diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/acct.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 255 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 288 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/cgroup.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/cred-internals.h | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/cred.c | 588 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/exit.c | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/fork.c | 61 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/futex.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/futex_compat.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/kmod.c | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/nsproxy.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/ptrace.c | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sched.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/signal.c | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 586 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/timer.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/tsacct.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/uid16.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/user.c | 84 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/user_namespace.c | 65 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/workqueue.c | 8 |
25 files changed, 1473 insertions, 768 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 19fad003b19..b1e6b6625ea 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ obj-y = sched.o fork.o exec_domain.o panic.o printk.o \ rcupdate.o extable.o params.o posix-timers.o \ kthread.o wait.o kfifo.o sys_ni.o posix-cpu-timers.o mutex.o \ hrtimer.o rwsem.o nsproxy.o srcu.o semaphore.o \ - notifier.o ksysfs.o pm_qos_params.o sched_clock.o + notifier.o ksysfs.o pm_qos_params.o sched_clock.o cred.o ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER # Do not trace debug files and internal ftrace files diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c index f6006a60df5..d57b7cbb98b 100644 --- a/kernel/acct.c +++ b/kernel/acct.c @@ -530,15 +530,14 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct, do_div(elapsed, AHZ); ac.ac_btime = get_seconds() - elapsed; /* we really need to bite the bullet and change layout */ - ac.ac_uid = current->uid; - ac.ac_gid = current->gid; + current_uid_gid(&ac.ac_uid, &ac.ac_gid); #if ACCT_VERSION==2 ac.ac_ahz = AHZ; #endif #if ACCT_VERSION==1 || ACCT_VERSION==2 /* backward-compatible 16 bit fields */ - ac.ac_uid16 = current->uid; - ac.ac_gid16 = current->gid; + ac.ac_uid16 = ac.ac_uid; + ac.ac_gid16 = ac.ac_gid; #endif #if ACCT_VERSION==3 ac.ac_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index cf5bc2f5f9c..bc1e2d854bf 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/inotify.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include "audit.h" @@ -84,6 +85,15 @@ int audit_n_rules; /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ int audit_signals; +struct audit_cap_data { + kernel_cap_t permitted; + kernel_cap_t inheritable; + union { + unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ + kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ + }; +}; + /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved * pointers at syscall exit time). @@ -100,6 +110,8 @@ struct audit_names { gid_t gid; dev_t rdev; u32 osid; + struct audit_cap_data fcap; + unsigned int fcap_ver; }; struct audit_aux_data { @@ -184,6 +196,20 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { int pid_count; }; +struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { + struct audit_aux_data d; + struct audit_cap_data fcap; + unsigned int fcap_ver; + struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; + struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; +}; + +struct audit_aux_data_capset { + struct audit_aux_data d; + pid_t pid; + struct audit_cap_data cap; +}; + struct audit_tree_refs { struct audit_tree_refs *next; struct audit_chunk *c[31]; @@ -421,6 +447,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *name, enum audit_state *state) { + const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); int i, j, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; @@ -440,28 +467,28 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FSUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FSGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PERS: result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); @@ -615,8 +642,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; } - if (!result) + if (!result) { + put_cred(cred); return 0; + } } if (rule->filterkey && ctx) ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -624,6 +653,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; } + put_cred(cred); return 1; } @@ -1171,8 +1201,38 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, kfree(buf); } +static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) +{ + int i; + + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); + CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { + audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); + } +} + +static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) +{ + kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; + kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; + int log = 0; + + if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); + log = 1; + } + if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); + log = 1; + } + + if (log) + audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); +} + static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) { + const struct cred *cred; int i, call_panic = 0; struct audit_buffer *ab; struct audit_aux_data *aux; @@ -1182,14 +1242,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts context->pid = tsk->pid; if (!context->ppid) context->ppid = sys_getppid(); - context->uid = tsk->uid; - context->gid = tsk->gid; - context->euid = tsk->euid; - context->suid = tsk->suid; - context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; - context->egid = tsk->egid; - context->sgid = tsk->sgid; - context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; + cred = current_cred(); + context->uid = cred->uid; + context->gid = cred->gid; + context->euid = cred->euid; + context->suid = cred->suid; + context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; + context->egid = cred->egid; + context->sgid = cred->sgid; + context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; context->personality = tsk->personality; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); @@ -1334,6 +1395,28 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]); break; } + case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { + struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; + audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); + audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); + audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); + audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); + audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); + audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); + audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); + audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); + audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); + audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); + break; } + + case AUDIT_CAPSET: { + struct audit_aux_data_capset *axs = (void *)aux; + audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", axs->pid); + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &axs->cap.inheritable); + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &axs->cap.permitted); + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &axs->cap.effective); + break; } + } audit_log_end(ab); } @@ -1421,6 +1504,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts } } + audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); + audit_log_end(ab); } @@ -1787,8 +1872,36 @@ static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, return 0; } + +static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; + int rc; + + memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); + memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); + name->fcap.fE = 0; + name->fcap_ver = 0; + + if (!dentry) + return 0; + + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); + if (rc) + return rc; + + name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; + name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; + name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); + name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; + + return 0; +} + + /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ -static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode) +static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct inode *inode) { name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; @@ -1797,6 +1910,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); + audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); } /** @@ -1831,7 +1945,7 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) context->names[idx].name = NULL; } handle_path(dentry); - audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode); + audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); } /** @@ -1892,7 +2006,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry, if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) || !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { if (inode) - audit_copy_inode(n, inode); + audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); else n->ino = (unsigned long)-1; found_child = n->name; @@ -1906,7 +2020,7 @@ add_names: return; idx = context->name_count - 1; context->names[idx].name = NULL; - audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent); + audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); } if (!found_child) { @@ -1927,7 +2041,7 @@ add_names: } if (inode) - audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode); + audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); else context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; } @@ -1978,7 +2092,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " "old auid=%u new auid=%u" " old ses=%u new ses=%u", - task->pid, task->uid, + task->pid, task_uid(task), task->loginuid, loginuid, task->sessionid, sessionid); audit_log_end(ab); @@ -2361,7 +2475,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_pid = t->pid; context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); - context->target_uid = t->uid; + context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); @@ -2380,6 +2494,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; + uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { @@ -2387,7 +2502,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) if (tsk->loginuid != -1) audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; else - audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid; + audit_sig_uid = uid; security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) @@ -2399,7 +2514,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) if (!ctx->target_pid) { ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); - ctx->target_uid = t->uid; + ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); @@ -2420,7 +2535,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); - axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid; + axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); @@ -2430,6 +2545,86 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) } /** + * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps + * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed + * @new: the proposed new credentials + * @old: the old credentials + * + * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not + * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall + * + * -Eric + */ +int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ + struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; + struct dentry *dentry; + + ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ax) + return -ENOMEM; + + ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; + ax->d.next = context->aux; + context->aux = (void *)ax; + + dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); + get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); + dput(dentry); + + ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; + ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; + ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); + ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; + + ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; + ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; + ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; + + ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; + ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; + ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; + return 0; +} + +/** + * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall + * @pid: target pid of the capset call + * @new: the new credentials + * @old: the old (current) credentials + * + * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the + * audit system if applicable + */ +int __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, + const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ + struct audit_aux_data_capset *ax; + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + + if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) + return 0; + + ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ax) + return -ENOMEM; + + ax->d.type = AUDIT_CAPSET; + ax->d.next = context->aux; + context->aux = (void *)ax; + + ax->pid = pid; + ax->cap.effective = new->cap_effective; + ax->cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; + ax->cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; + + return 0; +} + +/** * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally * @signr: signal value * @@ -2440,7 +2635,8 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr) { struct audit_buffer *ab; u32 sid; - uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); + uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; + gid_t gid; unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); if (!audit_enabled) @@ -2450,8 +2646,9 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr) return; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); + current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", - auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid); + auid, uid, gid, sessionid); security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); if (sid) { char *ctx = NULL; diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 33e51e78c2d..36b4b4daebe 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> */ +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -14,12 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> - -/* - * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current. - * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock. - */ -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock); +#include "cred-internals.h" /* * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities @@ -33,6 +29,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES +int file_caps_enabled = 1; + +static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str) +{ + file_caps_enabled = 0; + return 1; +} +__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); +#endif + /* * More recent versions of libcap are available from: * @@ -115,167 +122,12 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy) return 0; } -#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES - -/* - * Without filesystem capability support, we nominally support one process - * setting the capabilities of another - */ -static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, - kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp) -{ - struct task_struct *target; - int ret; - - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - - if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) { - target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!target) { - ret = -ESRCH; - goto out; - } - } else - target = current; - - ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp); - -out: - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - - return ret; -} - -/* - * cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process - * group. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock. - */ -static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective, - kernel_cap_t *inheritable, - kernel_cap_t *permitted) -{ - struct task_struct *g, *target; - int ret = -EPERM; - int found = 0; - struct pid *pgrp; - - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - - pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr); - do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) { - target = g; - while_each_thread(g, target) { - if (!security_capset_check(target, effective, - inheritable, permitted)) { - security_capset_set(target, effective, - inheritable, permitted); - ret = 0; - } - found = 1; - } - } while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g); - - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - - if (!found) - ret = 0; - return ret; -} - -/* - * cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init - * and self. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock. - */ -static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective, - kernel_cap_t *inheritable, - kernel_cap_t *permitted) -{ - struct task_struct *g, *target; - int ret = -EPERM; - int found = 0; - - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - - do_each_thread(g, target) { - if (target == current - || is_container_init(target->group_leader)) - continue; - found = 1; - if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, - permitted)) - continue; - ret = 0; - security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); - } while_each_thread(g, target); - - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - - if (!found) - ret = 0; - - return ret; -} - -/* - * Given the target pid does not refer to the current process we - * need more elaborate support... (This support is not present when - * filesystem capabilities are configured.) - */ -static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *effective, - kernel_cap_t *inheritable, - kernel_cap_t *permitted) -{ - struct task_struct *target; - int ret; - - if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) - return -EPERM; - - if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */ - return cap_set_all(effective, inheritable, permitted); - - else if (pid < 0) /* all procs in process group */ - return cap_set_pg(-pid, effective, inheritable, permitted); - - /* target != current */ - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - - target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!target) - ret = -ESRCH; - else { - ret = security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, - permitted); - - /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal, - we now put them into effect. */ - if (!ret) - security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, - permitted); - } - - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - - return ret; -} - -#else /* ie., def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ - /* - * If we have configured with filesystem capability support, then the - * only thing that can change the capabilities of the current process - * is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code at the - * same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities in this - * process. The net result is that we can limit our use of locks to - * when we are reading the caps of another process. + * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current + * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code + * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities + * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of + * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process. */ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp) @@ -285,7 +137,6 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) { struct task_struct *target; - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); read_lock(&tasklist_lock); target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); @@ -295,50 +146,12 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); } else ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp); return ret; } -/* - * With filesystem capability support configured, the kernel does not - * permit the changing of capabilities in one process by another - * process. (CAP_SETPCAP has much less broad semantics when configured - * this way.) - */ -static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid, - kernel_cap_t *effective, - kernel_cap_t *inheritable, - kernel_cap_t *permitted) -{ - return -EPERM; -} - -#endif /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ - -/* - * Atomically modify the effective capabilities returning the original - * value. No permission check is performed here - it is assumed that the - * caller is permitted to set the desired effective capabilities. - */ -kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new) -{ - kernel_cap_t pE_old; - - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - - pE_old = current->cap_effective; - current->cap_effective = pE_new; - - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - - return pE_old; -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_set_effective); - /** * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process. * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and @@ -366,7 +179,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr) return -EINVAL; ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP); - if (!ret) { struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; unsigned i; @@ -412,16 +224,14 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr) * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, * and inheritable capabilities * - * Set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all - * processes in a given process group. + * Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other + * process(es) has been deprecated and removed. * * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as: * - * [pid is for the 'target' task. 'current' is the calling task.] - * - * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted - * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted - * E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted + * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted + * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted + * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted * * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. */ @@ -430,6 +240,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data) struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; unsigned i, tocopy; kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; + struct cred *new; int ret; pid_t pid; @@ -440,10 +251,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data) if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) return -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy - * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { + /* may only affect current now */ + if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) + return -EPERM; + + if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, + tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) return -EFAULT; - } for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective; @@ -457,32 +271,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data) i++; } - if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) - ret = do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid, &effective, &inheritable, - &permitted); - else { - /* - * This lock is required even when filesystem - * capability support is configured - it protects the - * sys_capget() call from returning incorrect data in - * the case that the targeted process is not the - * current one. - */ - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; - ret = security_capset_check(current, &effective, &inheritable, - &permitted); - /* - * Having verified that the proposed changes are - * legal, we now put them into effect. - */ - if (!ret) - security_capset_set(current, &effective, &inheritable, - &permitted); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - } + ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(), + &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred()); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return commit_creds(new); +error: + abort_creds(new); return ret; } @@ -498,6 +303,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data) */ int capable(int cap) { + if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { + printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); + BUG(); + } + if (has_capability(current, cap)) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return 1; diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index fe00b3b983a..dee025f2f28 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -571,8 +571,8 @@ static struct inode *cgroup_new_inode(mode_t mode, struct super_block *sb) if (inode) { inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_uid = current->fsuid; - inode->i_gid = current->fsgid; + inode->i_uid = current_fsuid(); + inode->i_gid = current_fsgid(); inode->i_blocks = 0; inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME; inode->i_mapping->backing_dev_info = &cgroup_backing_dev_info; @@ -1279,6 +1279,7 @@ int cgroup_attach_task(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct task_struct *tsk) static int attach_task_by_pid(struct cgroup *cgrp, u64 pid) { struct task_struct *tsk; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; int ret; if (pid) { @@ -1288,14 +1289,16 @@ static int attach_task_by_pid(struct cgroup *cgrp, u64 pid) rcu_read_unlock(); return -ESRCH; } - get_task_struct(tsk); - rcu_read_unlock(); - if ((current->euid) && (current->euid != tsk->uid) - && (current->euid != tsk->suid)) { - put_task_struct(tsk); + tcred = __task_cred(tsk); + if (cred->euid && + cred->euid != tcred->uid && + cred->euid != tcred->suid) { + rcu_read_unlock(); return -EACCES; } + get_task_struct(tsk); + rcu_read_unlock(); } else { tsk = current; get_task_struct(tsk); diff --git a/kernel/cred-internals.h b/kernel/cred-internals.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2dc4fc2d0bf --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/cred-internals.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* Internal credentials stuff + * + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +/* + * user.c + */ +static inline void sched_switch_user(struct task_struct *p) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_SCHED + sched_move_task(p); +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_SCHED */ +} + diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ff7bc071991 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,588 @@ +/* Task credentials management - see Documentation/credentials.txt + * + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/keyctl.h> +#include <linux/init_task.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/cn_proc.h> +#include "cred-internals.h" + +static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar; + +/* + * The common credentials for the initial task's thread group + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = { + .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2), + .tgid = 0, + .lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED, +}; +#endif + +/* + * The initial credentials for the initial task + */ +struct cred init_cred = { + .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4), + .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, + .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, + .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, + .cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, + .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, + .user = INIT_USER, + .group_info = &init_groups, +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .tgcred = &init_tgcred, +#endif +}; + +/* + * Dispose of the shared task group credentials + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = + container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu); + + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0); + + key_put(tgcred->session_keyring); + key_put(tgcred->process_keyring); + kfree(tgcred); +} +#endif + +/* + * Release a set of thread group credentials. + */ +static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred; + + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage)) + call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu); +#endif +} + +/* + * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials + */ +static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu); + + if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0) + panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n", + cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage)); + + security_cred_free(cred); + key_put(cred->thread_keyring); + key_put(cred->request_key_auth); + release_tgcred(cred); + put_group_info(cred->group_info); + free_uid(cred->user); + kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred); +} + +/** + * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials + * @cred: The record to release + * + * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain. + */ +void __put_cred(struct cred *cred) +{ + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0); + + call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred); + +/** + * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification + * + * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds + * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to + * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by + * calling commit_creds(). + * + * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification. + * + * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise. + * + * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up. + */ +struct cred *prepare_creds(void) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; + + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1); + + new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return NULL; + + old = task->cred; + memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred)); + + atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); + get_group_info(new->group_info); + get_uid(new->user); + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + key_get(new->thread_keyring); + key_get(new->request_key_auth); + atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + new->security = NULL; +#endif + + if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0) + goto error; + return new; + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds); + +/* + * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve() + * - The caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex + */ +struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void) +{ + struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL; + struct cred *new; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tgcred) + return NULL; +#endif + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) { + kfree(tgcred); + return new; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */ + key_put(new->thread_keyring); + new->thread_keyring = NULL; + + /* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to + * share */ + memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred)); + + atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1); + spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock); + + /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */ + key_get(tgcred->session_keyring); + tgcred->process_keyring = NULL; + + release_tgcred(new); + new->tgcred = tgcred; +#endif + + return new; +} + +/* + * prepare new credentials for the usermode helper dispatcher + */ +struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL; +#endif + struct cred *new; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!tgcred) + return NULL; +#endif + + new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new) + return NULL; + + memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred)); + + atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); + get_group_info(new->group_info); + get_uid(new->user); + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + new->thread_keyring = NULL; + new->request_key_auth = NULL; + new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT; + + atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1); + spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock); + new->tgcred = tgcred; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + new->security = NULL; +#endif + if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0) + goto error; + + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1); + return new; + +error: + put_cred(new); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork() + * + * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new + * set. + * + * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its + * objective and subjective credentials + */ +int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + struct thread_group_cred *tgcred; +#endif + struct cred *new; + int ret; + + mutex_init(&p->cred_exec_mutex); + + if ( +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + !p->cred->thread_keyring && +#endif + clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD + ) { + p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred); + get_cred(p->cred); + atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes); + return 0; + } + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) { + ret = create_user_ns(new); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_put; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already + * had one */ + if (new->thread_keyring) { + key_put(new->thread_keyring); + new->thread_keyring = NULL; + if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) + install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new); + } + + /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in + * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a + * bit */ + if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) { + tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tgcred) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put; + } + atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1); + spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock); + tgcred->process_keyring = NULL; + tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring); + + release_tgcred(new); + new->tgcred = tgcred; + } +#endif + + atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); + p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new); + return 0; + +error_put: + put_cred(new); + return ret; +} + +/** + * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task + * @new: The credentials to be assigned + * + * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace + * the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are + * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are + * in an overridden state. + * + * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials. + * + * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end + * of, say, sys_setgid(). + */ +int commit_creds(struct cred *new) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + const struct cred *old; + + BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred); + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2); + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1); + + old = task->real_cred; + security_commit_creds(new, old); + + get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */ + + /* dumpability changes */ + if (old->euid != new->euid || + old->egid != new->egid || + old->fsuid != new->fsuid || + old->fsgid != new->fsgid || + !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) { + set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); + task->pdeath_signal = 0; + smp_wmb(); + } + + /* alter the thread keyring */ + if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid) + key_fsuid_changed(task); + if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid) + key_fsgid_changed(task); + + /* do it + * - What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the + * new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now + * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters + * we should be checking for it. -DaveM + */ + if (new->user != old->user) + atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); + rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new); + rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new); + if (new->user != old->user) + atomic_dec(&old->user->processes); + + sched_switch_user(task); + + /* send notifications */ + if (new->uid != old->uid || + new->euid != old->euid || + new->suid != old->suid || + new->fsuid != old->fsuid) + proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID); + + if (new->gid != old->gid || + new->egid != old->egid || + new->sgid != old->sgid || + new->fsgid != old->fsgid) + proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID); + + /* release the old obj and subj refs both */ + put_cred(old); + put_cred(old); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds); + +/** + * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task + * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied + * + * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the + * current task. + */ +void abort_creds(struct cred *new) +{ + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1); + put_cred(new); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds); + +/** + * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials + * @new: The credentials to be assigned + * + * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current + * process, returning the old set for later reversion. + */ +const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new) +{ + const struct cred *old = current->cred; + + rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new)); + return old; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds); + +/** + * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override + * @old: The credentials to be restored + * + * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set, + * discarding the override set. + */ +void revert_creds(const struct cred *old) +{ + const struct cred *override = current->cred; + + rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old); + put_cred(override); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds); + +/* + * initialise the credentials stuff + */ +void __init cred_init(void) +{ + /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */ + cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred), + 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); +} + +/** + * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service + * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference + * + * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to + * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that + * task that requires a different subjective context. + * + * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL. + * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that; + * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys. + * + * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired. + * + * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory. + * + * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex. + */ +struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) +{ + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; + + new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return NULL; + + if (daemon) + old = get_task_cred(daemon); + else + old = get_cred(&init_cred); + + get_uid(new->user); + get_group_info(new->group_info); + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + atomic_inc(&init_tgcred.usage); + new->tgcred = &init_tgcred; + new->request_key_auth = NULL; + new->thread_keyring = NULL; + new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + new->security = NULL; +#endif + if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0) + goto error; + + atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); + put_cred(old); + return new; + +error: + put_cred(new); + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred); + +/** + * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials + * @new: The credentials to alter + * @secid: The LSM security ID to set + * + * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective + * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. + */ +int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid) +{ + return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override); + +/** + * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials + * @new: The credentials to alter + * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from. + * + * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective + * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The + * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be + * interpreted by the LSM. + */ +int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx) +{ + u32 secid; + int ret; + + ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + return set_security_override(new, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx); + +/** + * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials + * @new: The credentials to alter + * @inode: The inode to take the context from + * + * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same + * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have + * the same MAC context as that inode. + */ +int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) +{ + new->fsuid = inode->i_uid; + new->fsgid = inode->i_gid; + return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as); diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 2d8be7ebb0f..ccb87162ff6 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -46,12 +46,14 @@ #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> +#include <linux/init_task.h> #include <trace/sched.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include "cred-internals.h" static void exit_mm(struct task_struct * tsk); @@ -164,7 +166,10 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct * p) int zap_leader; repeat: tracehook_prepare_release_task(p); - atomic_dec(&p->user->processes); + /* don't need to get the RCU readlock here - the process is dead and + * can't be modifying its own credentials */ + atomic_dec(&__task_cred(p)->user->processes); + proc_flush_task(p); write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); tracehook_finish_release_task(p); @@ -339,12 +344,12 @@ static void reparent_to_kthreadd(void) /* cpus_allowed? */ /* rt_priority? */ /* signals? */ - security_task_reparent_to_init(current); memcpy(current->signal->rlim, init_task.signal->rlim, sizeof(current->signal->rlim)); - atomic_inc(&(INIT_USER->__count)); + + atomic_inc(&init_cred.usage); + commit_creds(&init_cred); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - switch_uid(INIT_USER); } void __set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) @@ -1078,7 +1083,6 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code) check_stack_usage(); exit_thread(); cgroup_exit(tsk, 1); - exit_keys(tsk); if (group_dead && tsk->signal->leader) disassociate_ctty(1); @@ -1263,12 +1267,12 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_struct *p, int options, unsigned long state; int retval, status, traced; pid_t pid = task_pid_vnr(p); + uid_t uid = __task_cred(p)->uid; if (!likely(options & WEXITED)) return 0; if (unlikely(options & WNOWAIT)) { - uid_t uid = p->uid; int exit_code = p->exit_code; int why, status; @@ -1389,7 +1393,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_struct *p, int options, if (!retval && infop) retval = put_user(pid, &infop->si_pid); if (!retval && infop) - retval = put_user(p->uid, &infop->si_uid); + retval = put_user(uid, &infop->si_uid); if (!retval) retval = pid; @@ -1454,7 +1458,8 @@ static int wait_task_stopped(int ptrace, struct task_struct *p, if (!unlikely(options & WNOWAIT)) p->exit_code = 0; - uid = p->uid; + /* don't need the RCU readlock here as we're holding a spinlock */ + uid = __task_cred(p)->uid; unlock_sig: spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); if (!exit_code) @@ -1528,10 +1533,10 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct task_struct *p, int options, } if (!unlikely(options & WNOWAIT)) p->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED; + uid = __task_cred(p)->uid; spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); pid = task_pid_vnr(p); - uid = p->uid; get_task_struct(p); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 2a372a0e206..1dd89451fae 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -147,9 +147,8 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk) WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage)); WARN_ON(tsk == current); - security_task_free(tsk); - free_uid(tsk->user); - put_group_info(tsk->group_info); + put_cred(tsk->real_cred); + put_cred(tsk->cred); delayacct_tsk_free(tsk); if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk)) @@ -815,12 +814,6 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk) if (!sig) return -ENOMEM; - ret = copy_thread_group_keys(tsk); - if (ret < 0) { - kmem_cache_free(signal_cachep, sig); - return ret; - } - atomic_set(&sig->count, 1); atomic_set(&sig->live, 1); init_waitqueue_head(&sig->wait_chldexit); @@ -865,7 +858,6 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk) void __cleanup_signal(struct signal_struct *sig) { thread_group_cputime_free(sig); - exit_thread_group_keys(sig); tty_kref_put(sig->tty); kmem_cache_free(signal_cachep, sig); } @@ -981,16 +973,16 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled); #endif retval = -EAGAIN; - if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= + if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && - p->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user) + p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER) goto bad_fork_free; } - atomic_inc(&p->user->__count); - atomic_inc(&p->user->processes); - get_group_info(p->group_info); + retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags); + if (retval < 0) + goto bad_fork_free; /* * If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check @@ -1045,10 +1037,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time); p->real_start_time = p->start_time; monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time); -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY - p->security = NULL; -#endif - p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset; p->io_context = NULL; p->audit_context = NULL; cgroup_fork(p); @@ -1093,10 +1081,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, /* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */ sched_fork(p, clone_flags); - if ((retval = security_task_alloc(p))) - goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy; if ((retval = audit_alloc(p))) - goto bad_fork_cleanup_security; + goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy; /* copy all the process information */ if ((retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p))) goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit; @@ -1110,10 +1096,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand; if ((retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p))) goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal; - if ((retval = copy_keys(clone_flags, p))) - goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm; if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p))) - goto bad_fork_cleanup_keys; + goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm; if ((retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p))) goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces; retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs); @@ -1278,8 +1262,6 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_io: put_io_context(p->io_context); bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces: exit_task_namespaces(p); -bad_fork_cleanup_keys: - exit_keys(p); bad_fork_cleanup_mm: if (p->mm) mmput(p->mm); @@ -1295,8 +1277,6 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_semundo: exit_sem(p); bad_fork_cleanup_audit: audit_free(p); -bad_fork_cleanup_security: - security_task_free(p); bad_fork_cleanup_policy: #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA mpol_put(p->mempolicy); @@ -1309,9 +1289,9 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup: bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain: module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module); bad_fork_cleanup_count: - put_group_info(p->group_info); - atomic_dec(&p->user->processes); - free_uid(p->user); + atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes); + put_cred(p->real_cred); + put_cred(p->cred); bad_fork_free: free_task(p); fork_out: @@ -1355,6 +1335,20 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, long nr; /* + * Do some preliminary argument and permissions checking before we + * actually start allocating stuff + */ + if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) { + if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) + return -EINVAL; + /* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is + * complete + */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + } + + /* * We hope to recycle these flags after 2.6.26 */ if (unlikely(clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED)) { @@ -1601,8 +1595,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) err = -EINVAL; if (unshare_flags & ~(CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS|CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_SIGHAND| CLONE_VM|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SYSVSEM| - CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWUSER| - CLONE_NEWNET)) + CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNET)) goto bad_unshare_out; /* diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 8af10027514..4fe790e89d0 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -439,13 +439,20 @@ static void free_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state) static struct task_struct * futex_find_get_task(pid_t pid) { struct task_struct *p; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; rcu_read_lock(); p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p || ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid))) + if (!p) { p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - else - get_task_struct(p); + } else { + pcred = __task_cred(p); + if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && + cred->euid != pcred->uid) + p = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + else + get_task_struct(p); + } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1829,6 +1836,7 @@ sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user * __user *head_ptr, { struct robust_list_head __user *head; unsigned long ret; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled) return -ENOSYS; @@ -1844,8 +1852,10 @@ sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user * __user *head_ptr, if (!p) goto err_unlock; ret = -EPERM; - if ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + pcred = __task_cred(p); + if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && + cred->euid != pcred->uid && + !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto err_unlock; head = p->robust_list; rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c index 04ac3a9e42c..d607a5b9ee2 100644 --- a/kernel/futex_compat.c +++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ compat_sys_get_robust_list(int pid, compat_uptr_t __user *head_ptr, { struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head; unsigned long ret; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled) return -ENOSYS; @@ -150,8 +151,10 @@ compat_sys_get_robust_list(int pid, compat_uptr_t __user *head_ptr, if (!p) goto err_unlock; ret = -EPERM; - if ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + pcred = __task_cred(p); + if (cred->euid != pcred->euid && + cred->euid != pcred->uid && + !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto err_unlock; head = p->compat_robust_list; read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 3d3c3ea3a02..b46dbb90866 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_module); struct subprocess_info { struct work_struct work; struct completion *complete; + struct cred *cred; char *path; char **argv; char **envp; - struct key *ring; enum umh_wait wait; int retval; struct file *stdin; @@ -134,19 +134,20 @@ struct subprocess_info { static int ____call_usermodehelper(void *data) { struct subprocess_info *sub_info = data; - struct key *new_session, *old_session; int retval; - /* Unblock all signals and set the session keyring. */ - new_session = key_get(sub_info->ring); + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1); + + /* Unblock all signals */ spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - old_session = __install_session_keyring(current, new_session); flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); recalc_sigpending(); spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - key_put(old_session); + /* Install the credentials */ + commit_creds(sub_info->cred); + sub_info->cred = NULL; /* Install input pipe when needed */ if (sub_info->stdin) { @@ -185,6 +186,8 @@ void call_usermodehelper_freeinfo(struct subprocess_info *info) { if (info->cleanup) (*info->cleanup)(info->argv, info->envp); + if (info->cred) + put_cred(info->cred); kfree(info); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_freeinfo); @@ -240,6 +243,8 @@ static void __call_usermodehelper(struct work_struct *work) pid_t pid; enum umh_wait wait = sub_info->wait; + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1); + /* CLONE_VFORK: wait until the usermode helper has execve'd * successfully We need the data structures to stay around * until that is done. */ @@ -362,6 +367,9 @@ struct subprocess_info *call_usermodehelper_setup(char *path, char **argv, sub_info->path = path; sub_info->argv = argv; sub_info->envp = envp; + sub_info->cred = prepare_usermodehelper_creds(); + if (!sub_info->cred) + return NULL; out: return sub_info; @@ -376,7 +384,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_setup); void call_usermodehelper_setkeys(struct subprocess_info *info, struct key *session_keyring) { - info->ring = session_keyring; +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = info->cred->tgcred; + key_put(tgcred->session_keyring); + tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(session_keyring); +#else + BUG(); +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_setkeys); @@ -444,6 +458,8 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info, DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(done); int retval = 0; + BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1); + helper_lock(); if (sub_info->path[0] == '\0') goto out; diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c index 1d3ef29a258..63598dca2d0 100644 --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c @@ -80,12 +80,6 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags, goto out_pid; } - new_nsp->user_ns = copy_user_ns(flags, tsk->nsproxy->user_ns); - if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->user_ns)) { - err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->user_ns); - goto out_user; - } - new_nsp->net_ns = copy_net_ns(flags, tsk->nsproxy->net_ns); if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->net_ns)) { err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->net_ns); @@ -95,9 +89,6 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags, return new_nsp; out_net: - if (new_nsp->user_ns) - put_user_ns(new_nsp->user_ns); -out_user: if (new_nsp->pid_ns) put_pid_ns(new_nsp->pid_ns); out_pid: @@ -130,7 +121,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) get_nsproxy(old_ns); if (!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | - CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET))) + CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET))) return 0; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { @@ -173,8 +164,6 @@ void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns) put_ipc_ns(ns->ipc_ns); if (ns->pid_ns) put_pid_ns(ns->pid_ns); - if (ns->user_ns) - put_user_ns(ns->user_ns); put_net(ns->net_ns); kmem_cache_free(nsproxy_cachep, ns); } @@ -189,7 +178,7 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags, int err = 0; if (!(unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | - CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET))) + CLONE_NEWNET))) return 0; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 4c8bcd7dd8e..ca2df68faf7 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill) int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; + /* May we inspect the given task? * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace * and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc. @@ -127,13 +129,19 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */ if (task == current) return 0; - if (((current->uid != task->euid) || - (current->uid != task->suid) || - (current->uid != task->uid) || - (current->gid != task->egid) || - (current->gid != task->sgid) || - (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(task); + if ((cred->uid != tcred->euid || + cred->uid != tcred->suid || + cred->uid != tcred->uid || + cred->gid != tcred->egid || + cred->gid != tcred->sgid || + cred->gid != tcred->gid) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); return -EPERM; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); smp_rmb(); if (task->mm) dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm); @@ -163,6 +171,14 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task) if (same_thread_group(task, current)) goto out; + /* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference; + * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace. + */ + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + + retval = -EPERM; repeat: /* * Nasty, nasty. @@ -202,6 +218,7 @@ repeat: bad: write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags); task_unlock(task); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); out: return retval; } diff --git a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c index b7480fb5c3d..993bc74a290 100644 --- a/kernel/sched.c +++ b/kernel/sched.c @@ -345,7 +345,9 @@ static inline struct task_group *task_group(struct task_struct *p) struct task_group *tg; #ifdef CONFIG_USER_SCHED - tg = p->user->tg; + rcu_read_lock(); + tg = __task_cred(p)->user->tg; + rcu_read_unlock(); #elif defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED) tg = container_of(task_subsys_state(p, cpu_cgroup_subsys_id), struct task_group, css); @@ -5134,6 +5136,22 @@ __setscheduler(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int policy, int prio) set_load_weight(p); } +/* + * check the target process has a UID that matches the current process's + */ +static bool check_same_owner(struct task_struct *p) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred; + bool match; + + rcu_read_lock(); + pcred = __task_cred(p); + match = (cred->euid == pcred->euid || + cred->euid == pcred->uid); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return match; +} + static int __sched_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *param, bool user) { @@ -5193,8 +5211,7 @@ recheck: return -EPERM; /* can't change other user's priorities */ - if ((current->euid != p->euid) && - (current->euid != p->uid)) + if (!check_same_owner(p)) return -EPERM; } @@ -5426,8 +5443,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const cpumask_t *in_mask) read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); retval = -EPERM; - if ((current->euid != p->euid) && (current->euid != p->uid) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) + if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) goto out_unlock; retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, 0, NULL); diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 4530fc65445..2a64304ed54 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ int next_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask) return sig; } +/* + * allocate a new signal queue record + * - this may be called without locks if and only if t == current, otherwise an + * appopriate lock must be held to stop the target task from exiting + */ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags, int override_rlimit) { @@ -184,11 +189,12 @@ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags, struct user_struct *user; /* - * In order to avoid problems with "switch_user()", we want to make - * sure that the compiler doesn't re-load "t->user" + * We won't get problems with the target's UID changing under us + * because changing it requires RCU be used, and if t != current, the + * caller must be holding the RCU readlock (by way of a spinlock) and + * we use RCU protection here */ - user = t->user; - barrier(); + user = get_uid(__task_cred(t)->user); atomic_inc(&user->sigpending); if (override_rlimit || atomic_read(&user->sigpending) <= @@ -196,12 +202,14 @@ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags, q = kmem_cache_alloc(sigqueue_cachep, flags); if (unlikely(q == NULL)) { atomic_dec(&user->sigpending); + free_uid(user); } else { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->list); q->flags = 0; - q->user = get_uid(user); + q->user = user; } - return(q); + + return q; } static void __sigqueue_free(struct sigqueue *q) @@ -562,10 +570,12 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mask, struct sigpending *s) /* * Bad permissions for sending the signal + * - the caller must hold at least the RCU read lock */ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; struct pid *sid; int error; @@ -579,8 +589,11 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, if (error) return error; - if ((current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) && - (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) && + tcred = __task_cred(t); + if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && !capable(CAP_KILL)) { switch (sig) { case SIGCONT: @@ -844,7 +857,7 @@ static int send_signal(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, q->info.si_errno = 0; q->info.si_code = SI_USER; q->info.si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current); - q->info.si_uid = current->uid; + q->info.si_uid = current_uid(); break; case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_PRIV: q->info.si_signo = sig; @@ -1008,6 +1021,10 @@ struct sighand_struct *lock_task_sighand(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long return sighand; } +/* + * send signal info to all the members of a group + * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock at least + */ int group_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p) { unsigned long flags; @@ -1029,8 +1046,8 @@ int group_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p) /* * __kill_pgrp_info() sends a signal to a process group: this is what the tty * control characters do (^C, ^Z etc) + * - the caller must hold at least a readlock on tasklist_lock */ - int __kill_pgrp_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pgrp) { struct task_struct *p = NULL; @@ -1086,6 +1103,7 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_uid(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid, { int ret = -EINVAL; struct task_struct *p; + const struct cred *pcred; if (!valid_signal(sig)) return ret; @@ -1096,9 +1114,11 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_uid(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid, ret = -ESRCH; goto out_unlock; } - if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) - && (euid != p->suid) && (euid != p->uid) - && (uid != p->suid) && (uid != p->uid)) { + pcred = __task_cred(p); + if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || + (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) && + euid != pcred->suid && euid != pcred->uid && + uid != pcred->suid && uid != pcred->uid) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_unlock; } @@ -1369,10 +1389,9 @@ int do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig) */ rcu_read_lock(); info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns); + info.si_uid = __task_cred(tsk)->uid; rcu_read_unlock(); - info.si_uid = tsk->uid; - thread_group_cputime(tsk, &cputime); info.si_utime = cputime_to_jiffies(cputime.utime); info.si_stime = cputime_to_jiffies(cputime.stime); @@ -1440,10 +1459,9 @@ static void do_notify_parent_cldstop(struct task_struct *tsk, int why) */ rcu_read_lock(); info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns); + info.si_uid = __task_cred(tsk)->uid; rcu_read_unlock(); - info.si_uid = tsk->uid; - info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime); info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->stime); @@ -1598,7 +1616,7 @@ void ptrace_notify(int exit_code) info.si_signo = SIGTRAP; info.si_code = exit_code; info.si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current); - info.si_uid = current->uid; + info.si_uid = current_uid(); /* Let the debugger run. */ spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); @@ -1710,7 +1728,7 @@ static int ptrace_signal(int signr, siginfo_t *info, info->si_errno = 0; info->si_code = SI_USER; info->si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current->parent); - info->si_uid = current->parent->uid; + info->si_uid = task_uid(current->parent); } /* If the (new) signal is now blocked, requeue it. */ @@ -2211,7 +2229,7 @@ sys_kill(pid_t pid, int sig) info.si_errno = 0; info.si_code = SI_USER; info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current); - info.si_uid = current->uid; + info.si_uid = current_uid(); return kill_something_info(sig, &info, pid); } @@ -2228,7 +2246,7 @@ static int do_tkill(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig) info.si_errno = 0; info.si_code = SI_TKILL; info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current); - info.si_uid = current->uid; + info.si_uid = current_uid(); rcu_read_lock(); p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 31deba8f7d1..ebe65c2c987 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -112,12 +112,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid); void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void); +/* + * set the priority of a task + * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock + */ static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); int no_nice; - if (p->uid != current->euid && - p->euid != current->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { + if (pcred->uid != cred->euid && + pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { error = -EPERM; goto out; } @@ -141,6 +146,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval) { struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int error = -EINVAL; struct pid *pgrp; @@ -174,18 +180,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval) } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: - user = current->user; + user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user; if (!who) - who = current->uid; - else - if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who))) - goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ + who = cred->uid; + else if ((who != cred->uid) && + !(user = find_user(who))) + goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ do_each_thread(g, p) - if (p->uid == who) + if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); while_each_thread(g, p); - if (who != current->uid) + if (who != cred->uid) free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ break; } @@ -205,6 +211,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who) { struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; struct pid *pgrp; @@ -236,21 +243,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who) } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: - user = current->user; + user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user; if (!who) - who = current->uid; - else - if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who))) - goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ + who = cred->uid; + else if ((who != cred->uid) && + !(user = find_user(who))) + goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ do_each_thread(g, p) - if (p->uid == who) { + if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) { niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } while_each_thread(g, p); - if (who != current->uid) + if (who != cred->uid) free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ break; } @@ -472,46 +479,48 @@ void ctrl_alt_del(void) */ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) { - int old_rgid = current->gid; - int old_egid = current->egid; - int new_rgid = old_rgid; - int new_egid = old_egid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; int retval; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + old = current_cred(); + retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE); if (retval) - return retval; + goto error; + retval = -EPERM; if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { - if ((old_rgid == rgid) || - (current->egid==rgid) || + if (old->gid == rgid || + old->egid == rgid || capable(CAP_SETGID)) - new_rgid = rgid; + new->gid = rgid; else - return -EPERM; + goto error; } if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { - if ((old_rgid == egid) || - (current->egid == egid) || - (current->sgid == egid) || + if (old->gid == egid || + old->egid == egid || + old->sgid == egid || capable(CAP_SETGID)) - new_egid = egid; + new->egid = egid; else - return -EPERM; - } - if (new_egid != old_egid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); + goto error; } + if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || - (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid)) - current->sgid = new_egid; - current->fsgid = new_egid; - current->egid = new_egid; - current->gid = new_rgid; - key_fsgid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); - return 0; + (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid)) + new->sgid = new->egid; + new->fsgid = new->egid; + + return commit_creds(new); + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return retval; } /* @@ -521,56 +530,54 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid) { - int old_egid = current->egid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; int retval; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + old = current_cred(); + retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); if (retval) - return retval; + goto error; - if (capable(CAP_SETGID)) { - if (old_egid != gid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); - } - current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid; - } else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid)) { - if (old_egid != gid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); - } - current->egid = current->fsgid = gid; - } + retval = -EPERM; + if (capable(CAP_SETGID)) + new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid; + else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid) + new->egid = new->fsgid = gid; else - return -EPERM; + goto error; - key_fsgid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); - return 0; + return commit_creds(new); + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return retval; } -static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear) +/* + * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID + */ +static int set_user(struct cred *new) { struct user_struct *new_user; - new_user = alloc_uid(current->nsproxy->user_ns, new_ruid); + new_user = alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid); if (!new_user) return -EAGAIN; if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur && - new_user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user) { + new_user != INIT_USER) { free_uid(new_user); return -EAGAIN; } - switch_uid(new_user); - - if (dumpclear) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); - } - current->uid = new_ruid; + free_uid(new->user); + new->user = new_user; return 0; } @@ -591,54 +598,56 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear) */ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) { - int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; int retval; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + old = current_cred(); + retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE); if (retval) - return retval; - - new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid; - new_euid = old_euid = current->euid; - old_suid = current->suid; + goto error; + retval = -EPERM; if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { - new_ruid = ruid; - if ((old_ruid != ruid) && - (current->euid != ruid) && + new->uid = ruid; + if (old->uid != ruid && + old->euid != ruid && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) - return -EPERM; + goto error; } if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { - new_euid = euid; - if ((old_ruid != euid) && - (current->euid != euid) && - (current->suid != euid) && + new->euid = euid; + if (old->uid != euid && + old->euid != euid && + old->suid != euid && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) - return -EPERM; + goto error; } - if (new_ruid != old_ruid && set_user(new_ruid, new_euid != old_euid) < 0) - return -EAGAIN; + retval = -EAGAIN; + if (new->uid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0) + goto error; - if (new_euid != old_euid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); - } - current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid; if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || - (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid)) - current->suid = current->euid; - current->fsuid = current->euid; + (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid)) + new->suid = new->euid; + new->fsuid = new->euid; - key_fsuid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); - - return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE); -} + retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); + if (retval < 0) + goto error; + return commit_creds(new); +error: + abort_creds(new); + return retval; +} /* * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS @@ -653,36 +662,41 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid) { - int old_euid = current->euid; - int old_ruid, old_suid, new_suid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; int retval; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + old = current_cred(); + retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); if (retval) - return retval; + goto error; - old_ruid = current->uid; - old_suid = current->suid; - new_suid = old_suid; - + retval = -EPERM; if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0) - return -EAGAIN; - new_suid = uid; - } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid)) - return -EPERM; - - if (old_euid != uid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); + new->suid = new->uid = uid; + if (uid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0) { + retval = -EAGAIN; + goto error; + } + } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) { + goto error; } - current->fsuid = current->euid = uid; - current->suid = new_suid; - key_fsuid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); + new->fsuid = new->euid = uid; + + retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); + if (retval < 0) + goto error; - return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID); + return commit_creds(new); + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return retval; } @@ -692,54 +706,63 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) { - int old_ruid = current->uid; - int old_euid = current->euid; - int old_suid = current->suid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; int retval; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES); if (retval) - return retval; + goto error; + old = current_cred(); + retval = -EPERM; if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) && - (ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid)) - return -EPERM; - if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) && - (euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid)) - return -EPERM; - if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) && - (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid)) - return -EPERM; + if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid && + ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid) + goto error; + if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid && + euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid) + goto error; + if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid && + suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid) + goto error; } + + retval = -EAGAIN; if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { - if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0) - return -EAGAIN; + new->uid = ruid; + if (ruid != old->uid && set_user(new) < 0) + goto error; } - if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { - if (euid != current->euid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); - } - current->euid = euid; - } - current->fsuid = current->euid; + if (euid != (uid_t) -1) + new->euid = euid; if (suid != (uid_t) -1) - current->suid = suid; + new->suid = suid; + new->fsuid = new->euid; + + retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); + if (retval < 0) + goto error; - key_fsuid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); + return commit_creds(new); - return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES); +error: + abort_creds(new); + return retval; } asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(current->uid, ruid)) && - !(retval = put_user(current->euid, euid))) - retval = put_user(current->suid, suid); + if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) && + !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid))) + retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid); return retval; } @@ -749,48 +772,55 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __us */ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) { + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; int retval; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + old = current_cred(); + retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES); if (retval) - return retval; + goto error; + retval = -EPERM; if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) { - if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) && - (rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid)) - return -EPERM; - if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != current->gid) && - (egid != current->egid) && (egid != current->sgid)) - return -EPERM; - if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != current->gid) && - (sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid)) - return -EPERM; + if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid && + rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid) + goto error; + if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid && + egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid) + goto error; + if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid && + sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid) + goto error; } - if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { - if (egid != current->egid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); - } - current->egid = egid; - } - current->fsgid = current->egid; + if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) - current->gid = rgid; + new->gid = rgid; + if (egid != (gid_t) -1) + new->egid = egid; if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) - current->sgid = sgid; + new->sgid = sgid; + new->fsgid = new->egid; - key_fsgid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); - return 0; + return commit_creds(new); + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return retval; } asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(current->gid, rgid)) && - !(retval = put_user(current->egid, egid))) - retval = put_user(current->sgid, sgid); + if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) && + !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid))) + retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid); return retval; } @@ -804,27 +834,35 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __us */ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) { - int old_fsuid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; + uid_t old_fsuid; - old_fsuid = current->fsuid; - if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)) - return old_fsuid; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return current_fsuid(); + old = current_cred(); + old_fsuid = old->fsuid; - if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid || - uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid || + if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0) + goto error; + + if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid || + uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid || capable(CAP_SETUID)) { if (uid != old_fsuid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); + new->fsuid = uid; + if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) + goto change_okay; } - current->fsuid = uid; } - key_fsuid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_UID); - - security_task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS); +error: + abort_creds(new); + return old_fsuid; +change_okay: + commit_creds(new); return old_fsuid; } @@ -833,23 +871,34 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) */ asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) { - int old_fsgid; + const struct cred *old; + struct cred *new; + gid_t old_fsgid; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return current_fsgid(); + old = current_cred(); + old_fsgid = old->fsgid; - old_fsgid = current->fsgid; if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)) - return old_fsgid; + goto error; - if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid || - gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid || + if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid || + gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid || capable(CAP_SETGID)) { if (gid != old_fsgid) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - smp_wmb(); + new->fsgid = gid; + goto change_okay; } - current->fsgid = gid; - key_fsgid_changed(current); - proc_id_connector(current, PROC_EVENT_GID); } + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return old_fsgid; + +change_okay: + commit_creds(new); return old_fsgid; } @@ -1118,7 +1167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free); /* export the group_info to a user-space array */ static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist, - struct group_info *group_info) + const struct group_info *group_info) { int i; unsigned int count = group_info->ngroups; @@ -1186,7 +1235,7 @@ static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info) } /* a simple bsearch */ -int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp) +int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp) { unsigned int left, right; @@ -1208,51 +1257,74 @@ int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp) return 0; } -/* validate and set current->group_info */ -int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info) +/** + * set_groups - Change a group subscription in a set of credentials + * @new: The newly prepared set of credentials to alter + * @group_info: The group list to install + * + * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, insert it into a set + * of credentials. + */ +int set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info) { int retval; - struct group_info *old_info; retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info); if (retval) return retval; + put_group_info(new->group_info); groups_sort(group_info); get_group_info(group_info); + new->group_info = group_info; + return 0; +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_groups); - task_lock(current); - old_info = current->group_info; - current->group_info = group_info; - task_unlock(current); +/** + * set_current_groups - Change current's group subscription + * @group_info: The group list to impose + * + * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, impose it upon current's task + * security record. + */ +int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info) +{ + struct cred *new; + int ret; - put_group_info(old_info); + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; - return 0; + ret = set_groups(new, group_info); + if (ret < 0) { + abort_creds(new); + return ret; + } + + return commit_creds(new); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups); asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist) { - int i = 0; - - /* - * SMP: Nobody else can change our grouplist. Thus we are - * safe. - */ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + int i; if (gidsetsize < 0) return -EINVAL; /* no need to grab task_lock here; it cannot change */ - i = current->group_info->ngroups; + i = cred->group_info->ngroups; if (gidsetsize) { if (i > gidsetsize) { i = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (groups_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) { + if (groups_to_user(grouplist, cred->group_info)) { i = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -1296,9 +1368,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t __user *grouplist) */ int in_group_p(gid_t grp) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int retval = 1; - if (grp != current->fsgid) - retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp); + + if (grp != cred->fsgid) + retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp); return retval; } @@ -1306,9 +1380,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p); int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int retval = 1; - if (grp != current->egid) - retval = groups_search(current->group_info, grp); + + if (grp != cred->egid) + retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp); return retval; } @@ -1624,50 +1700,56 @@ asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask) asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { - long error = 0; + struct task_struct *me = current; + unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; + long error; - if (security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, &error)) + error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + if (error != -ENOSYS) return error; + error = 0; switch (option) { case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { error = -EINVAL; break; } - current->pdeath_signal = arg2; + me->pdeath_signal = arg2; + error = 0; break; case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: - error = put_user(current->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); + error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: - error = get_dumpable(current->mm); + error = get_dumpable(me->mm); break; case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) { error = -EINVAL; break; } - set_dumpable(current->mm, arg2); + set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); + error = 0; break; case PR_SET_UNALIGN: - error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2); + error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_UNALIGN: - error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(current, arg2); + error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEMU: - error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2); + error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEMU: - error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(current, arg2); + error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEXC: - error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2); + error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEXC: - error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(current, arg2); + error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_TIMING: error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; @@ -1675,33 +1757,28 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, case PR_SET_TIMING: if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) error = -EINVAL; + else + error = 0; break; - case PR_SET_NAME: { - struct task_struct *me = current; - unsigned char ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)]; - - ncomm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0; - if (strncpy_from_user(ncomm, (char __user *)arg2, - sizeof(me->comm)-1) < 0) + case PR_SET_NAME: + comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0; + if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, + sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) return -EFAULT; - set_task_comm(me, ncomm); + set_task_comm(me, comm); return 0; - } - case PR_GET_NAME: { - struct task_struct *me = current; - unsigned char tcomm[sizeof(me->comm)]; - - get_task_comm(tcomm, me); - if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, tcomm, sizeof(tcomm))) + case PR_GET_NAME: + get_task_comm(comm, me); + if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, + sizeof(comm))) return -EFAULT; return 0; - } case PR_GET_ENDIAN: - error = GET_ENDIAN(current, arg2); + error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_ENDIAN: - error = SET_ENDIAN(current, arg2); + error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_SECCOMP: @@ -1725,6 +1802,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, current->default_timer_slack_ns; else current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; + error = 0; break; default: error = -EINVAL; diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 3d56fe7570d..9d52b57310a 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1651,7 +1651,7 @@ out: static int test_perm(int mode, int op) { - if (!current->euid) + if (!current_euid()) mode >>= 6; else if (in_egroup_p(0)) mode >>= 3; diff --git a/kernel/timer.c b/kernel/timer.c index dbd50fabe4c..566257d1dc1 100644 --- a/kernel/timer.c +++ b/kernel/timer.c @@ -1192,25 +1192,25 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getppid(void) asmlinkage long sys_getuid(void) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ - return current->uid; + return current_uid(); } asmlinkage long sys_geteuid(void) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ - return current->euid; + return current_euid(); } asmlinkage long sys_getgid(void) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ - return current->gid; + return current_gid(); } asmlinkage long sys_getegid(void) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ - return current->egid; + return current_egid(); } #endif diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index d86e3252f30..1ee9e4e454a 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ __update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu) memcpy(data->comm, tsk->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); data->pid = tsk->pid; - data->uid = tsk->uid; + data->uid = task_uid(tsk); data->nice = tsk->static_prio - 20 - MAX_RT_PRIO; data->policy = tsk->policy; data->rt_priority = tsk->rt_priority; diff --git a/kernel/tsacct.c b/kernel/tsacct.c index 8ebcd8532df..2dc06ab3571 100644 --- a/kernel/tsacct.c +++ b/kernel/tsacct.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ */ void bacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *tsk) { + const struct cred *tcred; struct timespec uptime, ts; u64 ac_etime; @@ -53,10 +54,11 @@ void bacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *tsk) stats->ac_flag |= AXSIG; stats->ac_nice = task_nice(tsk); stats->ac_sched = tsk->policy; - stats->ac_uid = tsk->uid; - stats->ac_gid = tsk->gid; stats->ac_pid = tsk->pid; rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(tsk); + stats->ac_uid = tcred->uid; + stats->ac_gid = tcred->gid; stats->ac_ppid = pid_alive(tsk) ? rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->tgid : 0; rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c index 3e41c1673e2..2460c3199b5 100644 --- a/kernel/uid16.c +++ b/kernel/uid16.c @@ -84,11 +84,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid16(old_uid_t ruid, old_uid_t euid, old_uid_t suid) asmlinkage long sys_getresuid16(old_uid_t __user *ruid, old_uid_t __user *euid, old_uid_t __user *suid) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->uid), ruid)) && - !(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->euid), euid))) - retval = put_user(high2lowuid(current->suid), suid); + if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(cred->uid), ruid)) && + !(retval = put_user(high2lowuid(cred->euid), euid))) + retval = put_user(high2lowuid(cred->suid), suid); return retval; } @@ -104,11 +105,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid16(old_gid_t rgid, old_gid_t egid, old_gid_t sgid) asmlinkage long sys_getresgid16(old_gid_t __user *rgid, old_gid_t __user *egid, old_gid_t __user *sgid) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int retval; - if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->gid), rgid)) && - !(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->egid), egid))) - retval = put_user(high2lowgid(current->sgid), sgid); + if (!(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(cred->gid), rgid)) && + !(retval = put_user(high2lowgid(cred->egid), egid))) + retval = put_user(high2lowgid(cred->sgid), sgid); return retval; } @@ -161,25 +163,24 @@ static int groups16_from_user(struct group_info *group_info, asmlinkage long sys_getgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *grouplist) { - int i = 0; + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + int i; if (gidsetsize < 0) return -EINVAL; - get_group_info(current->group_info); - i = current->group_info->ngroups; + i = cred->group_info->ngroups; if (gidsetsize) { if (i > gidsetsize) { i = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, current->group_info)) { + if (groups16_to_user(grouplist, cred->group_info)) { i = -EFAULT; goto out; } } out: - put_group_info(current->group_info); return i; } @@ -210,20 +211,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *grouplist) asmlinkage long sys_getuid16(void) { - return high2lowuid(current->uid); + return high2lowuid(current_uid()); } asmlinkage long sys_geteuid16(void) { - return high2lowuid(current->euid); + return high2lowuid(current_euid()); } asmlinkage long sys_getgid16(void) { - return high2lowgid(current->gid); + return high2lowgid(current_gid()); } asmlinkage long sys_getegid16(void) { - return high2lowgid(current->egid); + return high2lowgid(current_egid()); } diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c index 39d6159fae4..97202cb29ad 100644 --- a/kernel/user.c +++ b/kernel/user.c @@ -16,12 +16,13 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include "cred-internals.h" struct user_namespace init_user_ns = { .kref = { - .refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(2), + .refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(1), }, - .root_user = &root_user, + .creator = &root_user, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns); @@ -47,12 +48,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep; */ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock); +/* root_user.__count is 2, 1 for init task cred, 1 for init_user_ns->creator */ struct user_struct root_user = { - .__count = ATOMIC_INIT(1), + .__count = ATOMIC_INIT(2), .processes = ATOMIC_INIT(1), .files = ATOMIC_INIT(0), .sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0), .locked_shm = 0, + .user_ns = &init_user_ns, #ifdef CONFIG_USER_SCHED .tg = &init_task_group, #endif @@ -104,16 +107,10 @@ static int sched_create_user(struct user_struct *up) return rc; } -static void sched_switch_user(struct task_struct *p) -{ - sched_move_task(p); -} - #else /* CONFIG_USER_SCHED */ static void sched_destroy_user(struct user_struct *up) { } static int sched_create_user(struct user_struct *up) { return 0; } -static void sched_switch_user(struct task_struct *p) { } #endif /* CONFIG_USER_SCHED */ @@ -319,12 +316,13 @@ done: * IRQ state (as stored in flags) is restored and uidhash_lock released * upon function exit. */ -static inline void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags) +static void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags) { /* restore back the count */ atomic_inc(&up->__count); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags); + put_user_ns(up->user_ns); INIT_WORK(&up->work, remove_user_sysfs_dir); schedule_work(&up->work); } @@ -340,13 +338,14 @@ static inline void uids_mutex_unlock(void) { } * IRQ state (as stored in flags) is restored and uidhash_lock released * upon function exit. */ -static inline void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags) +static void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags) { uid_hash_remove(up); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags); sched_destroy_user(up); key_put(up->uid_keyring); key_put(up->session_keyring); + put_user_ns(up->user_ns); kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up); } @@ -362,7 +361,7 @@ struct user_struct *find_user(uid_t uid) { struct user_struct *ret; unsigned long flags; - struct user_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns; + struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags); ret = uid_hash_find(uid, uidhashentry(ns, uid)); @@ -409,6 +408,8 @@ struct user_struct *alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid) if (sched_create_user(new) < 0) goto out_free_user; + new->user_ns = get_user_ns(ns); + if (uids_user_create(new)) goto out_destoy_sched; @@ -432,7 +433,6 @@ struct user_struct *alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid) up = new; } spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock); - } uids_mutex_unlock(); @@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ struct user_struct *alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid) out_destoy_sched: sched_destroy_user(new); + put_user_ns(new->user_ns); out_free_user: kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, new); out_unlock: @@ -448,63 +449,6 @@ out_unlock: return NULL; } -void switch_uid(struct user_struct *new_user) -{ - struct user_struct *old_user; - - /* What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the - * new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now - * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters - * we should be checking for it. -DaveM - */ - old_user = current->user; - atomic_inc(&new_user->processes); - atomic_dec(&old_user->processes); - switch_uid_keyring(new_user); - current->user = new_user; - sched_switch_user(current); - - /* - * We need to synchronize with __sigqueue_alloc() - * doing a get_uid(p->user).. If that saw the old - * user value, we need to wait until it has exited - * its critical region before we can free the old - * structure. - */ - smp_mb(); - spin_unlock_wait(¤t->sighand->siglock); - - free_uid(old_user); - suid_keys(current); -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -void release_uids(struct user_namespace *ns) -{ - int i; - unsigned long flags; - struct hlist_head *head; - struct hlist_node *nd; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags); - /* - * collapse the chains so that the user_struct-s will - * be still alive, but not in hashes. subsequent free_uid() - * will free them. - */ - for (i = 0; i < UIDHASH_SZ; i++) { - head = ns->uidhash_table + i; - while (!hlist_empty(head)) { - nd = head->first; - hlist_del_init(nd); - } - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags); - - free_uid(ns->root_user); -} -#endif - static int __init uid_cache_init(void) { int n; diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 532858fa5b8..79084311ee5 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -9,60 +9,55 @@ #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> /* - * Clone a new ns copying an original user ns, setting refcount to 1 - * @old_ns: namespace to clone - * Return NULL on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise + * Create a new user namespace, deriving the creator from the user in the + * passed credentials, and replacing that user with the new root user for the + * new namespace. + * + * This is called by copy_creds(), which will finish setting the target task's + * credentials. */ -static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace *old_ns) +int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) { struct user_namespace *ns; - struct user_struct *new_user; + struct user_struct *root_user; int n; ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct user_namespace), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ns) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + return -ENOMEM; kref_init(&ns->kref); for (n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n) INIT_HLIST_HEAD(ns->uidhash_table + n); - /* Insert new root user. */ - ns->root_user = alloc_uid(ns, 0); - if (!ns->root_user) { + /* Alloc new root user. */ + root_user = alloc_uid(ns, 0); + if (!root_user) { kfree(ns); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + return -ENOMEM; } - /* Reset current->user with a new one */ - new_user = alloc_uid(ns, current->uid); - if (!new_user) { - free_uid(ns->root_user); - kfree(ns); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - - switch_uid(new_user); - return ns; -} - -struct user_namespace * copy_user_ns(int flags, struct user_namespace *old_ns) -{ - struct user_namespace *new_ns; - - BUG_ON(!old_ns); - get_user_ns(old_ns); - - if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)) - return old_ns; + /* set the new root user in the credentials under preparation */ + ns->creator = new->user; + new->user = root_user; + new->uid = new->euid = new->suid = new->fsuid = 0; + new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = 0; + put_group_info(new->group_info); + new->group_info = get_group_info(&init_groups); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + key_put(new->request_key_auth); + new->request_key_auth = NULL; +#endif + /* tgcred will be cleared in our caller bc CLONE_THREAD won't be set */ - new_ns = clone_user_ns(old_ns); + /* alloc_uid() incremented the userns refcount. Just set it to 1 */ + kref_set(&ns->kref, 1); - put_user_ns(old_ns); - return new_ns; + return 0; } void free_user_ns(struct kref *kref) @@ -70,7 +65,7 @@ void free_user_ns(struct kref *kref) struct user_namespace *ns; ns = container_of(kref, struct user_namespace, kref); - release_uids(ns); + free_uid(ns->creator); kfree(ns); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_user_ns); diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c index d4dc69ddebd..4952322cba4 100644 --- a/kernel/workqueue.c +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c @@ -84,21 +84,21 @@ static cpumask_t cpu_singlethread_map __read_mostly; static cpumask_t cpu_populated_map __read_mostly; /* If it's single threaded, it isn't in the list of workqueues. */ -static inline int is_single_threaded(struct workqueue_struct *wq) +static inline int is_wq_single_threaded(struct workqueue_struct *wq) { return wq->singlethread; } static const cpumask_t *wq_cpu_map(struct workqueue_struct *wq) { - return is_single_threaded(wq) + return is_wq_single_threaded(wq) ? &cpu_singlethread_map : &cpu_populated_map; } static struct cpu_workqueue_struct *wq_per_cpu(struct workqueue_struct *wq, int cpu) { - if (unlikely(is_single_threaded(wq))) + if (unlikely(is_wq_single_threaded(wq))) cpu = singlethread_cpu; return per_cpu_ptr(wq->cpu_wq, cpu); } @@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ static int create_workqueue_thread(struct cpu_workqueue_struct *cwq, int cpu) { struct sched_param param = { .sched_priority = MAX_RT_PRIO-1 }; struct workqueue_struct *wq = cwq->wq; - const char *fmt = is_single_threaded(wq) ? "%s" : "%s/%d"; + const char *fmt = is_wq_single_threaded(wq) ? "%s" : "%s/%d"; struct task_struct *p; p = kthread_create(worker_thread, cwq, fmt, wq->name, cpu); |