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diff --git a/Documentation/block/data-integrity.txt b/Documentation/block/data-integrity.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e9dc8d86adc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/block/data-integrity.txt @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +1. INTRODUCTION + +Modern filesystems feature checksumming of data and metadata to +protect against data corruption. However, the detection of the +corruption is done at read time which could potentially be months +after the data was written. At that point the original data that the +application tried to write is most likely lost. + +The solution is to ensure that the disk is actually storing what the +application meant it to. Recent additions to both the SCSI family +protocols (SBC Data Integrity Field, SCC protection proposal) as well +as SATA/T13 (External Path Protection) try to remedy this by adding +support for appending integrity metadata to an I/O. The integrity +metadata (or protection information in SCSI terminology) includes a +checksum for each sector as well as an incrementing counter that +ensures the individual sectors are written in the right order. And +for some protection schemes also that the I/O is written to the right +place on disk. + +Current storage controllers and devices implement various protective +measures, for instance checksumming and scrubbing. But these +technologies are working in their own isolated domains or at best +between adjacent nodes in the I/O path. The interesting thing about +DIF and the other integrity extensions is that the protection format +is well defined and every node in the I/O path can verify the +integrity of the I/O and reject it if corruption is detected. This +allows not only corruption prevention but also isolation of the point +of failure. + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +2. THE DATA INTEGRITY EXTENSIONS + +As written, the protocol extensions only protect the path between +controller and storage device. However, many controllers actually +allow the operating system to interact with the integrity metadata +(IMD). We have been working with several FC/SAS HBA vendors to enable +the protection information to be transferred to and from their +controllers. + +The SCSI Data Integrity Field works by appending 8 bytes of protection +information to each sector. The data + integrity metadata is stored +in 520 byte sectors on disk. Data + IMD are interleaved when +transferred between the controller and target. The T13 proposal is +similar. + +Because it is highly inconvenient for operating systems to deal with +520 (and 4104) byte sectors, we approached several HBA vendors and +encouraged them to allow separation of the data and integrity metadata +scatter-gather lists. + +The controller will interleave the buffers on write and split them on +read. This means that the Linux can DMA the data buffers to and from +host memory without changes to the page cache. + +Also, the 16-bit CRC checksum mandated by both the SCSI and SATA specs +is somewhat heavy to compute in software. Benchmarks found that +calculating this checksum had a significant impact on system +performance for a number of workloads. Some controllers allow a +lighter-weight checksum to be used when interfacing with the operating +system. Emulex, for instance, supports the TCP/IP checksum instead. +The IP checksum received from the OS is converted to the 16-bit CRC +when writing and vice versa. This allows the integrity metadata to be +generated by Linux or the application at very low cost (comparable to +software RAID5). + +The IP checksum is weaker than the CRC in terms of detecting bit +errors. However, the strength is really in the separation of the data +buffers and the integrity metadata. These two distinct buffers much +match up for an I/O to complete. + +The separation of the data and integrity metadata buffers as well as +the choice in checksums is referred to as the Data Integrity +Extensions. As these extensions are outside the scope of the protocol +bodies (T10, T13), Oracle and its partners are trying to standardize +them within the Storage Networking Industry Association. + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +3. KERNEL CHANGES + +The data integrity framework in Linux enables protection information +to be pinned to I/Os and sent to/received from controllers that +support it. + +The advantage to the integrity extensions in SCSI and SATA is that +they enable us to protect the entire path from application to storage +device. However, at the same time this is also the biggest +disadvantage. It means that the protection information must be in a +format that can be understood by the disk. + +Generally Linux/POSIX applications are agnostic to the intricacies of +the storage devices they are accessing. The virtual filesystem switch +and the block layer make things like hardware sector size and +transport protocols completely transparent to the application. + +However, this level of detail is required when preparing the +protection information to send to a disk. Consequently, the very +concept of an end-to-end protection scheme is a layering violation. +It is completely unreasonable for an application to be aware whether +it is accessing a SCSI or SATA disk. + +The data integrity support implemented in Linux attempts to hide this +from the application. As far as the application (and to some extent +the kernel) is concerned, the integrity metadata is opaque information +that's attached to the I/O. + +The current implementation allows the block layer to automatically +generate the protection information for any I/O. Eventually the +intent is to move the integrity metadata calculation to userspace for +user data. Metadata and other I/O that originates within the kernel +will still use the automatic generation interface. + +Some storage devices allow each hardware sector to be tagged with a +16-bit value. The owner of this tag space is the owner of the block +device. I.e. the filesystem in most cases. The filesystem can use +this extra space to tag sectors as they see fit. Because the tag +space is limited, the block interface allows tagging bigger chunks by +way of interleaving. This way, 8*16 bits of information can be +attached to a typical 4KB filesystem block. + +This also means that applications such as fsck and mkfs will need +access to manipulate the tags from user space. A passthrough +interface for this is being worked on. + + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +4. BLOCK LAYER IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS + +4.1 BIO + +The data integrity patches add a new field to struct bio when +CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY is enabled. bio->bi_integrity is a pointer +to a struct bip which contains the bio integrity payload. Essentially +a bip is a trimmed down struct bio which holds a bio_vec containing +the integrity metadata and the required housekeeping information (bvec +pool, vector count, etc.) + +A kernel subsystem can enable data integrity protection on a bio by +calling bio_integrity_alloc(bio). This will allocate and attach the +bip to the bio. + +Individual pages containing integrity metadata can subsequently be +attached using bio_integrity_add_page(). + +bio_free() will automatically free the bip. + + +4.2 BLOCK DEVICE + +Because the format of the protection data is tied to the physical +disk, each block device has been extended with a block integrity +profile (struct blk_integrity). This optional profile is registered +with the block layer using blk_integrity_register(). + +The profile contains callback functions for generating and verifying +the protection data, as well as getting and setting application tags. +The profile also contains a few constants to aid in completing, +merging and splitting the integrity metadata. + +Layered block devices will need to pick a profile that's appropriate +for all subdevices. blk_integrity_compare() can help with that. DM +and MD linear, RAID0 and RAID1 are currently supported. RAID4/5/6 +will require extra work due to the application tag. + + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +5.0 BLOCK LAYER INTEGRITY API + +5.1 NORMAL FILESYSTEM + + The normal filesystem is unaware that the underlying block device + is capable of sending/receiving integrity metadata. The IMD will + be automatically generated by the block layer at submit_bio() time + in case of a WRITE. A READ request will cause the I/O integrity + to be verified upon completion. + + IMD generation and verification can be toggled using the + + /sys/block/<bdev>/integrity/write_generate + + and + + /sys/block/<bdev>/integrity/read_verify + + flags. + + +5.2 INTEGRITY-AWARE FILESYSTEM + + A filesystem that is integrity-aware can prepare I/Os with IMD + attached. It can also use the application tag space if this is + supported by the block device. + + + int bdev_integrity_enabled(block_device, int rw); + + bdev_integrity_enabled() will return 1 if the block device + supports integrity metadata transfer for the data direction + specified in 'rw'. + + bdev_integrity_enabled() honors the write_generate and + read_verify flags in sysfs and will respond accordingly. + + + int bio_integrity_prep(bio); + + To generate IMD for WRITE and to set up buffers for READ, the + filesystem must call bio_integrity_prep(bio). + + Prior to calling this function, the bio data direction and start + sector must be set, and the bio should have all data pages + added. It is up to the caller to ensure that the bio does not + change while I/O is in progress. + + bio_integrity_prep() should only be called if + bio_integrity_enabled() returned 1. + + + int bio_integrity_tag_size(bio); + + If the filesystem wants to use the application tag space it will + first have to find out how much storage space is available. + Because tag space is generally limited (usually 2 bytes per + sector regardless of sector size), the integrity framework + supports interleaving the information between the sectors in an + I/O. + + Filesystems can call bio_integrity_tag_size(bio) to find out how + many bytes of storage are available for that particular bio. + + Another option is bdev_get_tag_size(block_device) which will + return the number of available bytes per hardware sector. + + + int bio_integrity_set_tag(bio, void *tag_buf, len); + + After a successful return from bio_integrity_prep(), + bio_integrity_set_tag() can be used to attach an opaque tag + buffer to a bio. Obviously this only makes sense if the I/O is + a WRITE. + + + int bio_integrity_get_tag(bio, void *tag_buf, len); + + Similarly, at READ I/O completion time the filesystem can + retrieve the tag buffer using bio_integrity_get_tag(). + + +6.3 PASSING EXISTING INTEGRITY METADATA + + Filesystems that either generate their own integrity metadata or + are capable of transferring IMD from user space can use the + following calls: + + + struct bip * bio_integrity_alloc(bio, gfp_mask, nr_pages); + + Allocates the bio integrity payload and hangs it off of the bio. + nr_pages indicate how many pages of protection data need to be + stored in the integrity bio_vec list (similar to bio_alloc()). + + The integrity payload will be freed at bio_free() time. + + + int bio_integrity_add_page(bio, page, len, offset); + + Attaches a page containing integrity metadata to an existing + bio. The bio must have an existing bip, + i.e. bio_integrity_alloc() must have been called. For a WRITE, + the integrity metadata in the pages must be in a format + understood by the target device with the notable exception that + the sector numbers will be remapped as the request traverses the + I/O stack. This implies that the pages added using this call + will be modified during I/O! The first reference tag in the + integrity metadata must have a value of bip->bip_sector. + + Pages can be added using bio_integrity_add_page() as long as + there is room in the bip bio_vec array (nr_pages). + + Upon completion of a READ operation, the attached pages will + contain the integrity metadata received from the storage device. + It is up to the receiver to process them and verify data + integrity upon completion. + + +6.4 REGISTERING A BLOCK DEVICE AS CAPABLE OF EXCHANGING INTEGRITY + METADATA + + To enable integrity exchange on a block device the gendisk must be + registered as capable: + + int blk_integrity_register(gendisk, blk_integrity); + + The blk_integrity struct is a template and should contain the + following: + + static struct blk_integrity my_profile = { + .name = "STANDARDSBODY-TYPE-VARIANT-CSUM", + .generate_fn = my_generate_fn, + .verify_fn = my_verify_fn, + .get_tag_fn = my_get_tag_fn, + .set_tag_fn = my_set_tag_fn, + .tuple_size = sizeof(struct my_tuple_size), + .tag_size = <tag bytes per hw sector>, + }; + + 'name' is a text string which will be visible in sysfs. This is + part of the userland API so chose it carefully and never change + it. The format is standards body-type-variant. + E.g. T10-DIF-TYPE1-IP or T13-EPP-0-CRC. + + 'generate_fn' generates appropriate integrity metadata (for WRITE). + + 'verify_fn' verifies that the data buffer matches the integrity + metadata. + + 'tuple_size' must be set to match the size of the integrity + metadata per sector. I.e. 8 for DIF and EPP. + + 'tag_size' must be set to identify how many bytes of tag space + are available per hardware sector. For DIF this is either 2 or + 0 depending on the value of the Control Mode Page ATO bit. + + See 6.2 for a description of get_tag_fn and set_tag_fn. + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +2007-12-24 Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> |