diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 38 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..36a700acaf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H +#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 + +#include <asm/tsc.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> + +/* + * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. + * + * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return, + * and it must always be inlined. + */ +static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) +{ + u64 canary; + u64 tsc; + + /* + * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at + * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40); + + /* + * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source + * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, + * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later + * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. + */ + get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); + tsc = __native_read_tsc(); + canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); + + current->stack_canary = canary; + percpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary); +} + +#endif |