diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth.c | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 697 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c | 336 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 584 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c | 155 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c | 83 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c | 113 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 404 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/sched.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/stats.c | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 59 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 |
20 files changed, 2408 insertions, 322 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth.c b/net/sunrpc/auth.c index 95afe79dd9d..73affb8624f 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth.c @@ -236,10 +236,15 @@ rpcauth_prune_expired(struct list_head *free, int nr_to_scan) list_for_each_entry_safe(cred, next, &cred_unused, cr_lru) { - /* Enforce a 60 second garbage collection moratorium */ + if (nr_to_scan-- == 0) + break; + /* + * Enforce a 60 second garbage collection moratorium + * Note that the cred_unused list must be time-ordered. + */ if (time_in_range(cred->cr_expire, expired, jiffies) && test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED, &cred->cr_flags) != 0) - continue; + return 0; list_del_init(&cred->cr_lru); number_cred_unused--; @@ -252,13 +257,10 @@ rpcauth_prune_expired(struct list_head *free, int nr_to_scan) get_rpccred(cred); list_add_tail(&cred->cr_lru, free); rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked(cred); - nr_to_scan--; } spin_unlock(cache_lock); - if (nr_to_scan == 0) - break; } - return nr_to_scan; + return (number_cred_unused / 100) * sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure; } /* @@ -270,11 +272,12 @@ rpcauth_cache_shrinker(int nr_to_scan, gfp_t gfp_mask) LIST_HEAD(free); int res; + if ((gfp_mask & GFP_KERNEL) != GFP_KERNEL) + return (nr_to_scan == 0) ? 0 : -1; if (list_empty(&cred_unused)) return 0; spin_lock(&rpc_credcache_lock); - nr_to_scan = rpcauth_prune_expired(&free, nr_to_scan); - res = (number_cred_unused / 100) * sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure; + res = rpcauth_prune_expired(&free, nr_to_scan); spin_unlock(&rpc_credcache_lock); rpcauth_destroy_credlist(&free); return res; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile index 4de8bcf26fa..74a231735f6 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ auth_rpcgss-objs := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \ obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o rpcsec_gss_krb5-objs := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \ - gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o + gss_krb5_seqnum.o gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o gss_krb5_keys.o obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3) += rpcsec_gss_spkm3.o diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index c389ccf6437..8da2a0e6857 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -57,11 +57,14 @@ static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops; static const struct rpc_credops gss_credops; static const struct rpc_credops gss_nullops; +#define GSS_RETRY_EXPIRED 5 +static unsigned int gss_expired_cred_retry_delay = GSS_RETRY_EXPIRED; + #ifdef RPC_DEBUG # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif -#define GSS_CRED_SLACK 1024 +#define GSS_CRED_SLACK (RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2) /* length of a krb5 verifier (48), plus data added before arguments when * using integrity (two 4-byte integers): */ #define GSS_VERF_SLACK 100 @@ -229,7 +232,7 @@ gss_fill_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); goto err; } - ret = gss_import_sec_context(p, seclen, gm, &ctx->gc_gss_ctx); + ret = gss_import_sec_context(p, seclen, gm, &ctx->gc_gss_ctx, GFP_NOFS); if (ret < 0) { p = ERR_PTR(ret); goto err; @@ -350,6 +353,24 @@ gss_unhash_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg) } static void +gss_handle_downcall_result(struct gss_cred *gss_cred, struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg) +{ + switch (gss_msg->msg.errno) { + case 0: + if (gss_msg->ctx == NULL) + break; + clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &gss_cred->gc_base.cr_flags); + gss_cred_set_ctx(&gss_cred->gc_base, gss_msg->ctx); + break; + case -EKEYEXPIRED: + set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &gss_cred->gc_base.cr_flags); + } + gss_cred->gc_upcall_timestamp = jiffies; + gss_cred->gc_upcall = NULL; + rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno); +} + +static void gss_upcall_callback(struct rpc_task *task) { struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(task->tk_msg.rpc_cred, @@ -358,13 +379,9 @@ gss_upcall_callback(struct rpc_task *task) struct inode *inode = &gss_msg->inode->vfs_inode; spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); - if (gss_msg->ctx) - gss_cred_set_ctx(task->tk_msg.rpc_cred, gss_msg->ctx); - else - task->tk_status = gss_msg->msg.errno; - gss_cred->gc_upcall = NULL; - rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno); + gss_handle_downcall_result(gss_cred, gss_msg); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + task->tk_status = gss_msg->msg.errno; gss_release_msg(gss_msg); } @@ -377,11 +394,12 @@ static void gss_encode_v0_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg) static void gss_encode_v1_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg, struct rpc_clnt *clnt, int machine_cred) { + struct gss_api_mech *mech = gss_msg->auth->mech; char *p = gss_msg->databuf; int len = 0; gss_msg->msg.len = sprintf(gss_msg->databuf, "mech=%s uid=%d ", - gss_msg->auth->mech->gm_name, + mech->gm_name, gss_msg->uid); p += gss_msg->msg.len; if (clnt->cl_principal) { @@ -398,6 +416,11 @@ static void gss_encode_v1_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg, p += len; gss_msg->msg.len += len; } + if (mech->gm_upcall_enctypes) { + len = sprintf(p, mech->gm_upcall_enctypes); + p += len; + gss_msg->msg.len += len; + } len = sprintf(p, "\n"); gss_msg->msg.len += len; @@ -507,18 +530,16 @@ gss_refresh_upcall(struct rpc_task *task) spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (gss_cred->gc_upcall != NULL) rpc_sleep_on(&gss_cred->gc_upcall->rpc_waitqueue, task, NULL); - else if (gss_msg->ctx != NULL) { - gss_cred_set_ctx(task->tk_msg.rpc_cred, gss_msg->ctx); - gss_cred->gc_upcall = NULL; - rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno); - } else if (gss_msg->msg.errno >= 0) { + else if (gss_msg->ctx == NULL && gss_msg->msg.errno >= 0) { task->tk_timeout = 0; gss_cred->gc_upcall = gss_msg; /* gss_upcall_callback will release the reference to gss_upcall_msg */ atomic_inc(&gss_msg->count); rpc_sleep_on(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, task, gss_upcall_callback); - } else + } else { + gss_handle_downcall_result(gss_cred, gss_msg); err = gss_msg->msg.errno; + } spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); gss_release_msg(gss_msg); out: @@ -1117,6 +1138,23 @@ static int gss_renew_cred(struct rpc_task *task) return 0; } +static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred) +{ + if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &cred->cr_flags)) { + unsigned long now = jiffies; + unsigned long begin, expire; + struct gss_cred *gss_cred; + + gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base); + begin = gss_cred->gc_upcall_timestamp; + expire = begin + gss_expired_cred_retry_delay * HZ; + + if (time_in_range_open(now, begin, expire)) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + /* * Refresh credentials. XXX - finish */ @@ -1126,6 +1164,9 @@ gss_refresh(struct rpc_task *task) struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_msg.rpc_cred; int ret = 0; + if (gss_cred_is_negative_entry(cred)) + return -EKEYEXPIRED; + if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags) && !test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags)) { ret = gss_renew_cred(task); @@ -1316,15 +1357,21 @@ gss_wrap_req_priv(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, inpages = snd_buf->pages + first; snd_buf->pages = rqstp->rq_enc_pages; snd_buf->page_base -= first << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT; - /* Give the tail its own page, in case we need extra space in the - * head when wrapping: */ + /* + * Give the tail its own page, in case we need extra space in the + * head when wrapping: + * + * call_allocate() allocates twice the slack space required + * by the authentication flavor to rq_callsize. + * For GSS, slack is GSS_CRED_SLACK. + */ if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len) { tmp = page_address(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num - 1]); memcpy(tmp, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len); snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base = tmp; } maj_stat = gss_wrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, snd_buf, inpages); - /* RPC_SLACK_SPACE should prevent this ever happening: */ + /* slack space should prevent this ever happening: */ BUG_ON(snd_buf->len > snd_buf->buflen); status = -EIO; /* We're assuming that when GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED, the encryption was @@ -1573,5 +1620,11 @@ static void __exit exit_rpcsec_gss(void) } MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +module_param_named(expired_cred_retry_delay, + gss_expired_cred_retry_delay, + uint, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(expired_cred_retry_delay, "Timeout (in seconds) until " + "the RPC engine retries an expired credential"); + module_init(init_rpcsec_gss) module_exit(exit_rpcsec_gss) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index e9b63617668..75ee993ea05 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c * - * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan. + * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan. * All rights reserved. * * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h> @@ -58,13 +59,13 @@ krb5_encrypt( { u32 ret = -EINVAL; struct scatterlist sg[1]; - u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; + u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0}; struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm, .info = local_iv }; if (length % crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0) goto out; - if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) { + if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) { dprintk("RPC: gss_k5encrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n", crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm)); goto out; @@ -92,13 +93,13 @@ krb5_decrypt( { u32 ret = -EINVAL; struct scatterlist sg[1]; - u8 local_iv[16] = {0}; + u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0}; struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm, .info = local_iv }; if (length % crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0) goto out; - if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > 16) { + if (crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) { dprintk("RPC: gss_k5decrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n", crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm)); goto out; @@ -123,21 +124,155 @@ checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data) return crypto_hash_update(desc, sg, sg->length); } -/* checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header */ -s32 -make_checksum(char *cksumname, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body, - int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksum) +static int +arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(unsigned int usage, u8 salt[4]) +{ + unsigned int ms_usage; + + switch (usage) { + case KG_USAGE_SIGN: + ms_usage = 15; + break; + case KG_USAGE_SEAL: + ms_usage = 13; + break; + default: + return EINVAL;; + } + salt[0] = (ms_usage >> 0) & 0xff; + salt[1] = (ms_usage >> 8) & 0xff; + salt[2] = (ms_usage >> 16) & 0xff; + salt[3] = (ms_usage >> 24) & 0xff; + + return 0; +} + +static u32 +make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, + struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey, + unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout) { - struct hash_desc desc; /* XXX add to ctx? */ + struct hash_desc desc; struct scatterlist sg[1]; int err; + u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + u8 rc4salt[4]; + struct crypto_hash *md5; + struct crypto_hash *hmac_md5; + + if (cksumkey == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) { + dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n", + __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(usage, rc4salt)) { + dprintk("%s: invalid usage value %u\n", __func__, usage); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + md5 = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(md5)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + hmac_md5 = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5)) { + crypto_free_hash(md5); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + desc.tfm = md5; + desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); + if (err) + goto out; + sg_init_one(sg, rc4salt, 4); + err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, 4); + if (err) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen); + err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, hdrlen); + if (err) + goto out; + err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset, + checksummer, &desc); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata); + if (err) + goto out; + + desc.tfm = hmac_md5; + desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac_md5, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(sg, checksumdata, crypto_hash_digestsize(md5)); + err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, crypto_hash_digestsize(md5), + checksumdata); + if (err) + goto out; + + memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); + cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; +out: + crypto_free_hash(md5); + crypto_free_hash(hmac_md5); + return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; +} + +/* + * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header + * The checksum is performed over the first 8 bytes of the + * gss token header and then over the data body + */ +u32 +make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, + struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey, + unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout) +{ + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + int err; + u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + unsigned int checksumlen; + + if (kctx->gk5e->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR) + return make_checksum_hmac_md5(kctx, header, hdrlen, + body, body_offset, + cksumkey, usage, cksumout); + + if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) { + dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n", + __func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(cksumname, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - cksum->len = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm); desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + checksumlen = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm); + + if (cksumkey != NULL) { + err = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, cksumkey, + kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out; + } + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); if (err) goto out; @@ -149,15 +284,109 @@ make_checksum(char *cksumname, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body, checksummer, &desc); if (err) goto out; - err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, cksum->data); + err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata); + if (err) + goto out; + switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) { + case CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5: + err = kctx->gk5e->encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, checksumdata, + checksumdata, checksumlen); + if (err) + goto out; + memcpy(cksumout->data, + checksumdata + checksumlen - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength, + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); + break; + case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3: + memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); + break; + default: + BUG(); + break; + } + cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; +out: + crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); + return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; +} + +/* + * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header + * Per rfc4121, sec. 4.2.4, the checksum is performed over the data + * body then over the first 16 octets of the MIC token + * Inclusion of the header data in the calculation of the + * checksum is optional. + */ +u32 +make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, + struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey, + unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout) +{ + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + int err; + u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + unsigned int checksumlen; + + if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum == 0) { + dprintk("%s: expected keyed hash for %s\n", + __func__, kctx->gk5e->name); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + if (cksumkey == NULL) { + dprintk("%s: no key supplied for %s\n", + __func__, kctx->gk5e->name); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + checksumlen = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm); + desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + err = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); + if (err) + goto out; + err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset, + checksummer, &desc); + if (err) + goto out; + if (header != NULL) { + sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen); + err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, hdrlen); + if (err) + goto out; + } + err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata); + if (err) + goto out; + + cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; + + switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) { + case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128: + case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256: + /* note that this truncates the hash */ + memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); + break; + default: + BUG(); + break; + } out: crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; } struct encryptor_desc { - u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */ + u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE]; struct blkcipher_desc desc; int pos; struct xdr_buf *outbuf; @@ -198,7 +427,7 @@ encryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data) desc->fraglen += sg->length; desc->pos += sg->length; - fraglen = thislen & 7; /* XXX hardcoded blocksize */ + fraglen = thislen & (crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(desc->desc.tfm) - 1); thislen -= fraglen; if (thislen == 0) @@ -256,7 +485,7 @@ gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, } struct decryptor_desc { - u8 iv[8]; /* XXX hard-coded blocksize */ + u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE]; struct blkcipher_desc desc; struct scatterlist frags[4]; int fragno; @@ -278,7 +507,7 @@ decryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data) desc->fragno++; desc->fraglen += sg->length; - fraglen = thislen & 7; /* XXX hardcoded blocksize */ + fraglen = thislen & (crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(desc->desc.tfm) - 1); thislen -= fraglen; if (thislen == 0) @@ -325,3 +554,437 @@ gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf, return xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc); } + +/* + * This function makes the assumption that it was ultimately called + * from gss_wrap(). + * + * The client auth_gss code moves any existing tail data into a + * separate page before calling gss_wrap. + * The server svcauth_gss code ensures that both the head and the + * tail have slack space of RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE before calling gss_wrap. + * + * Even with that guarantee, this function may be called more than + * once in the processing of gss_wrap(). The best we can do is + * verify at compile-time (see GSS_KRB5_SLACK_CHECK) that the + * largest expected shift will fit within RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE. + * At run-time we can verify that a single invocation of this + * function doesn't attempt to use more the RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE. + */ + +int +xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, unsigned int shiftlen) +{ + u8 *p; + + if (shiftlen == 0) + return 0; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE); + BUG_ON(shiftlen > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE); + + p = buf->head[0].iov_base + base; + + memmove(p + shiftlen, p, buf->head[0].iov_len - base); + + buf->head[0].iov_len += shiftlen; + buf->len += shiftlen; + + return 0; +} + +static u32 +gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf, + u32 offset, u8 *iv, struct page **pages, int encrypt) +{ + u32 ret; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = cipher, .info = iv }; + u8 data[crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher) * 2]; + struct page **save_pages; + u32 len = buf->len - offset; + + BUG_ON(len > crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher) * 2); + + /* + * For encryption, we want to read from the cleartext + * page cache pages, and write the encrypted data to + * the supplied xdr_buf pages. + */ + save_pages = buf->pages; + if (encrypt) + buf->pages = pages; + + ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len); + buf->pages = save_pages; + if (ret) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(sg, data, len); + + if (encrypt) + ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, sg, sg, len); + else + ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, sg, sg, len); + + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len); + +out: + return ret; +} + +u32 +gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, + struct xdr_buf *buf, int ec, struct page **pages) +{ + u32 err; + struct xdr_netobj hmac; + u8 *cksumkey; + u8 *ecptr; + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher; + int blocksize; + struct page **save_pages; + int nblocks, nbytes; + struct encryptor_desc desc; + u32 cbcbytes; + unsigned int usage; + + if (kctx->initiate) { + cipher = kctx->initiator_enc; + aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux; + cksumkey = kctx->initiator_integ; + usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL; + } else { + cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc; + aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux; + cksumkey = kctx->acceptor_integ; + usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL; + } + blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher); + + /* hide the gss token header and insert the confounder */ + offset += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; + if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, kctx->gk5e->conflen)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + gss_krb5_make_confounder(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, kctx->gk5e->conflen); + offset -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; + + if (buf->tail[0].iov_base != NULL) { + ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len; + } else { + buf->tail[0].iov_base = buf->head[0].iov_base + + buf->head[0].iov_len; + buf->tail[0].iov_len = 0; + ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base; + } + + memset(ecptr, 'X', ec); + buf->tail[0].iov_len += ec; + buf->len += ec; + + /* copy plaintext gss token header after filler (if any) */ + memcpy(ecptr + ec, buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); + buf->tail[0].iov_len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; + buf->len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; + + /* Do the HMAC */ + hmac.len = GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN; + hmac.data = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len; + + /* + * When we are called, pages points to the real page cache + * data -- which we can't go and encrypt! buf->pages points + * to scratch pages which we are going to send off to the + * client/server. Swap in the plaintext pages to calculate + * the hmac. + */ + save_pages = buf->pages; + buf->pages = pages; + + err = make_checksum_v2(kctx, NULL, 0, buf, + offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + cksumkey, usage, &hmac); + buf->pages = save_pages; + if (err) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + nbytes = buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; + nblocks = (nbytes + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; + cbcbytes = 0; + if (nblocks > 2) + cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize; + + memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv)); + + if (cbcbytes) { + desc.pos = offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; + desc.fragno = 0; + desc.fraglen = 0; + desc.pages = pages; + desc.outbuf = buf; + desc.desc.info = desc.iv; + desc.desc.flags = 0; + desc.desc.tfm = aux_cipher; + + sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4); + sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4); + + err = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + cbcbytes, encryptor, &desc); + if (err) + goto out_err; + } + + /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */ + err = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, buf, + offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cbcbytes, + desc.iv, pages, 1); + if (err) { + err = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto out_err; + } + + /* Now update buf to account for HMAC */ + buf->tail[0].iov_len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; + buf->len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; + +out_err: + if (err) + err = GSS_S_FAILURE; + return err; +} + +u32 +gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, + u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip) +{ + struct xdr_buf subbuf; + u32 ret = 0; + u8 *cksum_key; + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher; + struct xdr_netobj our_hmac_obj; + u8 our_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + u8 pkt_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + int nblocks, blocksize, cbcbytes; + struct decryptor_desc desc; + unsigned int usage; + + if (kctx->initiate) { + cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc; + aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux; + cksum_key = kctx->acceptor_integ; + usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL; + } else { + cipher = kctx->initiator_enc; + aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux; + cksum_key = kctx->initiator_integ; + usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL; + } + blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(cipher); + + + /* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */ + xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + (buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)); + + nblocks = (subbuf.len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; + + cbcbytes = 0; + if (nblocks > 2) + cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize; + + memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv)); + + if (cbcbytes) { + desc.fragno = 0; + desc.fraglen = 0; + desc.desc.info = desc.iv; + desc.desc.flags = 0; + desc.desc.tfm = aux_cipher; + + sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4); + + ret = xdr_process_buf(&subbuf, 0, cbcbytes, decryptor, &desc); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + } + + /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */ + ret = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, &subbuf, cbcbytes, desc.iv, NULL, 0); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + + + /* Calculate our hmac over the plaintext data */ + our_hmac_obj.len = sizeof(our_hmac); + our_hmac_obj.data = our_hmac; + + ret = make_checksum_v2(kctx, NULL, 0, &subbuf, 0, + cksum_key, usage, &our_hmac_obj); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + + /* Get the packet's hmac value */ + ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength, + pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); + if (ret) + goto out_err; + + if (memcmp(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) { + ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + goto out_err; + } + *headskip = kctx->gk5e->conflen; + *tailskip = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; +out_err: + if (ret && ret != GSS_S_BAD_SIG) + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compute Kseq given the initial session key and the checksum. + * Set the key of the given cipher. + */ +int +krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, + unsigned char *cksum) +{ + struct crypto_hash *hmac; + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + u8 Kseq[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN]; + u32 zeroconstant = 0; + int err; + + dprintk("%s: entered\n", __func__); + + hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmac)) { + dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n", + __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); + return PTR_ERR(hmac); + } + + desc.tfm = hmac; + desc.flags = 0; + + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + /* Compute intermediate Kseq from session key */ + err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, kctx->Ksess, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + sg_init_table(sg, 1); + sg_set_buf(sg, &zeroconstant, 4); + + err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 4, Kseq); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + /* Compute final Kseq from the checksum and intermediate Kseq */ + err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + sg_set_buf(sg, cksum, 8); + + err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 8, Kseq); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(cipher, Kseq, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + err = 0; + +out_err: + crypto_free_hash(hmac); + dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err); + return err; +} + +/* + * Compute Kcrypt given the initial session key and the plaintext seqnum. + * Set the key of cipher kctx->enc. + */ +int +krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher, + s32 seqnum) +{ + struct crypto_hash *hmac; + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + u8 Kcrypt[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN]; + u8 zeroconstant[4] = {0}; + u8 seqnumarray[4]; + int err, i; + + dprintk("%s: entered, seqnum %u\n", __func__, seqnum); + + hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmac)) { + dprintk("%s: error %ld, allocating hash '%s'\n", + __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); + return PTR_ERR(hmac); + } + + desc.tfm = hmac; + desc.flags = 0; + + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + /* Compute intermediate Kcrypt from session key */ + for (i = 0; i < kctx->gk5e->keylength; i++) + Kcrypt[i] = kctx->Ksess[i] ^ 0xf0; + + err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + sg_init_table(sg, 1); + sg_set_buf(sg, zeroconstant, 4); + + err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 4, Kcrypt); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + /* Compute final Kcrypt from the seqnum and intermediate Kcrypt */ + err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + seqnumarray[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff); + seqnumarray[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff); + seqnumarray[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff); + seqnumarray[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff); + + sg_set_buf(sg, seqnumarray, 4); + + err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, 4, Kcrypt); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(cipher, Kcrypt, kctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + err = 0; + +out_err: + crypto_free_hash(hmac); + dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err); + return err; +} + diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..76e42e6be75 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/* + * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008 + * The Regents of the University of Michigan + * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + * + * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works + * and redistribute this software and such derivative works + * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of + * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity + * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software + * without specific, written prior authorization. If the + * above copyright notice or any other identification of the + * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any + * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must + * also be included. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION + * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY + * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF + * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE + * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGES. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC. + * + * All rights reserved. + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America may require + * a specific license from the United States Government. It is the + * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to + * obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + */ + +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h> + +#ifdef RPC_DEBUG +# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH +#endif + +/* + * This is the n-fold function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1 + * Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified. + */ + +static void krb5_nfold(u32 inbits, const u8 *in, + u32 outbits, u8 *out) +{ + int a, b, c, lcm; + int byte, i, msbit; + + /* the code below is more readable if I make these bytes + instead of bits */ + + inbits >>= 3; + outbits >>= 3; + + /* first compute lcm(n,k) */ + + a = outbits; + b = inbits; + + while (b != 0) { + c = b; + b = a%b; + a = c; + } + + lcm = outbits*inbits/a; + + /* now do the real work */ + + memset(out, 0, outbits); + byte = 0; + + /* this will end up cycling through k lcm(k,n)/k times, which + is correct */ + for (i = lcm-1; i >= 0; i--) { + /* compute the msbit in k which gets added into this byte */ + msbit = ( + /* first, start with the msbit in the first, + * unrotated byte */ + ((inbits << 3) - 1) + /* then, for each byte, shift to the right + * for each repetition */ + + (((inbits << 3) + 13) * (i/inbits)) + /* last, pick out the correct byte within + * that shifted repetition */ + + ((inbits - (i % inbits)) << 3) + ) % (inbits << 3); + + /* pull out the byte value itself */ + byte += (((in[((inbits - 1) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits] << 8)| + (in[((inbits) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits])) + >> ((msbit & 7) + 1)) & 0xff; + + /* do the addition */ + byte += out[i % outbits]; + out[i % outbits] = byte & 0xff; + + /* keep around the carry bit, if any */ + byte >>= 8; + + } + + /* if there's a carry bit left over, add it back in */ + if (byte) { + for (i = outbits - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + /* do the addition */ + byte += out[i]; + out[i] = byte & 0xff; + + /* keep around the carry bit, if any */ + byte >>= 8; + } + } +} + +/* + * This is the DK (derive_key) function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1 + * Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified. + */ + +u32 krb5_derive_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e, + const struct xdr_netobj *inkey, + struct xdr_netobj *outkey, + const struct xdr_netobj *in_constant, + gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + size_t blocksize, keybytes, keylength, n; + unsigned char *inblockdata, *outblockdata, *rawkey; + struct xdr_netobj inblock, outblock; + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher; + u32 ret = EINVAL; + + blocksize = gk5e->blocksize; + keybytes = gk5e->keybytes; + keylength = gk5e->keylength; + + if ((inkey->len != keylength) || (outkey->len != keylength)) + goto err_return; + + cipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + goto err_return; + if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(cipher, inkey->data, inkey->len)) + goto err_return; + + /* allocate and set up buffers */ + + ret = ENOMEM; + inblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask); + if (inblockdata == NULL) + goto err_free_cipher; + + outblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask); + if (outblockdata == NULL) + goto err_free_in; + + rawkey = kmalloc(keybytes, gfp_mask); + if (rawkey == NULL) + goto err_free_out; + + inblock.data = (char *) inblockdata; + inblock.len = blocksize; + + outblock.data = (char *) outblockdata; + outblock.len = blocksize; + + /* initialize the input block */ + + if (in_constant->len == inblock.len) { + memcpy(inblock.data, in_constant->data, inblock.len); + } else { + krb5_nfold(in_constant->len * 8, in_constant->data, + inblock.len * 8, inblock.data); + } + + /* loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated */ + + n = 0; + while (n < keybytes) { + (*(gk5e->encrypt))(cipher, NULL, inblock.data, + outblock.data, inblock.len); + + if ((keybytes - n) <= outblock.len) { + memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, (keybytes - n)); + break; + } + + memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, outblock.len); + memcpy(inblock.data, outblock.data, outblock.len); + n += outblock.len; + } + + /* postprocess the key */ + + inblock.data = (char *) rawkey; + inblock.len = keybytes; + + BUG_ON(gk5e->mk_key == NULL); + ret = (*(gk5e->mk_key))(gk5e, &inblock, outkey); + if (ret) { + dprintk("%s: got %d from mk_key function for '%s'\n", + __func__, ret, gk5e->encrypt_name); + goto err_free_raw; + } + + /* clean memory, free resources and exit */ + + ret = 0; + +err_free_raw: + memset(rawkey, 0, keybytes); + kfree(rawkey); +err_free_out: + memset(outblockdata, 0, blocksize); + kfree(outblockdata); +err_free_in: + memset(inblockdata, 0, blocksize); + kfree(inblockdata); +err_free_cipher: + crypto_free_blkcipher(cipher); +err_return: + return ret; +} + +#define smask(step) ((1<<step)-1) +#define pstep(x, step) (((x)&smask(step))^(((x)>>step)&smask(step))) +#define parity_char(x) pstep(pstep(pstep((x), 4), 2), 1) + +static void mit_des_fixup_key_parity(u8 key[8]) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + key[i] &= 0xfe; + key[i] |= 1^parity_char(key[i]); + } +} + +/* + * This is the des3 key derivation postprocess function + */ +u32 gss_krb5_des3_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e, + struct xdr_netobj *randombits, + struct xdr_netobj *key) +{ + int i; + u32 ret = EINVAL; + + if (key->len != 24) { + dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len); + goto err_out; + } + if (randombits->len != 21) { + dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n", + __func__, randombits->len); + goto err_out; + } + + /* take the seven bytes, move them around into the top 7 bits of the + 8 key bytes, then compute the parity bits. Do this three times. */ + + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + memcpy(key->data + i*8, randombits->data + i*7, 7); + key->data[i*8+7] = (((key->data[i*8]&1)<<1) | + ((key->data[i*8+1]&1)<<2) | + ((key->data[i*8+2]&1)<<3) | + ((key->data[i*8+3]&1)<<4) | + ((key->data[i*8+4]&1)<<5) | + ((key->data[i*8+5]&1)<<6) | + ((key->data[i*8+6]&1)<<7)); + + mit_des_fixup_key_parity(key->data + i*8); + } + ret = 0; +err_out: + return ret; +} + +/* + * This is the aes key derivation postprocess function + */ +u32 gss_krb5_aes_make_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e, + struct xdr_netobj *randombits, + struct xdr_netobj *key) +{ + u32 ret = EINVAL; + + if (key->len != 16 && key->len != 32) { + dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len); + goto err_out; + } + if (randombits->len != 16 && randombits->len != 32) { + dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n", + __func__, randombits->len); + goto err_out; + } + if (randombits->len != key->len) { + dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d, key->len is %d\n", + __func__, randombits->len, key->len); + goto err_out; + } + memcpy(key->data, randombits->data, key->len); + ret = 0; +err_out: + return ret; +} + diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c index 2deb0ed72ff..03264461052 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c * - * Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan. * All rights reserved. * * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu> @@ -48,6 +48,143 @@ # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif +static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech; /* forward declaration */ + +static const struct gss_krb5_enctype supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[] = { + /* + * DES (All DES enctypes are mapped to the same gss functionality) + */ + { + .etype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW, + .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + .name = "des-cbc-crc", + .encrypt_name = "cbc(des)", + .cksum_name = "md5", + .encrypt = krb5_encrypt, + .decrypt = krb5_decrypt, + .mk_key = NULL, + .signalg = SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5, + .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_DES, + .keybytes = 7, + .keylength = 8, + .blocksize = 8, + .conflen = 8, + .cksumlength = 8, + .keyed_cksum = 0, + }, + /* + * RC4-HMAC + */ + { + .etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, + .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR, + .name = "rc4-hmac", + .encrypt_name = "ecb(arc4)", + .cksum_name = "hmac(md5)", + .encrypt = krb5_encrypt, + .decrypt = krb5_decrypt, + .mk_key = NULL, + .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5, + .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4, + .keybytes = 16, + .keylength = 16, + .blocksize = 1, + .conflen = 8, + .cksumlength = 8, + .keyed_cksum = 1, + }, + /* + * 3DES + */ + { + .etype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW, + .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3, + .name = "des3-hmac-sha1", + .encrypt_name = "cbc(des3_ede)", + .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)", + .encrypt = krb5_encrypt, + .decrypt = krb5_decrypt, + .mk_key = gss_krb5_des3_make_key, + .signalg = SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD, + .sealalg = SEAL_ALG_DES3KD, + .keybytes = 21, + .keylength = 24, + .blocksize = 8, + .conflen = 8, + .cksumlength = 20, + .keyed_cksum = 1, + }, + /* + * AES128 + */ + { + .etype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, + .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128, + .name = "aes128-cts", + .encrypt_name = "cts(cbc(aes))", + .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)", + .encrypt = krb5_encrypt, + .decrypt = krb5_decrypt, + .mk_key = gss_krb5_aes_make_key, + .encrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_encrypt, + .decrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_decrypt, + .signalg = -1, + .sealalg = -1, + .keybytes = 16, + .keylength = 16, + .blocksize = 16, + .conflen = 16, + .cksumlength = 12, + .keyed_cksum = 1, + }, + /* + * AES256 + */ + { + .etype = ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, + .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256, + .name = "aes256-cts", + .encrypt_name = "cts(cbc(aes))", + .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)", + .encrypt = krb5_encrypt, + .decrypt = krb5_decrypt, + .mk_key = gss_krb5_aes_make_key, + .encrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_encrypt, + .decrypt_v2 = gss_krb5_aes_decrypt, + .signalg = -1, + .sealalg = -1, + .keybytes = 32, + .keylength = 32, + .blocksize = 16, + .conflen = 16, + .cksumlength = 12, + .keyed_cksum = 1, + }, +}; + +static const int num_supported_enctypes = + ARRAY_SIZE(supported_gss_krb5_enctypes); + +static int +supported_gss_krb5_enctype(int etype) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < num_supported_enctypes; i++) + if (supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i].etype == etype) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +static const struct gss_krb5_enctype * +get_gss_krb5_enctype(int etype) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < num_supported_enctypes; i++) + if (supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i].etype == etype) + return &supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i]; + return NULL; +} + static const void * simple_get_bytes(const void *p, const void *end, void *res, int len) { @@ -78,35 +215,45 @@ simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *res) } static inline const void * -get_key(const void *p, const void *end, struct crypto_blkcipher **res) +get_key(const void *p, const void *end, + struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct crypto_blkcipher **res) { struct xdr_netobj key; int alg; - char *alg_name; p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &alg, sizeof(alg)); if (IS_ERR(p)) goto out_err; + + switch (alg) { + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC: + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4: + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5: + /* Map all these key types to ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW */ + alg = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW; + break; + } + + if (!supported_gss_krb5_enctype(alg)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported " + "encryption key algorithm %d\n", alg); + goto out_err; + } p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &key); if (IS_ERR(p)) goto out_err; - switch (alg) { - case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: - alg_name = "cbc(des)"; - break; - default: - printk("gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported algorithm %d\n", alg); - goto out_err_free_key; - } - *res = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + *res = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(*res)) { - printk("gss_kerberos_mech: unable to initialize crypto algorithm %s\n", alg_name); + printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: unable to initialize " + "crypto algorithm %s\n", ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name); *res = NULL; goto out_err_free_key; } if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(*res, key.data, key.len)) { - printk("gss_kerberos_mech: error setting key for crypto algorithm %s\n", alg_name); + printk(KERN_WARNING "gss_kerberos_mech: error setting key for " + "crypto algorithm %s\n", ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name); goto out_err_free_tfm; } @@ -123,56 +270,55 @@ out_err: } static int -gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(const void *p, - size_t len, - struct gss_ctx *ctx_id) +gss_import_v1_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx) { - const void *end = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); - struct krb5_ctx *ctx; int tmp; - if (!(ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_NOFS))) { - p = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - goto out_err; - } - p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->initiate, sizeof(ctx->initiate)); if (IS_ERR(p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; + + /* Old format supports only DES! Any other enctype uses new format */ + ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW; + + ctx->gk5e = get_gss_krb5_enctype(ctx->enctype); + if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) + goto out_err; + /* The downcall format was designed before we completely understood * the uses of the context fields; so it includes some stuff we * just give some minimal sanity-checking, and some we ignore * completely (like the next twenty bytes): */ if (unlikely(p + 20 > end || p + 20 < p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; p += 20; p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)); if (IS_ERR(p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; if (tmp != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) { p = ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; } p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)); if (IS_ERR(p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; if (tmp != SEAL_ALG_DES) { p = ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; } p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->endtime, sizeof(ctx->endtime)); if (IS_ERR(p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->seq_send, sizeof(ctx->seq_send)); if (IS_ERR(p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; + goto out_err; p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &ctx->mech_used); if (IS_ERR(p)) - goto out_err_free_ctx; - p = get_key(p, end, &ctx->enc); + goto out_err; + p = get_key(p, end, ctx, &ctx->enc); if (IS_ERR(p)) goto out_err_free_mech; - p = get_key(p, end, &ctx->seq); + p = get_key(p, end, ctx, &ctx->seq); if (IS_ERR(p)) goto out_err_free_key1; if (p != end) { @@ -180,9 +326,6 @@ gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(const void *p, goto out_err_free_key2; } - ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = ctx; - - dprintk("RPC: Successfully imported new context.\n"); return 0; out_err_free_key2: @@ -191,18 +334,378 @@ out_err_free_key1: crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->enc); out_err_free_mech: kfree(ctx->mech_used.data); -out_err_free_ctx: - kfree(ctx); out_err: return PTR_ERR(p); } +struct crypto_blkcipher * +context_v2_alloc_cipher(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, const char *cname, u8 *key) +{ + struct crypto_blkcipher *cp; + + cp = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(cname, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(cp)) { + dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: unable to initialize " + "crypto algorithm %s\n", cname); + return NULL; + } + if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(cp, key, ctx->gk5e->keylength)) { + dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: error setting key for " + "crypto algorithm %s\n", cname); + crypto_free_blkcipher(cp); + return NULL; + } + return cp; +} + +static inline void +set_cdata(u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH], u32 usage, u8 seed) +{ + cdata[0] = (usage>>24)&0xff; + cdata[1] = (usage>>16)&0xff; + cdata[2] = (usage>>8)&0xff; + cdata[3] = usage&0xff; + cdata[4] = seed; +} + +static int +context_derive_keys_des3(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + struct xdr_netobj c, keyin, keyout; + u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH]; + u32 err; + + c.len = GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH; + c.data = cdata; + + keyin.data = ctx->Ksess; + keyin.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength; + keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength; + + /* seq uses the raw key */ + ctx->seq = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, + ctx->Ksess); + if (ctx->seq == NULL) + goto out_err; + + ctx->enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, + ctx->Ksess); + if (ctx->enc == NULL) + goto out_free_seq; + + /* derive cksum */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM); + keyout.data = ctx->cksum; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving cksum key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_free_enc; + } + + return 0; + +out_free_enc: + crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->enc); +out_free_seq: + crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->seq); +out_err: + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * Note that RC4 depends on deriving keys using the sequence + * number or the checksum of a token. Therefore, the final keys + * cannot be calculated until the token is being constructed! + */ +static int +context_derive_keys_rc4(struct krb5_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct crypto_hash *hmac; + char sigkeyconstant[] = "signaturekey"; + int slen = strlen(sigkeyconstant) + 1; /* include null terminator */ + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + int err; + + dprintk("RPC: %s: entered\n", __func__); + /* + * derive cksum (aka Ksign) key + */ + hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(ctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmac)) { + dprintk("%s: error %ld allocating hash '%s'\n", + __func__, PTR_ERR(hmac), ctx->gk5e->cksum_name); + err = PTR_ERR(hmac); + goto out_err; + } + + err = crypto_hash_setkey(hmac, ctx->Ksess, ctx->gk5e->keylength); + if (err) + goto out_err_free_hmac; + + sg_init_table(sg, 1); + sg_set_buf(sg, sigkeyconstant, slen); + + desc.tfm = hmac; + desc.flags = 0; + + err = crypto_hash_init(&desc); + if (err) + goto out_err_free_hmac; + + err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, slen, ctx->cksum); + if (err) + goto out_err_free_hmac; + /* + * allocate hash, and blkciphers for data and seqnum encryption + */ + ctx->enc = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->enc)) { + err = PTR_ERR(ctx->enc); + goto out_err_free_hmac; + } + + ctx->seq = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->seq)) { + crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->enc); + err = PTR_ERR(ctx->seq); + goto out_err_free_hmac; + } + + dprintk("RPC: %s: returning success\n", __func__); + + err = 0; + +out_err_free_hmac: + crypto_free_hash(hmac); +out_err: + dprintk("RPC: %s: returning %d\n", __func__, err); + return err; +} + +static int +context_derive_keys_new(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + struct xdr_netobj c, keyin, keyout; + u8 cdata[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH]; + u32 err; + + c.len = GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH; + c.data = cdata; + + keyin.data = ctx->Ksess; + keyin.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength; + keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength; + + /* initiator seal encryption */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION); + keyout.data = ctx->initiator_seal; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving initiator_seal key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_err; + } + ctx->initiator_enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, + ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, + ctx->initiator_seal); + if (ctx->initiator_enc == NULL) + goto out_err; + + /* acceptor seal encryption */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION); + keyout.data = ctx->acceptor_seal; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving acceptor_seal key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_free_initiator_enc; + } + ctx->acceptor_enc = context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, + ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, + ctx->acceptor_seal); + if (ctx->acceptor_enc == NULL) + goto out_free_initiator_enc; + + /* initiator sign checksum */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM); + keyout.data = ctx->initiator_sign; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving initiator_sign key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_free_acceptor_enc; + } + + /* acceptor sign checksum */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM); + keyout.data = ctx->acceptor_sign; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving acceptor_sign key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_free_acceptor_enc; + } + + /* initiator seal integrity */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY); + keyout.data = ctx->initiator_integ; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving initiator_integ key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_free_acceptor_enc; + } + + /* acceptor seal integrity */ + set_cdata(cdata, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL, KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY); + keyout.data = ctx->acceptor_integ; + err = krb5_derive_key(ctx->gk5e, &keyin, &keyout, &c, gfp_mask); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: Error %d deriving acceptor_integ key\n", + __func__, err); + goto out_free_acceptor_enc; + } + + switch (ctx->enctype) { + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + ctx->initiator_enc_aux = + context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, "cbc(aes)", + ctx->initiator_seal); + if (ctx->initiator_enc_aux == NULL) + goto out_free_acceptor_enc; + ctx->acceptor_enc_aux = + context_v2_alloc_cipher(ctx, "cbc(aes)", + ctx->acceptor_seal); + if (ctx->acceptor_enc_aux == NULL) { + crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->initiator_enc_aux); + goto out_free_acceptor_enc; + } + } + + return 0; + +out_free_acceptor_enc: + crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->acceptor_enc); +out_free_initiator_enc: + crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->initiator_enc); +out_err: + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int +gss_import_v2_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx, + gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + int keylen; + + p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->flags, sizeof(ctx->flags)); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + goto out_err; + ctx->initiate = ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR; + + p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->endtime, sizeof(ctx->endtime)); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + goto out_err; + p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->seq_send64, sizeof(ctx->seq_send64)); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + goto out_err; + /* set seq_send for use by "older" enctypes */ + ctx->seq_send = ctx->seq_send64; + if (ctx->seq_send64 != ctx->seq_send) { + dprintk("%s: seq_send64 %lx, seq_send %x overflow?\n", __func__, + (long unsigned)ctx->seq_send64, ctx->seq_send); + goto out_err; + } + p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->enctype, sizeof(ctx->enctype)); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + goto out_err; + /* Map ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 to ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW */ + if (ctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1) + ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW; + ctx->gk5e = get_gss_krb5_enctype(ctx->enctype); + if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) { + dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported krb5 enctype %u\n", + ctx->enctype); + p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto out_err; + } + keylen = ctx->gk5e->keylength; + + p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, ctx->Ksess, keylen); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + goto out_err; + + if (p != end) { + p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto out_err; + } + + ctx->mech_used.data = kmemdup(gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.data, + gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len, gfp_mask); + if (unlikely(ctx->mech_used.data == NULL)) { + p = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + goto out_err; + } + ctx->mech_used.len = gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len; + + switch (ctx->enctype) { + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + return context_derive_keys_des3(ctx, gfp_mask); + case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: + return context_derive_keys_rc4(ctx); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return context_derive_keys_new(ctx, gfp_mask); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + +out_err: + return PTR_ERR(p); +} + +static int +gss_import_sec_context_kerberos(const void *p, size_t len, + struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, + gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + const void *end = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); + struct krb5_ctx *ctx; + int ret; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), gfp_mask); + if (ctx == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (len == 85) + ret = gss_import_v1_context(p, end, ctx); + else + ret = gss_import_v2_context(p, end, ctx, gfp_mask); + + if (ret == 0) + ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = ctx; + else + kfree(ctx); + + dprintk("RPC: %s: returning %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} + static void gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx; crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->seq); crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->enc); + crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->acceptor_enc); + crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->initiator_enc); + crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->acceptor_enc_aux); + crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->initiator_enc_aux); kfree(kctx->mech_used.data); kfree(kctx); } @@ -241,6 +744,7 @@ static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = { .gm_ops = &gss_kerberos_ops, .gm_pf_num = ARRAY_SIZE(gss_kerberos_pfs), .gm_pfs = gss_kerberos_pfs, + .gm_upcall_enctypes = "enctypes=18,17,16,23,3,1,2 ", }; static int __init init_kerberos_module(void) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c index 88fe6e75ed7..d7941eab779 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5seal.c * - * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan. + * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan. * All rights reserved. * * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu> @@ -70,53 +70,154 @@ DEFINE_SPINLOCK(krb5_seq_lock); -u32 -gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, +static char * +setup_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token) +{ + __be16 *ptr, *krb5_hdr; + int body_size = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength; + + token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, body_size); + + ptr = (__be16 *)token->data; + g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, body_size, (unsigned char **)&ptr); + + /* ptr now at start of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ + krb5_hdr = ptr; + *ptr++ = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG; + *ptr++ = cpu_to_le16(ctx->gk5e->signalg); + *ptr++ = SEAL_ALG_NONE; + *ptr++ = 0xffff; + + return (char *)krb5_hdr; +} + +static void * +setup_token_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token) +{ + __be16 *ptr, *krb5_hdr; + u8 *p, flags = 0x00; + + if ((ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0) + flags |= 0x01; + if (ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) + flags |= 0x04; + + /* Per rfc 4121, sec 4.2.6.1, there is no header, + * just start the token */ + krb5_hdr = ptr = (__be16 *)token->data; + + *ptr++ = KG2_TOK_MIC; + p = (u8 *)ptr; + *p++ = flags; + *p++ = 0xff; + ptr = (__be16 *)p; + *ptr++ = 0xffff; + *ptr++ = 0xffff; + + token->len = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength; + return krb5_hdr; +} + +static u32 +gss_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, struct xdr_netobj *token) { - struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id; - char cksumdata[16]; - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; - unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; + void *ptr; s32 now; u32 seq_send; + u8 *cksumkey; - dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal\n"); + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); BUG_ON(ctx == NULL); now = get_seconds(); - token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8); + ptr = setup_token(ctx, token); - ptr = token->data; - g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8, &ptr); + if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) + cksumkey = ctx->cksum; + else + cksumkey = NULL; - /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ - ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); - ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff); + if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, text, 0, cksumkey, + KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; - msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8; + memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); - *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); - memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4); + spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); + seq_send = ctx->seq_send++; + spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); - if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, text, 0, &md5cksum)) + if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, + seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, - md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +u32 +gss_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, + struct xdr_netobj *token) +{ + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = { .len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; + void *krb5_hdr; + s32 now; + u64 seq_send; + u8 *cksumkey; + unsigned int cksum_usage; - memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8); + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + krb5_hdr = setup_token_v2(ctx, token); + + /* Set up the sequence number. Now 64-bits in clear + * text and w/o direction indicator */ spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); - seq_send = ctx->seq_send++; + seq_send = ctx->seq_send64++; spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); - - if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, - seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, - ptr + 8)) + *((u64 *)(krb5_hdr + 8)) = cpu_to_be64(seq_send); + + if (ctx->initiate) { + cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign; + cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN; + } else { + cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign; + cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN; + } + + if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, krb5_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + text, 0, cksumkey, cksum_usage, &cksumobj)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; + memcpy(krb5_hdr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, cksumobj.data, cksumobj.len); + + now = get_seconds(); + return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; } + +u32 +gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text, + struct xdr_netobj *token) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id; + + switch (ctx->enctype) { + default: + BUG(); + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: + return gss_get_mic_v1(ctx, text, token); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return gss_get_mic_v2(ctx, text, token); + } +} + diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c index 6331cd6866e..415c013ba38 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seqnum.c @@ -39,14 +39,51 @@ # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif +static s32 +krb5_make_rc4_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int direction, s32 seqnum, + unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf) +{ + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher; + unsigned char plain[8]; + s32 code; + + dprintk("RPC: %s:\n", __func__); + cipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + return PTR_ERR(cipher); + + plain[0] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 24) & 0xff); + plain[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff); + plain[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff); + plain[3] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 0) & 0xff); + plain[4] = direction; + plain[5] = direction; + plain[6] = direction; + plain[7] = direction; + + code = krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(kctx, cipher, cksum); + if (code) + goto out; + + code = krb5_encrypt(cipher, cksum, plain, buf, 8); +out: + crypto_free_blkcipher(cipher); + return code; +} s32 -krb5_make_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, +krb5_make_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, + struct crypto_blkcipher *key, int direction, u32 seqnum, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf) { unsigned char plain[8]; + if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) + return krb5_make_rc4_seq_num(kctx, direction, seqnum, + cksum, buf); + plain[0] = (unsigned char) (seqnum & 0xff); plain[1] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 8) & 0xff); plain[2] = (unsigned char) ((seqnum >> 16) & 0xff); @@ -60,17 +97,59 @@ krb5_make_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, return krb5_encrypt(key, cksum, plain, buf, 8); } +static s32 +krb5_get_rc4_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum, + unsigned char *buf, int *direction, s32 *seqnum) +{ + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher; + unsigned char plain[8]; + s32 code; + + dprintk("RPC: %s:\n", __func__); + cipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + return PTR_ERR(cipher); + + code = krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(kctx, cipher, cksum); + if (code) + goto out; + + code = krb5_decrypt(cipher, cksum, buf, plain, 8); + if (code) + goto out; + + if ((plain[4] != plain[5]) || (plain[4] != plain[6]) + || (plain[4] != plain[7])) { + code = (s32)KG_BAD_SEQ; + goto out; + } + + *direction = plain[4]; + + *seqnum = ((plain[0] << 24) | (plain[1] << 16) | + (plain[2] << 8) | (plain[3])); +out: + crypto_free_blkcipher(cipher); + return code; +} + s32 -krb5_get_seq_num(struct crypto_blkcipher *key, +krb5_get_seq_num(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, unsigned char *cksum, unsigned char *buf, int *direction, u32 *seqnum) { s32 code; unsigned char plain[8]; + struct crypto_blkcipher *key = kctx->seq; dprintk("RPC: krb5_get_seq_num:\n"); + if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) + return krb5_get_rc4_seq_num(kctx, cksum, buf, + direction, seqnum); + if ((code = krb5_decrypt(key, cksum, buf, plain, 8))) return code; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c index ce6c247edad..6cd930f3678 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * * Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c * - * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan. + * Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan. * All rights reserved. * * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu> @@ -70,20 +70,21 @@ /* read_token is a mic token, and message_buffer is the data that the mic was * supposedly taken over. */ -u32 -gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, +static u32 +gss_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token) { - struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id; int signalg; int sealalg; - char cksumdata[16]; - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; s32 now; int direction; u32 seqnum; unsigned char *ptr = (unsigned char *)read_token->data; int bodysize; + u8 *cksumkey; dprintk("RPC: krb5_read_token\n"); @@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); - if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) + if (signalg != ctx->gk5e->signalg) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); @@ -108,13 +109,17 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) + cksumkey = ctx->cksum; + else + cksumkey = NULL; - if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, 16)) + if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0, + cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8)) + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ @@ -126,7 +131,8 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, /* do sequencing checks */ - if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) + if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, + &direction, &seqnum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || @@ -135,3 +141,86 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } + +static u32 +gss_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, + struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token) +{ + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; + s32 now; + u64 seqnum; + u8 *ptr = read_token->data; + u8 *cksumkey; + u8 flags; + int i; + unsigned int cksum_usage; + + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + + if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_MIC) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + flags = ptr[2]; + if ((!ctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) || + (ctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR))) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + if (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) { + dprintk("%s: token has unexpected sealed flag\n", __func__); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + for (i = 3; i < 8; i++) + if (ptr[i] != 0xff) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + if (ctx->initiate) { + cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign; + cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN; + } else { + cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign; + cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN; + } + + if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, ptr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, message_buffer, 0, + cksumkey, cksum_usage, &cksumobj)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + if (memcmp(cksumobj.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ + now = get_seconds(); + if (now > ctx->endtime) + return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; + + /* do sequencing checks */ + + seqnum = be64_to_cpup((__be64 *)ptr + 8); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +u32 +gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, + struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, + struct xdr_netobj *read_token) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id; + + switch (ctx->enctype) { + default: + BUG(); + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: + return gss_verify_mic_v1(ctx, message_buffer, read_token); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return gss_verify_mic_v2(ctx, message_buffer, read_token); + } +} + diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index a6e905637e0..2763e3e48db 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -1,3 +1,33 @@ +/* + * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008 + * The Regents of the University of Michigan + * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + * + * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works + * and redistribute this software and such derivative works + * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of + * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity + * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software + * without specific, written prior authorization. If the + * above copyright notice or any other identification of the + * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any + * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must + * also be included. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION + * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY + * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF + * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE + * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGES. + */ + #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> @@ -12,10 +42,7 @@ static inline int gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length) { - /* Most of the code is block-size independent but currently we - * use only 8: */ - BUG_ON(blocksize != 8); - return 8 - (length & 7); + return blocksize - (length % blocksize); } static inline void @@ -86,8 +113,8 @@ out: return 0; } -static void -make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) +void +gss_krb5_make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) { static u64 i = 0; u64 *q = (u64 *)p; @@ -127,69 +154,73 @@ make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) /* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */ -u32 -gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, +static u32 +gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) { - struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id; - char cksumdata[16]; - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; int blocksize = 0, plainlen; unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; s32 now; int headlen; struct page **tmp_pages; u32 seq_send; + u8 *cksumkey; + u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; - dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n"); + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); now = get_seconds(); blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize); BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize); - plainlen = blocksize + buf->len - offset; + plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset; - headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 24 + plainlen) - - (buf->len - offset); + headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) - + (buf->len - offset); ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; /* shift data to make room for header. */ + xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen); + /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */ - /* XXX bounds checking, slack, etc. */ - memmove(ptr + headlen, ptr, buf->head[0].iov_len - offset); - buf->head[0].iov_len += headlen; - buf->len += headlen; BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + plainlen, &ptr); + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr); /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff); - msg_start = ptr + 24; + msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; - *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); + *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg); memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4); - *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = htons(SEAL_ALG_DES); + *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg); - make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize); + gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen); + + if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) + cksumkey = kctx->cksum; + else + cksumkey = NULL; /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */ tmp_pages = buf->pages; buf->pages = pages; - if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf, - offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum)) + if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen, + cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; buf->pages = tmp_pages; - if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, - md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - 8, 8); + memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); seq_send = kctx->seq_send++; @@ -197,25 +228,42 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum * and encrypt at the same time: */ - if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, + if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize, - pages)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher; + int err; + cipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seq_send); + + err = gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf, + offset + headlen - conflen, pages); + crypto_free_blkcipher(cipher); + if (err) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } else { + if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, + offset + headlen - conflen, pages)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; } -u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +static u32 +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) { - struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id; int signalg; int sealalg; - char cksumdata[16]; - struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; + char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), + .data = cksumdata}; s32 now; int direction; s32 seqnum; @@ -224,6 +272,9 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) void *data_start, *orig_start; int data_len; int blocksize; + u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; + int crypt_offset; + u8 *cksumkey; dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n"); @@ -241,29 +292,65 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) /* get the sign and seal algorithms */ signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); - if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) + if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); - if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) + if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, - ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base)) - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + /* + * Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points + * to the beginning of the token header + */ + crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) - + (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base; + + /* + * Need plaintext seqnum to derive encryption key for arcfour-hmac + */ + if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, buf, - ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || + (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { + struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher; + int err; + + cipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(kctx->gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(kctx, cipher, seqnum); - if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, - md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) + err = gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(cipher, buf, crypt_offset); + crypto_free_blkcipher(cipher); + if (err) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } else { + if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset)) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) + cksumkey = kctx->cksum; + else + cksumkey = NULL; + + if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset, + cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8)) + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ @@ -275,19 +362,12 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) /* do sequencing checks */ - if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, - &direction, &seqnum)) - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - - if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || - (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) - return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); - data_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + 8 + blocksize; + data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) + + conflen; orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); @@ -299,3 +379,209 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } + +/* + * We cannot currently handle tokens with rotated data. We need a + * generalized routine to rotate the data in place. It is anticipated + * that we won't encounter rotated data in the general case. + */ +static u32 +rotate_left(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, u16 rrc) +{ + unsigned int realrrc = rrc % (buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); + + if (realrrc == 0) + return 0; + + dprintk("%s: cannot process token with rotated data: " + "rrc %u, realrrc %u\n", __func__, rrc, realrrc); + return 1; +} + +static u32 +gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, + struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) +{ + int blocksize; + u8 *ptr, *plainhdr; + s32 now; + u8 flags = 0x00; + __be16 *be16ptr, ec = 0; + __be64 *be64ptr; + u32 err; + + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + + if (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2 == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* make room for gss token header */ + if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* construct gss token header */ + ptr = plainhdr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff); + *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff); + + if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0) + flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR; + if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0) + flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY; + /* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */ + flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED; + + *ptr++ = flags; + *ptr++ = 0xff; + be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr; + + blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->acceptor_enc); + *be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(ec); + /* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */ + *be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(0); + + be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr; + spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); + *be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(kctx->seq_send64++); + spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); + + err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, ec, pages); + if (err) + return err; + + now = get_seconds(); + return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static u32 +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +{ + s32 now; + u64 seqnum; + u8 *ptr; + u8 flags = 0x00; + u16 ec, rrc; + int err; + u32 headskip, tailskip; + u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN]; + unsigned int movelen; + + + dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); + + if (kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2 == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; + + if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + flags = ptr[2]; + if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) || + (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR))) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + + if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) { + dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__); + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + if (ptr[3] != 0xff) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + + ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4)); + rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6)); + + seqnum = be64_to_cpup((__be64 *)(ptr + 8)); + + if (rrc != 0) { + err = rotate_left(kctx, offset, buf, rrc); + if (err) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, + &headskip, &tailskip); + if (err) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* + * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify + * it against the original + */ + err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, + buf->len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, + decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); + if (err) { + dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6) + || memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) { + dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + /* do sequencing checks */ + + /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ + now = get_seconds(); + if (now > kctx->endtime) + return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; + + /* + * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf. + * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or + * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it. + * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available + * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. + */ + movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, buf->len); + movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > + buf->head[0].iov_len); + memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); + buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + buf->len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +u32 +gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, + struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + + switch (kctx->enctype) { + default: + BUG(); + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: + return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages); + } +} + +u32 +gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +{ + struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; + + switch (kctx->enctype) { + default: + BUG(); + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: + case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf); + case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf); + } +} + diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c index 76e4c6f4ac3..2689de39dc7 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c @@ -249,14 +249,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gss_mech_put); int gss_import_sec_context(const void *input_token, size_t bufsize, struct gss_api_mech *mech, - struct gss_ctx **ctx_id) + struct gss_ctx **ctx_id, + gfp_t gfp_mask) { - if (!(*ctx_id = kzalloc(sizeof(**ctx_id), GFP_KERNEL))) + if (!(*ctx_id = kzalloc(sizeof(**ctx_id), gfp_mask))) return -ENOMEM; (*ctx_id)->mech_type = gss_mech_get(mech); return mech->gm_ops - ->gss_import_sec_context(input_token, bufsize, *ctx_id); + ->gss_import_sec_context(input_token, bufsize, *ctx_id, gfp_mask); } /* gss_get_mic: compute a mic over message and return mic_token. */ @@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ gss_verify_mic(struct gss_ctx *context_handle, mic_token); } +/* + * This function is called from both the client and server code. + * Each makes guarantees about how much "slack" space is available + * for the underlying function in "buf"'s head and tail while + * performing the wrap. + * + * The client and server code allocate RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE extra + * space in both the head and tail which is available for use by + * the wrap function. + * + * Underlying functions should verify they do not use more than + * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE of extra space in either the head or tail + * when performing the wrap. + */ u32 gss_wrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c index 035e1dd6af1..dc3f1f5ed86 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c @@ -84,13 +84,14 @@ simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *res) static int gss_import_sec_context_spkm3(const void *p, size_t len, - struct gss_ctx *ctx_id) + struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, + gfp_t gfp_mask) { const void *end = (const void *)((const char *)p + len); struct spkm3_ctx *ctx; int version; - if (!(ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_NOFS))) + if (!(ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), gfp_mask))) goto out_err; p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &version, sizeof(version)); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index b81e790ef9f..cc385b3a59c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen); if (len < 0) goto out; - status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx); + status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx, GFP_KERNEL); if (status) goto out; @@ -1315,6 +1315,14 @@ svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) inpages = resbuf->pages; /* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for * nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */ + + /* + * If there is currently tail data, make sure there is + * room for the head, tail, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in + * the page, and move the current tail data such that + * there is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in + * both the head and tail. + */ if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) { BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base + PAGE_SIZE); @@ -1327,6 +1335,13 @@ svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) resbuf->tail[0].iov_len); resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE; } + /* + * If there is no current tail data, make sure there is + * room for the head data, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in the + * allotted page, and set up tail information such that there + * is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in both the + * head and tail. + */ if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) { if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c index 19c9983d536..8c7b5433022 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c @@ -556,26 +556,16 @@ static const struct rpc_call_ops rpc_default_ops = { */ struct rpc_task *rpc_run_task(const struct rpc_task_setup *task_setup_data) { - struct rpc_task *task, *ret; + struct rpc_task *task; task = rpc_new_task(task_setup_data); - if (task == NULL) { - rpc_release_calldata(task_setup_data->callback_ops, - task_setup_data->callback_data); - ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + if (IS_ERR(task)) goto out; - } - if (task->tk_status != 0) { - ret = ERR_PTR(task->tk_status); - rpc_put_task(task); - goto out; - } atomic_inc(&task->tk_count); rpc_execute(task); - ret = task; out: - return ret; + return task; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpc_run_task); @@ -657,9 +647,8 @@ struct rpc_task *rpc_run_bc_task(struct rpc_rqst *req, * Create an rpc_task to send the data */ task = rpc_new_task(&task_setup_data); - if (!task) { + if (IS_ERR(task)) { xprt_free_bc_request(req); - task = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); goto out; } task->tk_rqstp = req; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sched.c b/net/sunrpc/sched.c index aae6907fd54..4a843b883b8 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sched.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sched.c @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #ifdef RPC_DEBUG #define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_SCHED -#define RPC_TASK_MAGIC_ID 0xf00baa #endif /* @@ -237,7 +236,6 @@ static void rpc_task_set_debuginfo(struct rpc_task *task) { static atomic_t rpc_pid; - task->tk_magic = RPC_TASK_MAGIC_ID; task->tk_pid = atomic_inc_return(&rpc_pid); } #else @@ -360,9 +358,6 @@ static void __rpc_do_wake_up_task(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, struct rpc_task dprintk("RPC: %5u __rpc_wake_up_task (now %lu)\n", task->tk_pid, jiffies); -#ifdef RPC_DEBUG - BUG_ON(task->tk_magic != RPC_TASK_MAGIC_ID); -#endif /* Has the task been executed yet? If not, we cannot wake it up! */ if (!RPC_IS_ACTIVATED(task)) { printk(KERN_ERR "RPC: Inactive task (%p) being woken up!\n", task); @@ -834,7 +829,7 @@ static void rpc_init_task(struct rpc_task *task, const struct rpc_task_setup *ta } /* starting timestamp */ - task->tk_start = jiffies; + task->tk_start = ktime_get(); dprintk("RPC: new task initialized, procpid %u\n", task_pid_nr(current)); @@ -856,16 +851,23 @@ struct rpc_task *rpc_new_task(const struct rpc_task_setup *setup_data) if (task == NULL) { task = rpc_alloc_task(); - if (task == NULL) - goto out; + if (task == NULL) { + rpc_release_calldata(setup_data->callback_ops, + setup_data->callback_data); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } flags = RPC_TASK_DYNAMIC; } rpc_init_task(task, setup_data); + if (task->tk_status < 0) { + int err = task->tk_status; + rpc_put_task(task); + return ERR_PTR(err); + } task->tk_flags |= flags; dprintk("RPC: allocated task %p\n", task); -out: return task; } @@ -909,9 +911,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpc_put_task); static void rpc_release_task(struct rpc_task *task) { -#ifdef RPC_DEBUG - BUG_ON(task->tk_magic != RPC_TASK_MAGIC_ID); -#endif dprintk("RPC: %5u release task\n", task->tk_pid); if (!list_empty(&task->tk_task)) { @@ -923,9 +922,6 @@ static void rpc_release_task(struct rpc_task *task) } BUG_ON (RPC_IS_QUEUED(task)); -#ifdef RPC_DEBUG - task->tk_magic = 0; -#endif /* Wake up anyone who is waiting for task completion */ rpc_mark_complete_task(task); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/stats.c b/net/sunrpc/stats.c index 5785d2037f4..ea1046f3f9a 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/stats.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/stats.c @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void rpc_count_iostats(struct rpc_task *task) struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp; struct rpc_iostats *stats; struct rpc_iostats *op_metrics; - long rtt, execute, queue; + ktime_t delta; if (!task->tk_client || !task->tk_client->cl_metrics || !req) return; @@ -156,23 +156,16 @@ void rpc_count_iostats(struct rpc_task *task) op_metrics->om_ntrans += req->rq_ntrans; op_metrics->om_timeouts += task->tk_timeouts; - op_metrics->om_bytes_sent += task->tk_bytes_sent; + op_metrics->om_bytes_sent += req->rq_xmit_bytes_sent; op_metrics->om_bytes_recv += req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd; - queue = (long)req->rq_xtime - task->tk_start; - if (queue < 0) - queue = -queue; - op_metrics->om_queue += queue; + delta = ktime_sub(req->rq_xtime, task->tk_start); + op_metrics->om_queue = ktime_add(op_metrics->om_queue, delta); - rtt = task->tk_rtt; - if (rtt < 0) - rtt = -rtt; - op_metrics->om_rtt += rtt; + op_metrics->om_rtt = ktime_add(op_metrics->om_rtt, req->rq_rtt); - execute = (long)jiffies - task->tk_start; - if (execute < 0) - execute = -execute; - op_metrics->om_execute += execute; + delta = ktime_sub(ktime_get(), task->tk_start); + op_metrics->om_execute = ktime_add(op_metrics->om_execute, delta); } static void _print_name(struct seq_file *seq, unsigned int op, @@ -186,8 +179,6 @@ static void _print_name(struct seq_file *seq, unsigned int op, seq_printf(seq, "\t%12u: ", op); } -#define MILLISECS_PER_JIFFY (1000 / HZ) - void rpc_print_iostats(struct seq_file *seq, struct rpc_clnt *clnt) { struct rpc_iostats *stats = clnt->cl_metrics; @@ -214,9 +205,9 @@ void rpc_print_iostats(struct seq_file *seq, struct rpc_clnt *clnt) metrics->om_timeouts, metrics->om_bytes_sent, metrics->om_bytes_recv, - metrics->om_queue * MILLISECS_PER_JIFFY, - metrics->om_rtt * MILLISECS_PER_JIFFY, - metrics->om_execute * MILLISECS_PER_JIFFY); + ktime_to_ms(metrics->om_queue), + ktime_to_ms(metrics->om_rtt), + ktime_to_ms(metrics->om_execute)); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpc_print_iostats); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c index 2763fde8849..a1f82a87d34 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c @@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ int write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, void *obj, un __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(&subbuf, obj, len); return 0; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(write_bytes_to_xdr_buf); int xdr_decode_word(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, u32 *obj) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/xprt.c index 42f09ade004..65fe2e4e7cb 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprt.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/metrics.h> @@ -62,7 +63,6 @@ * Local functions */ static void xprt_request_init(struct rpc_task *, struct rpc_xprt *); -static inline void do_xprt_reserve(struct rpc_task *); static void xprt_connect_status(struct rpc_task *task); static int __xprt_get_cong(struct rpc_xprt *, struct rpc_task *); @@ -711,12 +711,16 @@ void xprt_connect(struct rpc_task *task) if (task->tk_rqstp) task->tk_rqstp->rq_bytes_sent = 0; - task->tk_timeout = xprt->connect_timeout; + task->tk_timeout = task->tk_rqstp->rq_timeout; rpc_sleep_on(&xprt->pending, task, xprt_connect_status); + + if (test_bit(XPRT_CLOSING, &xprt->state)) + return; + if (xprt_test_and_set_connecting(xprt)) + return; xprt->stat.connect_start = jiffies; xprt->ops->connect(task); } - return; } static void xprt_connect_status(struct rpc_task *task) @@ -771,25 +775,19 @@ struct rpc_rqst *xprt_lookup_rqst(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, __be32 xid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xprt_lookup_rqst); -/** - * xprt_update_rtt - update an RPC client's RTT state after receiving a reply - * @task: RPC request that recently completed - * - */ -void xprt_update_rtt(struct rpc_task *task) +static void xprt_update_rtt(struct rpc_task *task) { struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp; struct rpc_rtt *rtt = task->tk_client->cl_rtt; unsigned timer = task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_timer; + long m = usecs_to_jiffies(ktime_to_us(req->rq_rtt)); if (timer) { if (req->rq_ntrans == 1) - rpc_update_rtt(rtt, timer, - (long)jiffies - req->rq_xtime); + rpc_update_rtt(rtt, timer, m); rpc_set_timeo(rtt, timer, req->rq_ntrans - 1); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xprt_update_rtt); /** * xprt_complete_rqst - called when reply processing is complete @@ -807,7 +805,9 @@ void xprt_complete_rqst(struct rpc_task *task, int copied) task->tk_pid, ntohl(req->rq_xid), copied); xprt->stat.recvs++; - task->tk_rtt = (long)jiffies - req->rq_xtime; + req->rq_rtt = ktime_sub(ktime_get(), req->rq_xtime); + if (xprt->ops->timer != NULL) + xprt_update_rtt(task); list_del_init(&req->rq_list); req->rq_private_buf.len = copied; @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ void xprt_transmit(struct rpc_task *task) return; req->rq_connect_cookie = xprt->connect_cookie; - req->rq_xtime = jiffies; + req->rq_xtime = ktime_get(); status = xprt->ops->send_request(task); if (status != 0) { task->tk_status = status; @@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ void xprt_transmit(struct rpc_task *task) spin_unlock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock); } -static inline void do_xprt_reserve(struct rpc_task *task) +static void xprt_alloc_slot(struct rpc_task *task) { struct rpc_xprt *xprt = task->tk_xprt; @@ -955,6 +955,16 @@ static inline void do_xprt_reserve(struct rpc_task *task) rpc_sleep_on(&xprt->backlog, task, NULL); } +static void xprt_free_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_rqst *req) +{ + memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); /* mark unused */ + + spin_lock(&xprt->reserve_lock); + list_add(&req->rq_list, &xprt->free); + rpc_wake_up_next(&xprt->backlog); + spin_unlock(&xprt->reserve_lock); +} + /** * xprt_reserve - allocate an RPC request slot * @task: RPC task requesting a slot allocation @@ -968,7 +978,7 @@ void xprt_reserve(struct rpc_task *task) task->tk_status = -EIO; spin_lock(&xprt->reserve_lock); - do_xprt_reserve(task); + xprt_alloc_slot(task); spin_unlock(&xprt->reserve_lock); } @@ -1006,14 +1016,10 @@ void xprt_release(struct rpc_task *task) { struct rpc_xprt *xprt; struct rpc_rqst *req; - int is_bc_request; if (!(req = task->tk_rqstp)) return; - /* Preallocated backchannel request? */ - is_bc_request = bc_prealloc(req); - xprt = req->rq_xprt; rpc_count_iostats(task); spin_lock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock); @@ -1027,21 +1033,16 @@ void xprt_release(struct rpc_task *task) mod_timer(&xprt->timer, xprt->last_used + xprt->idle_timeout); spin_unlock_bh(&xprt->transport_lock); - if (!bc_prealloc(req)) + if (req->rq_buffer) xprt->ops->buf_free(req->rq_buffer); task->tk_rqstp = NULL; if (req->rq_release_snd_buf) req->rq_release_snd_buf(req); dprintk("RPC: %5u release request %p\n", task->tk_pid, req); - if (likely(!is_bc_request)) { - memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); /* mark unused */ - - spin_lock(&xprt->reserve_lock); - list_add(&req->rq_list, &xprt->free); - rpc_wake_up_next(&xprt->backlog); - spin_unlock(&xprt->reserve_lock); - } else + if (likely(!bc_prealloc(req))) + xprt_free_slot(xprt, req); + else xprt_free_bc_request(req); } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c index 187257b1d88..a85e866a77f 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c @@ -305,7 +305,6 @@ xprt_setup_rdma(struct xprt_create *args) /* 60 second timeout, no retries */ xprt->timeout = &xprt_rdma_default_timeout; xprt->bind_timeout = (60U * HZ); - xprt->connect_timeout = (60U * HZ); xprt->reestablish_timeout = (5U * HZ); xprt->idle_timeout = (5U * 60 * HZ); @@ -449,21 +448,19 @@ xprt_rdma_connect(struct rpc_task *task) struct rpc_xprt *xprt = (struct rpc_xprt *)task->tk_xprt; struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt = rpcx_to_rdmax(xprt); - if (!xprt_test_and_set_connecting(xprt)) { - if (r_xprt->rx_ep.rep_connected != 0) { - /* Reconnect */ - schedule_delayed_work(&r_xprt->rdma_connect, - xprt->reestablish_timeout); - xprt->reestablish_timeout <<= 1; - if (xprt->reestablish_timeout > (30 * HZ)) - xprt->reestablish_timeout = (30 * HZ); - else if (xprt->reestablish_timeout < (5 * HZ)) - xprt->reestablish_timeout = (5 * HZ); - } else { - schedule_delayed_work(&r_xprt->rdma_connect, 0); - if (!RPC_IS_ASYNC(task)) - flush_scheduled_work(); - } + if (r_xprt->rx_ep.rep_connected != 0) { + /* Reconnect */ + schedule_delayed_work(&r_xprt->rdma_connect, + xprt->reestablish_timeout); + xprt->reestablish_timeout <<= 1; + if (xprt->reestablish_timeout > (30 * HZ)) + xprt->reestablish_timeout = (30 * HZ); + else if (xprt->reestablish_timeout < (5 * HZ)) + xprt->reestablish_timeout = (5 * HZ); + } else { + schedule_delayed_work(&r_xprt->rdma_connect, 0); + if (!RPC_IS_ASYNC(task)) + flush_scheduled_work(); } } @@ -677,7 +674,7 @@ xprt_rdma_send_request(struct rpc_task *task) if (rpcrdma_ep_post(&r_xprt->rx_ia, &r_xprt->rx_ep, req)) goto drop_connection; - task->tk_bytes_sent += rqst->rq_snd_buf.len; + rqst->rq_xmit_bytes_sent += rqst->rq_snd_buf.len; rqst->rq_bytes_sent = 0; return 0; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index 9847c30b500..02fc7f04dd1 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -138,20 +138,6 @@ static ctl_table sunrpc_table[] = { #endif /* - * Time out for an RPC UDP socket connect. UDP socket connects are - * synchronous, but we set a timeout anyway in case of resource - * exhaustion on the local host. - */ -#define XS_UDP_CONN_TO (5U * HZ) - -/* - * Wait duration for an RPC TCP connection to be established. Solaris - * NFS over TCP uses 60 seconds, for example, which is in line with how - * long a server takes to reboot. - */ -#define XS_TCP_CONN_TO (60U * HZ) - -/* * Wait duration for a reply from the RPC portmapper. */ #define XS_BIND_TO (60U * HZ) @@ -542,7 +528,7 @@ static int xs_udp_send_request(struct rpc_task *task) xdr->len - req->rq_bytes_sent, status); if (status >= 0) { - task->tk_bytes_sent += status; + req->rq_xmit_bytes_sent += status; if (status >= req->rq_slen) return 0; /* Still some bytes left; set up for a retry later. */ @@ -638,7 +624,7 @@ static int xs_tcp_send_request(struct rpc_task *task) /* If we've sent the entire packet, immediately * reset the count of bytes sent. */ req->rq_bytes_sent += status; - task->tk_bytes_sent += status; + req->rq_xmit_bytes_sent += status; if (likely(req->rq_bytes_sent >= req->rq_slen)) { req->rq_bytes_sent = 0; return 0; @@ -858,7 +844,6 @@ static void xs_udp_data_ready(struct sock *sk, int len) dst_confirm(skb_dst(skb)); xprt_adjust_cwnd(task, copied); - xprt_update_rtt(task); xprt_complete_rqst(task, copied); out_unlock: @@ -2016,9 +2001,6 @@ static void xs_connect(struct rpc_task *task) struct rpc_xprt *xprt = task->tk_xprt; struct sock_xprt *transport = container_of(xprt, struct sock_xprt, xprt); - if (xprt_test_and_set_connecting(xprt)) - return; - if (transport->sock != NULL && !RPC_IS_SOFTCONN(task)) { dprintk("RPC: xs_connect delayed xprt %p for %lu " "seconds\n", @@ -2038,16 +2020,6 @@ static void xs_connect(struct rpc_task *task) } } -static void xs_tcp_connect(struct rpc_task *task) -{ - struct rpc_xprt *xprt = task->tk_xprt; - - /* Exit if we need to wait for socket shutdown to complete */ - if (test_bit(XPRT_CLOSING, &xprt->state)) - return; - xs_connect(task); -} - /** * xs_udp_print_stats - display UDP socket-specifc stats * @xprt: rpc_xprt struct containing statistics @@ -2246,7 +2218,7 @@ static struct rpc_xprt_ops xs_tcp_ops = { .release_xprt = xs_tcp_release_xprt, .rpcbind = rpcb_getport_async, .set_port = xs_set_port, - .connect = xs_tcp_connect, + .connect = xs_connect, .buf_alloc = rpc_malloc, .buf_free = rpc_free, .send_request = xs_tcp_send_request, @@ -2337,7 +2309,6 @@ static struct rpc_xprt *xs_setup_udp(struct xprt_create *args) xprt->max_payload = (1U << 16) - (MAX_HEADER << 3); xprt->bind_timeout = XS_BIND_TO; - xprt->connect_timeout = XS_UDP_CONN_TO; xprt->reestablish_timeout = XS_UDP_REEST_TO; xprt->idle_timeout = XS_IDLE_DISC_TO; @@ -2412,7 +2383,6 @@ static struct rpc_xprt *xs_setup_tcp(struct xprt_create *args) xprt->max_payload = RPC_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE; xprt->bind_timeout = XS_BIND_TO; - xprt->connect_timeout = XS_TCP_CONN_TO; xprt->reestablish_timeout = XS_TCP_INIT_REEST_TO; xprt->idle_timeout = XS_IDLE_DISC_TO; @@ -2472,9 +2442,6 @@ static struct rpc_xprt *xs_setup_bc_tcp(struct xprt_create *args) struct sock_xprt *transport; struct svc_sock *bc_sock; - if (!args->bc_xprt) - ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - xprt = xs_setup_xprt(args, xprt_tcp_slot_table_entries); if (IS_ERR(xprt)) return xprt; @@ -2488,7 +2455,6 @@ static struct rpc_xprt *xs_setup_bc_tcp(struct xprt_create *args) /* backchannel */ xprt_set_bound(xprt); xprt->bind_timeout = 0; - xprt->connect_timeout = 0; xprt->reestablish_timeout = 0; xprt->idle_timeout = 0; |