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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c515
1 files changed, 129 insertions, 386 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 00815973d41..ba808ef6bab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,11 +89,10 @@
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
-extern int selinux_compat_net;
extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
/* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sk->sk_security = ssec;
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
return 0;
}
@@ -353,6 +352,7 @@ enum {
Opt_fscontext = 2,
Opt_defcontext = 3,
Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+ Opt_labelsupport = 5,
};
static const match_table_t tokens = {
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
{Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
{Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+ {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
{Opt_error, NULL},
};
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
}
}
- sbsec->initialized = 1;
+ sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
@@ -441,6 +442,12 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
+ sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
+ sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
/* Initialize the root inode. */
rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -487,23 +494,22 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
- if (!sbsec->initialized)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
return -EINVAL;
if (!ss_initialized)
return -EINVAL;
- /*
- * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
- * settings this is going to need a mask
- */
- tmp = sbsec->flags;
+ tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (tmp & 0x01)
opts->num_mnt_opts++;
tmp >>= 1;
}
+ /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+ opts->num_mnt_opts++;
opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
@@ -549,6 +555,10 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
}
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+ }
BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
@@ -562,8 +572,10 @@ out_free:
static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
{
+ char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
/* check if the old mount command had the same options */
- if (sbsec->initialized)
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
(old_sid != new_sid))
return 1;
@@ -571,8 +583,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
/* check if we were passed the same options twice,
* aka someone passed context=a,context=b
*/
- if (!sbsec->initialized)
- if (sbsec->flags & flag)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ if (mnt_flags & flag)
return 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -626,7 +638,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
* this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
* will be used for both mounts)
*/
- if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
&& (num_opts == 0))
goto out;
@@ -637,6 +649,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
*/
for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
u32 sid;
+
+ if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+ continue;
rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
if (rc) {
@@ -690,19 +705,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
}
- if (sbsec->initialized) {
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
- if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
goto out_double_mount;
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
- sbsec->proc = 1;
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
- rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+ rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
@@ -806,10 +821,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
}
/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
- BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
+ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
/* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
- if (newsbsec->initialized)
+ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
return;
mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
@@ -917,7 +932,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
goto out_err;
}
break;
-
+ case Opt_labelsupport:
+ break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
@@ -999,7 +1015,12 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
char *prefix;
for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
- char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+ char *has_comma;
+
+ if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+ has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+ else
+ has_comma = NULL;
switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
case CONTEXT_MNT:
@@ -1014,6 +1035,10 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
break;
+ case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+ continue;
default:
BUG();
};
@@ -1209,7 +1234,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
goto out_unlock;
sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
- if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
server is ready to handle calls. */
@@ -1237,19 +1262,26 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
}
if (!dentry) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
- "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
- inode->i_ino);
+ /*
+ * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
+ * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+ * be used again by userspace.
+ */
goto out_unlock;
}
len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
- context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!context) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
dput(dentry);
goto out_unlock;
}
+ context[len] = '\0';
rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
context, len);
if (rc == -ERANGE) {
@@ -1262,12 +1294,13 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
}
kfree(context);
len = rc;
- context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!context) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
dput(dentry);
goto out_unlock;
}
+ context[len] = '\0';
rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
context, len);
@@ -1289,10 +1322,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
sbsec->def_sid,
GFP_NOFS);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
- "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
- __func__, context, -rc,
- inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+ unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ if (printk_ratelimit())
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+ "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+ "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+ } else {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
+ "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+ }
kfree(context);
/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
rc = 0;
@@ -1326,7 +1368,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
- if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
if (proci->pde) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
@@ -1587,7 +1629,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1801,6 +1843,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
av |= DIR__OPEN;
+ else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
+ av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
else
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
"unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
@@ -1815,7 +1859,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1832,7 +1876,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1848,7 +1892,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
if (error)
return error;
- return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1858,7 +1902,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
{
int error;
- error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+ error = cap_capset(new, old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -1866,12 +1910,22 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1997,7 +2051,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+ rc = cap_syslog(type);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2028,10 +2082,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
* mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
* succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
*
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
* Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
* processes that allocate mappings.
*/
@@ -2058,7 +2108,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2156,11 +2206,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
-}
-
static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2180,7 +2225,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
}
- return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+ return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
}
extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -2290,8 +2335,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
int rc, i;
- secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
return;
@@ -2337,8 +2380,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int rc, i;
unsigned long flags;
- secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
-
osid = tsec->osid;
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -2400,7 +2441,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
+ match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+ match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
}
static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
@@ -2513,11 +2555,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
void *data)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
@@ -2530,11 +2567,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
@@ -2570,7 +2602,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
@@ -2585,14 +2617,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
- if (sbsec->initialized) {
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = 1;
}
- if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (name) {
@@ -2622,21 +2654,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int ma
static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
}
static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
}
@@ -2657,12 +2679,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
}
@@ -2682,22 +2698,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (!mask) {
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
@@ -2711,11 +2718,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
return 0;
@@ -2769,7 +2771,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
- if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
@@ -2931,16 +2933,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
return len;
}
-static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
-static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -2952,7 +2944,6 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (!mask) {
@@ -2964,29 +2955,15 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
mask |= MAY_APPEND;
- rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
- file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+ return file_has_perm(cred, file,
+ file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
}
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- u32 sid = current_sid();
-
- if (!mask) {
+ if (!mask)
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
return 0;
- }
-
- if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
- && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
- return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
}
@@ -3078,18 +3055,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long prot)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
- rc = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
@@ -3239,12 +3211,6 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
@@ -3278,14 +3244,6 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
}
/*
- * commit new credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
- secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
-/*
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
@@ -3329,29 +3287,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
- since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
- identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
- this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
- of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
- capable hook. */
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
- int flags)
-{
- return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- /* See the comment for setuid above. */
- return 0;
-}
-
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3372,17 +3307,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
*secid = task_sid(p);
}
-static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
- /* See the comment for setuid above. */
- return 0;
-}
-
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3393,7 +3322,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3408,11 +3337,6 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
@@ -3428,7 +3352,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3451,10 +3375,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
u32 perm;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
if (!sig)
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
@@ -3467,18 +3387,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
- unsigned long arg2,
- unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5)
-{
- /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
- any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
- the state of the current process. */
- return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-}
-
static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
@@ -3799,7 +3707,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
sksec->sid = isec->sid;
sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
- err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
+ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
}
return err;
@@ -3990,13 +3898,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
}
static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
@@ -4047,10 +3949,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int err;
- err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
@@ -4120,72 +4018,6 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
}
-static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad,
- u16 family,
- char *addrp)
-{
- int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- u16 sk_class;
- u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
- u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
-
- sk_sid = sksec->sid;
- sk_class = sksec->sclass;
-
- switch (sk_class) {
- case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
- netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
- node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
- recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
- break;
- case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
- netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
- node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
- recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
- break;
- case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
- netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
- node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
- recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
- break;
- default:
- netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
- node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
- recv_perm = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- if (!recv_perm)
- return 0;
- err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
- ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
- if (unlikely(err)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in"
- " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
- " network port label not found\n");
- return err;
- }
- return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
-}
-
static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
@@ -4203,14 +4035,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (err)
return err;
- if (selinux_compat_net)
- err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
- family, addrp);
- else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
+ if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RECV, &ad);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
@@ -4252,7 +4082,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
* to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
- if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -4384,7 +4214,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
}
static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
@@ -4428,16 +4258,15 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
req->secid = sksec->sid;
req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
- return 0;
+ } else {
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ req->secid = newsid;
+ req->peer_secid = peersid;
}
- err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- req->secid = newsid;
- req->peer_secid = peersid;
- return 0;
+ return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
}
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
@@ -4454,7 +4283,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
/* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
* thread with access to newsksec */
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
+ selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
}
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -4467,8 +4296,6 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
family = PF_INET;
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
-
- selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
}
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4620,71 +4447,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
}
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
- int ifindex,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad,
- u16 family, char *addrp)
-{
- int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- u16 sk_class;
- u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
- u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
-
- sk_sid = sksec->sid;
- sk_class = sksec->sclass;
-
- switch (sk_class) {
- case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
- netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
- node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
- send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
- break;
- case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
- netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
- node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
- send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
- break;
- case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
- netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
- node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
- send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
- break;
- default:
- netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
- node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
- send_perm = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
- return err;
-
- err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- if (send_perm != 0)
- return 0;
-
- err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
- ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
- if (unlikely(err)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in"
- " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
- " network port label not found\n");
- return err;
- }
- return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
-}
-
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
int ifindex,
u16 family)
@@ -4705,15 +4467,10 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
return NF_DROP;
- if (selinux_compat_net) {
- if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
- &ad, family, addrp))
- return NF_DROP;
- } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
+ if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
- }
if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
@@ -4737,7 +4494,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
* to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
- if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
@@ -4844,7 +4601,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4859,7 +4616,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
int err;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+ err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5167,11 +4924,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
u32 perms;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
perms = SHM__READ;
@@ -5581,7 +5333,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
.bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
.bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
.bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
.bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
@@ -5623,8 +5374,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
- .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
- .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
.inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
@@ -5644,17 +5393,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
.cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
.cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
- .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
.kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
.kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
- .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
- .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
- .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
.task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
- .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
.task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
.task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
.task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
@@ -5664,7 +5408,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
.task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
.task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
- .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2024-11-12 03:20:43 +0000