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Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/security/Yama.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/Yama.txt | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a9511f17906 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of system-wide DAC +security protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. To +select it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable +any other LSM). + +Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama: + +- ptrace_scope + +============================================================== + +ptrace_scope: + +As Linux grows in popularity, it will become a larger target for +malware. One particularly troubling weakness of the Linux process +interfaces is that a single user is able to examine the memory and +running state of any of their processes. For example, if one application +(e.g. Pidgin) was compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to +attach to other running processes (e.g. Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent, +etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope +of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing. + +This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking +(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection +(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already +exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before. +Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system +builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system. + +For a solution, some applications use prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...) to +specifically disallow such ptrace attachment (e.g. ssh-agent), but many +do not. A more general solution is to only allow ptrace directly from a +parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still +work), or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID" +still work as root). + +For software that has defined application-specific relationships +between a debugging process and its inferior (crash handlers, etc), +prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, pid, ...) can be used. An inferior can declare which +other process (and its descendents) are allowed to call PTRACE_ATTACH +against it. Only one such declared debugging process can exists for +each inferior at a time. For example, this is used by KDE, Chromium, and +Firefox's crash handlers, and by Wine for allowing only Wine processes +to ptrace each other. If a process wishes to entirely disable these ptrace +restrictions, it can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...) +so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces) +may attach. + +The sysctl settings are: + +0 - classic ptrace permissions: a process can PTRACE_ATTACH to any other + process running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e. + did not transition uids, start privileged, or have called + prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already). + +1 - restricted ptrace: a process must have a predefined relationship + with the inferior it wants to call PTRACE_ATTACH on. By default, + this relationship is that of only its descendants when the above + classic criteria is also met. To change the relationship, an + inferior can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...) to declare + an allowed debugger PID to call PTRACE_ATTACH on the inferior. + +The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity. + +============================================================== |