, a large number +of platform configuration checks are performed and values locked, +protection is provided for any data in the event of an improper +shutdown, and there is support for policy-based execution/verification. +This provides a more stable measurement and a higher assurance of +system configuration and initial state than would be otherwise +possible. Since the tboot project is open source, source code for +almost all parts of the trust chain is available (excepting SMM and +Intel-provided firmware). + +How Does it Work? +================= + +o Tboot is an executable that is launched by the bootloader as + the "kernel" (the binary the bootloader executes). +o It performs all of the work necessary to determine if the + platform supports Intel TXT and, if so, executes the GETSEC[SENTER] + processor instruction that initiates the dynamic root of trust. + - If tboot determines that the system does not support Intel TXT + or is not configured correctly (e.g. the SINIT AC Module was + incorrect), it will directly launch the kernel with no changes + to any state. + - Tboot will output various information about its progress to the + terminal, serial port, and/or an in-memory log; the output + locations can be configured with a command line switch. +o The GETSEC[SENTER] instruction will return control to tboot and + tboot then verifies certain aspects of the environment (e.g. TPM NV + lock, e820 table does not have invalid entries, etc.). +o It will wake the APs from the special sleep state the GETSEC[SENTER] + instruction had put them in and place them into a wait-for-SIPI + state. + - Because the processors will not respond to an INIT or SIPI when + in the TXT environment, it is necessary to create a small VT-x + guest for the APs. When they run in this guest, they will + simply wait for the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence, which will cause + VMEXITs, and then disable VT and jump to the SIPI vector. This + approach seemed like a better choice than having to insert + special code into the kernel's MP wakeup sequence. +o Tboot then applies an (optional) user-defined launch policy to + verify the kernel and initrd. + - This policy is rooted in TPM NV and is described in the tboot + project. The tboot project also contains code for tools to + create and provision the policy. + - Policies are completely under user control and if not present + then any kernel will be launched. + - Policy action is flexible and can include halting on failures + or simply logging them and continuing. +o Tboot adjusts the e820 table provided by the bootloader to reserve + its own location in memory as well as to reserve certain other + TXT-related regions. +o As part of it's launch, tboot DMA protects all of RAM (using the + VT-d PMRs). Thus, the kernel must be booted with 'intel_iommu=on' + in order to remove this blanket protection and use VT-d's + page-level protection. +o Tboot will populate a shared page with some data about itself and + pass this to the Linux kernel as it transfers control. + - The location of the shared page is passed via the boot_params + struct as a physical address. +o The kernel will look for the tboot shared page address and, if it + exists, map it. +o As one of the checks/protections provided by TXT, it makes a copy + of the VT-d DMARs in a DMA-protected region of memory and verifies + them for correctness. The VT-d code will detect if the kernel was + launched with tboot and use this copy instead of the one in the + ACPI table. +o At this point, tboot and TXT are out of the picture until a + shutdown (S<n>) +o In order to put a system into any of the sleep states after a TXT + launch, TXT must first be exited. This is to prevent attacks that + attempt to crash the system to gain control on reboot and steal + data left in memory. + - The kernel will perform all of its sleep preparation and + populate the shared page with the ACPI data needed to put the + platform in the desired sleep state. + - Then the kernel jumps into tboot via the vector specified in the + shared page. + - Tboot will clean up the environment and disable TXT, then use the + kernel-provided ACPI information to actually place the platform + into the desired sleep state. + - In the case of S3, tboot will also register itself as the resume + vector. This is necessary because it must re-establish the + measured environment upon resume. Once the TXT environment + has been restored, it will restore the TPM PCRs and then + transfer control back to the kernel's S3 resume vector. + In order to preserve system integrity across S3, the kernel + provides tboot with a set of memory ranges (kernel + code/data/bss, S3 resume code, and AP trampoline) that tboot + will calculate a MAC (message authentication code) over and then + seal with the TPM. On resume and once the measured environment + has been re-established, tboot will re-calculate the MAC and + verify it against the sealed value. Tboot's policy determines + what happens if the verification fails. + +That's pretty much it for TXT support. + + +Configuring the System: +====================== + +This code works with 32bit, 32bit PAE, and 64bit (x86_64) kernels. + +In BIOS, the user must enable: TPM, TXT, VT-x, VT-d. Not all BIOSes +allow these to be individually enabled/disabled and the screens in +which to find them are BIOS-specific. + +grub.conf needs to be modified as follows: + title Linux 2.6.29-tip w/ tboot + root (hd0,0) + kernel /tboot.gz logging=serial,vga,memory + module /vmlinuz-2.6.29-tip intel_iommu=on ro + root=LABEL=/ rhgb console=ttyS0,115200 3 + module /initrd-2.6.29-tip.img + module /Q35_SINIT_17.BIN + +The kernel option for enabling Intel TXT support is found under the +Security top-level menu and is called "Enable Intel(R) Trusted +Execution Technology (TXT)". It is marked as EXPERIMENTAL and +depends on the generic x86 support (to allow maximum flexibility in +kernel build options), since the tboot code will detect whether the +platform actually supports Intel TXT and thus whether any of the +kernel code is executed. + +The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an +Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the +system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is an +(unencrypted) module signed by Intel that is used as part of the +DRTM process to verify and configure the system. It is signed +because it operates at a higher privilege level in the system than +any other macrocode and its correct operation is critical to the +establishment of the DRTM. The process for determining the correct +SINIT ACM for a system is documented in the SINIT-guide.txt file +that is on the tboot SourceForge site under the SINIT ACM downloads. diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt index 4f913857b8a..feb37e17701 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning 000/040 ALL screen_info Text mode or frame buffer information (struct screen_info) 040/014 ALL apm_bios_info APM BIOS information (struct apm_bios_info) +058/008 ALL tboot_addr Physical address of tboot shared page 060/010 ALL ist_info Intel SpeedStep (IST) BIOS support information (struct ist_info) 080/010 ALL hd0_info hd0 disk parameter, OBSOLETE!! diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h index 1724e8de317..6ca20218dd7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h @@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ struct efi_info { struct boot_params { struct screen_info screen_info; /* 0x000 */ struct apm_bios_info apm_bios_info; /* 0x040 */ - __u8 _pad2[12]; /* 0x054 */ + __u8 _pad2[4]; /* 0x054 */ + __u64 tboot_addr; /* 0x058 */ struct ist_info ist_info; /* 0x060 */ __u8 _pad3[16]; /* 0x070 */ __u8 hd0_info[16]; /* obsolete! */ /* 0x080 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h index 7b2d71df39a..14f9890eb49 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h @@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ enum fixed_addresses { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 FIX_WP_TEST, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TXT + FIX_TBOOT_BASE, +#endif __end_of_fixed_addresses }; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b13929d4e5f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +/* + * tboot.h: shared data structure with tboot and kernel and functions + * used by kernel for runtime support of Intel(R) Trusted + * Execution Technology + * + * Copyright (c) 2006-2009, Intel Corporation + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, + * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT + * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for + * more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with + * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + * + */ + +#ifndef _ASM_TBOOT_H +#define _ASM_TBOOT_H + +#include <acpi/acpi.h> + +/* these must have the values from 0-5 in this order */ +enum { + TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT = 0, + TB_SHUTDOWN_S5, + TB_SHUTDOWN_S4, + TB_SHUTDOWN_S3, + TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT, + TB_SHUTDOWN_WFS +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TXT + +/* used to communicate between tboot and the launched kernel */ + +#define TB_KEY_SIZE 64 /* 512 bits */ + +#define MAX_TB_MAC_REGIONS 32 + +struct tboot_mac_region { + u64 start; /* must be 64 byte -aligned */ + u32 size; /* must be 64 byte -granular */ +} __packed; + +/* GAS - Generic Address Structure (ACPI 2.0+) */ +struct tboot_acpi_generic_address { + u8 space_id; + u8 bit_width; + u8 bit_offset; + u8 access_width; + u64 address; +} __packed; + +/* + * combines Sx info from FADT and FACS tables per ACPI 2.0+ spec + * (http://www.acpi.info/) + */ +struct tboot_acpi_sleep_info { + struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1a_cnt_blk; + struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1b_cnt_blk; + struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1a_evt_blk; + struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1b_evt_blk; + u16 pm1a_cnt_val; + u16 pm1b_cnt_val; + u64 wakeup_vector; + u32 vector_width; + u64 kernel_s3_resume_vector; +} __packed; + +/* + * shared memory page used for communication between tboot and kernel + */ +struct tboot { + /* + * version 3+ fields: + */ + + /* TBOOT_UUID */ + u8 uuid[16]; + + /* version number: 5 is current */ + u32 version; + + /* physical addr of tb_log_t log */ + u32 log_addr; + + /* + * physical addr of entry point for tboot shutdown and + * type of shutdown (TB_SHUTDOWN_*) being requested + */ + u32 shutdown_entry; + u32 shutdown_type; + + /* kernel-specified ACPI info for Sx shutdown */ + struct tboot_acpi_sleep_info acpi_sinfo; + + /* tboot location in memory (physical) */ + u32 tboot_base; + u32 tboot_size; + + /* memory regions (phys addrs) for tboot to MAC on S3 */ + u8 num_mac_regions; + struct tboot_mac_region mac_regions[MAX_TB_MAC_REGIONS]; + + + /* + * version 4+ fields: + */ + + /* symmetric key for use by kernel; will be encrypted on S3 */ + u8 s3_key[TB_KEY_SIZE]; + + + /* + * version 5+ fields: + */ + + /* used to 4byte-align num_in_wfs */ + u8 reserved_align[3]; + + /* number of processors in wait-for-SIPI */ + u32 num_in_wfs; +} __packed; + +/* + * UUID for tboot data struct to facilitate matching + * defined as {663C8DFF-E8B3-4b82-AABF-19EA4D057A08} by tboot, which is + * represented as {} in the char array used here + */ +#define TBOOT_UUID {0xff, 0x8d, 0x3c, 0x66, 0xb3, 0xe8, 0x82, 0x4b, 0xbf,\ + 0xaa, 0x19, 0xea, 0x4d, 0x5, 0x7a, 0x8} + +extern struct tboot *tboot; + +static inline int tboot_enabled(void) +{ + return tboot != NULL; +} + +extern void tboot_probe(void); +extern void tboot_create_trampoline(void); +extern void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type); +extern void tboot_sleep(u8 sleep_state, u32 pm1a_control, u32 pm1b_control); +extern int tboot_wait_for_aps(int num_aps); +extern struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table( + struct acpi_table_header *dmar_tbl); +extern int tboot_force_iommu(void); + +#else /* CONFIG_INTEL_TXT */ + +static inline int tboot_enabled(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void tboot_probe(void) +{ +} + +static inline void tboot_create_trampoline(void) +{ +} + +static inline void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type) +{ +} + +static inline void tboot_sleep(u8 sleep_state, u32 pm1a_control, + u32 pm1b_control) +{ +} + +static inline int tboot_wait_for_aps(int num_aps) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table( + struct acpi_table_header *dmar_tbl) +{ + return dmar_tbl; +} + +static inline int tboot_force_iommu(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TXT */ + +#endif /* _ASM_TBOOT_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 430d5b24af7..832cb838cb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_DS_SELFTEST) += ds_selftest.o obj-$(CONFIG_X86_32) += tls.o obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += tls.o obj-y += step.o +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT) += tboot.o obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o obj-y += cpu/ obj-y += acpi/ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index de2cab13284..80d6e9e3248 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ struct boot_params __initdata boot_params; struct boot_params boot_params; #endif +#include <asm/tboot.h> + /* * Machine setup.. */ @@ -964,6 +966,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) paravirt_pagetable_setup_done(swapper_pg_dir); paravirt_post_allocator_init(); + tboot_probe(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 map_vsyscall(); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..263591afd29 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +/* + * tboot.c: main implementation of helper functions used by kernel for + * runtime support of Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology + * + * Copyright (c) 2006-2009, Intel Corporation + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, + * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT + * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for + * more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with + * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + * + */ + +#include <linux/dma_remapping.h> +#include <linux/init_task.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/dmar.h> +#include <linux/pfn.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> + +#include <asm/trampoline.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/bootparam.h> +#include <asm/pgtable.h> +#include <asm/pgalloc.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> +#include <asm/tboot.h> +#include <asm/e820.h> +#include <asm/io.h> + +#include "acpi/realmode/wakeup.h" + +/* Global pointer to shared data; NULL means no measured launch. */ +struct tboot *tboot __read_mostly; + +/* timeout for APs (in secs) to enter wait-for-SIPI state during shutdown */ +#define AP_WAIT_TIMEOUT 1 + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tboot: " fmt + +static u8 tboot_uuid[16] __initdata = TBOOT_UUID; + +void __init tboot_probe(void) +{ + /* Look for valid page-aligned address for shared page. */ + if (!boot_params.tboot_addr) + return; + /* + * also verify that it is mapped as we expect it before calling + * set_fixmap(), to reduce chance of garbage value causing crash + */ + if (!e820_any_mapped(boot_params.tboot_addr, + boot_params.tboot_addr, E820_RESERVED)) { + pr_warning("non-0 tboot_addr but it is not of type E820_RESERVED\n"); + return; + } + + /* only a natively booted kernel should be using TXT */ + if (paravirt_enabled()) { + pr_warning("non-0 tboot_addr but pv_ops is enabled\n"); + return; + } + + /* Map and check for tboot UUID. */ + set_fixmap(FIX_TBOOT_BASE, boot_params.tboot_addr); + tboot = (struct tboot *)fix_to_virt(FIX_TBOOT_BASE); + if (memcmp(&tboot_uuid, &tboot->uuid, sizeof(tboot->uuid))) { + pr_warning("tboot at 0x%llx is invalid\n", + boot_params.tboot_addr); + tboot = NULL; + return; + } + if (tboot->version < 5) { + pr_warning("tboot version is invalid: %u\n", tboot->version); + tboot = NULL; + return; + } + + pr_info("found shared page at phys addr 0x%llx:\n", + boot_params.tboot_addr); + pr_debug("version: %d\n", tboot->version); + pr_debug("log_addr: 0x%08x\n", tboot->log_addr); + pr_debug("shutdown_entry: 0x%x\n", tboot->shutdown_entry); + pr_debug("tboot_base: 0x%08x\n", tboot->tboot_base); + pr_debug("tboot_size: 0x%x\n", tboot->tboot_size); +} + +static pgd_t *tboot_pg_dir; +static struct mm_struct tboot_mm = { + .mm_rb = RB_ROOT, + .pgd = swapper_pg_dir, + .mm_users = ATOMIC_INIT(2), + .mm_count = ATOMIC_INIT(1), + .mmap_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_mm.mmap_sem), + .page_table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_mm.page_table_lock), + .mmlist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_mm.mmlist), + .cpu_vm_mask = CPU_MASK_ALL, +}; + +static inline void switch_to_tboot_pt(void) +{ + write_cr3(virt_to_phys(tboot_pg_dir)); +} + +static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn, + pgprot_t prot) +{ + pgd_t *pgd; + pud_t *pud; + pmd_t *pmd; + pte_t *pte; + + pgd = pgd_offset(&tboot_mm, vaddr); + pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr); + if (!pud) + return -1; + pmd = pmd_alloc(&tboot_mm, pud, vaddr); + if (!pmd) + return -1; + pte = pte_alloc_map(&tboot_mm, pmd, vaddr); + if (!pte) + return -1; + set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot)); + pte_unmap(pte); + return 0; +} + +static int map_tboot_pages(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long start_pfn, + unsigned long nr) +{ + /* Reuse the original kernel mapping */ + tboot_pg_dir = pgd_alloc(&tboot_mm); + if (!tboot_pg_dir) + return -1; + + for (; nr > 0; nr--, vaddr += PAGE_SIZE, start_pfn++) { + if (map_tboot_page(vaddr, start_pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)) + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +void tboot_create_trampoline(void) +{ + u32 map_base, map_size; + + if (!tboot_enabled()) + return; + + /* Create identity map for tboot shutdown code. */ + map_base = PFN_DOWN(tboot->tboot_base); + map_size = PFN_UP(tboot->tboot_size); + if (map_tboot_pages(map_base << PAGE_SHIFT, map_base, map_size)) + panic("tboot: Error mapping tboot pages (mfns) @ 0x%x, 0x%x\n", map_base, map_size); +} + +static void set_mac_regions(void) +{ + tboot->num_mac_regions = 3; + /* S3 resume code */ + tboot->mac_regions[0].start = PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(acpi_wakeup_address)); + tboot->mac_regions[0].size = PFN_UP(WAKEUP_SIZE) << PAGE_SHIFT; + /* AP trampoline code */ + tboot->mac_regions[1].start = + PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(trampoline_base))); + tboot->mac_regions[1].size = PFN_UP(TRAMPOLINE_SIZE) << PAGE_SHIFT; + /* kernel code + data + bss */ + tboot->mac_regions[2].start = PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(&_text))); + tboot->mac_regions[2].size = PFN_PHYS(PFN_UP(virt_to_phys(&_end))) - + PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(&_text))); +} + +void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type) +{ + void (*shutdown)(void); + + if (!tboot_enabled()) + return; + + /* + * if we're being called before the 1:1 mapping is set up then just + * return and let the normal shutdown happen; this should only be + * due to very early panic() + */ + if (!tboot_pg_dir) + return; + + /* if this is S3 then set regions to MAC */ + if (shutdown_type == TB_SHUTDOWN_S3) + set_mac_regions(); + + tboot->shutdown_type = shutdown_type; + + switch_to_tboot_pt(); + + shutdown = (void(*)(void))(unsigned long)tboot->shutdown_entry; + shutdown(); + + /* should not reach here */ + while (1) + halt(); +} + +static void tboot_copy_fadt(const struct acpi_table_fadt *fadt) +{ +#define TB_COPY_GAS(tbg, g) \ + tbg.space_id = g.space_id; \ + tbg.bit_width = g.bit_width; \ + tbg.bit_offset = g.bit_offset; \ + tbg.access_width = g.access_width; \ + tbg.address = g.address; + + TB_COPY_GAS(tboot->acpi_sinfo.pm1a_cnt_blk, fadt->xpm1a_control_block); + TB_COPY_GAS(tboot->acpi_sinfo.pm1b_cnt_blk, fadt->xpm1b_control_block); + TB_COPY_GAS(tboot->acpi_sinfo.pm1a_evt_blk, fadt->xpm1a_event_block); + TB_COPY_GAS(tboot->acpi_sinfo.pm1b_evt_blk, fadt->xpm1b_event_block); + + /* + * We need phys addr of waking vector, but can't use virt_to_phys() on + * &acpi_gbl_FACS because it is ioremap'ed, so calc from FACS phys + * addr. + */ + tboot->acpi_sinfo.wakeup_vector = fadt->facs + + offsetof(struct acpi_table_facs, firmware_waking_vector); +} + +void tboot_sleep(u8 sleep_state, u32 pm1a_control, u32 pm1b_control) +{ + static u32 acpi_shutdown_map[ACPI_S_STATE_COUNT] = { + /* S0,1,2: */ -1, -1, -1, + /* S3: */ TB_SHUTDOWN_S3, + /* S4: */ TB_SHUTDOWN_S4, + /* S5: */ TB_SHUTDOWN_S5 }; + + if (!tboot_enabled()) + return; + + tboot_copy_fadt(&acpi_gbl_FADT); + tboot->acpi_sinfo.pm1a_cnt_val = pm1a_control; + tboot->acpi_sinfo.pm1b_cnt_val = pm1b_control; + /* we always use the 32b wakeup vector */ + tboot->acpi_sinfo.vector_width = 32; + tboot->acpi_sinfo.kernel_s3_resume_vector = acpi_wakeup_address; + + if (sleep_state >= ACPI_S_STATE_COUNT || + acpi_shutdown_map[sleep_state] == -1) { + pr_warning("unsupported sleep state 0x%x\n", sleep_state); + return; + } + + tboot_shutdown(acpi_shutdown_map[sleep_state]); +} + +int tboot_wait_for_aps(int num_aps) +{ + unsigned long timeout; + + if (!tboot_enabled()) + return 0; + + timeout = jiffies + AP_WAIT_TIMEOUT*HZ; + while (atomic_read((atomic_t *)&tboot->num_in_wfs) != num_aps && + time_before(jiffies, timeout)) + cpu_relax(); + + return time_before(jiffies, timeout) ? 0 : 1; +} + +/* + * TXT configuration registers (offsets from TXT_{PUB, PRIV}_CONFIG_REGS_BASE) + */ + +#define TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE 0xfed30000 +#define TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE 0xfed20000 + +/* # pages for each config regs space - used by fixmap */ +#define NR_TXT_CONFIG_PAGES ((TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE - \ + TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + +/* offsets from pub/priv config space */ +#define TXTCR_HEAP_BASE 0x0300 +#define TXTCR_HEAP_SIZE 0x0308 + +#define SHA1_SIZE 20 + +struct sha1_hash { + u8 hash[SHA1_SIZE]; +}; + +struct sinit_mle_data { + u32 version; /* currently 6 */ + struct sha1_hash bios_acm_id; + u32 edx_senter_flags; + u64 mseg_valid; + struct sha1_hash sinit_hash; + struct sha1_hash mle_hash; + struct sha1_hash stm_hash; + struct sha1_hash lcp_policy_hash; + u32 lcp_policy_control; + u32 rlp_wakeup_addr; + u32 reserved; + u32 num_mdrs; + u32 mdrs_off; + u32 num_vtd_dmars; + u32 vtd_dmars_off; +} __packed; + +struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table(struct acpi_table_header *dmar_tbl) +{ + void *heap_base, *heap_ptr, *config; + + if (!tboot_enabled()) + return dmar_tbl; + + /* + * ACPI tables may not be DMA protected by tboot, so use DMAR copy + * SINIT saved in SinitMleData in TXT heap (which is DMA protected) + */ + + /* map config space in order to get heap addr */ + config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, NR_TXT_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) + return NULL; + + /* now map TXT heap */ + heap_base = ioremap(*(u64 *)(config + TXTCR_HEAP_BASE), + *(u64 *)(config + TXTCR_HEAP_SIZE)); + iounmap(config); + if (!heap_base) + return NULL; + + /* walk heap to SinitMleData */ + /* skip BiosData */ + heap_ptr = heap_base + *(u64 *)heap_base; + /* skip OsMleData */ + heap_ptr += *(u64 *)heap_ptr; + /* skip OsSinitData */ + heap_ptr += *(u64 *)heap_ptr; + /* now points to SinitMleDataSize; set to SinitMleData */ + heap_ptr += sizeof(u64); + /* get addr of DMAR table */ + dmar_tbl = (struct acpi_table_header *)(heap_ptr + + ((struct sinit_mle_data *)heap_ptr)->vtd_dmars_off - + sizeof(u64)); + + /* don't unmap heap because dmar.c needs access to this */ + + return dmar_tbl; +} + +int tboot_force_iommu(void) +{ + if (!tboot_enabled()) + return 0; + + if (no_iommu || swiotlb || dmar_disabled) + pr_warning("Forcing Intel-IOMMU to enabled\n"); + + dmar_disabled = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB + swiotlb = 0; +#endif + no_iommu = 0; + + return 1; +} diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index d23c839038f..edc7cbdc012 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -113,6 +113,36 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config INTEL_TXT + bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" + depends on EXPERIMENTAL && X86 && DMAR && ACPI + help + This option enables support for booting the kernel with the + Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize + Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch + of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this + will have no effect. + + Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of sysem configuration and + initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to + create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which + helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning + correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside + of the kernel itself. + + Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having + confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that + it was conigured with, especially since they may be responsible for + providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. + + See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information + about Intel(R) TXT. + See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. + See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable + Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |