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-rw-r--r--security/keys/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/ecryptfs_format.c81
-rw-r--r--security/keys/ecryptfs_format.h30
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted.c253
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c38
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c13
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c20
13 files changed, 369 insertions, 100 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 1bf090a885f..b34cc6ee690 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-y := \
user_defined.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += ecryptfs_format.o encrypted.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
diff --git a/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.c b/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6daa3b6ff9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_format.c: helper functions for the encrypted key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
+ * Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@ou.edu>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include "ecryptfs_format.h"
+
+u8 *ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok)
+{
+ return auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key);
+
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_get_versions()
+ *
+ * Source code taken from the software 'ecryptfs-utils' version 83.
+ *
+ */
+void ecryptfs_get_versions(int *major, int *minor, int *file_version)
+{
+ *major = ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ *minor = ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR;
+ if (file_version)
+ *file_version = ECRYPTFS_SUPPORTED_FILE_VERSION;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecryptfs_get_versions);
+
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok - fill the ecryptfs_auth_tok structure
+ *
+ * Fill the ecryptfs_auth_tok structure with required ecryptfs data.
+ * The source code is inspired to the original function generate_payload()
+ * shipped with the software 'ecryptfs-utils' version 83.
+ *
+ */
+int ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+ const char *key_desc)
+{
+ int major, minor;
+
+ ecryptfs_get_versions(&major, &minor, NULL);
+ auth_tok->version = (((uint16_t)(major << 8) & 0xFF00)
+ | ((uint16_t)minor & 0x00FF));
+ auth_tok->token_type = ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD;
+ strncpy((char *)auth_tok->token.password.signature, key_desc,
+ ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE);
+ auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes =
+ ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES;
+ /*
+ * Removed auth_tok->token.password.salt and
+ * auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key
+ * initialization from the original code
+ */
+ /* TODO: Make the hash parameterizable via policy */
+ auth_tok->token.password.flags |=
+ ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET;
+ /* The kernel code will encrypt the session key. */
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[0] = 0;
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 0;
+ /* Default; subject to change by kernel eCryptfs */
+ auth_tok->token.password.hash_algo = PGP_DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512;
+ auth_tok->token.password.flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_PERSISTENT_PASSWORD);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.h b/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..40294de238b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * ecryptfs_format.h: helper functions for the encrypted key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
+ * Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@ou.edu>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __KEYS_ECRYPTFS_H
+#define __KEYS_ECRYPTFS_H
+
+#include <linux/ecryptfs.h>
+
+#define PGP_DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512 10
+
+u8 *ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok);
+void ecryptfs_get_versions(int *major, int *minor, int *file_version);
+int ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+ const char *key_desc);
+
+#endif /* __KEYS_ECRYPTFS_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted.c
index 69907a58a68..e7eca9ec4c6 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted.c
@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ * TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
*
- * Author:
+ * Authors:
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -26,22 +29,27 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include "encrypted.h"
+#include "ecryptfs_format.h"
static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)";
+static const char key_format_default[] = "default";
+static const char key_format_ecryptfs[] = "ecryptfs";
static unsigned int ivsize;
static int blksize;
#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN 16
#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096
#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20
@@ -58,6 +66,16 @@ enum {
Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
};
+enum {
+ Opt_error = -1, Opt_default, Opt_ecryptfs
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_format_tokens = {
+ {Opt_default, "default"},
+ {Opt_ecryptfs, "ecryptfs"},
+ {Opt_error, NULL}
+};
+
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_new, "new"},
{Opt_load, "load"},
@@ -82,9 +100,37 @@ static int aes_get_sizes(void)
}
/*
+ * valid_ecryptfs_desc - verify the description of a new/loaded encrypted key
+ *
+ * The description of a encrypted key with format 'ecryptfs' must contain
+ * exactly 16 hexadecimal characters.
+ *
+ */
+static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (strlen(ecryptfs_desc) != KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: key description must be %d hexadecimal "
+ "characters long\n", KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN; i++) {
+ if (!isxdigit(ecryptfs_desc[i])) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: key description must contain "
+ "only hexadecimal characters\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key
*
- * key-type:= "trusted:" | "encrypted:"
+ * key-type:= "trusted:" | "user:"
* desc:= master-key description
*
* Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update,
@@ -118,8 +164,9 @@ out:
* datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data
*
* datablob format:
- * new <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
- * load <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * <encrypted iv + data>
* update <new-master-key name>
*
* Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token,
@@ -127,52 +174,95 @@ out:
*
* On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
*/
-static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc,
- char **decrypted_datalen, char **hex_encoded_iv)
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
+ char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
+ char **hex_encoded_iv)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int ret = -EINVAL;
int key_cmd;
- char *p;
+ int key_format;
+ char *p, *keyword;
+
+ keyword = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ if (!keyword) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: insufficient parameters specified\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ key_cmd = match_token(keyword, key_tokens, args);
+ /* Get optional format: default | ecryptfs */
p = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!p)
+ if (!p) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: insufficient parameters specified\n");
return ret;
- key_cmd = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+ }
- *master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!*master_desc)
+ key_format = match_token(p, key_format_tokens, args);
+ switch (key_format) {
+ case Opt_ecryptfs:
+ case Opt_default:
+ *format = p;
+ *master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+ break;
+ case Opt_error:
+ *master_desc = p;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!*master_desc) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: master key parameter is missing\n");
goto out;
+ }
- if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0)
+ if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: master key parameter \'%s\' "
+ "is invalid\n", *master_desc);
goto out;
+ }
if (decrypted_datalen) {
*decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!*decrypted_datalen)
+ if (!*decrypted_datalen) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: keylen parameter is missing\n");
goto out;
+ }
}
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_new:
- if (!decrypted_datalen)
+ if (!decrypted_datalen) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
+ "when called from .update method\n", keyword);
break;
+ }
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_load:
- if (!decrypted_datalen)
+ if (!decrypted_datalen) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
+ "when called from .update method\n", keyword);
break;
+ }
*hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
- if (!*hex_encoded_iv)
+ if (!*hex_encoded_iv) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: hex blob is missing\n");
break;
+ }
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_update:
- if (decrypted_datalen)
+ if (decrypted_datalen) {
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not allowed "
+ "when called from .instantiate method\n",
+ keyword);
break;
+ }
ret = 0;
break;
case Opt_err:
+ pr_info("encrypted_key: keyword \'%s\' not recognized\n",
+ keyword);
break;
}
out:
@@ -197,8 +287,8 @@ static char *datablob_format(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
ascii_buf[asciiblob_len] = '\0';
/* copy datablob master_desc and datalen strings */
- len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s ", epayload->master_desc,
- epayload->datalen);
+ len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s %s ", epayload->format,
+ epayload->master_desc, epayload->datalen);
/* convert the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data and HMAC to ascii */
bufp = &ascii_buf[len];
@@ -378,11 +468,13 @@ static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
} else
goto out;
- if (IS_ERR(mkey))
+ if (IS_ERR(mkey)) {
pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found",
epayload->master_desc);
- if (mkey)
- dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen);
out:
return mkey;
}
@@ -439,9 +531,9 @@ static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- digest = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
+ digest = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len;
ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
- epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
+ epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len);
if (!ret)
dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
out:
@@ -450,26 +542,35 @@ out:
/* verify HMAC before decrypting encrypted key */
static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
- const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
+ const u8 *format, const u8 *master_key,
+ size_t master_keylen)
{
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
u8 digest[HASH_SIZE];
int ret;
+ char *p;
+ unsigned short len;
ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
- epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len);
+ len = epayload->datablob_len;
+ if (!format) {
+ p = epayload->master_desc;
+ len -= strlen(epayload->format) + 1;
+ } else
+ p = epayload->format;
+
+ ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, p, len);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
+ ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
sizeof digest);
if (ret) {
ret = -EINVAL;
dump_hmac("datablob",
- epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len,
+ epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
HASH_SIZE);
dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE);
}
@@ -514,13 +615,16 @@ out:
/* Allocate memory for decrypted key and datablob. */
static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
+ const char *format,
const char *master_desc,
const char *datalen)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
unsigned short datablob_len;
unsigned short decrypted_datalen;
+ unsigned short payload_datalen;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
+ unsigned int format_len;
long dlen;
int ret;
@@ -528,29 +632,43 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
decrypted_datalen = dlen;
+ payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+ if (format && !strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
+ if (dlen != ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
+ pr_err("encrypted_key: keylen for the ecryptfs format "
+ "must be equal to %d bytes\n",
+ ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ decrypted_datalen = ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES;
+ payload_datalen = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok);
+ }
+
encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize);
- datablob_len = strlen(master_desc) + 1 + strlen(datalen) + 1
- + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
+ datablob_len = format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1
+ + strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen;
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, decrypted_datalen + datablob_len
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_datalen + datablob_len
+ HASH_SIZE + 1);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
- epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + decrypted_datalen +
+ epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + payload_datalen +
datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!epayload)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ epayload->payload_datalen = payload_datalen;
epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len;
return epayload;
}
static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
- const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+ const char *format, const char *hex_encoded_iv)
{
struct key *mkey;
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
@@ -571,14 +689,14 @@ static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
hex2bin(epayload->iv, hex_encoded_iv, ivsize);
hex2bin(epayload->encrypted_data, hex_encoded_data, encrypted_datalen);
- hmac = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len;
+ hmac = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len;
hex2bin(hmac, hex_encoded_data + (encrypted_datalen * 2), HASH_SIZE);
mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen);
if (IS_ERR(mkey))
return PTR_ERR(mkey);
- ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, master_key, master_keylen);
+ ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, format, master_key, master_keylen);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: bad hmac (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
@@ -598,13 +716,28 @@ out:
}
static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
- const char *master_desc, const char *datalen)
+ const char *format, const char *master_desc,
+ const char *datalen)
{
- epayload->master_desc = epayload->decrypted_data
- + epayload->decrypted_datalen;
+ unsigned int format_len;
+
+ format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
+ epayload->format = epayload->payload_data + epayload->payload_datalen;
+ epayload->master_desc = epayload->format + format_len + 1;
epayload->datalen = epayload->master_desc + strlen(master_desc) + 1;
epayload->iv = epayload->datalen + strlen(datalen) + 1;
epayload->encrypted_data = epayload->iv + ivsize + 1;
+ epayload->decrypted_data = epayload->payload_data;
+
+ if (!format)
+ memcpy(epayload->format, key_format_default, format_len);
+ else {
+ if (!strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs))
+ epayload->decrypted_data =
+ ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_key((struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)epayload->payload_data);
+
+ memcpy(epayload->format, format, format_len);
+ }
memcpy(epayload->master_desc, master_desc, strlen(master_desc));
memcpy(epayload->datalen, datalen, strlen(datalen));
@@ -617,19 +750,29 @@ static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
* itself. For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
*/
static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
+ const char *key_desc, const char *format,
const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
const char *hex_encoded_iv)
{
int ret = 0;
- __ekey_init(epayload, master_desc, datalen);
+ if (format && !strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
+ ret = valid_ecryptfs_desc(key_desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok((struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)epayload->payload_data,
+ key_desc);
+ }
+
+ __ekey_init(epayload, format, master_desc, datalen);
if (!hex_encoded_iv) {
get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
epayload->decrypted_datalen);
} else
- ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, hex_encoded_iv);
+ ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
return ret;
}
@@ -646,6 +789,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
char *datablob = NULL;
+ const char *format = NULL;
char *master_desc = NULL;
char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
@@ -659,18 +803,19 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
return -ENOMEM;
datablob[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
- ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen,
- &hex_encoded_iv);
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
+ &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, master_desc, decrypted_datalen);
+ epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
+ decrypted_datalen);
if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
goto out;
}
- ret = encrypted_init(epayload, master_desc, decrypted_datalen,
- hex_encoded_iv);
+ ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
+ decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(epayload);
goto out;
@@ -706,6 +851,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
char *buf;
char *new_master_desc = NULL;
+ const char *format = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
@@ -717,7 +863,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
buf[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(buf, data, datalen);
- ret = datablob_parse(buf, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
+ ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -725,18 +871,19 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, new_master_desc,
- epayload->datalen);
+ new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
+ new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
goto out;
}
- __ekey_init(new_epayload, new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+ __ekey_init(new_epayload, epayload->format, new_master_desc,
+ epayload->datalen);
memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize);
- memcpy(new_epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_data,
- epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ memcpy(new_epayload->payload_data, epayload->payload_data,
+ epayload->payload_datalen);
rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 07a025f8190..f375152a250 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
- key_match_func_t match);
+ key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check);
extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred);
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 427fddcaeb1..eca51918c95 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -206,8 +206,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
goto error5;
}
+ /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
+ ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error6;
+
ret = key->serial;
+error6:
key_put(key);
error5:
key_type_put(ktype);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index cdd2f3f88c8..30e242f7bd0 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
}
klist = rcu_dereference_check(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
- rcu_read_lock_held() ||
atomic_read(&keyring->usage) == 0);
if (klist) {
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
@@ -176,13 +175,15 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
- rcu_read_lock();
- klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
- if (klist)
- seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
- else
- seq_puts(m, ": empty");
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+ if (klist)
+ seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+ else
+ seq_puts(m, ": empty");
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
* @type: The type of key to search for.
* @description: Parameter for @match.
* @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required.
+ * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad
*
* Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
* The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
@@ -303,7 +305,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
- key_match_func_t match)
+ key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check)
{
struct {
struct keyring_list *keylist;
@@ -345,6 +348,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
kflags = keyring->flags;
if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) {
key = keyring;
+ if (no_state_check)
+ goto found;
/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
* revoked */
@@ -384,11 +389,13 @@ descend:
continue;
/* skip revoked keys and expired keys */
- if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
- continue;
+ if (!no_state_check) {
+ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
+ continue;
- if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
- continue;
+ if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+ continue;
+ }
/* keys that don't match */
if (!match(key, description))
@@ -399,6 +406,9 @@ descend:
cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
+ if (no_state_check)
+ goto found;
+
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
err = key->type_data.reject_error;
@@ -478,7 +488,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
- type, description, type->match);
+ type, description, type->match, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 525cf8a29cd..49bbc97943a 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
- cred);
+ true, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 930634e4514..a3063eb3dc2 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred)
{
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
if (cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -459,7 +460,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
might_sleep();
- key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred);
+ key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
+ false, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
err = key_ref;
@@ -845,6 +847,7 @@ void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
new->user = get_uid(old->user);
+ new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
new->securebits = old->securebits;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index df3c0417ee4..82465328c39 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -71,9 +71,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_request_key);
* This is called in context of freshly forked kthread before kernel_execve(),
* so we can simply install the desired session_keyring at this point.
*/
-static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info)
+static int umh_keys_init(struct subprocess_info *info, struct cred *cred)
{
- struct cred *cred = (struct cred*)current_cred();
struct key *keyring = info->data;
return install_session_keyring_to_cred(cred, keyring);
@@ -470,7 +469,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
- key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto couldnt_alloc_key;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -480,6 +479,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
+couldnt_alloc_key:
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
@@ -530,8 +530,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
dest_keyring, flags);
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
- key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
- cred);
+ key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 68164031a74..60d4e3f5e4b 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
seq_puts(m, "key:");
seq_puts(m, key->description);
- seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
+ if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
}
/*
@@ -250,6 +251,8 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);
+ if (authkey == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN))
+ authkey = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
goto error;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index c99b9368368..0c33e2ea1f3 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index c6ca8662a46..5b366d7af3c 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -69,18 +69,6 @@ error:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
/*
- * dispose of the old data from an updated user defined key
- */
-static void user_update_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload;
-
- upayload = container_of(rcu, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
-
- kfree(upayload);
-}
-
-/*
* update a user defined key
* - the key's semaphore is write-locked
*/
@@ -114,7 +102,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
key->expiry = 0;
}
- call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_update_rcu_disposal);
+ kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
error:
return ret;
@@ -145,7 +133,7 @@ void user_revoke(struct key *key)
if (upayload) {
rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, NULL);
- call_rcu(&upayload->rcu, user_update_rcu_disposal);
+ kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
}
}
@@ -169,8 +157,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
-
- seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+ if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);