diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/Kconfig | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/proc.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 102 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/Kconfig | 1 |
11 files changed, 147 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index d68c57a62bc..070dd46f62f 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -12,6 +12,29 @@ #include <linux/security.h> +static int cap_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_syslog(int type) { return 0; @@ -930,6 +953,10 @@ static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) { + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_set_context_mgr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transaction); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_binder); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 57515bc915c..df303346029 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS default y help This option requires that all keys added to the .ima diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index a4f3f8c48d6..72483b8f1be 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -80,21 +80,3 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. - -config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" - depends on KEYS - help - This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which - can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the - reading process. - - The only keys included in the list are those that grant View - permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them. - Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further - filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. - - Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in - the resulting table. - - If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 972eeb336b8..f0611a6368c 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ #include <asm/errno.h> #include "internal.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos); static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos); @@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = { .llseek = seq_lseek, .release = seq_release, }; -#endif static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos); @@ -67,11 +65,9 @@ static int __init key_proc_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *p; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS p = proc_create("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops); if (!p) panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n"); -#endif p = proc_create("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops); if (!p) @@ -86,8 +82,6 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init); * Implement "/proc/keys" to provide a list of the keys on the system that * grant View permission to the caller. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p); @@ -275,8 +269,6 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */ - static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n) { while (n) { diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0c7aea4dea5..486ef6fa393 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ link_check_failed: link_prealloc_failed: mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock); + key_put(key); kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret); return ret; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 18b35c63fc0..e81d5bbe736 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -135,6 +135,29 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops) /* Security operations */ +int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + return security_ops->binder_set_context_mgr(mgr); +} + +int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return security_ops->binder_transaction(from, to); +} + +int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return security_ops->binder_transfer_binder(from, to); +} + +int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file); +} + int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED @@ -726,16 +749,15 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return prot | PROT_EXEC; /* * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need - * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case */ if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MMU - unsigned long caps = 0; - struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; - if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) - caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; - if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) - return prot; + if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { + unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); + if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) + return prot; + } #endif return prot | PROT_EXEC; } diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index a18f1fa6440..afcc0aed939 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -517,11 +517,6 @@ out: return rc; } -static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y) -{ - return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD); -} - /** * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry * @event : Updating event diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6da7532893a..29c39e0b03e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -401,23 +401,14 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; - if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK) - return 1; - - /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ - if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) - return 1; - - /* - * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports - * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes. - */ - if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0) - return 1; - - return 0; + return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK || + /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs"); } static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) @@ -456,10 +447,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); - else - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", - sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, - labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) @@ -1933,6 +1920,74 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) /* Hook functions begin here. */ +static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + u32 mysid = current_sid(); + u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr); + + return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, + BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + u32 mysid = current_sid(); + u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); + u32 tosid = task_sid(to); + int rc; + + if (mysid != fromsid) { + rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, + BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, + NULL); +} + +static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); + u32 tosid = task_sid(to); + + return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, + NULL); +} + +static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, + struct file *file) +{ + u32 sid = task_sid(to); + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; + struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct common_audit_data ad; + int rc; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; + ad.u.path = file->f_path; + + if (sid != fsec->sid) { + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, + SECCLASS_FD, + FD__USE, + &ad); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), + &ad); +} + static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { @@ -5810,6 +5865,11 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .name = "selinux", + .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr, + .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction, + .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder, + .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file, + .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check, .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, .capget = selinux_capget, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index be491a74c1e..eccd61b3de8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -151,5 +151,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } }, + { "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer", + NULL } }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index bc2a586f095..74aa224267c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -289,12 +289,16 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p) goto out; p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10)); - if (!p->filename_trans) + if (!p->filename_trans) { + rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; + } p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256); - if (!p->range_tr) + if (!p->range_tr) { + rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; + } ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes); ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig index 8eb779b9d77..604e718d68d 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig +++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO select SECURITYFS select SECURITY_PATH select SECURITY_NETWORK + select SRCU default n help This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control. |