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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig9
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c57
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c6
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c5
-rw-r--r--security/inode.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c23
-rw-r--r--security/security.c66
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c26
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c4
11 files changed, 170 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index a79b23f73d0..bf129f87de7 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
IPSec.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_PATH
+ bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ help
+ This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+ If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+ implement pathname based access controls.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
default n
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2dce66fcb99..c545bd1300b 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -263,6 +263,53 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*secid = 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ unsigned int dev)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+ unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -883,6 +930,16 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
+#endif
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f0e671dcfff..7cd61a5f520 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error;
- if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+ if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
return 0;
error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
+ if (!inode->i_op->removexattr)
return 0;
return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
- if (!inode || !inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+ if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
return -ENODATA;
size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps,
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 5ba78701adc..3aacd0fe717 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -513,11 +513,14 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
+ if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
+ return 0;
+
rcu_read_lock();
dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
- list_for_each_entry(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
goto acc_check;
if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode))
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index b41e708147a..f3b91bfbe4c 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -61,9 +61,6 @@ static struct inode *get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode, dev_t dev)
if (inode) {
inode->i_mode = mode;
- inode->i_uid = 0;
- inode->i_gid = 0;
- inode->i_blocks = 0;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
default:
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 09796797d12..b1ec3b4ee17 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
* - returns the new key's serial number
* - implements add_key()
*/
-asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
- const char __user *_description,
- const void __user *_payload,
- size_t plen,
- key_serial_t ringid)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
+ const char __user *, _description,
+ const void __user *, _payload,
+ size_t, plen,
+ key_serial_t, ringid)
{
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
char type[32], *description;
@@ -146,10 +146,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
* - if the _callout_info string is empty, it will be rendered as "-"
* - implements request_key()
*/
-asmlinkage long sys_request_key(const char __user *_type,
- const char __user *_description,
- const char __user *_callout_info,
- key_serial_t destringid)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
+ const char __user *, _description,
+ const char __user *, _callout_info,
+ key_serial_t, destringid)
{
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *key;
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
/* join the session */
ret = join_session_keyring(name);
+ kfree(name);
error:
return ret;
@@ -1216,8 +1217,8 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
/*
* the key control system call
*/
-asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
+ unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
{
switch (option) {
case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a02f243f09c..c3586c0d97e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -373,6 +373,72 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+int security_path_mknod(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ unsigned int dev)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_mknod(path, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
+
+int security_path_mkdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_mkdir(path, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+int security_path_rmdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_rmdir(path, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_unlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_unlink(path, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_symlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_symlink(path, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
+ (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+ new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+ unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs);
+}
+#endif
+
int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 77fb3c8d926..01ec6d2c6b9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -847,8 +847,6 @@ static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
if (ret) {
ret->i_mode = mode;
- ret->i_uid = ret->i_gid = 0;
- ret->i_blocks = 0;
ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
}
return ret;
@@ -1211,7 +1209,7 @@ static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
{
int cpu;
- for (cpu = *idx; cpu < NR_CPUS; ++cpu) {
+ for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
*idx = cpu + 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 343c8ab14af..c65e4fe4a0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2602,7 +2602,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
- if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
@@ -2736,10 +2736,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
break;
}
@@ -2747,10 +2747,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
break;
}
@@ -2758,10 +2758,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
break;
}
@@ -2774,31 +2774,31 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
&ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
- case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_equal:
match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
level);
break;
- case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_not_equal:
match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
level);
break;
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+ case Audit_lt:
match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
level) &&
!mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
level));
break;
- case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_le:
match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
level);
break;
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+ case Audit_gt:
match = (mls_level_dom(level,
&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
!mls_level_eq(level,
&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
break;
- case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ case Audit_ge:
match = mls_level_dom(level,
&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
break;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6bfaba6177c..0278bc08304 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return -EINVAL;
- if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
return -EINVAL;
*rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
@@ -2755,9 +2755,9 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
* both pointers will point to the same smack_known
* label.
*/
- if (op == AUDIT_EQUAL)
+ if (op == Audit_equal)
return (rule == smack);
- if (op == AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ if (op == Audit_not_equal)
return (rule != smack);
return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index bf107a389ac..8e42800878f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
break;
case 'a':
case 'A':
- rule.smk_access |= MAY_READ;
+ rule.smk_access |= MAY_APPEND;
break;
default:
goto out;
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (skp == NULL)
goto out;
- rule += SMK_LABELLEN;;
+ rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
goto out;
generated by cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 (git 2.46.0) at 2024-11-16 21:07:01 +0000