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Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after
rebasing on 3.2.
Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according
to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as
raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible
(at least passwords with characters > 0xFF).
The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with
ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which
relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also
uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so
it will work as expected.)
Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Tested-by: A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and
non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste
code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the
vectorized one.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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...it's more efficient since we know the length.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares.
cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly.
All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2
"Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM,
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName)
as
Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion,
Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)"
is MsvAvNbDomainName.
For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from
type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication.
I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against
Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7.
They all worked.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed
out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the
signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the
same way.
It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested
against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as
possible here.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log
an error and return from the calling function with error.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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When signing is enabled, the first session that's established on a
socket will cause a printk like this to pop:
CIFS VFS: Unexpected SMB signature
This is because the key exchange hasn't happened yet, so the signature
field is bogus. Don't try to check the signature on the socket until the
first session has been established. Also, eliminate the specific check
for SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE since this check covers that case too.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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secMode to sec_mode
and
cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon
and
cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001
length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as
u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its
native form) before sending on the wire. To remove the last sparse
endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2
implementation (which always treats the fields in their
native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to
be32.
This version incorporates Christoph's comment about
using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second
version of the patch.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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local cifs functions (repost)
Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation
instead of local functions within cifs.
Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which
uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs.
Remove function SMBOWFencrypt.
Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash,
SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt. Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
CC: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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While testing my patchset to fix asynchronous writes, I hit a bunch
of signature problems when testing with signing on. The problem seems
to be that signature checks on receive can be running at the same
time as a process that is sending, or even that multiple receives can
be checking signatures at the same time, clobbering the same data
structures.
While we're at it, clean up the comments over cifs_calculate_signature
and add a note that the srv_mutex should be held when calling this
function.
This patch seems to fix the problems for me, but I'm not clear on
whether it's the best approach. If it is, then this should probably
go to stable too.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle
larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name
string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure.
Also clean up old checkpatch warning.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Missed one change as per earlier suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs.
As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in
file md4.c are not needed anymore.
Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations,
and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included.
Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Replace remaining use of md5 hash functions local to cifs module
with kernel crypto APIs.
Remove header and source file containing those local functions.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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The server->sequence_number is already protected by the srv_mutex. The
GlobalMid_lock is unneeded here.
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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authentication
Removed following fields from smb session structure
cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob
and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech
in NTLMSSP.
response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the
target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP
or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store
Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response).
Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication
is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed
once authenticaiton process is done.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection
(struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which
cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol
response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over
that smb connection.
For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every
smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey
provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection
does not count.
Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label
In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory,
let the tiblob get freed.
For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer
instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function.
For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the
response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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signatures
Use kernel crypto sync hash apis insetead of cifs crypto functions.
The calls typically corrospond one to one except that insead of
key init, setkey is used.
Use crypto apis to generate smb signagtures also.
Use hmac-md5 to genereate ntlmv2 hash, ntlmv2 response, and HMAC (CR1 of
ntlmv2 auth blob.
User crypto apis to genereate signature and to verify signature.
md5 hash is used to calculate signature.
Use secondary key to calculate signature in case of ntlmssp.
For ntlmv2 within ntlmssp, during signature calculation, only 16 bytes key
(a nonce) stored within session key is used. during smb signature calculation.
For ntlm and ntlmv2 without extended security, 16 bytes key
as well as entire response (24 bytes in case of ntlm and variable length
in case of ntlmv2) is used for smb signature calculation.
For kerberos, there is no distinction between key and response.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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needed for key exchange
Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig.
Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store
crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection
and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures.
Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective
contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established.
Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down.
md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used
throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that
calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc.
structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection.
ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of
secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key
field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp
negotiation/exchange
A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in
type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp
negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in
type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field.
The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using
ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4.
Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within
the server structure needs to be zero until session is established
i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first
smb session on that smb connection is sent.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Start calculating auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet
data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in
a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session
before copying session key and response over to server data
structures because a session setup can fail.
Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copy/make its
session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with
the smb connection throughout its life.
sequence_number within server is set to 0x2.
The authentication Message Authentication Key (mak) which consists
of session key followed by client response within structure session_key
is now dynamic. Every authentication type allocates the key + response
sized memory within its session structure and later either assigns or
frees it once the client response is sent and if session's session key
becomes connetion's session key.
ntlm/ntlmi authentication functions are rearranged. A function
named setup_ntlm_resp(), similar to setup_ntlmv2_resp(), replaces
function cifs_calculate_session_key().
size of CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE is changed to 16, to reflect the byte size
of the key it holds.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Start calculation auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet
data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in
a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session
before copying session key and response over to server data
structures because a session setup can fail.
Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copies/makes its
session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with
the smb connection throughout its life.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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ntlmv2 without extended security authentication
Build an av pair blob as part of ntlmv2 (without extended security) auth
request. Include netbios and dns names for domain and server and
a timestamp in the blob.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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find_domain_name() uses load_nls_default which takes a module reference
on the appropriate NLS module, but doesn't put it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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the key it holds
Change name of variable mac_key to session key.
The reason mac_key was changed to session key is, this structure does not
hold message authentication code, it holds the session key (for ntlmv2,
ntlmv1 etc.). mac is generated as a signature in cifs_calc* functions.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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This function is not used, so remove the definition and declaration.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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This reverts commit 9fbc590860e75785bdaf8b83e48fabfe4d4f7d58.
The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp
series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series
to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
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This reverts commit 3ec6bbcdb4e85403f2c5958876ca9492afdf4031.
The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp
series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series
to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
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This reverts commit 2d20ca835867d93ead6ce61780d883a4b128106d.
The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp
series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series
to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
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Eliminiate sparse warning during usage of crypto_shash_* APIs
error: bad constant expression
Allocate memory for shash descriptors once, so that we do not kmalloc/kfree it
for every signature generation (shash descriptor for md5 hash).
From ed7538619817777decc44b5660b52268077b74f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 11:47:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] eliminate sparse warnings during crypto_shash_* APis usage
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Make ntlmv2 as an authentication mechanism within ntlmssp
instead of ntlmv1.
Parse type 2 response in ntlmssp negotiation to pluck
AV pairs and use them to calculate ntlmv2 response token.
Also, assign domain name from the sever response in type 2
packet of ntlmssp and use that (netbios) domain name in
calculation of response.
Enable cifs/smb signing using rc4 and md5.
Changed name of the structure mac_key to session_key to reflect
the type of key it holds.
Use kernel crypto_shash_* APIs instead of the equivalent cifs functions.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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...since that more accurately describes what that variable holds.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Neaten cERROR and cFYI macros, reduce text space
~2.5K
Convert '__FILE__ ": " fmt' to '"%s: " fmt', __FILE__' to save text space
Surround macros with do {} while
Add parentheses to macros
Make statement expression macro from macro with assign
Remove now unnecessary parentheses from cFYI and cERROR uses
defconfig with CIFS support old
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
156012 1760 148 157920 268e0 fs/cifs/built-in.o
defconfig with CIFS support old
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
153508 1760 148 155416 25f18 fs/cifs/built-in.o
allyesconfig old:
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
309138 3864 74824 387826 5eaf2 fs/cifs/built-in.o
allyesconfig new
$ size fs/cifs/built-in.o
text data bss dec hex filename
305655 3864 74824 384343 5dd57 fs/cifs/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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in function calc_ntlmv2_hash memory is not released.
1. If in the line 333 we successfully allocate memory and assign it to
pctxt variable:
pctxt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct HMACMD5Context), GFP_KERNEL);
then we go to line 376 and exit wihout releasing memory pointed to by pctxt
variable.
Add a memory releasing for pctxt variable before exit from function
calc_ntlmv2_hash.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Strakh <strakh@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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When rt modules were added they (each) included their own md5
with names which collided with the existing names of cifs's md5 functions.
Renaming cifs's md5 modules so we don't collide with them.
> Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> When CIFS is built-in (=y) and staging/rt28[67]0 =y, there are multiple
> definitions of:
>
> build-r8250.out:(.text+0x1d8ad0): multiple definition of `MD5Init'
> build-r8250.out:(.text+0x1dbb30): multiple definition of `MD5Update'
> build-r8250.out:(.text+0x1db9b0): multiple definition of `MD5Final'
>
> all of which need to have more unique identifiers for their global
> symbols (e.g., rt28_md5_init, cifs_md5_init, foo, blah, bar).
>
CC: Greg K-H <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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cifs: have calc_lanman_hash take more granular args
We need to use this routine to encrypt passwords associated with the
tcon too. Don't assume that the password will be attached to the
smb_session.
Also, make some of the values in the lower encryption functions
const since they aren't changed.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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The last eight bytes of the password field were not cleared when doing lanman plaintext password authentication. This patch fixes that.
I tested it with Samba by setting password
encryption to no in the server's smb.conf. Other servers also can be
configured to force plaintext authentication. Note that plaintexti
authentication requires setting /proc/fs/cifs/SecurityFlags to 0x30030
on the client (enabling both LANMAN and also plaintext password support).
Also note that LANMAN support (and thus plaintext password support) requires
CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH to be enabled in menuconfig.
CC: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
CC: Stable Kernel <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Acked-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Currently, cifs_calc_signature2 errors out if it gets a zero-length
iovec. Fix it to silently continue in that case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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This should be the last big batch of whitespace/formatting fixes.
checkpatch warnings for the cifs directory are down about 90% and
many of the remaining ones are harder to remove or make the code
harder to read.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Yehuda Sadeh Weinraub <Yehuda.Sadeh@expand.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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More whitespace problems found by checkpatch
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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Windows servers are pickier about NTLMv2 than Samba.
This enables more secure mounts to Windows (not just Samba)
ie when "sec=ntlmv2" is specified on the mount.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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