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-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c148
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index d247ed4ee42..61cbd5a8dd0 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
+static sctp_disposition_t __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ const sctp_subtype_t type,
+ void *arg,
+ sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands);
+
/* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length
* is of the appropriate length. The 'required_length' argument
* is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing.
@@ -475,7 +481,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
sctp_init_chunk_t *initchunk;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
struct sctp_packet *packet;
- sctp_error_t error;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
@@ -500,8 +505,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
(sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
&err_chunk)) {
+ sctp_error_t error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_RESOURCE;
+
/* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded.
- * Send an ABORT, with causes if there is any.
+ * Send an ABORT, with causes. If there are no causes,
+ * then there wasn't enough memory. Just terminate
+ * the association.
*/
if (err_chunk) {
packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(ep, asoc, arg,
@@ -517,12 +526,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
SCTP_PACKET(packet));
SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
error = SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
- } else {
- error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_RESOURCE;
}
- } else {
- sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
- error = SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
}
/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
@@ -2073,11 +2077,20 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort(
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_abort_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ /* ADD-IP: Special case for ABORT chunks
+ * F4) One special consideration is that ABORT Chunks arriving
+ * destined to the IP address being deleted MUST be
+ * ignored (see Section 5.3.1 for further details).
+ */
+ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL ==
+ sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest))
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Stop the T5-shutdown guard timer. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD));
- return sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ return __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/*
@@ -2109,6 +2122,15 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_abort_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ /* ADD-IP: Special case for ABORT chunks
+ * F4) One special consideration is that ABORT Chunks arriving
+ * destined to the IP address being deleted MUST be
+ * ignored (see Section 5.3.1 for further details).
+ */
+ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL ==
+ sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest))
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Stop the T2-shutdown timer. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN));
@@ -2117,7 +2139,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD));
- return sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ return __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/*
@@ -2344,8 +2366,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
- unsigned len;
- __be16 error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify_either(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
@@ -2363,6 +2383,28 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_abort_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ /* ADD-IP: Special case for ABORT chunks
+ * F4) One special consideration is that ABORT Chunks arriving
+ * destined to the IP address being deleted MUST be
+ * ignored (see Section 5.3.1 for further details).
+ */
+ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL ==
+ sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest))
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+ return __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+}
+
+static sctp_disposition_t __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ const sctp_subtype_t type,
+ void *arg,
+ sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
+{
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+ unsigned len;
+ __be16 error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
+
/* See if we have an error cause code in the chunk. */
len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (len >= sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr))
@@ -3377,6 +3419,15 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
+ /* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1
+ * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
+ * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
+ * is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
+ * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
+ */
+ if (!sctp_addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
@@ -3393,48 +3444,68 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
- (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
- (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
- &err_param))
+ (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
+ (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
+ &err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type,
- (void *)&err_param, commands);
+ (void *)&err_param, commands);
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
* the endpoint stored in a new association variable
* 'Peer-Serial-Number'.
*/
if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C2) If the value found in the serial number is
- * equal to the ('Peer-Serial-Number' + 1), the endpoint MUST
- * do V1-V5.
+ /* If this is the first instance of ASCONF in the packet,
+ * we can clean our old ASCONF-ACKs.
+ */
+ if (!chunk->has_asconf)
+ sctp_assoc_clean_asconf_ack_cache(asoc);
+
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E4) When the Sequence Number matches the next one
+ * expected, process the ASCONF as described below and after
+ * processing the ASCONF Chunk, append an ASCONF-ACK Chunk to
+ * the response packet and cache a copy of it (in the event it
+ * later needs to be retransmitted).
+ *
+ * Essentially, do V1-V5.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_process_asconf((struct sctp_association *)
asoc, chunk);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
- } else if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial) {
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C3) If the value found in the serial number is
- * equal to the value stored in the 'Peer-Serial-Number'
- * IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: As an optimization a receiver may wish
- * to save the last ASCONF-ACK for some predetermined period of
- * time and instead of re-processing the ASCONF (with the same
- * serial number) it may just re-transmit the ASCONF-ACK.
+ } else if (serial < asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E2)
+ * If the value found in the Sequence Number is less than the
+ * ('Peer- Sequence-Number' + 1), simply skip to the next
+ * ASCONF, and include in the outbound response packet
+ * any previously cached ASCONF-ACK response that was
+ * sent and saved that matches the Sequence Number of the
+ * ASCONF. Note: It is possible that no cached ASCONF-ACK
+ * Chunk exists. This will occur when an older ASCONF
+ * arrives out of order. In such a case, the receiver
+ * should skip the ASCONF Chunk and not include ASCONF-ACK
+ * Chunk for that chunk.
*/
- if (asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack)
- asconf_ack = asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack;
- else
+ asconf_ack = sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(asoc, hdr->serial);
+ if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
} else {
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C4) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E5) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
* it must be either a stale packet or from an attacker.
*/
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C5) In both cases C2 and C3 the ASCONF-ACK MUST be sent
- * back to the source address contained in the IP header of the ASCONF
- * being responded to.
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E6) The destination address of the SCTP packet
+ * containing the ASCONF-ACK Chunks MUST be the source address of
+ * the SCTP packet that held the ASCONF Chunks.
+ *
+ * To do this properly, we'll set the destination address of the chunk
+ * and at the transmit time, will try look up the transport to use.
+ * Since ASCONFs may be bundled, the correct transport may not be
+ * created untill we process the entire packet, thus this workaround.
*/
+ asconf_ack->dest = chunk->source;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(asconf_ack));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
@@ -3463,6 +3534,15 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
+ /* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2:
+ * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
+ * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
+ * is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
+ * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
+ */
+ if (!sctp_addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
@@ -5763,7 +5843,7 @@ static int sctp_eat_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
/*
* Also try to renege to limit our memory usage in the event that
* we are under memory pressure
- * If we can't renege, don't worry about it, the sk_stream_rmem_schedule
+ * If we can't renege, don't worry about it, the sk_rmem_schedule
* in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg will drop the frame if we grow our
* memory usage too much
*/