diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 73 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 52 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 |
10 files changed, 155 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index d68c57a62bc..070dd46f62f 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -12,6 +12,29 @@ #include <linux/security.h> +static int cap_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_syslog(int type) { return 0; @@ -930,6 +953,10 @@ static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) { + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_set_context_mgr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transaction); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_binder); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 2915d850305..f66713bd745 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -434,7 +434,6 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data */ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) { - struct dentry *dentry; int rc = 0; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; @@ -446,9 +445,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) return 0; - dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_path.dentry); - - rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); if (rc < 0) { if (rc == -EINVAL) printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", @@ -464,7 +461,6 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c __func__, rc, bprm->filename); out: - dput(dentry); if (rc) bprm_clear_caps(bprm); diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index b76235ae478..73c457bf5a4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ config INTEGRITY if INTEGRITY config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE - boolean "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" + bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" depends on KEYS default n select SIGNATURE @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE usually only added from initramfs. config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support" + bool "Enable asymmetric keys support" depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE default n select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index df586fa00ef..bf19723cf11 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ config EVM - boolean "EVM support" + bool "EVM support" select KEYS select ENCRYPTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0c7aea4dea5..486ef6fa393 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ link_check_failed: link_prealloc_failed: mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock); + key_put(key); kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret); return ret; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 18b35c63fc0..e81d5bbe736 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -135,6 +135,29 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops) /* Security operations */ +int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + return security_ops->binder_set_context_mgr(mgr); +} + +int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return security_ops->binder_transaction(from, to); +} + +int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + return security_ops->binder_transfer_binder(from, to); +} + +int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file); +} + int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED @@ -726,16 +749,15 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return prot | PROT_EXEC; /* * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need - * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case */ if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MMU - unsigned long caps = 0; - struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; - if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info) - caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities; - if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP)) - return prot; + if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { + unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); + if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) + return prot; + } #endif return prot | PROT_EXEC; } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 87a915656ea..29c39e0b03e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1920,6 +1920,74 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) /* Hook functions begin here. */ +static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) +{ + u32 mysid = current_sid(); + u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr); + + return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, + BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + u32 mysid = current_sid(); + u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); + u32 tosid = task_sid(to); + int rc; + + if (mysid != fromsid) { + rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, + BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, + NULL); +} + +static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +{ + u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); + u32 tosid = task_sid(to); + + return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, + NULL); +} + +static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, + struct file *file) +{ + u32 sid = task_sid(to); + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; + struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct common_audit_data ad; + int rc; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; + ad.u.path = file->f_path; + + if (sid != fsec->sid) { + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, + SECCLASS_FD, + FD__USE, + &ad); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), + &ad); +} + static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { @@ -5797,6 +5865,11 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .name = "selinux", + .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr, + .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction, + .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder, + .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file, + .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check, .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, .capget = selinux_capget, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index be491a74c1e..eccd61b3de8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -151,5 +151,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } }, + { "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer", + NULL } }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 33db1ad4fd1..1684bcc78b3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1195,30 +1195,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = { static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de) { - struct list_head *node; - - spin_lock(&de->d_lock); - node = de->d_subdirs.next; - while (node != &de->d_subdirs) { - struct dentry *d = list_entry(node, struct dentry, d_child); - - spin_lock_nested(&d->d_lock, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED); - list_del_init(node); - - if (d->d_inode) { - dget_dlock(d); - spin_unlock(&de->d_lock); - spin_unlock(&d->d_lock); - d_delete(d); - simple_unlink(de->d_inode, d); - dput(d); - spin_lock(&de->d_lock); - } else - spin_unlock(&d->d_lock); - node = de->d_subdirs.next; - } - - spin_unlock(&de->d_lock); + d_genocide(de); + shrink_dcache_parent(de); } #define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans" @@ -1668,37 +1646,13 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, return rc; } -static void sel_remove_classes(void) -{ - struct list_head *class_node; - - list_for_each(class_node, &class_dir->d_subdirs) { - struct dentry *class_subdir = list_entry(class_node, - struct dentry, d_child); - struct list_head *class_subdir_node; - - list_for_each(class_subdir_node, &class_subdir->d_subdirs) { - struct dentry *d = list_entry(class_subdir_node, - struct dentry, d_child); - - if (d->d_inode) - if (d->d_inode->i_mode & S_IFDIR) - sel_remove_entries(d); - } - - sel_remove_entries(class_subdir); - } - - sel_remove_entries(class_dir); -} - static int sel_make_classes(void) { int rc, nclasses, i; char **classes; /* delete any existing entries */ - sel_remove_classes(); + sel_remove_entries(class_dir); rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses); if (rc) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index a0ccce4e46f..ed94f6f836e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3818,6 +3818,18 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + /* + * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label. + * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO. + * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better. + */ + if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) { + skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark); + goto access_check; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ + netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); if (rc == 0) @@ -3826,6 +3838,10 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, skp = &smack_known_huh; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER +access_check: +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); ad.a.u.net->family = family; |