diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Makefile | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 64 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/inode.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/seclvl.c | 669 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/Kconfig | 37 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/exports.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 351 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h | 119 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 140 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 197 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/mls.h | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 629 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 216 |
24 files changed, 1687 insertions, 929 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 67785df264e..460e5c9cf49 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -93,18 +93,6 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_SECLVL - tristate "BSD Secure Levels" - depends on SECURITY - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_SHA1 - help - Implements BSD Secure Levels as an LSM. See - <file:Documentation/seclvl.txt> for instructions on how to use this - module. - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. - source security/selinux/Kconfig endmenu diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 8cbbf2f3670..ef87df2f50a 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -16,4 +16,3 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o dummy.o inode.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL) += seclvl.o diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f50fc298cf8..5a5ef5ca7ea 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual * capability rules */ - if (current->pid != 1) { + if (!is_init(current)) { current->cap_permitted = new_permitted; current->cap_effective = cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective); diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 58c6d399c84..aeee7056550 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -709,10 +709,10 @@ static int dummy_socket_create (int family, int type, return 0; } -static void dummy_socket_post_create (struct socket *sock, int family, int type, - int protocol, int kern) +static int dummy_socket_post_create (struct socket *sock, int family, int type, + int protocol, int kern) { - return; + return 0; } static int dummy_socket_bind (struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, @@ -805,14 +805,38 @@ static inline void dummy_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { } -static unsigned int dummy_sk_getsid(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir) +static inline void dummy_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) +{ +} + +static inline void dummy_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) +{ +} + +static inline void dummy_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent) +{ +} + +static inline int dummy_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { return 0; } + +static inline void dummy_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ +} + +static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, + struct flowi *fl) +{ +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM -static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct sock *sk) { return 0; } @@ -831,7 +855,8 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp) return 0; } -static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid) { return 0; } @@ -849,6 +874,23 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) { return 0; } + +static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl) +{ + return 1; +} + +static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm) +{ + return 1; +} + +static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall) +{ + return 0; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { @@ -1060,7 +1102,12 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsid); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sock_graft); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); @@ -1071,6 +1118,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc); diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 47eb63480da..9b16e14f3a8 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ static ssize_t default_write_file(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, static int default_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - if (inode->u.generic_ip) - file->private_data = inode->u.generic_ip; + if (inode->i_private) + file->private_data = inode->i_private; return 0; } @@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ static struct inode *get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode, dev_t dev) inode->i_mode = mode; inode->i_uid = 0; inode->i_gid = 0; - inode->i_blksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE; inode->i_blocks = 0; inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME; switch (mode & S_IFMT) { @@ -79,7 +78,7 @@ static struct inode *get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode, dev_t dev) inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */ - inode->i_nlink++; + inc_nlink(inode); break; } } @@ -112,7 +111,7 @@ static int mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) mode = (mode & (S_IRWXUGO | S_ISVTX)) | S_IFDIR; res = mknod(dir, dentry, mode, 0); if (!res) - dir->i_nlink++; + inc_nlink(dir); return res; } @@ -194,7 +193,7 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode, * directory dentry if set. If this paramater is NULL, then the * file will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem. * @data: a pointer to something that the caller will want to get to later - * on. The inode.u.generic_ip pointer will point to this value on + * on. The inode.i_private pointer will point to this value on * the open() call. * @fops: a pointer to a struct file_operations that should be used for * this file. @@ -240,7 +239,7 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode, if (fops) dentry->d_inode->i_fop = fops; if (data) - dentry->d_inode->u.generic_ip = data; + dentry->d_inode->i_private = data; } exit: return dentry; diff --git a/security/seclvl.c b/security/seclvl.c deleted file mode 100644 index c26dd7de047..00000000000 --- a/security/seclvl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,669 +0,0 @@ -/** - * BSD Secure Levels LSM - * - * Maintainers: - * Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us> - * Serge Hallyn <hallyn@cs.wm.edu> - * - * Copyright (c) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> - * Copyright (c) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> - * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <robb@austin.ibm.com> - * Copyright (c) 2006 Davi E. M. Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - */ - -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/moduleparam.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/netlink.h> -#include <linux/fs.h> -#include <linux/namei.h> -#include <linux/mount.h> -#include <linux/capability.h> -#include <linux/time.h> -#include <linux/proc_fs.h> -#include <linux/kobject.h> -#include <linux/crypto.h> -#include <asm/scatterlist.h> -#include <linux/scatterlist.h> -#include <linux/gfp.h> -#include <linux/sysfs.h> - -#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20 - -/** - * Module parameter that defines the initial secure level. - * - * When built as a module, it defaults to seclvl 1, which is the - * behavior of BSD secure levels. Note that this default behavior - * wrecks havoc on a machine when the seclvl module is compiled into - * the kernel. In that case, we default to seclvl 0. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL_MODULE -static int initlvl = 1; -#else -static int initlvl; -#endif -module_param(initlvl, int, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(initlvl, "Initial secure level (defaults to 1)"); - -/* Module parameter that defines the verbosity level */ -static int verbosity; -module_param(verbosity, int, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(verbosity, "Initial verbosity level (0 or 1; defaults to " - "0, which is Quiet)"); - -/** - * Optional password which can be passed in to bring seclvl to 0 - * (i.e., for halt/reboot). Defaults to NULL (the passwd attribute - * file will not be registered in sysfs). - * - * This gets converted to its SHA1 hash when stored. It's probably - * not a good idea to use this parameter when loading seclvl from a - * script; use sha1_passwd instead. - */ - -#define MAX_PASSWD_SIZE 32 -static char passwd[MAX_PASSWD_SIZE]; -module_param_string(passwd, passwd, sizeof(passwd), 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(passwd, - "Plaintext of password that sets seclvl=0 when written to " - "(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n"); - -/** - * SHA1 hashed version of the optional password which can be passed in - * to bring seclvl to 0 (i.e., for halt/reboot). Must be in - * hexadecimal format (40 characters). Defaults to NULL (the passwd - * attribute file will not be registered in sysfs). - * - * Use the sha1sum utility to generate the SHA1 hash of a password: - * - * echo -n "secret" | sha1sum - */ -#define MAX_SHA1_PASSWD 41 -static char sha1_passwd[MAX_SHA1_PASSWD]; -module_param_string(sha1_passwd, sha1_passwd, sizeof(sha1_passwd), 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(sha1_passwd, - "SHA1 hash (40 hexadecimal characters) of password that " - "sets seclvl=0 when plaintext password is written to " - "(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n"); - -static int hideHash = 1; -module_param(hideHash, int, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(hideHash, "When set to 0, reading seclvl/passwd from sysfs " - "will return the SHA1-hashed value of the password that " - "lowers the secure level to 0.\n"); - -#define MY_NAME "seclvl" - -/** - * This time-limits log writes to one per second. - */ -#define seclvl_printk(verb, type, fmt, arg...) \ - do { \ - if (verbosity >= verb) { \ - static unsigned long _prior; \ - unsigned long _now = jiffies; \ - if ((_now - _prior) > HZ) { \ - printk(type "%s: %s: " fmt, \ - MY_NAME, __FUNCTION__ , \ - ## arg); \ - _prior = _now; \ - } \ - } \ - } while (0) - -/** - * The actual security level. Ranges between -1 and 2 inclusive. - */ -static int seclvl; - -/** - * flag to keep track of how we were registered - */ -static int secondary; - -/** - * Verifies that the requested secure level is valid, given the current - * secure level. - */ -static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl) -{ - if ((reqlvl < -1) || (reqlvl > 2)) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to set seclvl out of " - "range: [%d]\n", reqlvl); - return -EINVAL; - } - if ((seclvl == 0) && (reqlvl == -1)) - return 0; - if (reqlvl < seclvl) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to lower seclvl to " - "[%d]\n", reqlvl); - return -EPERM; - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * security level advancement rules: - * Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive. - * From -1, stuck. [ in case compiled into kernel ] - * From 0 or above, can only increment. - */ -static void do_seclvl_advance(void *data, u64 val) -{ - int ret; - int newlvl = (int)val; - - ret = seclvl_sanity(newlvl); - if (ret) - return; - - if (newlvl > 2) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl " - "[%d]\n", newlvl); - return; - } - if (seclvl == -1) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Not allowed to advance to " - "seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl); - return; - } - seclvl = newlvl; /* would it be more "correct" to set *data? */ - return; -} - -static u64 seclvl_int_get(void *data) -{ - return *(int *)data; -} - -DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(seclvl_file_ops, seclvl_int_get, do_seclvl_advance, "%lld\n"); - -static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - -/** - * Converts a block of plaintext of into its SHA1 hashed value. - * - * It would be nice if crypto had a wrapper to do this for us linear - * people... - */ -static int -plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, unsigned int len) -{ - struct crypto_tfm *tfm; - struct scatterlist sg; - if (len > PAGE_SIZE) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Plaintext password too large (%d " - "characters). Largest possible is %lu " - "bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE); - return -EINVAL; - } - tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP); - if (tfm == NULL) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, - "Failed to load transform for SHA1\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - sg_init_one(&sg, (u8 *)plaintext, len); - crypto_digest_init(tfm); - crypto_digest_update(tfm, &sg, 1); - crypto_digest_final(tfm, hash); - crypto_free_tfm(tfm); - return 0; -} - -/** - * Called whenever the user writes to the sysfs passwd handle to this kernel - * object. It hashes the password and compares the hashed results. - */ -static ssize_t -passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) -{ - char *p; - int len; - unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - - if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the " - "seclvl module, but neither a plain text " - "password nor a SHA1 hashed password was " - "passed in as a module parameter! This is a " - "bug, since it should not be possible to be in " - "this part of the module; please tell a " - "maintainer about this event.\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - return -EINVAL; - p = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!p) - return -ENOMEM; - len = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(p, buf, count)) - goto out; - - len = count; - /* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */ - if (p[len - 1] == '\n') - len--; - /* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */ - if ((len = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, p, len))) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = " - "[%d]\n", len); - goto out; - } - - len = -EPERM; - if (memcmp(hashedPassword, tmp, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - goto out; - - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, - "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n"); - seclvl = 0; - len = count; - -out: - kfree (p); - return len; -} - -static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = { - .write = passwd_write_file, -}; - -/** - * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process. - */ -static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) -{ - if (seclvl >= 0 && child->pid == 1) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace " - "the init process dissallowed in " - "secure level %d\n", seclvl); - return -EPERM; - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * Capability checks for seclvl. The majority of the policy - * enforcement for seclvl takes place here. - */ -static int seclvl_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) -{ - int rc = 0; - - /* init can do anything it wants */ - if (tsk->pid == 1) - return 0; - - if (seclvl > 0) { - rc = -EPERM; - - if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to modify " - "the IMMUTABLE and/or APPEND extended " - "attribute on a file with the IMMUTABLE " - "and/or APPEND extended attribute set " - "denied in seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl); - else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform " - "raw I/O while in secure level [%d] " - "denied\n", seclvl); - else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform " - "network administrative task while " - "in secure level [%d] denied\n", seclvl); - else if (cap == CAP_SETUID) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setuid " - "while in secure level [%d] denied\n", - seclvl); - else if (cap == CAP_SETGID) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setgid " - "while in secure level [%d] denied\n", - seclvl); - else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform " - "a module operation while in secure " - "level [%d] denied\n", seclvl); - else - rc = 0; - } - - if (!rc) { - if (!(cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0)) - rc = -EPERM; - } - - if (rc) - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n"); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * Disallow reversing the clock in seclvl > 1 - */ -static int seclvl_settime(struct timespec *tv, struct timezone *tz) -{ - if (tv && seclvl > 1) { - struct timespec now; - now = current_kernel_time(); - if (tv->tv_sec < now.tv_sec || - (tv->tv_sec == now.tv_sec && tv->tv_nsec < now.tv_nsec)) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to decrement " - "time in secure level %d denied: " - "current->pid = [%d], " - "current->group_leader->pid = [%d]\n", - seclvl, current->pid, - current->group_leader->pid); - return -EPERM; - } /* if attempt to decrement time */ - } /* if seclvl > 1 */ - return 0; -} - -/* claim the blockdev to exclude mounters, release on file close */ -static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct inode *inode) -{ - int holder; - struct block_device *bdev = NULL; - dev_t dev = inode->i_rdev; - bdev = open_by_devnum(dev, FMODE_WRITE); - if (bdev) { - if (bd_claim(bdev, &holder)) { - blkdev_put(bdev); - return -EPERM; - } - /* claimed, mark it to release on close */ - inode->i_security = current; - } - return 0; -} - -/* release the blockdev if you claimed it */ -static void seclvl_bd_release(struct inode *inode) -{ - if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_security == current) { - struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_bdev; - if (bdev) { - bd_release(bdev); - blkdev_put(bdev); - inode->i_security = NULL; - } - } -} - -/** - * Security for writes to block devices is regulated by this seclvl - * function. Deny all writes to block devices in seclvl 2. In - * seclvl 1, we only deny writes to *mounted* block devices. - */ -static int -seclvl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) -{ - if (current->pid != 1 && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) { - switch (seclvl) { - case 2: - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Write to block device " - "denied in secure level [%d]\n", seclvl); - return -EPERM; - case 1: - if (seclvl_bd_claim(inode)) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, - "Write to mounted block device " - "denied in secure level [%d]\n", - seclvl); - return -EPERM; - } - } - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * The SUID and SGID bits cannot be set in seclvl >= 1 - */ -static int seclvl_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) -{ - if (seclvl > 0) { - if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) - if (iattr->ia_mode & S_ISUID || - iattr->ia_mode & S_ISGID) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to " - "modify SUID or SGID bit " - "denied in seclvl [%d]\n", - seclvl); - return -EPERM; - } - } - return 0; -} - -/* release busied block devices */ -static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp) -{ - struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry; - - if (dentry) - seclvl_bd_release(dentry->d_inode); -} - -/** - * Cannot unmount in secure level 2 - */ -static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -{ - if (current->pid != 1 && seclvl == 2) { - seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to unmount in secure " - "level %d\n", seclvl); - return -EPERM; - } - return 0; -} - -static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = { - .ptrace = seclvl_ptrace, - .capable = seclvl_capable, - .inode_permission = seclvl_inode_permission, - .inode_setattr = seclvl_inode_setattr, - .file_free_security = seclvl_file_free_security, - .settime = seclvl_settime, - .sb_umount = seclvl_umount, -}; - -/** - * Process the password-related module parameters - */ -static int processPassword(void) -{ - int rc = 0; - if (*passwd) { - char *p; - - if (*sha1_passwd) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: Both " - "passwd and sha1_passwd " - "were set, but they are mutually " - "exclusive.\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - p = kstrdup(passwd, GFP_KERNEL); - if (p == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - - if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, p, strlen(p)))) - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: SHA1 support not " - "in kernel\n"); - - kfree (p); - /* All static data goes to the BSS, which zero's the - * plaintext password out for us. */ - } else if (*sha1_passwd) { // Base 16 - int i; - i = strlen(sha1_passwd); - if (i != (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2)) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Received [%d] bytes; " - "expected [%d] for the hexadecimal " - "representation of the SHA1 hash of " - "the password.\n", - i, (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2)); - return -EINVAL; - } - while ((i -= 2) + 2) { - unsigned char tmp; - tmp = sha1_passwd[i + 2]; - sha1_passwd[i + 2] = '\0'; - hashedPassword[i / 2] = (unsigned char) - simple_strtol(&sha1_passwd[i], NULL, 16); - sha1_passwd[i + 2] = tmp; - } - } - return rc; -} - -/** - * securityfs registrations - */ -struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino; - -static int seclvlfs_register(void) -{ - int rc = 0; - - dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL); - - if (IS_ERR(dir_ino)) - return PTR_ERR(dir_ino); - - seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, - dir_ino, &seclvl, &seclvl_file_ops); - if (IS_ERR(seclvl_ino)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(seclvl_ino); - goto out_deldir; - } - if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) { - passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, - dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops); - if (IS_ERR(passwd_ino)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(passwd_ino); - goto out_delf; - } - } - return rc; - -out_delf: - securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino); - -out_deldir: - securityfs_remove(dir_ino); - - return rc; -} - -static void seclvlfs_unregister(void) -{ - securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino); - - if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) - securityfs_remove(passwd_ino); - - securityfs_remove(dir_ino); -} - -/** - * Initialize the seclvl module. - */ -static int __init seclvl_init(void) -{ - int rc = 0; - static char once; - - if (verbosity < 0 || verbosity > 1) { - printk(KERN_ERR "Error: bad verbosity [%d]; only 0 or 1 " - "are valid values\n", verbosity); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto exit; - } - if (initlvl < -1 || initlvl > 2) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: bad initial securelevel " - "[%d].\n", initlvl); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto exit; - } - seclvl = initlvl; - if ((rc = processPassword())) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error processing the password " - "module parameter(s): rc = [%d]\n", rc); - goto exit; - } - - if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n"); - goto exit; - } - /* register ourselves with the security framework */ - if (register_security(&seclvl_ops)) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, - "seclvl: Failure registering with the " - "kernel.\n"); - /* try registering with primary module */ - rc = mod_reg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops); - if (rc) { - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "seclvl: Failure " - "registering with primary security " - "module.\n"); - seclvlfs_unregister(); - goto exit; - } /* if primary module registered */ - secondary = 1; - } /* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */ - - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl: Successfully initialized.\n"); - - if (once) { - once = 1; - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl is going away. It has been " - "buggy for ages. Also, be warned that " - "Securelevels are useless."); - } - exit: - if (rc) - printk(KERN_ERR "seclvl: Error during initialization: rc = " - "[%d]\n", rc); - return rc; -} - -/** - * Remove the seclvl module. - */ -static void __exit seclvl_exit(void) -{ - seclvlfs_unregister(); - - if (secondary) - mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops); - else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) - seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, - "seclvl: Failure unregistering with the " - "kernel\n"); -} - -module_init(seclvl_init); -module_exit(seclvl_exit); - -MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us>"); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LSM implementation of the BSD Secure Levels"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index 814ddc42f1f..293dbd6246c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -124,3 +124,40 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT If you are unsure what do do here, select N. +config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX + bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + default n + help + This option enables the maximum policy format version supported + by SELinux to be set to a particular value. This value is reported + to userspace via /selinux/policyvers and used at policy load time. + It can be adjusted downward to support legacy userland (init) that + does not correctly handle kernels that support newer policy versions. + + Examples: + For the Fedora Core 3 or 4 Linux distributions, enable this option + and set the value via the next option. For Fedore Core 5 and later, + do not enable this option. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE + int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX + range 15 21 + default 19 + help + This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version + supported by SELinux. + + Examples: + For Fedora Core 3, use 18. + For Fedora Core 4, use 19. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, look for the + policy format version supported by your policy toolchain, by + running 'checkpolicy -V'. Or look at what policy you have + installed under /etc/selinux/$SELINUXTYPE/policy, where + SELINUXTYPE is defined in your /etc/selinux/config. + diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c index 9d7737db5e5..b6f96943be1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/exports.c +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c @@ -21,19 +21,10 @@ #include "security.h" #include "objsec.h" -void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid) +int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; if (selinux_enabled) - *ctxid = tsec->sid; - else - *ctxid = 0; -} - -int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) - return security_sid_to_context(ctxid, ctx, ctxlen); + return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen); else { *ctx = NULL; *ctxlen = 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5d1b8c73319..e9969a2fc84 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com> * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, @@ -49,7 +51,6 @@ #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ #include <asm/uaccess.h> -#include <asm/semaphore.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> @@ -69,11 +70,13 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/selinux.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" #include "xfrm.h" +#include "selinux_netlabel.h" #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX @@ -182,7 +185,7 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) return -ENOMEM; memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec)); - init_MUTEX(&isec->sem); + mutex_init(&isec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); isec->inode = inode; isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; @@ -239,7 +242,7 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) if (!sbsec) return -ENOMEM; - init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem); + mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); @@ -269,17 +272,17 @@ static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { struct sk_security_struct *ssec; - if (family != PF_UNIX) - return 0; - ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority); if (!ssec) return -ENOMEM; ssec->sk = sk; ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sk->sk_security = ssec; + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family); + return 0; } @@ -287,9 +290,6 @@ static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; - if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) - return; - sk->sk_security = NULL; kfree(ssec); } @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) /* Standard string-based options. */ char *p, *options = data; - while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) { + while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { int token; substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; @@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; int rc = 0; - down(&sbsec->sem); + mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); if (sbsec->initialized) goto out; @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ next_inode: } spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); out: - up(&sbsec->sem); + mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); return rc; } @@ -843,15 +843,13 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent char *context = NULL; unsigned len = 0; int rc = 0; - int hold_sem = 0; if (isec->initialized) goto out; - down(&isec->sem); - hold_sem = 1; + mutex_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!sbsec->initialized) { @@ -862,7 +860,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent if (list_empty(&isec->list)) list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } switch (sbsec->behavior) { @@ -885,7 +883,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s " "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } len = INITCONTEXTLEN; @@ -893,7 +891,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); @@ -903,7 +901,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent NULL, 0); if (rc < 0) { dput(dentry); - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } kfree(context); len = rc; @@ -911,7 +909,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, @@ -924,7 +922,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); kfree(context); - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ sid = sbsec->def_sid; @@ -960,7 +958,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: @@ -978,7 +976,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } @@ -987,12 +985,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->initialized = 1; +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); out: if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - - if (hold_sem) - up(&isec->sem); return rc; } @@ -1364,25 +1361,6 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) return av; } -/* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */ -static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid) -{ - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; - - if (!sbsec->initialized) { - /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ - return 0; - } - - down(&isec->sem); - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - isec->sid = sid; - isec->initialized = 1; - up(&isec->sem); - return 0; -} - /* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) @@ -1711,10 +1689,12 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) { struct avc_audit_data ad; struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; - struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty; + struct tty_struct *tty; struct fdtable *fdt; long j = -1; + mutex_lock(&tty_mutex); + tty = current->signal->tty; if (tty) { file_list_lock(); file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); @@ -1734,6 +1714,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) } file_list_unlock(); } + mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ @@ -1942,18 +1923,40 @@ static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) if (!*first) { **to = ','; *to += 1; - } - else + } else *first = 0; memcpy(*to, from, len); *to += len; } +static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, + int len) +{ + int current_size = 0; + + if (!*first) { + **to = '|'; + *to += 1; + } + else + *first = 0; + + while (current_size < len) { + if (*from != '"') { + **to = *from; + *to += 1; + } + from += 1; + current_size += 1; + } +} + static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy) { int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; + int open_quote = 0; in_curr = orig; sec_curr = copy; @@ -1975,11 +1978,14 @@ static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void in_save = in_end = orig; do { - if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') { + if (*in_end == '"') + open_quote = !open_quote; + if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) || + *in_end == '\0') { int len = in_end - in_curr; if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) - take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); + take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); else take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); @@ -2091,7 +2097,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } } - inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid); + /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ + if (sbsec->initialized) { + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + isec->sid = newsid; + isec->initialized = 1; + } if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -2400,6 +2412,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { + int rc; struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; if (!mask) { @@ -2411,8 +2424,12 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) mask |= MAY_APPEND; - return file_has_perm(current, file, - file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); + rc = file_has_perm(current, file, + file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask); } static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) @@ -3063,11 +3080,13 @@ out: return err; } -static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, - int type, int protocol, int kern) +static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) { + int err = 0; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u32 newsid; isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; @@ -3078,7 +3097,15 @@ static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid; isec->initialized = 1; - return; + if (sock->sk) { + sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + sksec->sid = isec->sid; + err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock, + family, + isec->sid); + } + + return err; } /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. @@ -3259,7 +3286,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE); } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, @@ -3327,8 +3360,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, /* server child socket */ ssec = newsk->sk_security; ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; - - return 0; + err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid); + + return err; } static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, @@ -3354,11 +3388,29 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, } static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct avc_audit_data *ad, u32 sock_sid, u16 sock_class, - u16 family, char *addrp, int len) + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len) { int err = 0; u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0; + struct socket *sock; + u16 sock_class = 0; + u32 sock_sid = 0; + + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + sock = sk->sk_socket; + if (sock) { + struct inode *inode; + inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); + if (inode) { + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + isec = inode->i_security; + sock_sid = isec->sid; + sock_class = isec->sclass; + } + } + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + if (!sock_sid) + goto out; if (!skb->dev) goto out; @@ -3418,12 +3470,10 @@ out: static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family; - u16 sock_class = 0; char *addrp; int len, err = 0; - u32 sock_sid = 0; - struct socket *sock; struct avc_audit_data ad; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; family = sk->sk_family; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) @@ -3433,22 +3483,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; - read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - sock = sk->sk_socket; - if (sock) { - struct inode *inode; - inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); - if (inode) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec; - isec = inode->i_security; - sock_sid = isec->sid; - sock_class = isec->sclass; - } - } - read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (!sock_sid) - goto out; - AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]"; ad.u.net.family = family; @@ -3458,16 +3492,19 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) goto out; if (selinux_compat_net) - err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, sock_sid, - sock_class, family, + err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, addrp, len); else - err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) goto out; - err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb); + err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); out: return err; } @@ -3490,8 +3527,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; } else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { - peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk); - + peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock); + if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) + peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk); if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { err = -ENOPROTOOPT; goto out; @@ -3531,8 +3569,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff * if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)) selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); - else if (skb) - peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb); + else if (skb) { + peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb); + if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) + peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb); + } if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) err = -EINVAL; @@ -3551,22 +3592,88 @@ static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) sk_free_security(sk); } -static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir) +static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec; - u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security; + + newssec->sid = ssec->sid; + newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; + selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec); +} + +static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) +{ if (!sk) - return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl); + *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; + else { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + + *secid = sksec->sid; + } +} + +static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + + if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || + sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + isec->sid = sksec->sid; + + selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent); +} + +static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + int err; + u32 newsid; + u32 peersid; + + newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid); + if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) { + req->secid = newsid; + return 0; + } + + err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0); + BUG_ON(err); - read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - isec = get_sock_isec(sk); + if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { + req->secid = sksec->sid; + return 0; + } - if (isec) - sock_sid = isec->sid; + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); + if (err) + return err; - read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - return sock_sid; + req->secid = newsid; + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + + newsksec->sid = req->secid; + /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the + new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. + So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which + time it will have been created and available. */ + + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family); +} + +static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, + struct flowi *fl) +{ + fl->secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -3608,12 +3715,24 @@ out: #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev, - struct inode_security_struct *isec, struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len) { - int err; + int err = 0; u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0; + struct socket *sock; + struct inode *inode; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + + sock = sk->sk_socket; + if (!sock) + goto out; + + inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); + if (!inode) + goto out; + + isec = inode->i_security; err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); if (err) @@ -3678,26 +3797,16 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, char *addrp; int len, err = 0; struct sock *sk; - struct socket *sock; - struct inode *inode; struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct avc_audit_data ad; struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sk = skb->sk; if (!sk) goto out; - sock = sk->sk_socket; - if (!sock) - goto out; - - inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); - if (!inode) - goto out; - - isec = inode->i_security; + sksec = sk->sk_security; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; @@ -3708,16 +3817,16 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, goto out; if (selinux_compat_net) - err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, isec, &ad, + err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad, family, addrp, len); else - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad); if (err) goto out; - err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb); + err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); out: return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; } @@ -4618,7 +4727,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram, .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, - .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security, + .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security, + .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid, + .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, + .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, + .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, + .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, @@ -4629,6 +4743,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, + .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, + .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match, + .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h index 7c9b5838083..09fc8a2345e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto") S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom") S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext") + S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, "polmatch") S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send") S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv") S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index 69fd4b48202..81f4f526c8b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -911,6 +911,7 @@ #define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO 0x00000001UL #define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM 0x00000002UL #define ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT 0x00000004UL +#define ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH 0x00000008UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 940178865fc..ef2267fea8b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct inode_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ - struct semaphore sem; + struct mutex lock; unsigned char inherit; /* inherit SID from parent entry */ }; @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct { unsigned int behavior; /* labeling behavior */ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ unsigned char proc; /* proc fs */ - struct semaphore sem; + struct mutex lock; struct list_head isec_head; spinlock_t isec_lock; }; @@ -99,7 +99,16 @@ struct netif_security_struct { struct sk_security_struct { struct sock *sk; /* back pointer to sk object */ + u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */ +#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL + u16 sclass; /* sock security class */ + enum { /* NetLabel state */ + NLBL_UNSET = 0, + NLBL_REQUIRE, + NLBL_LABELED, + } nlbl_state; +#endif }; struct key_security_struct { diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 063af47bb23..1ef79172cc8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -24,10 +24,15 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS 19 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS 19 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB 20 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE +#else +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS +#endif extern int selinux_enabled; extern int selinux_mls_enabled; @@ -78,6 +83,8 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen, int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 tclass); +int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid); + #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK 3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ecab4bddaaf --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/selinux_netlabel.h @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * SELinux interface to the NetLabel subsystem + * + * Author : Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + */ + +/* + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006 + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See + * the GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + * + */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_ +#define _SELINUX_NETLABEL_H_ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <net/sock.h> + +#include "avc.h" +#include "objsec.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL +void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void); +int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, + int sock_family, + u32 sid); +void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock); +u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid); +int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad); +u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock); +u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb); +void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, + int family); +void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, + struct sk_security_struct *newssec); +int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); +#else +static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void) +{ + return; +} + +static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, + int sock_family, + u32 sid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, + struct socket *sock) +{ + return; +} + +static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 sock_sid) +{ + return SECSID_NULL; +} + +static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock) +{ + return SECSID_NULL; +} + +static inline u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return SECSID_NULL; +} + +static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init( + struct sk_security_struct *ssec, + int family) +{ + return; +} + +static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security( + struct sk_security_struct *ssec, + struct sk_security_struct *newssec) +{ + return; +} + +static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, + int mask) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ + +#endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index c96498a10eb..81eb5989016 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -2,18 +2,25 @@ * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks * * Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com> + * Updated : Venkat Yekkirala, <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> */ #ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ #define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct sock *sk); int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new); void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp); int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp); -int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid); void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); -int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir); +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); +int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl); +int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm); + /* * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket) @@ -26,30 +33,23 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk) return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security; } - -static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl) -{ - /* NOTE: no sock occurs on ICMP reply, forwards, ... */ - /* icmp_reply: authorize as kernel packet */ - if (fl && fl->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) { - return SECINITSID_KERNEL; - } - - return SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM -int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb); -int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb); +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad); +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad); u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk); u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb); +int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); #else -static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) { return 0; } -static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) { return 0; } @@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb) { return SECSID_NULL; } +static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; +} #endif #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 00534c302ba..cd244419c98 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -771,7 +771,6 @@ static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode) if (ret) { ret->i_mode = mode; ret->i_uid = ret->i_gid = 0; - ret->i_blksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE; ret->i_blocks = 0; ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME; } @@ -1254,10 +1253,10 @@ static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */ - inode->i_nlink++; + inc_nlink(inode); d_add(dentry, inode); /* bump link count on parent directory, too */ - dir->i_nlink++; + inc_nlink(dir); out: return ret; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 47024a6e184..cfed1d30fa6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -3,6 +3,14 @@ * * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> */ +/* + * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * Added ebitmap_export() and ebitmap_import() + * + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006 + */ + #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/errno.h> @@ -59,6 +67,138 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src) return 0; } +/** + * ebitmap_export - Export an ebitmap to a unsigned char bitmap string + * @src: the ebitmap to export + * @dst: the resulting bitmap string + * @dst_len: length of dst in bytes + * + * Description: + * Allocate a buffer at least src->highbit bits long and export the extensible + * bitmap into the buffer. The bitmap string will be in little endian format, + * i.e. LSB first. The value returned in dst_len may not the true size of the + * buffer as the length of the buffer is rounded up to a multiple of MAPTYPE. + * The caller must free the buffer when finished. Returns zero on success, + * negative values on failure. + * + */ +int ebitmap_export(const struct ebitmap *src, + unsigned char **dst, + size_t *dst_len) +{ + size_t bitmap_len; + unsigned char *bitmap; + struct ebitmap_node *iter_node; + MAPTYPE node_val; + size_t bitmap_byte; + unsigned char bitmask; + + bitmap_len = src->highbit / 8; + if (src->highbit % 7) + bitmap_len += 1; + if (bitmap_len == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + bitmap = kzalloc((bitmap_len & ~(sizeof(MAPTYPE) - 1)) + + sizeof(MAPTYPE), + GFP_ATOMIC); + if (bitmap == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + iter_node = src->node; + do { + bitmap_byte = iter_node->startbit / 8; + bitmask = 0x80; + node_val = iter_node->map; + do { + if (bitmask == 0) { + bitmap_byte++; + bitmask = 0x80; + } + if (node_val & (MAPTYPE)0x01) + bitmap[bitmap_byte] |= bitmask; + node_val >>= 1; + bitmask >>= 1; + } while (node_val > 0); + iter_node = iter_node->next; + } while (iter_node); + + *dst = bitmap; + *dst_len = bitmap_len; + return 0; +} + +/** + * ebitmap_import - Import an unsigned char bitmap string into an ebitmap + * @src: the bitmap string + * @src_len: the bitmap length in bytes + * @dst: the empty ebitmap + * + * Description: + * This function takes a little endian bitmap string in src and imports it into + * the ebitmap pointed to by dst. Returns zero on success, negative values on + * failure. + * + */ +int ebitmap_import(const unsigned char *src, + size_t src_len, + struct ebitmap *dst) +{ + size_t src_off = 0; + size_t node_limit; + struct ebitmap_node *node_new; + struct ebitmap_node *node_last = NULL; + u32 i_byte; + u32 i_bit; + unsigned char src_byte; + + while (src_off < src_len) { + if (src_len - src_off >= sizeof(MAPTYPE)) { + if (*(MAPTYPE *)&src[src_off] == 0) { + src_off += sizeof(MAPTYPE); + continue; + } + node_limit = sizeof(MAPTYPE); + } else { + for (src_byte = 0, i_byte = src_off; + i_byte < src_len && src_byte == 0; + i_byte++) + src_byte |= src[i_byte]; + if (src_byte == 0) + break; + node_limit = src_len - src_off; + } + + node_new = kzalloc(sizeof(*node_new), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(node_new == NULL)) { + ebitmap_destroy(dst); + return -ENOMEM; + } + node_new->startbit = src_off * 8; + for (i_byte = 0; i_byte < node_limit; i_byte++) { + src_byte = src[src_off++]; + for (i_bit = i_byte * 8; src_byte != 0; i_bit++) { + if (src_byte & 0x80) + node_new->map |= MAPBIT << i_bit; + src_byte <<= 1; + } + } + + if (node_last != NULL) + node_last->next = node_new; + else + dst->node = node_new; + node_last = node_new; + } + + if (likely(node_last != NULL)) + dst->highbit = node_last->startbit + MAPSIZE; + else + ebitmap_init(dst); + + return 0; +} + int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2) { struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 8bf41055a6c..da2d4651b10 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node * n, int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src); +int ebitmap_export(const struct ebitmap *src, + unsigned char **dst, + size_t *dst_len); +int ebitmap_import(const unsigned char *src, + size_t src_len, + struct ebitmap *dst); int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit); int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 7bc5b6440f7..c713af23250 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -10,6 +10,13 @@ * * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. */ +/* + * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * Added support to import/export the MLS label + * + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006 + */ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -212,26 +219,6 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c) } /* - * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'. - */ -static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst, - struct context *src) -{ - int l, rc = 0; - - /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */ - for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { - dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens; - rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat, - &src->range.level[l].cat); - if (rc) - break; - } - - return rc; -} - -/* * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure * `context' based on the string representation in * the string `*scontext'. Update `*scontext' to @@ -543,22 +530,21 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, u32 specified, struct context *newcontext) { + struct range_trans *rtr; + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) return 0; switch (specified) { case AVTAB_TRANSITION: - if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS) { - struct range_trans *rangetr; - /* Look for a range transition rule. */ - for (rangetr = policydb.range_tr; rangetr; - rangetr = rangetr->next) { - if (rangetr->dom == scontext->type && - rangetr->type == tcontext->type) { - /* Set the range from the rule */ - return mls_range_set(newcontext, - &rangetr->range); - } + /* Look for a range transition rule. */ + for (rtr = policydb.range_tr; rtr; rtr = rtr->next) { + if (rtr->source_type == scontext->type && + rtr->target_type == tcontext->type && + rtr->target_class == tclass) { + /* Set the range from the rule */ + return mls_range_set(newcontext, + &rtr->target_range); } } /* Fallthrough */ @@ -585,3 +571,152 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, return -EINVAL; } +/** + * mls_export_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels + * @context: the security context + * @low: the low sensitivity level + * @high: the high sensitivity level + * + * Description: + * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into lvl_low + * and the high sensitivity level in lvl_high. The MLS levels are only + * exported if the pointers are not NULL, if they are NULL then that level is + * not exported. + * + */ +void mls_export_lvl(const struct context *context, u32 *low, u32 *high) +{ + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) + return; + + if (low != NULL) + *low = context->range.level[0].sens - 1; + if (high != NULL) + *high = context->range.level[1].sens - 1; +} + +/** + * mls_import_lvl - Import the MLS sensitivity levels + * @context: the security context + * @low: the low sensitivity level + * @high: the high sensitivity level + * + * Description: + * Given the security context and the two sensitivty levels, set the MLS levels + * in the context according the two given as parameters. Returns zero on + * success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +void mls_import_lvl(struct context *context, u32 low, u32 high) +{ + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) + return; + + context->range.level[0].sens = low + 1; + context->range.level[1].sens = high + 1; +} + +/** + * mls_export_cat - Export the MLS categories + * @context: the security context + * @low: the low category + * @low_len: length of the cat_low bitmap in bytes + * @high: the high category + * @high_len: length of the cat_high bitmap in bytes + * + * Description: + * Given the security context export the low MLS category bitmap into cat_low + * and the high category bitmap into cat_high. The MLS categories are only + * exported if the pointers are not NULL, if they are NULL then that level is + * not exported. The caller is responsibile for freeing the memory when + * finished. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +int mls_export_cat(const struct context *context, + unsigned char **low, + size_t *low_len, + unsigned char **high, + size_t *high_len) +{ + int rc = -EPERM; + + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) + return 0; + + if (low != NULL) { + rc = ebitmap_export(&context->range.level[0].cat, + low, + low_len); + if (rc != 0) + goto export_cat_failure; + } + if (high != NULL) { + rc = ebitmap_export(&context->range.level[1].cat, + high, + high_len); + if (rc != 0) + goto export_cat_failure; + } + + return 0; + +export_cat_failure: + if (low != NULL) + kfree(*low); + if (high != NULL) + kfree(*high); + return rc; +} + +/** + * mls_import_cat - Import the MLS categories + * @context: the security context + * @low: the low category + * @low_len: length of the cat_low bitmap in bytes + * @high: the high category + * @high_len: length of the cat_high bitmap in bytes + * + * Description: + * Given the security context and the two category bitmap strings import the + * categories into the security context. The MLS categories are only imported + * if the pointers are not NULL, if they are NULL they are skipped. Returns + * zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +int mls_import_cat(struct context *context, + const unsigned char *low, + size_t low_len, + const unsigned char *high, + size_t high_len) +{ + int rc = -EPERM; + + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) + return 0; + + if (low != NULL) { + rc = ebitmap_import(low, + low_len, + &context->range.level[0].cat); + if (rc != 0) + goto import_cat_failure; + } + if (high != NULL) { + if (high == low) + rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, + &context->range.level[0].cat); + else + rc = ebitmap_import(high, + high_len, + &context->range.level[1].cat); + if (rc != 0) + goto import_cat_failure; + } + + return 0; + +import_cat_failure: + ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat); + ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[1].cat); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index fbb42f07dd7..df6032c6d49 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -10,6 +10,13 @@ * * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. */ +/* + * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * Added support to import/export the MLS label + * + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006 + */ #ifndef _SS_MLS_H_ #define _SS_MLS_H_ @@ -17,6 +24,26 @@ #include "context.h" #include "policydb.h" +/* + * Copies the MLS range from `src' into `dst'. + */ +static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst, + struct context *src) +{ + int l, rc = 0; + + /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */ + for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { + dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens; + rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat, + &src->range.level[l].cat); + if (rc) + break; + } + + return rc; +} + int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context); void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext); int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c); @@ -42,5 +69,19 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon); +void mls_export_lvl(const struct context *context, u32 *low, u32 *high); +void mls_import_lvl(struct context *context, u32 low, u32 high); + +int mls_export_cat(const struct context *context, + unsigned char **low, + size_t *low_len, + unsigned char **high, + size_t *high_len); +int mls_import_cat(struct context *context, + const unsigned char *low, + size_t low_len, + const unsigned char *high, + size_t high_len); + #endif /* _SS_MLS_H */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index f03960e697c..b1889530255 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) @@ -645,15 +650,15 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next) { if (lrt) { - ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->range.level[0].cat); - ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->range.level[1].cat); + ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat); + ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat); kfree(lrt); } lrt = rt; } if (lrt) { - ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->range.level[0].cat); - ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->range.level[1].cat); + ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat); + ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat); kfree(lrt); } @@ -1829,6 +1834,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) } if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) { + int new_rangetr = p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc < 0) goto bad; @@ -1847,9 +1853,16 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2)); if (rc < 0) goto bad; - rt->dom = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - rt->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); - rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->range, fp); + rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + if (new_rangetr) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc < 0) + goto bad; + rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + } else + rt->target_class = SECCLASS_PROCESS; + rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->target_range, fp); if (rc) goto bad; lrt = rt; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index b1340711f72..8319d5ff594 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ struct cat_datum { }; struct range_trans { - u32 dom; /* current process domain */ - u32 type; /* program executable type */ - struct mls_range range; /* new range */ + u32 source_type; + u32 target_type; + u32 target_class; + struct mls_range target_range; struct range_trans *next; }; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 85e42988439..0c219a1b324 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ * * Added conditional policy language extensions * + * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * Added support for NetLabel + * + * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> @@ -29,6 +34,8 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <net/netlabel.h> #include "flask.h" #include "avc.h" @@ -40,6 +47,8 @@ #include "services.h" #include "conditional.h" #include "mls.h" +#include "objsec.h" +#include "selinux_netlabel.h" extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; @@ -1241,6 +1250,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) selinux_complete_init(); avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); + selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); return 0; } @@ -1295,6 +1305,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); + selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); return 0; @@ -1817,6 +1828,75 @@ out: return rc; } +/* + * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given + * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid. + */ +int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) +{ + struct context *context1; + struct context *context2; + struct context newcon; + char *s; + u32 len; + int rc = 0; + + if (!ss_initialized || !selinux_mls_enabled) { + *new_sid = sid; + goto out; + } + + context_init(&newcon); + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + if (!context1) { + printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID " + "%d\n", sid); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } + + context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid); + if (!context2) { + printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID " + "%d\n", mls_sid); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } + + newcon.user = context1->user; + newcon.role = context1->role; + newcon.type = context1->type; + rc = mls_copy_context(&newcon, context2); + if (rc) + goto out_unlock; + + + /* Check the validity of the new context. */ + if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) { + rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon); + if (rc) + goto bad; + } + + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid); + goto out_unlock; + +bad: + if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) { + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, + "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s); + kfree(s); + } + +out_unlock: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + context_destroy(&newcon); +out: + return rc; +} + struct selinux_audit_rule { u32 au_seqno; struct context au_ctxt; @@ -1923,7 +2003,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return rc; } -int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, struct selinux_audit_rule *rule, struct audit_context *actx) { @@ -1946,11 +2026,11 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op, goto out; } - ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ctxid); + ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); if (!ctxt) { audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", - ctxid); + sid); match = -ENOENT; goto out; } @@ -2064,3 +2144,546 @@ void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) { aurule_callback = callback; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL +/* + * This is the structure we store inside the NetLabel cache block. + */ +#define NETLBL_CACHE(x) ((struct netlbl_cache *)(x)) +#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_NONE 0 +#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID 1 +#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS 2 +struct netlbl_cache { + u32 type; + union { + u32 sid; + struct mls_range mls_label; + } data; +}; + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_cache_free - Free the NetLabel cached data + * @data: the data to free + * + * Description: + * This function is intended to be used as the free() callback inside the + * netlbl_lsm_cache structure. + * + */ +static void selinux_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data) +{ + struct netlbl_cache *cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data); + switch (cache->type) { + case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS: + ebitmap_destroy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat); + break; + } + kfree(data); +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache + * @skb: the packet + * @ctx: the SELinux context + * + * Description: + * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in + * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. + * + */ +static void selinux_netlbl_cache_add(struct sk_buff *skb, struct context *ctx) +{ + struct netlbl_cache *cache = NULL; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + + cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (cache == NULL) + goto netlbl_cache_add_failure; + secattr.cache.free = selinux_netlbl_cache_free; + secattr.cache.data = (void *)cache; + + cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS; + if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat, + &ctx->range.level[0].cat) != 0) + goto netlbl_cache_add_failure; + cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit = + cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit; + cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node = + cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node; + cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens; + cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens; + + if (netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr) != 0) + goto netlbl_cache_add_failure; + + return; + +netlbl_cache_add_failure: + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 1); +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache + * + * Description: + * Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache. + * + */ +void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void) +{ + netlbl_cache_invalidate(); +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID + * @skb: the network packet + * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes + * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes + * @sid: the SELinux SID + * + * Description: + * Convert the given NetLabel packet security attributes in @secattr into a + * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux + * SID/context then use the context in @base_sid as the foundation. If @skb + * is not NULL attempt to cache as much data as possibile. Returns zero on + * success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, + u32 base_sid, + u32 *sid) +{ + int rc = -EIDRM; + struct context *ctx; + struct context ctx_new; + struct netlbl_cache *cache; + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + + if (secattr->cache.data) { + cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache.data); + switch (cache->type) { + case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID: + *sid = cache->data.sid; + rc = 0; + break; + case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS: + ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; + + ctx_new.user = ctx->user; + ctx_new.role = ctx->role; + ctx_new.type = ctx->type; + ctx_new.range.level[0].sens = + cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens; + ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit = + cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit; + ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node = + cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node; + ctx_new.range.level[1].sens = + cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens; + ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit = + cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit; + ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node = + cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node; + + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid); + break; + default: + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; + } + } else if (secattr->mls_lvl_vld) { + ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; + + ctx_new.user = ctx->user; + ctx_new.role = ctx->role; + ctx_new.type = ctx->type; + mls_import_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr->mls_lvl, secattr->mls_lvl); + if (secattr->mls_cat) { + if (mls_import_cat(&ctx_new, + secattr->mls_cat, + secattr->mls_cat_len, + NULL, + 0) != 0) + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; + ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit = + ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit; + ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node = + ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node; + } else { + ebitmap_init(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); + ebitmap_init(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat); + } + if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1) + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup; + + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid); + if (rc != 0) + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup; + + if (skb != NULL) + selinux_netlbl_cache_add(skb, &ctx_new); + ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); + } else { + *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + rc = 0; + } + +netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + return rc; +netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup: + ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); + goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel + * @skb: the packet + * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes + * @sid: the SID + * + * Description: + * Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given + * packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to + * assign to the packet. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 base_sid, + u32 *sid) +{ + int rc; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) + rc = selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(skb, + &secattr, + base_sid, + sid); + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism + * @sock: the socket to label + * @sid: the SID to use + * + * Description: + * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given + * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(struct socket *sock, u32 sid) +{ + int rc = -ENOENT; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + struct context *ctx; + + if (!ss_initialized) + return 0; + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + + ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto netlbl_socket_setsid_return; + + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + secattr.domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1], + GFP_ATOMIC); + mls_export_lvl(ctx, &secattr.mls_lvl, NULL); + secattr.mls_lvl_vld = 1; + mls_export_cat(ctx, + &secattr.mls_cat, + &secattr.mls_cat_len, + NULL, + NULL); + + rc = netlbl_socket_setattr(sock, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED; + + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0); + +netlbl_socket_setsid_return: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + return rc; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init - Setup the NetLabel fields + * @ssec: the sk_security_struct + * @family: the socket family + * + * Description: + * Called when a new sk_security_struct is allocated to initialize the NetLabel + * fields. + * + */ +void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, + int family) +{ + if (family == PF_INET) + ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE; + else + ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security - Copy the NetLabel fields + * @ssec: the original sk_security_struct + * @newssec: the cloned sk_security_struct + * + * Description: + * Clone the NetLabel specific sk_security_struct fields from @ssec to + * @newssec. + * + */ +void selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, + struct sk_security_struct *newssec) +{ + newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass; + if (ssec->nlbl_state != NLBL_UNSET) + newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE; + else + newssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel + * @sock: the socket to label + * @sock_family: the socket family + * @sid: the SID to use + * + * Description: + * Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given + * SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, + int sock_family, + u32 sid) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + + sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; + + if (sock_family != PF_INET) + return 0; + + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE; + return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sid); +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_sock_graft - Netlabel the new socket + * @sk: the new connection + * @sock: the new socket + * + * Description: + * The connection represented by @sk is being grafted onto @sock so set the + * socket's NetLabel to match the SID of @sk. + * + */ +void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; + u32 nlbl_peer_sid; + + sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; + + if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET) + return; + + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 && + selinux_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(NULL, + &secattr, + sksec->sid, + &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0) + sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid; + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr, 0); + + sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE; + + /* Try to set the NetLabel on the socket to save time later, if we fail + * here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to + * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */ + selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid); +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Handle a new connection request + * @skb: the packet + * @sock_sid: the SID of the parent socket + * + * Description: + * If present, use the security attributes of the packet in @skb and the + * parent sock's SID to arrive at a SID for the new child sock. Returns the + * SID of the connection or SECSID_NULL on failure. + * + */ +u32 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sock_sid) +{ + int rc; + u32 peer_sid; + + rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, sock_sid, &peer_sid); + if (rc != 0) + return SECSID_NULL; + + if (peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) + return SECSID_NULL; + + return peer_sid; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_inode_permission - Verify the socket is NetLabel labeled + * @inode: the file descriptor's inode + * @mask: the permission mask + * + * Description: + * Looks at a file's inode and if it is marked as a socket protected by + * NetLabel then verify that the socket has been labeled, if not try to label + * the socket now with the inode's SID. Returns zero on success, negative + * values on failure. + * + */ +int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + int rc; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + struct socket *sock; + + if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + + sock = SOCKET_I(inode); + isec = inode->i_security; + sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + mutex_lock(&isec->lock); + if (unlikely(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE && + (mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))) { + lock_sock(sock->sk); + rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid); + release_sock(sock->sk); + } else + rc = 0; + mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel + * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct + * @skb: the packet + * @ad: the audit data + * + * Description: + * Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check + * against the receiving socket. Returns zero on success, negative values on + * error. + * + */ +int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) +{ + int rc; + u32 netlbl_sid; + u32 recv_perm; + + rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &netlbl_sid); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + if (netlbl_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) + return 0; + + switch (sksec->sclass) { + case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: + recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; + break; + case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: + recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; + break; + default: + recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM; + } + + rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, + netlbl_sid, + sksec->sclass, + recv_perm, + ad); + if (rc == 0) + return 0; + + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc); + return rc; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream - Return the connected peer's SID + * @sock: the socket + * + * Description: + * Examine @sock to find the connected peer's SID. Returns the SID on success + * or SECSID_NULL on error. + * + */ +u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + + if (sksec->peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) + return SECSID_NULL; + + return sksec->peer_sid; +} + +/** + * selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram - Return the SID of a NetLabel packet + * @skb: the packet + * + * Description: + * Examine @skb to find the SID assigned to it by NetLabel. Returns the SID on + * success, SECSID_NULL on error. + * + */ +u32 selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int peer_sid; + struct sock *sk = skb->sk; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + + if (sk == NULL || sk->sk_socket == NULL) + return SECSID_NULL; + + isec = SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security; + if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, isec->sid, &peer_sid) != 0) + return SECSID_NULL; + if (peer_sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) + return SECSID_NULL; + + return peer_sid; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 6c985ced810..3e742b850af 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com> * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com> * + * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> + * + * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments. + * * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, @@ -67,10 +72,10 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) } /* - * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a socket can be used - * with the corresponding xfrm_sec_ctx and direction. + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use + * a xfrm policy rule. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) +int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) { int rc = 0; u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; @@ -84,27 +89,130 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; } - rc = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ((dir == FLOW_DIR_IN) ? ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM : - ((dir == FLOW_DIR_OUT) ? ASSOCIATION__SENDTO : - (ASSOCIATION__SENDTO | ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM))), + rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL); return rc; } /* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches + * the given policy, flow combo. + */ + +int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, + struct flowi *fl) +{ + u32 state_sid; + u32 pol_sid; + int err; + + if (x->security) + state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; + else + state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + + if (xp->security) + pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid; + else + pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + + err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, + NULL); + + if (err) + return 0; + + return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x); +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow + * can use a given security association. + */ + +int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm) +{ + int rc = 0; + u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + + /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ + if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) { + if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) + return 0; + + sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + } + + rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, + NULL)? 0:1; + + return rc; +} + +/* + * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session. + */ + +int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + struct sec_path *sp; + + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + + if (skb == NULL) + return 0; + + sp = skb->sp; + if (sp) { + int i, sid_set = 0; + + for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) { + struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; + if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; + + if (!sid_set) { + *sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + sid_set = 1; + + if (!ckall) + break; + } + else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid) + return -EINVAL; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input */ -static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid) { int rc = 0; struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL; + char *ctx_str = NULL; + u32 str_len; + u32 ctx_sid; + + BUG_ON(uctx && pol); + + if (!uctx) + goto not_from_user; - BUG_ON(!uctx); - BUG_ON(uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX); + if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) + return -EINVAL; if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; @@ -141,9 +249,43 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_us return rc; +not_from_user: + if (pol) { + rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid); + if (rc) + goto out; + } + else + ctx_sid = sid; + + rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len); + if (rc) + goto out; + + *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + + str_len, + GFP_ATOMIC); + + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; + ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; + ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid; + ctx->ctx_len = str_len; + memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, + ctx_str, + str_len); + + goto out2; + out: *ctxp = NULL; kfree(ctx); +out2: + kfree(ctx_str); return rc; } @@ -151,13 +293,23 @@ out: * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to * xfrm_policy. */ -int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct sock *sk) { int err; + u32 sid; BUG_ON(!xp); + BUG_ON(uctx && sk); - err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx); + if (sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; + sid = ssec->sid; + } + else + sid = SECSID_NULL; + + err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, sid); return err; } @@ -217,13 +369,14 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp) * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to * xfrm_state. */ -int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx) +int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid) { int err; BUG_ON(!x); - err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx); + err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid); return err; } @@ -329,38 +482,30 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have * gone thru the IPSec process. */ -int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) { int i, rc = 0; struct sec_path *sp; + u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sp = skb->sp; if (sp) { - /* - * __xfrm_policy_check does not approve unless xfrm_policy_ok - * says that spi's match for policy and the socket. - * - * Only need to verify the existence of an authorizable sp. - */ for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i]; - if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) - goto accept; + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; + sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + break; + } } } - /* check SELinux sock for unlabelled access */ - rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, NULL); - if (rc) - goto drop; - -accept: - return 0; + rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); -drop: return rc; } @@ -371,7 +516,8 @@ drop: * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook. */ -int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) { struct dst_entry *dst; int rc = 0; @@ -391,7 +537,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb) } rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL); + ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); out: return rc; } |