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-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h1
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c209
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c65
-rw-r--r--kernel/futex.c8
-rw-r--r--kernel/irq/handle.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/irq/manage.c48
-rw-r--r--kernel/irq/spurious.c4
7 files changed, 243 insertions, 96 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 8323e4132a3..6aa33b848cf 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct audit_krule {
u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
struct audit_field *fields;
struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 4c99d2c586e..5b4e16276ca 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
+ kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
kfree(e);
}
@@ -278,6 +279,29 @@ static int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len,
return 0;
}
+static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
+
+int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
+{
+ __u32 *p = kzalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ while (*list != ~0U) {
+ unsigned n = *list++;
+ if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
+ kfree(p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
+ }
+ if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
+ kfree(p);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ classes[class] = p;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
{
@@ -321,6 +345,22 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
+ int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
+ __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
+ __u32 *class;
+
+ if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
+ continue;
+ *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
+ class = classes[i];
+ if (class) {
+ int j;
+ for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
+ entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
+ }
+ }
+
return entry;
exit_err:
@@ -469,11 +509,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
if (IS_ERR(str))
goto exit_free;
@@ -511,6 +556,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
if (err)
goto exit_free;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
+ goto exit_free;
+ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str))
+ goto exit_free;
+ entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+ entry->rule.filterkey = str;
+ break;
default:
goto exit_free;
}
@@ -600,11 +655,16 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->fields[i] = f->type;
data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
switch(f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
break;
@@ -612,6 +672,10 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->watch->path);
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
+ break;
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
@@ -639,11 +703,16 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 1;
switch(a->fields[i].type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
return 1;
break;
@@ -651,6 +720,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
if (strcmp(a->watch->path, b->watch->path))
return 1;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
+ if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
+ return 1;
+ break;
default:
if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
return 1;
@@ -730,6 +804,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
u32 fcount = old->field_count;
struct audit_entry *entry;
struct audit_krule *new;
+ char *fk;
int i, err = 0;
entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
@@ -753,13 +828,25 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!fk))
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ else
+ new->filterkey = fk;
}
if (err) {
audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -1245,6 +1332,34 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
}
+/* Log rule additions and removals */
+static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
+ struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u", loginuid);
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s rule key=", action);
+ if (rule->filterkey)
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, rule->filterkey);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
/**
* audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
* @type: audit message type
@@ -1304,24 +1419,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
err = audit_add_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
- /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "add", &entry->rule, !err);
if (err)
audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -1337,24 +1435,8 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
err = audit_del_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
- /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
- kfree(ctx);
- } else
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
- loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "remove", &entry->rule,
+ !err);
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
@@ -1514,11 +1596,16 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
return 1;
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index dc5e3f01efe..ae40ac8c39e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ struct audit_context {
int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+ char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
struct dentry * pwd;
struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
@@ -320,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
match for now to avoid losing information that
@@ -341,6 +342,46 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
ctx);
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
+ also applies here */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ /* Find files that match */
+ if (name) {
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx);
+ } else if (ctx) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ ctx->names[j].osid,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Find ipc objects that match */
+ if (ctx) {
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
+ aux = aux->next) {
+ if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
@@ -348,11 +389,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ /* ignore this field for filtering */
+ result = 1;
+ break;
}
if (!result)
return 0;
}
+ if (rule->filterkey)
+ ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
@@ -627,6 +674,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context);
context = previous;
} while (context);
@@ -735,6 +783,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+ if (context->filterkey) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -1060,6 +1113,8 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
+ kfree(context->filterkey);
+ context->filterkey = NULL;
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 6c91f938005..15caf93e4a4 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -630,8 +630,10 @@ static int futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, int nr_wake)
list_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, head, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) {
- if (this->pi_state)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (this->pi_state) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
wake_futex(this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
@@ -1208,7 +1210,7 @@ static int do_futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, int detect, int trylock,
}
down_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem);
- hb = queue_lock(&q, -1, NULL);
+ spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
index e71266c3803..6d8b3011496 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_IRQ_event(unsigned int irq, struct pt_regs *regs,
}
#endif
- if (!(action->flags & SA_INTERRUPT))
+ if (!(action->flags & IRQF_DISABLED))
local_irq_enable();
do {
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_IRQ_event(unsigned int irq, struct pt_regs *regs,
action = action->next;
} while (action);
- if (status & SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM)
+ if (status & IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM)
add_interrupt_randomness(irq);
local_irq_disable();
diff --git a/kernel/irq/manage.c b/kernel/irq/manage.c
index b7117e81ac5..fede5fa351d 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/manage.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/manage.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ void enable_irq(unsigned int irq)
spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
switch (desc->depth) {
case 0:
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Unablanced enable_irq(%d)\n", irq);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Unbalanced enable for IRQ %d\n", irq);
WARN_ON(1);
break;
case 1: {
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int can_request_irq(unsigned int irq, unsigned long irqflags)
action = irq_desc[irq].action;
if (action)
- if (irqflags & action->flags & SA_SHIRQ)
+ if (irqflags & action->flags & IRQF_SHARED)
action = NULL;
return !action;
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int setup_irq(unsigned int irq, struct irqaction *new)
* so we have to be careful not to interfere with a
* running system.
*/
- if (new->flags & SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM) {
+ if (new->flags & IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM) {
/*
* This function might sleep, we want to call it first,
* outside of the atomic block.
@@ -227,16 +227,17 @@ int setup_irq(unsigned int irq, struct irqaction *new)
/*
* Can't share interrupts unless both agree to and are
* the same type (level, edge, polarity). So both flag
- * fields must have SA_SHIRQ set and the bits which
+ * fields must have IRQF_SHARED set and the bits which
* set the trigger type must match.
*/
- if (!((old->flags & new->flags) & SA_SHIRQ) ||
- ((old->flags ^ new->flags) & SA_TRIGGER_MASK))
+ if (!((old->flags & new->flags) & IRQF_SHARED) ||
+ ((old->flags ^ new->flags) & IRQF_TRIGGER_MASK))
goto mismatch;
-#if defined(CONFIG_IRQ_PER_CPU) && defined(SA_PERCPU_IRQ)
+#if defined(CONFIG_IRQ_PER_CPU) && defined(IRQF_PERCPU)
/* All handlers must agree on per-cpuness */
- if ((old->flags & IRQ_PER_CPU) != (new->flags & IRQ_PER_CPU))
+ if ((old->flags & IRQF_PERCPU) !=
+ (new->flags & IRQF_PERCPU))
goto mismatch;
#endif
@@ -249,26 +250,27 @@ int setup_irq(unsigned int irq, struct irqaction *new)
}
*p = new;
-#if defined(CONFIG_IRQ_PER_CPU) && defined(SA_PERCPU_IRQ)
- if (new->flags & SA_PERCPU_IRQ)
+#if defined(CONFIG_IRQ_PER_CPU) && defined(IRQF_PERCPU)
+ if (new->flags & IRQF_PERCPU)
desc->status |= IRQ_PER_CPU;
#endif
if (!shared) {
irq_chip_set_defaults(desc->chip);
/* Setup the type (level, edge polarity) if configured: */
- if (new->flags & SA_TRIGGER_MASK) {
+ if (new->flags & IRQF_TRIGGER_MASK) {
if (desc->chip && desc->chip->set_type)
desc->chip->set_type(irq,
- new->flags & SA_TRIGGER_MASK);
+ new->flags & IRQF_TRIGGER_MASK);
else
/*
- * SA_TRIGGER_* but the PIC does not support
+ * IRQF_TRIGGER_* but the PIC does not support
* multiple flow-types?
*/
- printk(KERN_WARNING "setup_irq(%d) SA_TRIGGER"
- "set. No set_type function available\n",
- irq);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "No IRQF_TRIGGER set_type "
+ "function for IRQ %d (%s)\n", irq,
+ desc->chip ? desc->chip->name :
+ "unknown");
} else
compat_irq_chip_set_default_handler(desc);
@@ -297,8 +299,8 @@ int setup_irq(unsigned int irq, struct irqaction *new)
mismatch:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
- if (!(new->flags & SA_PROBEIRQ)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: irq handler mismatch\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (!(new->flags & IRQF_PROBE_SHARED)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "IRQ handler type mismatch for IRQ %d\n", irq);
dump_stack();
}
return -EBUSY;
@@ -365,7 +367,7 @@ void free_irq(unsigned int irq, void *dev_id)
kfree(action);
return;
}
- printk(KERN_ERR "Trying to free free IRQ%d\n", irq);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Trying to free already-free IRQ %d\n", irq);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
return;
}
@@ -396,9 +398,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_irq);
*
* Flags:
*
- * SA_SHIRQ Interrupt is shared
- * SA_INTERRUPT Disable local interrupts while processing
- * SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM The interrupt can be used for entropy
+ * IRQF_SHARED Interrupt is shared
+ * IRQF_DISABLED Disable local interrupts while processing
+ * IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM The interrupt can be used for entropy
*
*/
int request_irq(unsigned int irq,
@@ -414,7 +416,7 @@ int request_irq(unsigned int irq,
* which interrupt is which (messes up the interrupt freeing
* logic etc).
*/
- if ((irqflags & SA_SHIRQ) && !dev_id)
+ if ((irqflags & IRQF_SHARED) && !dev_id)
return -EINVAL;
if (irq >= NR_IRQS)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/irq/spurious.c b/kernel/irq/spurious.c
index b483deed311..417e98092cf 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/spurious.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/spurious.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static int misrouted_irq(int irq, struct pt_regs *regs)
* Already running: If it is shared get the other
* CPU to go looking for our mystery interrupt too
*/
- if (desc->action && (desc->action->flags & SA_SHIRQ))
+ if (desc->action && (desc->action->flags & IRQF_SHARED))
desc->status |= IRQ_PENDING;
spin_unlock(&desc->lock);
continue;
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int misrouted_irq(int irq, struct pt_regs *regs)
while (action) {
/* Only shared IRQ handlers are safe to call */
- if (action->flags & SA_SHIRQ) {
+ if (action->flags & IRQF_SHARED) {
if (action->handler(i, action->dev_id, regs) ==
IRQ_HANDLED)
ok = 1;
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2024-11-23 21:07:02 +0000