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This patch is inspired by Arjan's "Patch series to mark struct
file_operations and struct inode_operations const".
Compile tested with gcc & sparse.
Signed-off-by: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Many struct inode_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Call flush_dcache_page() after modifying a pagecache by hand.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Open-code flag checking and manipulation.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace kmap() with kmap_atomic(). Reduce the amount of time that mappings
are held.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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sys_write() takes a local copy of f_pos and writes that back
into the struct file. It does this so that two concurrent write()
callers don't make a mess of f_pos, and of the file contents.
ecryptfs should be calling vfs_write(). That way we also get the fsnotify
notifications, which ecryptfs presently appears to have subverted.
Convert direct calls to f_op->write() into calls to vfs_write().
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Provide an option to provide a view of the encrypted files such that the
metadata is always in the header of the files, regardless of whether the
metadata is actually in the header or in the extended attribute. This mode of
operation is useful for applications like incremental backup utilities that do
not preserve the extended attributes when directly accessing the lower files.
With this option enabled, the files under the eCryptfs mount point will be
read-only.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for
now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the
lower file.
[akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix]
[bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch set introduces the ability to store cryptographic metadata into an
lower file extended attribute rather than the lower file header region.
This patch set implements two new mount options:
ecryptfs_xattr_metadata
- When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic
metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather
than the header.
When storing the data in the file header, there is a minimum of 8KB
reserved for the header information for each file, making each file at
least 12KB in size. This can take up a lot of extra disk space if the user
creates a lot of small files. By storing the data in the extended
attribute, each file will only occupy at least of 4KB of space.
As the eCryptfs metadata set becomes larger with new features such as
multi-key associations, most popular filesystems will not be able to store
all of the information in the xattr region in some cases due to space
constraints. However, the majority of users will only ever associate one
key per file, so most users will be okay with storing their data in the
xattr region.
This option should be used with caution. I want to emphasize that the
xattr must be maintained under all circumstances, or the file will be
rendered permanently unrecoverable. The last thing I want is for a user to
forget to set an xattr flag in a backup utility, only to later discover
that their backups are worthless.
ecryptfs_encrypted_view
- When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a
view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were
stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored
in the header or in the extended attributes.
No matter what eCryptfs winds up doing in the lower filesystem, I want
to preserve a baseline format compatibility for the encrypted files. As of
right now, the metadata may be in the file header or in an xattr. There is
no reason why the metadata could not be put in a separate file in future
versions.
Without the compatibility mode, backup utilities would have to know to
back up the metadata file along with the files. The semantics of eCryptfs
have always been that the lower files are self-contained units of encrypted
data, and the only additional information required to decrypt any given
eCryptfs file is the key. That is what has always been emphasized about
eCryptfs lower files, and that is what users expect. Providing the
encrypted view option will provide a way to userspace applications wherein
they can always get to the same old familiar eCryptfs encrypted files,
regardless of what eCryptfs winds up doing with the metadata behind the
scenes.
This patch:
Add extended attribute support to version bit vector, flags to indicate when
xattr or encrypted view modes are enabled, and support for the new mount
options.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that
contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the
previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request
packets from the userspace daemon.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs. It
manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.
Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK). Under passphrase, a File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
combo on mount. This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440. This is all
symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.
These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK. There is no
asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon. After
considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.
eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring. These tokens
correlate with individual keys. For passphrase mode of operation, the
authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK. For public key, the
authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
individual PKI modules in userspace.
Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
mode must be running a daemon. That daemon has the user's credentials and has
access to all of the keys to which the user should have access. The daemon,
when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module. Userspace utilities
register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
blobs. The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.
When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
(signature). The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.
The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
packet parsing and manages PKI modules. libecryptfs grabs the public key
authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
the PKI block from the auth tok. The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
the decrypted data back to libecryptfs. libecryptfs then puts together a
reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
module.
The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
message context structs. The module maintains an array of message context
structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
allocated list. When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
off the message to the user's registered daemon.
When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself. The
msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs. It verifies
that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
the message. It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
and the msg ctx. Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.
The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open(). This process
originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
ecryptfs_wait_for_response(). When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
packet) and returns. If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
normal.
The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.
> - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel. Why is that
> not suitable (or growable) for public key management?
eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
information. It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
code. The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
management in and of itself. What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
based on the UID. Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
that channel of communication.
> - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
> management be private to a particular fs?
The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
into a separate kernel service. In essence, this would be a sort of
request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon. I am not aware
of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
existing tools to do just what we wanted.
> What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
> message?
There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user. When
the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
generates a new one. See ecryptfs_process_helo().
> - _why_ does it use netlink?
Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user). I
explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
channels for the daemons. We do not have to worry about any of that with
netlink.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch removes the old cipher interface and related code.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Change all the uses of f_{dentry,vfsmnt} to f_path.{dentry,mnt} in the
ecryptfs filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Convert eCryptfs dentry-vfsmount pairs in dentry private data to struct
path.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Replace eCryptfs specific code & calls with the more generic fsstack
equivalents and remove the eCryptfs specific functions.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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SLAB_USER is an alias of GFP_USER
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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The return value of crypto_alloc_blkcipher() should be checked by IS_ERR().
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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When CIFS is the lower filesystem, the old lower dentry needs to be explicitly
dropped from inside eCryptfs to force a revalidate. In addition, when CIFS is
the lower filesystem, the inode attributes need to be copied back up from the
lower inode to the eCryptfs inode on an eCryptfs revalidate.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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On rename, for both the old and new lower dentry objects, eCryptfs is
missing a dput on the lower parent directory dentry. This patch will
prevent the BUG() at fs/dcache.c:613 from being hit after renaming a file
inside eCryptfs and then doing a umount on the lower filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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I missed a pointer dereference in this kmalloc result check.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Fix the use of dget/dput calls to balance out on the lower filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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There is no point to calling the lower umount_begin when the eCryptfs
umount_begin is called.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Opens on lower dentry objects happen in several places in eCryptfs, and they
all involve the same steps (dget, mntget, dentry_open). This patch
consolidates the lower open events into a single function call.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Update cipher block encryption code to the new crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Update eCryptfs hash code to the new kernel crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Clean up the crypto initialization code; let the crypto API take care of the
key size checks.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Use the special_file() macro to check whether an inode is special instead of
open-coding it.
Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux. It is derived from
Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating
stacked filesystems. eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key
management and policy features. eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the
header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between
hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need
to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the
encrypted file itself.
[akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes]
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates]
[pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates]
[rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes]
[akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven]
Signed-off-by: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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