diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/encrypted_defined.c | 903 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/encrypted_defined.h | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 1175 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted_defined.h | 134 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack.h | 45 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_access.c | 58 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 364 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/realpath.c | 1 |
18 files changed, 2708 insertions, 157 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e80da955e68..95accd442d5 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -21,6 +21,37 @@ config KEYS If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +config TRUSTED_KEYS + tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" + depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + help + This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing + keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, + generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, + if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever + see encrypted blobs. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + +config ENCRYPTED_KEYS + tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS" + depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CBC + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_RNG + help + This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys + in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers, + which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The + 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type. + Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index c773635ca3a..2a5df2b7da8 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static int cap_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, +static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index aef8c0a923a..d661afbe474 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, args, &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) + return -EINVAL; return result; } diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 74d5447d7df..6c941050f57 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ obj-y := \ request_key_auth.o \ user_defined.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted_defined.o obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..32d27c85838 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.c @@ -0,0 +1,903 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt + */ + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <keys/encrypted-type.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <crypto/aes.h> + +#include "encrypted_defined.h" + +static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:"; +static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:"; +static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256"; +static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)"; +static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)"; +static unsigned int ivsize; +static int blksize; + +#define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) +#define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +#define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE +#define MAX_DATA_SIZE 4096 +#define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20 + +struct sdesc { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; +static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; + +enum { + Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +static int aes_get_sizes(void) +{ + struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n", + PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm); + blksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm); + crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm); + return 0; +} + +/* + * valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key + * + * key-type:= "trusted:" | "encrypted:" + * desc:= master-key description + * + * Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update, + * only the master key description is permitted to change, not the key-type. + * The key-type remains constant. + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc) +{ + if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { + if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) + goto out; + if (orig_desc) + if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) + goto out; + } else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { + if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN) + goto out; + if (orig_desc) + if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) + goto out; + } else + goto out; + return 0; +out: + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data + * + * datablob format: + * new <master-key name> <decrypted data length> + * load <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv + data> + * update <new-master-key name> + * + * Tokenizes a copy of the keyctl data, returning a pointer to each token, + * which is null terminated. + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, char **master_desc, + char **decrypted_datalen, char **hex_encoded_iv) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + int ret = -EINVAL; + int key_cmd; + char *p; + + p = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!p) + return ret; + key_cmd = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); + + *master_desc = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!*master_desc) + goto out; + + if (valid_master_desc(*master_desc, NULL) < 0) + goto out; + + if (decrypted_datalen) { + *decrypted_datalen = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!*decrypted_datalen) + goto out; + } + + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_new: + if (!decrypted_datalen) + break; + ret = 0; + break; + case Opt_load: + if (!decrypted_datalen) + break; + *hex_encoded_iv = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!*hex_encoded_iv) + break; + ret = 0; + break; + case Opt_update: + if (decrypted_datalen) + break; + ret = 0; + break; + case Opt_err: + break; + } +out: + return ret; +} + +/* + * datablob_format - format as an ascii string, before copying to userspace + */ +static char *datablob_format(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + size_t asciiblob_len) +{ + char *ascii_buf, *bufp; + u8 *iv = epayload->iv; + int len; + int i; + + ascii_buf = kmalloc(asciiblob_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + goto out; + + ascii_buf[asciiblob_len] = '\0'; + + /* copy datablob master_desc and datalen strings */ + len = sprintf(ascii_buf, "%s %s ", epayload->master_desc, + epayload->datalen); + + /* convert the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data and HMAC to ascii */ + bufp = &ascii_buf[len]; + for (i = 0; i < (asciiblob_len - len) / 2; i++) + bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, iv[i]); +out: + return ascii_buf; +} + +/* + * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key + * + * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace + * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type + * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace. + */ +static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, + u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload; + struct key *tkey; + + tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(tkey)) + goto error; + + down_read(&tkey->sem); + tpayload = rcu_dereference(tkey->payload.data); + *master_key = tpayload->key; + *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len; +error: + return tkey; +} + +/* + * request_user_key - request the user key + * + * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key. + */ +static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key, + size_t *master_keylen) +{ + struct user_key_payload *upayload; + struct key *ukey; + + ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(ukey)) + goto error; + + down_read(&ukey->sem); + upayload = rcu_dereference(ukey->payload.data); + *master_key = upayload->data; + *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; +error: + return ukey; +} + +static struct sdesc *alloc_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int size; + + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); + sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sdesc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; + sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0; + return sdesc; +} + +static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, + const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int ret; + + sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hmacalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); + if (!ret) + ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest); + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +static int calc_hash(u8 *digest, const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int ret; + + sdesc = alloc_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, buf, buflen, digest); + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY }; + +/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */ +static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type, + const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen) +{ + u8 *derived_buf; + unsigned int derived_buf_len; + int ret; + + derived_buf_len = strlen("AUTH_KEY") + 1 + master_keylen; + if (derived_buf_len < HASH_SIZE) + derived_buf_len = HASH_SIZE; + + derived_buf = kzalloc(derived_buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!derived_buf) { + pr_err("encrypted_key: out of memory\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + if (key_type) + strcpy(derived_buf, "AUTH_KEY"); + else + strcpy(derived_buf, "ENC_KEY"); + + memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key, + master_keylen); + ret = calc_hash(derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len); + kfree(derived_buf); + return ret; +} + +static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key, + unsigned int key_len, const u8 *iv, + unsigned int ivsize) +{ + int ret; + + desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) { + pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n", + blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(desc->tfm); + } + desc->flags = 0; + + ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret); + crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm); + return ret; + } + crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(desc->tfm, iv, ivsize); + return 0; +} + +static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) +{ + struct key *mkey = NULL; + + if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, + KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) { + mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc + + KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN, + master_key, master_keylen); + } else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, + KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) { + mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc + + KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN, + master_key, master_keylen); + } else + goto out; + + if (IS_ERR(mkey)) + pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found", + epayload->master_desc); + if (mkey) + dump_master_key(*master_key, *master_keylen); +out: + return mkey; +} + +/* Before returning data to userspace, encrypt decrypted data. */ +static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const u8 *derived_key, + unsigned int derived_keylen) +{ + struct scatterlist sg_in[2]; + struct scatterlist sg_out[1]; + struct blkcipher_desc desc; + unsigned int encrypted_datalen; + unsigned int padlen; + char pad[16]; + int ret; + + encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize); + padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen; + + ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen, + epayload->iv, ivsize); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + dump_decrypted_data(epayload); + + memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad); + sg_init_table(sg_in, 2); + sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen); + sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen); + + sg_init_table(sg_out, 1); + sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen); + + ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen); + crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to encrypt (%d)\n", ret); + else + dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen); +out: + return ret; +} + +static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen) +{ + u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; + u8 *digest; + int ret; + + ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + digest = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len; + ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, + epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len); + if (!ret) + dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE); +out: + return ret; +} + +/* verify HMAC before decrypting encrypted key */ +static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen) +{ + u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; + u8 digest[HASH_SIZE]; + int ret; + + ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, AUTH_KEY, master_key, master_keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, + epayload->master_desc, epayload->datablob_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = memcmp(digest, epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len, + sizeof digest); + if (ret) { + ret = -EINVAL; + dump_hmac("datablob", + epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len, + HASH_SIZE); + dump_hmac("calc", digest, HASH_SIZE); + } +out: + return ret; +} + +static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const u8 *derived_key, + unsigned int derived_keylen) +{ + struct scatterlist sg_in[1]; + struct scatterlist sg_out[2]; + struct blkcipher_desc desc; + unsigned int encrypted_datalen; + char pad[16]; + int ret; + + encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize); + ret = init_blkcipher_desc(&desc, derived_key, derived_keylen, + epayload->iv, ivsize); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen); + + memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad); + sg_init_table(sg_in, 1); + sg_init_table(sg_out, 2); + sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen); + sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen); + sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad); + + ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, encrypted_datalen); + crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + dump_decrypted_data(epayload); +out: + return ret; +} + +/* Allocate memory for decrypted key and datablob. */ +static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, + const char *master_desc, + const char *datalen) +{ + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; + unsigned short datablob_len; + unsigned short decrypted_datalen; + unsigned int encrypted_datalen; + long dlen; + int ret; + + ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen); + if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + decrypted_datalen = dlen; + encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize); + + datablob_len = strlen(master_desc) + 1 + strlen(datalen) + 1 + + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, decrypted_datalen + datablob_len + + HASH_SIZE + 1); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + decrypted_datalen + + datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!epayload) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + epayload->decrypted_datalen = decrypted_datalen; + epayload->datablob_len = datablob_len; + return epayload; +} + +static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const char *hex_encoded_iv) +{ + struct key *mkey; + u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; + u8 *master_key; + u8 *hmac; + const char *hex_encoded_data; + unsigned int encrypted_datalen; + size_t master_keylen; + size_t asciilen; + int ret; + + encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize); + asciilen = (ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen + HASH_SIZE) * 2; + if (strlen(hex_encoded_iv) != asciilen) + return -EINVAL; + + hex_encoded_data = hex_encoded_iv + (2 * ivsize) + 2; + hex2bin(epayload->iv, hex_encoded_iv, ivsize); + hex2bin(epayload->encrypted_data, hex_encoded_data, encrypted_datalen); + + hmac = epayload->master_desc + epayload->datablob_len; + hex2bin(hmac, hex_encoded_data + (encrypted_datalen * 2), HASH_SIZE); + + mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen); + if (IS_ERR(mkey)) + return PTR_ERR(mkey); + + ret = datablob_hmac_verify(epayload, master_key, master_keylen); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("encrypted_key: bad hmac (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = derived_key_decrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to decrypt key (%d)\n", ret); +out: + up_read(&mkey->sem); + key_put(mkey); + return ret; +} + +static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const char *master_desc, const char *datalen) +{ + epayload->master_desc = epayload->decrypted_data + + epayload->decrypted_datalen; + epayload->datalen = epayload->master_desc + strlen(master_desc) + 1; + epayload->iv = epayload->datalen + strlen(datalen) + 1; + epayload->encrypted_data = epayload->iv + ivsize + 1; + + memcpy(epayload->master_desc, master_desc, strlen(master_desc)); + memcpy(epayload->datalen, datalen, strlen(datalen)); +} + +/* + * encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key + * + * For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data + * itself. For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data. + */ +static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + const char *master_desc, const char *datalen, + const char *hex_encoded_iv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + __ekey_init(epayload, master_desc, datalen); + if (!hex_encoded_iv) { + get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize); + + get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen); + } else + ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, hex_encoded_iv); + return ret; +} + +/* + * encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key + * + * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key + * based on a kernel random number. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; + char *datablob = NULL; + char *master_desc = NULL; + char *decrypted_datalen = NULL; + char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL; + int ret; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + datablob[datalen] = 0; + memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen, + &hex_encoded_iv); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, master_desc, decrypted_datalen); + if (IS_ERR(epayload)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(epayload); + goto out; + } + ret = encrypted_init(epayload, master_desc, decrypted_datalen, + hex_encoded_iv); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree(epayload); + goto out; + } + + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, epayload); +out: + kfree(datablob); + return ret; +} + +static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; + + epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu); + memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen); + kfree(epayload); +} + +/* + * encrypted_update - update the master key description + * + * Change the master key description for an existing encrypted key. + * The next read will return an encrypted datablob using the new + * master key description. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; + char *buf; + char *new_master_desc = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + buf[datalen] = 0; + memcpy(buf, data, datalen); + ret = datablob_parse(buf, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = valid_master_desc(new_master_desc, epayload->master_desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, new_master_desc, + epayload->datalen); + if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload); + goto out; + } + + __ekey_init(new_epayload, new_master_desc, epayload->datalen); + + memcpy(new_epayload->iv, epayload->iv, ivsize); + memcpy(new_epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen); + + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_epayload); + call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free); +out: + kfree(buf); + return ret; +} + +/* + * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace + * + * The resulting datablob format is: + * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data> + * + * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size. + */ +static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, + size_t buflen) +{ + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; + struct key *mkey; + u8 *master_key; + size_t master_keylen; + char derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; + char *ascii_buf; + size_t asciiblob_len; + int ret; + + epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data, + rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); + + /* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */ + asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1 + + roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize) + + (HASH_SIZE * 2); + + if (!buffer || buflen < asciiblob_len) + return asciiblob_len; + + mkey = request_master_key(epayload, &master_key, &master_keylen); + if (IS_ERR(mkey)) + return PTR_ERR(mkey); + + ret = get_derived_key(derived_key, ENC_KEY, master_key, master_keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = derived_key_encrypt(epayload, derived_key, sizeof derived_key); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = datablob_hmac_append(epayload, master_key, master_keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ascii_buf = datablob_format(epayload, asciiblob_len); + if (!ascii_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + up_read(&mkey->sem); + key_put(mkey); + + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0) + ret = -EFAULT; + kfree(ascii_buf); + + return asciiblob_len; +out: + up_read(&mkey->sem); + key_put(mkey); + return ret; +} + +/* + * encrypted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data + * + * Before freeing the key, clear the memory containing the decrypted + * key data. + */ +static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key) +{ + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + + if (!epayload) + return; + + memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen); + kfree(key->payload.data); +} + +struct key_type key_type_encrypted = { + .name = "encrypted", + .instantiate = encrypted_instantiate, + .update = encrypted_update, + .match = user_match, + .destroy = encrypted_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = encrypted_read, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_encrypted); + +static void encrypted_shash_release(void) +{ + if (hashalg) + crypto_free_shash(hashalg); + if (hmacalg) + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); +} + +static int __init encrypted_shash_alloc(void) +{ + int ret; + + hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { + pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); + } + + hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { + pr_info("encrypted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hash_alg); + ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); + goto hashalg_fail; + } + + return 0; + +hashalg_fail: + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); + return ret; +} + +static int __init init_encrypted(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = encrypted_shash_alloc(); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + return aes_get_sizes(); +out: + encrypted_shash_release(); + return ret; + +} + +static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void) +{ + encrypted_shash_release(); + unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted); +} + +late_initcall(init_encrypted); +module_exit(cleanup_encrypted); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted_defined.h b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cef5e2f2b7d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/encrypted_defined.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +#ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H +#define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H + +#define ENCRYPTED_DEBUG 0 + +#if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG +static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "master key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, + master_key, master_keylen, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "decrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, + epayload->decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + unsigned int encrypted_datalen) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "encrypted data: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, + epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest, + unsigned int hmac_size) +{ + if (str) + pr_info("encrypted_key: %s", str); + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "hmac: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 32, 1, digest, + hmac_size, 0); +} +#else +static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_decrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_encrypted_data(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, + unsigned int encrypted_datalen) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_hmac(const char *str, const u8 *digest, + unsigned int hmac_size) +{ +} +#endif +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0088dd8bf68..0ea52d25a6b 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -403,7 +403,6 @@ link_check_failed: return ret; link_prealloc_failed: - up_write(&dest_keyring->sem); mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock); kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret); return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..975e9f29a52 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c @@ -0,0 +1,1175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt + */ + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> + +#include "trusted_defined.h" + +static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; + +struct sdesc { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[]; +}; + +static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; +static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; + +static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int size; + + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); + sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sdesc) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; + sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0; + return sdesc; +} + +static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, + unsigned char *digest) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + int ret; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, ...) +{ + struct sdesc *sdesc; + va_list argp; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned char *data; + int ret; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + va_start(argp, keylen); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); + if (data == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + } + va_end(argp); + if (!ret) + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM + */ +static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, + unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) +{ + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char c; + int ret; + va_list argp; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + + c = h3; + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + va_start(argp, h3); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); + if (ret < 0) { + va_end(argp); + goto out; + } + } + va_end(argp); + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (!ret) + ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM + */ +static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen, ...) +{ + uint32_t bufsize; + uint16_t tag; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t result; + unsigned char *enonce; + unsigned char *continueflag; + unsigned char *authdata; + unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int dpos; + va_list argp; + int ret; + + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); + ordinal = command; + result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); + if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) + return 0; + if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND) + return -EINVAL; + authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; + continueflag = authdata - 1; + enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, + sizeof result); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, + sizeof ordinal); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + va_start(argp, keylen); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); + if (ret < 0) { + va_end(argp); + goto out; + } + } + va_end(argp); + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, + 1, continueflag, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + ret = -EINVAL; +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM + */ +static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, + const uint32_t command, + const unsigned char *ononce, + const unsigned char *key1, + unsigned int keylen1, + const unsigned char *key2, + unsigned int keylen2, ...) +{ + uint32_t bufsize; + uint16_t tag; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t result; + unsigned char *enonce1; + unsigned char *continueflag1; + unsigned char *authdata1; + unsigned char *enonce2; + unsigned char *continueflag2; + unsigned char *authdata2; + unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct sdesc *sdesc; + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int dpos; + va_list argp; + int ret; + + bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); + ordinal = command; + result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET); + + if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND) + return 0; + if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND) + return -EINVAL; + authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1 + + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1; + continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1; + enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; + + sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); + if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + return PTR_ERR(sdesc); + } + ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, + sizeof result); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, + sizeof ordinal); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + va_start(argp, keylen2); + for (;;) { + dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + if (dlen == 0) + break; + dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); + ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); + if (ret < 0) { + va_end(argp); + goto out; + } + } + va_end(argp); + ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, + TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + ret = -EINVAL; +out: + kfree(sdesc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our + * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. + */ +static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, + size_t buflen) +{ + int rc; + + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); + rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen); + dump_tpm_buf(cmd); + if (rc > 0) + /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ + rc = -EPERM; + return rc; +} + +/* + * get a random value from TPM + */ +static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len) +{ + int ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM); + store32(tb, len); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data); + if (!ret) + memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len); + return ret; +} + +static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len); + + kfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. + * + * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. + * This uses the tpm driver's extend function. + */ +static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) +{ + unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int ret; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + +/* + * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session + */ +static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, + const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) +{ + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); + store16(tb, type); + store32(tb, handle); + storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]), + TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + + TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0); +} + +/* + * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session + */ +static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +{ + int ret; + + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)], + TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + return 0; +} + +struct tpm_digests { + unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2]; + unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; +}; + +/* + * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on + * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. + */ +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, + uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, + unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, + const unsigned char *blobauth, + const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize) +{ + struct osapsess sess; + struct tpm_digests *td; + unsigned char cont; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t pcrsize; + uint32_t datsize; + int sealinfosize; + int encdatasize; + int storedsize; + int ret; + int i; + + /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */ + td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!td) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* get session for sealing key */ + ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + dump_sess(&sess); + + /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ + memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); + datsize = htonl(datalen); + pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); + cont = 0; + + /* encrypt data authorization key */ + for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i) + td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i]; + + /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ + if (pcrinfosize == 0) { + /* no pcr info specified */ + ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, + sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, + sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0, + 0); + } else { + /* pcr info specified */ + ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont, + sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize, + pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t), + &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0); + } + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* build and send the TPM request packet */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + store32(tb, pcrinfosize); + storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); + store32(tb, datalen); + storebytes(tb, data, datalen); + store32(tb, sess.handle); + storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */ + sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)); + encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) + + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize); + storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize + + sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize; + + /* check the HMAC in the response */ + ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0, + 0); + + /* copy the returned blob to caller */ + if (!ret) { + memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize); + *bloblen = storedsize; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob + */ +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, + uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, + const unsigned char *blobauth, + unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen) +{ + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t authhandle1 = 0; + uint32_t authhandle2 = 0; + unsigned char cont = 0; + uint32_t ordinal; + uint32_t keyhndl; + int ret; + + /* sessions for unsealing key and data */ + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); + ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, + enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), + &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* build and send TPM request packet */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); + store32(tb, authhandle1); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + store32(tb, authhandle2); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, + keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET, + *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, + 0); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ + p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; + + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, + o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + + kfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + struct tpm_buf *tb; + int ret; + + tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tb) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, + o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + else + /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ + p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; + + kfree(tb); + return ret; +} + +enum { + Opt_err = -1, + Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, + Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, + {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, + {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, + {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, + {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +/* can have zero or more token= options */ +static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, + struct trusted_key_options *opt) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + char *p = c; + int token; + int res; + unsigned long handle; + unsigned long lock; + + while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') + continue; + token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); + + switch (token) { + case Opt_pcrinfo: + opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; + if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len); + break; + case Opt_keyhandle: + res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; + opt->keyhandle = handle; + break; + case Opt_keyauth: + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + break; + case Opt_blobauth: + if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + break; + case Opt_migratable: + if (*args[0].from == '0') + pay->migratable = 0; + else + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_pcrlock: + res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->pcrlock = lock; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the + * payload and options structures + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, + struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + long keylen; + int ret = -EINVAL; + int key_cmd; + char *c; + + /* main command */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_new: + /* first argument is key size */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen); + if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + p->key_len = keylen; + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = Opt_new; + break; + case Opt_load: + /* first argument is sealed blob */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; + if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = Opt_load; + break; + case Opt_update: + /* all arguments are options */ + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = Opt_update; + break; + case Opt_err: + return -EINVAL; + break; + } + return ret; +} + +static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) +{ + struct trusted_key_options *options; + + options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL); + if (options) { + /* set any non-zero defaults */ + options->keytype = SRK_keytype; + options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + } + return options; +} + +static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; + int ret; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p); + if (ret < 0) + return p; + p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL); + if (p) + p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */ + return p; +} + +/* + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key + * + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, + * adding it to the specified keyring. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + int key_cmd; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + + options = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!options) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!payload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options); + if (key_cmd < 0) { + ret = key_cmd; + goto out; + } + + dump_payload(payload); + dump_options(options); + + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_load: + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + dump_payload(payload); + dump_options(options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + case Opt_new: + ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + ret = key_seal(payload, options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if (!ret && options->pcrlock) + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); +out: + kfree(datablob); + kfree(options); + if (!ret) + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload); + else + kfree(payload); + return ret; +} + +static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); + kfree(p); +} + +/* + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values + */ +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; + struct trusted_key_options *new_o; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + + if (!p->migratable) + return -EPERM; + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + new_o = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!new_o) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!new_p) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); + if (ret != Opt_update) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ + new_p->migratable = p->migratable; + new_p->key_len = p->key_len; + memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); + dump_payload(p); + dump_payload(new_p); + + ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + kfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + if (new_o->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); + kfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + } + rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p); + call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); +out: + kfree(datablob); + kfree(new_o); + return ret; +} + +/* + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. + */ +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, + size_t buflen) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + char *ascii_buf; + char *bufp; + int i; + + p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data, + rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); + if (!p) + return -EINVAL; + if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) + return 2 * p->blob_len; + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + kfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } + kfree(ascii_buf); + return 2 * p->blob_len; +} + +/* + * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data + */ +static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + + if (!p) + return; + memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); + kfree(key->payload.data); +} + +struct key_type key_type_trusted = { + .name = "trusted", + .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, + .update = trusted_update, + .match = user_match, + .destroy = trusted_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = trusted_read, +}; + +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); + +static void trusted_shash_release(void) +{ + if (hashalg) + crypto_free_shash(hashalg); + if (hmacalg) + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); +} + +static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) +{ + int ret; + + hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hmac_alg); + return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); + } + + hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { + pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + hash_alg); + ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); + goto hashalg_fail; + } + + return 0; + +hashalg_fail: + crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); + return ret; +} + +static int __init init_trusted(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + trusted_shash_release(); + return ret; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{ + trusted_shash_release(); + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +late_initcall(init_trusted); +module_exit(cleanup_trusted); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.h b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3249fbd2b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H + +/* implementation specific TPM constants */ +#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512 +#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 +#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 +#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 +#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 +#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 + +#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) +#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) +#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) + +struct tpm_buf { + int len; + unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; +}; + +#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) + +struct osapsess { + uint32_t handle; + unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; +}; + +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ +enum { + SEAL_keytype = 1, + SRK_keytype = 4 +}; + +struct trusted_key_options { + uint16_t keytype; + uint32_t keyhandle; + unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; + int pcrlock; +}; + +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 + +#if TPM_DEBUG +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); +} + +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ + int len; + + pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n"); + len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); +} +#else +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ +} +#endif + +static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) +{ + buf->data[buf->len++] = value; +} + +static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) +{ + *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); + buf->len += sizeof value; +} + +static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) +{ + *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); + buf->len += sizeof value; +} + +static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, + const int len) +{ + memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); + buf->len += len; +} +#endif diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1b798d3df71..739e40362f4 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -513,6 +513,15 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask); } +int security_inode_exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + if (flags) + return -ECHILD; + return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); +} + int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) @@ -977,8 +986,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, - struct sock *newsk) +int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index cda18fd8ca0..e276eb46853 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3924,18 +3924,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); } -static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, - struct socket *other, +static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, + struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; int err; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; + ad.u.net.sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, @@ -4523,11 +4523,11 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) - return NF_DROP; + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) - return NF_DROP; + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); return NF_ACCEPT; } @@ -4584,7 +4584,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; break; default: - return NF_DROP; + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) { if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) @@ -4606,7 +4606,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) - return NF_DROP; + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (peerlbl_active) { u32 if_sid; @@ -4616,13 +4616,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) - return NF_DROP; + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) - return NF_DROP; + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } return NF_ACCEPT; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 8858d2b2d4b..7ed3663332e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } }, { "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } }, { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, - { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } }, + { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } }, { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 45d35e629fc..ea39cb742ae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1149,24 +1149,28 @@ static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de) { struct list_head *node; - spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + spin_lock(&de->d_lock); node = de->d_subdirs.next; while (node != &de->d_subdirs) { struct dentry *d = list_entry(node, struct dentry, d_u.d_child); + + spin_lock_nested(&d->d_lock, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED); list_del_init(node); if (d->d_inode) { - d = dget_locked(d); - spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + dget_dlock(d); + spin_unlock(&de->d_lock); + spin_unlock(&d->d_lock); d_delete(d); simple_unlink(de->d_inode, d); dput(d); - spin_lock(&dcache_lock); - } + spin_lock(&de->d_lock); + } else + spin_unlock(&d->d_lock); node = de->d_subdirs.next; } - spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + spin_unlock(&de->d_lock); } #define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans" diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 43ae747a5aa..129c4eb8ffb 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -51,11 +51,18 @@ struct socket_smack { */ struct inode_smack { char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */ + char *smk_task; /* label of the task */ struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */ int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */ }; +struct task_smack { + char *smk_task; /* label used for access control */ + char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ +}; + #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ +#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */ /* * A label access rule. @@ -161,6 +168,10 @@ struct smack_known { #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 239 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */ /* + * Flag for transmute access + */ +#define MAY_TRANSMUTE 64 +/* * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with */ #define MAY_ANY (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) @@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *); /* * These functions are in smack_access.c */ +int smk_access_entry(char *, char *); int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *); int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *); int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *); @@ -234,6 +246,15 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(int cat, char *catsetp) } /* + * Is the directory transmuting? + */ +static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp) +{ + struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security; + return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0; +} + +/* * Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob. */ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp) @@ -243,6 +264,30 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp) } /* + * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob. + */ +static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp) +{ + return tsp->smk_task; +} + +/* + * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob. + */ +static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp) +{ + return tsp->smk_forked; +} + +/* + * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob. + */ +static inline char *smk_of_current(void) +{ + return smk_of_task(current_security()); +} + +/* * logging functions */ #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1 diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index f4fac64c4da..7ba8478f599 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -67,6 +67,46 @@ static u32 smack_next_secid = 10; int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED; /** + * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule + * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label + * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label + * + * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the + * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found, + * NULL otherwise. + * + * NOTE: + * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list + * labels that come in off the network can't be imported + * and added to the list for locking reasons. + * + * Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels, + * not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels + * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile + * optimization. + */ +int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label) +{ + u32 may = MAY_NOT; + struct smack_rule *srp; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) { + if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label || + strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) { + if (srp->smk_object == object_label || + strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) { + may = srp->smk_access; + break; + } + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return may; +} + +/** * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label @@ -90,7 +130,6 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, struct smk_audit_info *a) { u32 may = MAY_NOT; - struct smack_rule *srp; int rc = 0; /* @@ -144,18 +183,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's * good. */ - rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) { - if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label || - strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) { - if (srp->smk_object == object_label || - strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) { - may = srp->smk_access; - break; - } - } - } - rcu_read_unlock(); + may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label); /* * This is a bit map operation. */ @@ -185,7 +213,7 @@ out_audit: int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) { int rc; - char *sp = current_security(); + char *sp = smk_of_current(); rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL); if (rc == 0) @@ -196,7 +224,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) * only one that gets privilege and current does not * have that label. */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security) + if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp) goto out_audit; if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 489a85afa47..533bf3255d7 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ * * This file contains the smack hook function implementations. * - * Author: + * Authors: * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> + * Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com> * * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> + * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, @@ -35,6 +37,9 @@ #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security)) +#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE" +#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4 + /** * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file. * @ip: a pointer to the inode @@ -43,7 +48,7 @@ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label * or NULL if there was no label to fetch. */ -static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) +static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) { int rc; char in[SMK_LABELLEN]; @@ -51,7 +56,7 @@ static char *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL) return NULL; - rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, in, SMK_LABELLEN); + rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN); if (rc < 0) return NULL; @@ -103,8 +108,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) if (rc != 0) return rc; - sp = current_security(); - tsp = task_security(ctp); + sp = smk_of_current(); + tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp); @@ -138,8 +143,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp); - sp = current_security(); - tsp = task_security(ptp); + sp = smk_of_current(); + tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp)); /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL); if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) @@ -160,7 +165,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) { int rc = 0; - char *sp = current_security(); + char *sp = smk_of_current(); if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; @@ -391,6 +396,40 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) } /* + * BPRM hooks + */ + +static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct dentry *dp; + int rc; + + rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + if (bprm->cred_prepared) + return 0; + + if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL) + return 0; + + dp = bprm->file->f_dentry; + + if (dp->d_inode == NULL) + return 0; + + isp = dp->d_inode->i_security; + + if (isp->smk_task != NULL) + tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; + + return 0; +} + +/* * Inode hooks */ @@ -402,7 +441,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) */ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current_security()); + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current()); if (inode->i_security == NULL) return -ENOMEM; return 0; @@ -434,6 +473,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); + char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); + u32 may; if (name) { *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -442,6 +483,16 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } if (value) { + may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp); + + /* + * If the access rule allows transmutation and + * the directory requests transmutation then + * by all means transmute. + */ + if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) + isp = dsp; + *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL); if (*value == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +715,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; /* @@ -674,6 +726,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN || smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || + strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) + rc = -EINVAL; } else rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); @@ -700,26 +758,23 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - struct inode_smack *isp; char *nsp; + struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; - /* - * Not SMACK - */ - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK)) - return; - - isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; - - /* - * No locking is done here. This is a pointer - * assignment. - */ - nsp = smk_import(value, size); - if (nsp != NULL) - isp->smk_inode = nsp; - else - isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { + nsp = smk_import(value, size); + if (nsp != NULL) + isp->smk_inode = nsp; + else + isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { + nsp = smk_import(value, size); + if (nsp != NULL) + isp->smk_task = nsp; + else + isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; return; } @@ -752,12 +807,15 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) */ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { + struct inode_smack *isp; struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc = 0; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else @@ -768,6 +826,11 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (rc == 0) rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + if (rc == 0) { + isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; + isp->smk_task = NULL; + } + return rc; } @@ -895,7 +958,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) */ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = current_security(); + file->f_security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1005,7 +1068,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, */ static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { - file->f_security = current_security(); + file->f_security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1025,7 +1088,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct file *file; int rc; - char *tsp = tsk->cred->security; + char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); struct smk_audit_info ad; /* @@ -1082,7 +1145,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) */ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { - cred->security = NULL; + cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + if (cred->security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; return 0; } @@ -1097,7 +1162,7 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) */ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - cred->security = NULL; + kfree(cred->security); } /** @@ -1111,7 +1176,16 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - new->security = old->security; + struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *new_tsp; + + new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + if (new_tsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; + new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; + new->security = new_tsp; return 0; } @@ -1124,7 +1198,11 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - new->security = old->security; + struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; + + new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; + new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; } /** @@ -1136,12 +1214,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) */ static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { + struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid); if (smack == NULL) return -EINVAL; - new->security = smack; + new_tsp->smk_task = smack; return 0; } @@ -1157,8 +1236,10 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; + struct task_smack *tsp = new->security; - new->security = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; return 0; } @@ -1175,7 +1256,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), access, &ad); + return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad); } /** @@ -1221,7 +1302,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) */ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - *secid = smack_to_secid(task_security(p)); + *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p))); } /** @@ -1333,14 +1414,15 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, * can write the receiver. */ if (secid == 0) - return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, + &ad); /* * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing * we can't take privilege into account. */ - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), - MAY_WRITE, &ad); + return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), + smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad); } /** @@ -1352,12 +1434,12 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *sp = current_security(); - char *tsp = task_security(p); + char *sp = smk_of_current(); + char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p)); int rc; /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */ - rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); + rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); if (rc == 0) goto out_log; @@ -1378,7 +1460,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) out_log: smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); - smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); + smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); return rc; } @@ -1392,7 +1474,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; - isp->smk_inode = task_security(p); + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); } /* @@ -1411,7 +1493,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) */ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) { - char *csp = current_security(); + char *csp = smk_of_current(); struct socket_smack *ssp; ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags); @@ -1667,10 +1749,13 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, ssp->smk_in = sp; else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) { ssp->smk_out = sp; - rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); - if (rc != 0) - printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n", - __func__, -rc); + if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) { + rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); + if (rc != 0) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n", + __func__, -rc); + } } else return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -1749,7 +1834,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) */ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { - msg->security = current_security(); + msg->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1785,7 +1870,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm; - isp->security = current_security(); + isp->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -1908,7 +1993,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm; - isp->security = current_security(); + isp->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -2026,7 +2111,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm; - kisp->security = current_security(); + kisp->security = smk_of_current(); return 0; } @@ -2198,9 +2283,11 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) struct super_block *sbp; struct superblock_smack *sbsp; struct inode_smack *isp; - char *csp = current_security(); + char *csp = smk_of_current(); char *fetched; char *final; + char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE]; + int transflag = 0; struct dentry *dp; if (inode == NULL) @@ -2267,9 +2354,10 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) break; case SOCKFS_MAGIC: /* - * Casey says sockets get the smack of the task. + * Socket access is controlled by the socket + * structures associated with the task involved. */ - final = csp; + final = smack_known_star.smk_known; break; case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC: /* @@ -2296,7 +2384,16 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) /* * This isn't an understood special case. * Get the value from the xattr. - * + */ + + /* + * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data. + */ + if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { + final = smack_known_star.smk_known; + break; + } + /* * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label. * Use the aforeapplied default. * It would be curious if the label of the task @@ -2308,9 +2405,21 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * Get the dentry for xattr. */ dp = dget(opt_dentry); - fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp); - if (fetched != NULL) + fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); + if (fetched != NULL) { final = fetched; + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { + trattr[0] = '\0'; + inode->i_op->getxattr(dp, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, + trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE); + if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0) + transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + } + } + isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); + dput(dp); break; } @@ -2320,7 +2429,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) else isp->smk_inode = final; - isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; + isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag); unlockandout: mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock); @@ -2345,7 +2454,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) return -EINVAL; - cp = kstrdup(task_security(p), GFP_KERNEL); + cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL); if (cp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2369,6 +2478,8 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct task_smack *oldtsp; struct cred *new; char *newsmack; @@ -2398,34 +2509,46 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known) return -EPERM; + oldtsp = p->cred->security; new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - new->security = newsmack; + tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + if (tsp == NULL) { + kfree(new); + return -ENOMEM; + } + tsp->smk_task = newsmack; + tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked; + new->security = tsp; commit_creds(new); return size; } /** * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS - * @sock: one socket - * @other: the other socket + * @sock: one sock + * @other: the other sock * @newsk: unused * * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code */ -static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, - struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk) +static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, + struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock); - struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other); + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc = 0; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); - smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); - return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), - MAY_READWRITE, &ad); + smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); + + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + + return rc; } /** @@ -2438,13 +2561,18 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, */ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { - struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock); - struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other); + struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc = 0; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); - return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + + return rc; } /** @@ -2629,7 +2757,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, /** * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label - * @sock: the socket + * @sock: the peer socket * @skb: packet data * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet * @@ -2640,41 +2768,39 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, { struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; - struct sock *sk; + struct socket_smack *sp; char smack[SMK_LABELLEN]; - int family = PF_INET; - u32 s; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */ int rc; - /* - * Only works for families with packets. - */ - if (sock != NULL) { - sk = sock->sk; - if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) - return 0; - family = sk->sk_family; + if (skb != NULL) { + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; + else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + family = PF_INET6; } - /* - * Translate what netlabel gave us. - */ - netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); - if (rc == 0) - smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack); - netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL) + family = sock->sk->sk_family; - /* - * Give up if we couldn't get anything - */ - if (rc != 0) - return rc; - - s = smack_to_secid(smack); + if (family == PF_UNIX) { + sp = sock->sk->sk_security; + s = smack_to_secid(sp->smk_out); + } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { + /* + * Translate what netlabel gave us. + */ + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0) { + smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack); + s = smack_to_secid(smack); + } + netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + } + *secid = s; if (s == 0) return -EINVAL; - - *secid = s; return 0; } @@ -2695,7 +2821,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) return; ssp = sk->sk_security; - ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security(); + ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current(); /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */ } @@ -2816,7 +2942,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { - key->security = cred->security; + key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security); return 0; } @@ -2845,6 +2971,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, { struct key *keyp; struct smk_audit_info ad; + char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security); keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (keyp == NULL) @@ -2858,14 +2985,14 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, /* * This should not occur */ - if (cred->security == NULL) + if (tsp == NULL) return -EACCES; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY); ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description; #endif - return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, + return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ @@ -3067,6 +3194,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount, .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount, + .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds, + .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security, .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security, .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security, @@ -3203,9 +3332,16 @@ static __init void init_smack_know_list(void) static __init int smack_init(void) { struct cred *cred; + struct task_smack *tsp; - if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + if (tsp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) { + kfree(tsp); return 0; + } printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); @@ -3213,7 +3349,9 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) * Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred = (struct cred *) current->cred; - cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known; + tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known; + tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known; + cred->security = tsp; /* initialize the smack_know_list */ init_smack_know_list(); diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index dc1fd6239f2..362d5eda948 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ const char *smack_cipso_option = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION; * SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field * SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length */ -#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxa" -#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1) -#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN) +#define SMK_OACCESS "rwxa" +#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxat" +#define SMK_OACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1) +#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1) +#define SMK_OLOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN) +#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN) /** * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct @@ -121,7 +124,7 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) { nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security()); + nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current()); } /* @@ -175,6 +178,8 @@ static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) seq_putc(s, 'x'); if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND) seq_putc(s, 'a'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE) + seq_putc(s, 't'); if (srp->smk_access == 0) seq_putc(s, '-'); @@ -273,10 +278,15 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - if (*ppos != 0 || count != SMK_LOADLEN) + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * Minor hack for backward compatability + */ + if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN) return -EINVAL; - data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + data = kzalloc(SMK_LOADLEN, GFP_KERNEL); if (data == NULL) return -ENOMEM; @@ -285,6 +295,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; } + /* + * More on the minor hack for backward compatability + */ + if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN)) + data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-'; + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL); if (rule == NULL) { rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -345,6 +361,17 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out_free_rule; } + switch (data[SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + 4]) { + case '-': + break; + case 't': + case 'T': + rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE; + break; + default: + goto out_free_rule; + } + rc = smk_set_access(rule); if (!rc) @@ -1160,7 +1187,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char in[SMK_LABELLEN]; - char *sp = current->cred->security; + char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c index 1d0bf8fa192..d1e05b04771 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include "common.h" +#include "../../fs/internal.h" /** * tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string. |