diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 55 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 34019c57888..a5cf13c018c 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> */ +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/mm.h> @@ -22,7 +24,6 @@ */ const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); int file_caps_enabled = 1; @@ -42,15 +43,10 @@ __setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) { - static int warned; - if (!warned) { - char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; - - printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities" - " (legacy support in use)\n", - get_task_comm(name, current)); - warned = 1; - } + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); } /* @@ -71,16 +67,10 @@ static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) static void warn_deprecated_v2(void) { - static int warned; + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; - if (!warned) { - char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; - - printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2" - " capabilities in a way that may be insecure.\n", - get_task_comm(name, current)); - warned = 1; - } + pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); } /* @@ -198,7 +188,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) * * An alternative would be to return an error here * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to - * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts + * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts * before modification is attempted and the application * fails. */ @@ -380,7 +370,7 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { - printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); + pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); BUG(); } @@ -404,7 +394,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not * actually be privileged. */ -bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) return false; @@ -433,23 +424,19 @@ bool capable(int cap) EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); /** - * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode + * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped * @inode: The inode in question * @cap: The capability in question * - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability - * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned - * by the current user namespace or a child namespace. - * - * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current - * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the - * current user namespace. - * + * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at + * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are + * mapped into the current user namespace. */ -bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap) +bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap) { struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); - return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid); + return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && + kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); |