summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c4
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c13
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c37
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c13
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c20
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c25
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c3
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c17
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/file.c1
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/memory.c1
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/mount.c3
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/util.c2
27 files changed, 117 insertions, 123 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95accd442d5..e0f08b52e4a 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT
config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default 32768 if ARM
default 65536
help
This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ae3a698415e..3d2fd141dff 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -593,7 +593,8 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
sa.aad.info = name;
sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
+ __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
&sa, NULL);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
@@ -611,7 +612,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
+ struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
int error = 0;
if (!unconfined(profile))
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 06d764ccbbe..94de6b4907c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
* @flags: flags controlling what type of accept tables are acceptable
*
* Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa
- * format look in Documentation/apparmor.txt
+ * format look in Documentation/security/apparmor.txt
* Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary
*
* Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index e33aaf7e574..d6d9a57b565 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*
- * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy.
- * To find policy format documentation look in Documentation/apparmor.txt
+ * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy. To find
+ * policy format documentation look in Documentation/security/apparmor.txt
* All policy is validated before it is used.
*/
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f20e984ccfb..a93b3b73307 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -529,15 +529,10 @@ skip:
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
- /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial
- * task. Thus we skip the usual capability rules
- */
- if (!is_global_init(current)) {
- if (effective)
- new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
- else
- cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
- }
+ if (effective)
+ new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
+ else
+ cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 8d9c48f1377..cd1f779fa51 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -62,8 +62,7 @@ static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task)
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys;
static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
- struct cgroup *new_cgroup, struct task_struct *task,
- bool threadgroup)
+ struct cgroup *new_cgroup, struct task_struct *task)
{
if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted.c
index 69907a58a68..b1cba5bf0a5 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 07a025f8190..f375152a250 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
- key_match_func_t match);
+ key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check);
extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred);
extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 427fddcaeb1..eca51918c95 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -206,8 +206,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
goto error5;
}
+ /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
+ ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error6;
+
ret = key->serial;
+error6:
key_put(key);
error5:
key_type_put(ktype);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index cdd2f3f88c8..a06ffab3856 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -176,13 +176,15 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
- rcu_read_lock();
- klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
- if (klist)
- seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
- else
- seq_puts(m, ": empty");
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+ if (klist)
+ seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+ else
+ seq_puts(m, ": empty");
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
* @type: The type of key to search for.
* @description: Parameter for @match.
* @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required.
+ * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad
*
* Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
* The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
@@ -303,7 +306,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
- key_match_func_t match)
+ key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check)
{
struct {
struct keyring_list *keylist;
@@ -345,6 +349,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
kflags = keyring->flags;
if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) {
key = keyring;
+ if (no_state_check)
+ goto found;
/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
* revoked */
@@ -384,11 +390,13 @@ descend:
continue;
/* skip revoked keys and expired keys */
- if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
- continue;
+ if (!no_state_check) {
+ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
+ continue;
- if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
- continue;
+ if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+ continue;
+ }
/* keys that don't match */
if (!match(key, description))
@@ -399,6 +407,9 @@ descend:
cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
+ if (no_state_check)
+ goto found;
+
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
err = key->type_data.reject_error;
@@ -478,7 +489,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
- type, description, type->match);
+ type, description, type->match, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 525cf8a29cd..49bbc97943a 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
lookup_user_key_possessed,
- cred);
+ true, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 930634e4514..a3063eb3dc2 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
const void *description,
key_match_func_t match,
+ bool no_state_check,
const struct cred *cred)
{
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
if (cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
- cred, type, description, match);
+ cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -459,7 +460,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
might_sleep();
- key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred);
+ key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
+ false, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
err = key_ref;
@@ -845,6 +847,7 @@ void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
new->user = get_uid(old->user);
+ new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
new->securebits = old->securebits;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index df3c0417ee4..d31862e0aa1 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -530,8 +530,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
dest_keyring, flags);
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
- key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
- cred);
+ key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 68164031a74..6cff37529b8 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
seq_puts(m, "key:");
seq_puts(m, key->description);
- seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
+ if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index c99b9368368..0c33e2ea1f3 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
- * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index c6ca8662a46..5b366d7af3c 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -69,18 +69,6 @@ error:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
/*
- * dispose of the old data from an updated user defined key
- */
-static void user_update_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload;
-
- upayload = container_of(rcu, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
-
- kfree(upayload);
-}
-
-/*
* update a user defined key
* - the key's semaphore is write-locked
*/
@@ -114,7 +102,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
key->expiry = 0;
}
- call_rcu(&zap->rcu, user_update_rcu_disposal);
+ kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
error:
return ret;
@@ -145,7 +133,7 @@ void user_revoke(struct key *key)
if (upayload) {
rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, NULL);
- call_rcu(&upayload->rcu, user_update_rcu_disposal);
+ kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
}
}
@@ -169,8 +157,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
-
- seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+ if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index ce742f1778e..d515b2128a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -38,11 +38,7 @@
#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
-#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \
-do { \
- per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, get_cpu()).field++; \
- put_cpu(); \
-} while (0)
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field)
#else
#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0)
#endif
@@ -347,11 +343,10 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (node)
- avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
- else
- avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
+ return node;
- return node;
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
+ return NULL;
}
static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
@@ -757,10 +752,9 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
- struct av_decision *in_avd)
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
- struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
@@ -769,20 +763,13 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- if (!node) {
+ if (unlikely(!node)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
-
- if (in_avd)
- avd = in_avd;
- else
- avd = &avd_entry;
-
security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
} else {
- if (in_avd)
- memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd));
+ memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
avd = &node->ae.avd;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a0d38459d65..20219ef5439 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1476,7 +1476,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
unsigned flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid;
validate_creds(cred);
@@ -1487,15 +1486,21 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
sid = cred_sid(cred);
isec = inode->i_security;
- if (!adp) {
- adp = &ad;
- COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
- ad.u.inode = inode;
- }
-
return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
}
+static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ u32 perms,
+ unsigned flags)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+ ad.u.inode = inode;
+ return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
+}
+
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
pathname if needed. */
@@ -2122,8 +2127,8 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
struct tty_file_private, list);
file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
- FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
+ if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
+ FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
@@ -3228,7 +3233,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
- return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
+ return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
}
/* task security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index e77b2ac2908..47fda963495 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ struct sk_buff;
*/
struct avc_cache_stats {
unsigned int lookups;
- unsigned int hits;
unsigned int misses;
unsigned int allocations;
unsigned int reclaims;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index d6095d63d83..58cc481c93d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -104,22 +104,6 @@ static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
}
/**
- * sel_netif_free - Frees an interface entry
- * @p: the entry's RCU field
- *
- * Description:
- * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu()
- * function so that memory allocated to a hash table interface entry can be
- * released safely.
- *
- */
-static void sel_netif_free(struct rcu_head *p)
-{
- struct sel_netif *netif = container_of(p, struct sel_netif, rcu_head);
- kfree(netif);
-}
-
-/**
* sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table
* @netif: the existing interface record
*
@@ -131,7 +115,7 @@ static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif)
{
list_del_rcu(&netif->list);
sel_netif_total--;
- call_rcu(&netif->rcu_head, sel_netif_free);
+ kfree_rcu(netif, rcu_head);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 19489042fdf..35459340019 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
length = -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
- goto out;;
+ goto out;
/* No partial writes. */
length = -EINVAL;
@@ -924,12 +924,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
if (length)
- goto out;;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con)
- goto out;;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
length = -ENOMEM;
scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
- goto out;;
+ goto out;
length = -ENOMEM;
tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1428,10 +1428,14 @@ static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims "
"frees\n");
- else
- seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", st->lookups,
- st->hits, st->misses, st->allocations,
+ else {
+ unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
+ unsigned int misses = st->misses;
+ unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups,
+ hits, misses, st->allocations,
st->reclaims, st->frees);
+ }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index c3e4b52699f..973e00e34fa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2217,10 +2217,11 @@ out_unlock:
goto out;
}
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+ struct av_decision dummy_avd;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
- NULL);
+ &dummy_avd);
if (!rc)
mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
cond_resched();
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 7556315c197..a0d09e56874 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -108,10 +108,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_flush(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
head->read_user_buf += len;
w += len;
}
- if (*w) {
- head->r.w[0] = w;
+ head->r.w[0] = w;
+ if (*w)
return false;
- }
/* Add '\0' for query. */
if (head->poll) {
if (!head->read_user_buf_avail ||
@@ -459,8 +458,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
if (profile == &tomoyo_default_profile)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment = profile->comment;
- profile->comment = tomoyo_get_name(cp);
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *new_comment
+ = tomoyo_get_name(cp);
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment;
+ if (!new_comment)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ spin_lock(&lock);
+ old_comment = profile->comment;
+ profile->comment = new_comment;
+ spin_unlock(&lock);
tomoyo_put_name(old_comment);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index cb09f1fce91..d64e8ecb6fb 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -1011,7 +1011,6 @@ int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path)
break;
case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR:
case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT:
- case TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT:
tomoyo_add_slash(&buf);
break;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c
index 297612669c7..42a7b1ba8cb 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
memset(data, 0, size);
return ptr;
}
+ kfree(ptr);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 82bf8c2390b..9fc2e15841c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -138,11 +138,12 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
}
if (need_dev) {
/* Get mount point or device file. */
- if (kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
+ if (!dev_name || kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
+ path_put(&path);
if (!requested_dev_name) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index 9bfc1ee8222..6d5393204d9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname)
if (!cp)
break;
if (*domainname != '/' ||
- !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname - 1))
+ !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname))
goto out;
domainname = cp + 1;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-01-02 14:58:29 +0000