diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 |
4 files changed, 24 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 37832026e58..ef4e2a8a33a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, return 0; } -static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) +static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ - int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit); + int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); if (!error) { profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); if (!unconfined(profile)) - error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit); + error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit); } return error; } diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index a93b3b73307..89f02ff66af 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability - * @tsk: The task to query * @cred: The credentials to use * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for @@ -80,8 +79,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ -int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit) +int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, + int cap, int audit) { for (;;) { /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ @@ -222,9 +221,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ - if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), - current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns, + CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) return 0; return 1; } @@ -870,7 +868,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), + || (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* @@ -936,7 +934,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); @@ -963,7 +961,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, int ret = 0; if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { - ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, + ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret == 0) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d9e15339092..9ae68c64455 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -157,8 +157,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, @@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int ret; cred = get_task_cred(tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + ret = security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); put_cred(cred); return ret; } @@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int ret; cred = get_task_cred(tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + ret = security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); put_cred(cred); return ret; } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index e545b9f6707..c9605c4a2e0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1414,8 +1414,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk, #endif /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ -static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, - const struct cred *cred, +static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -1426,7 +1425,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, int rc; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); - ad.tsk = tsk; + ad.tsk = current; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { @@ -1867,16 +1866,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. */ -static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) +static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, int audit) { int rc; - rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit); + rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); if (rc) return rc; - return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit); + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) @@ -1953,8 +1952,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; - rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), - &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; @@ -2858,8 +2856,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), - &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, + error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (!error) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, @@ -2992,8 +2989,8 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: - error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go |