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-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ibss.c6
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h3
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/iface.c4
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/key.c21
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/mlme.c1
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/scan.c4
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/tx.c7
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c24
8 files changed, 39 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ibss.c b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
index 421eaa6b0c2..56c24cabf26 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ibss.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
@@ -965,6 +965,10 @@ int ieee80211_ibss_leave(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
mutex_lock(&sdata->u.ibss.mtx);
+ sdata->u.ibss.state = IEEE80211_IBSS_MLME_SEARCH;
+ memset(sdata->u.ibss.bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
+ sdata->u.ibss.ssid_len = 0;
+
active_ibss = ieee80211_sta_active_ibss(sdata);
if (!active_ibss && !is_zero_ether_addr(ifibss->bssid)) {
@@ -999,8 +1003,6 @@ int ieee80211_ibss_leave(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
kfree_skb(skb);
skb_queue_purge(&sdata->skb_queue);
- memset(sdata->u.ibss.bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
- sdata->u.ibss.ssid_len = 0;
del_timer_sync(&sdata->u.ibss.timer);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 2025af52b19..090b0ec1e05 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -775,9 +775,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local {
int tx_headroom; /* required headroom for hardware/radiotap */
- /* count for keys needing tailroom space allocation */
- int crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt;
-
/* Tasklet and skb queue to process calls from IRQ mode. All frames
* added to skb_queue will be processed, but frames in
* skb_queue_unreliable may be dropped if the total length of these
diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c
index 49d4f869e0b..dee30aea9ab 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c
@@ -1145,6 +1145,10 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_local *local, const char *name,
+ IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM;
ndev->needed_tailroom = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM;
+ ret = dev_alloc_name(ndev, ndev->name);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
ieee80211_assign_perm_addr(local, ndev, type);
memcpy(ndev->dev_addr, ndev->perm_addr, ETH_ALEN);
SET_NETDEV_DEV(ndev, wiphy_dev(local->hw.wiphy));
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 31afd712930..f825e2f0a57 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -101,11 +101,6 @@ static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
if (!ret) {
key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
-
- if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
- (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
- key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -161,10 +156,6 @@ static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->addr : bcast_addr, ret);
key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
-
- if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) ||
- (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)))
- key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++;
}
void ieee80211_key_removed(struct ieee80211_key_conf *key_conf)
@@ -403,10 +394,8 @@ static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key)
ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
- if (key->local) {
+ if (key->local)
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
- key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--;
- }
kfree(key);
}
@@ -468,8 +457,6 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
- key->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++;
-
ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
@@ -511,12 +498,8 @@ void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
- sdata->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
-
- list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
- sdata->local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++;
+ list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list)
ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
- }
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index 4f6b2675e41..d595265d6c2 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ static void ieee80211_set_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
local->hw.conf.flags &= ~IEEE80211_CONF_PS;
config_changed |= IEEE80211_CONF_CHANGE_PS;
}
+ local->ps_sdata = NULL;
ieee80211_hw_config(local, config_changed);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/scan.c b/net/mac80211/scan.c
index 27af6723cb5..669d2e32efb 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/scan.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/scan.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/if_arp.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/pm_qos_params.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/sch_generic.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
@@ -878,7 +877,8 @@ int ieee80211_request_sched_scan_start(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; i++) {
local->sched_scan_ies.ie[i] = kzalloc(2 +
IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN +
- local->scan_ies_len,
+ local->scan_ies_len +
+ req->ie_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!local->sched_scan_ies.ie[i]) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index 64e0f7587e6..3104c844b54 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -1480,7 +1480,12 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct ieee80211_local *local,
{
int tail_need = 0;
- if (may_encrypt && local->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt) {
+ /*
+ * This could be optimised, devices that do full hardware
+ * crypto (including TKIP MMIC) need no tailroom... But we
+ * have no drivers for such devices currently.
+ */
+ if (may_encrypt) {
tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM;
tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb);
tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 9dc3b5f26e8..8f6a302d2ac 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+ int queue = rx->queue;
+
+ /* otherwise, TKIP is vulnerable to TID 0 vs. non-QoS replays */
+ if (rx->queue == NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1)
+ queue = 0;
/*
* it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
@@ -148,13 +153,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
update_iv:
/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
mic_fail:
- mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata, rx->key->conf.keyidx,
+ /*
+ * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
+ * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
+ * the key is set.
+ */
+ mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
+ rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
(void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
@@ -235,6 +246,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+ int queue = rx->queue;
+
+ /* otherwise, TKIP is vulnerable to TID 0 vs. non-QoS replays */
+ if (rx->queue == NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1)
+ queue = 0;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
@@ -255,7 +271,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
key, skb->data + hdrlen,
skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
- hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
+ hdr->addr1, hwaccel, queue,
&rx->tkip_iv32,
&rx->tkip_iv16);
if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-02-11 20:15:24 +0000