| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
got rid of compilation warning:
ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code
Signed-off-by: Cordelia Sam <cordesam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Sorry, I miss a blank between if and "(".
And I add "unlikely" to check "ctx" in audit_match_perm() and audit_match_filetype().
This is a new patch for it.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
When calling audit_filter_task(), it calls audit_filter_rules() with audit_context is NULL.
If the key field is set, the result in audit_filter_rules() will be set to 1 and
ctx->filterkey will be set to key.
But the ctx is NULL in this condition, so kernel will panic.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Makes the kernel audit subsystem collect information about the sending
process when that process sends SIGUSR2 to the userspace audit daemon.
SIGUSR2 is a new interesting signal to auditd telling auditd that it
should try to start logging to disk again and the error condition which
caused it to stop logging to disk (usually out of space) has been
rectified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This adds a fast path for 64-bit syscall entry and exit when
TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is set, but no other kind of syscall tracing.
This path does not need to save and restore all registers as
the general case of tracing does. Avoiding the iret return path
when syscall audit is enabled helps performance a lot.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
|
|
Argument is S_IF... | <index>, where index is normally 0 or 1.
Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the
mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument.
I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory",
etc.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Use msglen as the identifier.
kernel/audit.c:724:10: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one
kernel/audit.c:575:8: originally declared here
Don't use ino_f to check the inode field at the end of the functions.
kernel/auditfilter.c:429:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:420:21: originally declared here
kernel/auditfilter.c:542:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:529:21: originally declared here
i always used as a counter for a for loop and initialized to zero before
use. Eliminate the inner i variables.
kernel/auditsc.c:1295:8: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
kernel/auditsc.c:1320:7: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Leave audit_sig_{uid|pid|sid} protected by #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
Noticed by sparse:
kernel/audit.c:73:6: warning: symbol 'audit_ever_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:100:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_uid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:101:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_pid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:102:6: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_sid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:117:23: warning: symbol 'audit_ih' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/auditfilter.c:78:18: warning: symbol 'audit_filter_list' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace
changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy
work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use:
void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n);
void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf);
void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n);
void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string);
This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that
people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we
still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
A couple of audit printk statements did not have a newline.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.
Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match
instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
kfree(ctx)
and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
|
|
Fix the following compiler warning by using "%zu" as defined in C99.
CC kernel/auditsc.o
kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_log_single_execve_arg':
kernel/auditsc.c:1074: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but
argument 4 has type 'size_t'
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Clearly this was supposed to be an == not an = in the if statement.
This patch also causes us to stop processing execve args once we have
failed rather than continuing to loop on failure over and over and over.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code. To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
* Use struct path in fs_struct.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Disabling audit at runtime by auditctl doesn't mean that we can
stop allocating contexts for new processes; we don't want to miss them
when that sucker is reenabled.
(based on work from Al Viro in the RHEL kernel series)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
execve arguments can be quite large. There is no limit on the number of
arguments and a 4G limit on the size of an argument.
this patch prints those aruguments in bite sized pieces. a userspace size
limitation of 8k was discovered so this keeps messages around 7.5k
single arguments larger than 7.5k in length are split into multiple records
and can be identified as aX[Y]=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
If we fail to get an ab in audit_log_pid_context this may be due to an exclude
rule rather than a memory allocation failure. If it was due to a memory
allocation failue we would have already paniced and no need to do it again.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
This patch adds an end of event record type. It will be sent by the kernel as
the last record when a multi-record event is triggered. This will aid realtime
analysis programs since they will now reliably know they have the last record
to complete an event. The audit daemon filters this and will not write it to
disk.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb redhat com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is
labeled ses= or oses=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
Add uid, loginuid, and comm collection to OBJ_PID records. This just
gives users a little more information about the task that received a
signal. pid is rather meaningless after the fact, and even though comm
isn't great we can't collect exe reasonably on this code path for
performance reasons.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
The syscall exit code will change ERESTART* kernel internal return codes
to EINTR if it does not restart the syscall. Since we collect the audit
info before that point we should fix those in the audit log as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
Keeping loginuid in audit_context is racy and results in messier
code. Taken to task_struct, out of the way of ->audit_context
changes.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
all callers pass something->audit_context
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Fix kernel-doc for auditsc parameter changes.
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1623): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1666): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@mvista.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
kernel/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This will allow rpc.gssd to use inotify instead of dnotify in order to
locate new rpc upcall pipes.
This also requires the exporting of __audit_inode_child(), which is used by
fsnotify_create() and fsnotify_mkdir(). Ccing David Woodhouse.
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
|
This patch fixes an off-by-one in a BUG_ON() spotted by the Coverity
checker.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Cc: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The check for audit_signals is misplaced and the check for
audit_dummy_context() is missing; as the result, if we send a signal to
auditd from task with NULL ->audit_context while we have audit_signals
!= 0 we end up with an oops.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied, hence 0 is the
expected output.
axi->mm might not be valid anymore when not equal to current->mm, do not
dereference before checking that - thanks to Al for spotting that.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Tested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled. I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.
Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem. IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record. It's trivial to do.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
The mode fields for IPC records are not consistent. Some are hex, others are
octal. This patch makes them all octal.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Remove the arg+env limit of MAX_ARG_PAGES by copying the strings directly from
the old mm into the new mm.
We create the new mm before the binfmt code runs, and place the new stack at
the very top of the address space. Once the binfmt code runs and figures out
where the stack should be, we move it downwards.
It is a bit peculiar in that we have one task with two mm's, one of which is
inactive.
[a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl: limit stack size]
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
[bunk@stusta.de: unexport bprm_mm_init]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The purpose of audit_bprm() is to log the argv array to a userspace daemon at
the end of the execve system call. Since user-space hasn't had time to run,
this array is still in pristine state on the process' stack; so no need to
copy it, we can just grab it from there.
In order to minimize the damage to audit_log_*() copy each string into a
temporary kernel buffer first.
Currently the audit code requires that the full argument vector fits in a
single packet. So currently it does clip the argv size to a (sysctl) limit,
but only when execve auditing is enabled.
If the audit protocol gets extended to allow for multiple packets this check
can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com>
Cc: <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fix parameter name in audit_core_dumps for kerneldoc.
Signed-off-by: Henrik Kretzschmar <henne@nachtwindheim.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Hi,
I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Make more effort to detect previously collected names, so we don't log
multiple PATH records for a single filesystem object. Add
audit_inc_name_count() to reduce duplicate code.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Handle the edge cases for POSIX message queue auditing. Collect inode
info when opening an existing mq, and for send/receive operations. Remove
audit_inode_update() as it has really evolved into the equivalent of
audit_inode().
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Audit contexts can be reused, so initialize a name's osid to the
default in audit_getname(). This ensures we don't log a bogus object
label when no inode data is collected for a name.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
GFP_KERNEL allocations in non-blocking context; fixed by killing
an idiotic use of security_getprocattr().
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Provide an audit record of the descriptor pair returned by pipe() and
socketpair(). Rewritten from the original posted to linux-audit by
John D. Ramsdell <ramsdell@mitre.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
