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When pfkey has no km listeners, it still does a lot of work
before finding out there aint nobody out there.
If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make
a sound? In this case it makes a lot of noise:
With this short-circuit adding 10s of thousands of SAs using
netlink improves performance by ~10%.
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This propagates the xfrm_user fix made in commit
bcf0dda8d2408fe1c1040cdec5a98e5fcad2ac72 ("[XFRM]: xfrm_user: fix
selector family initialization")
Based upon a bug report from, and tested by, Alan Swanson.
Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was
available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of
netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages
so we can audit who sent netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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net/key/af_key.c: In function ‘pfkey_spddelete’:
net/key/af_key.c:2359: warning: ‘pol_ctx’ may be used uninitialized in
this function
When CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM isn't set,
security_xfrm_policy_alloc() is an inline that doesn't set pol_ctx, so
this seemed like the easiest fix short of using *uninitialized_var(pol_ctx).
Signed-off-by: Brian Haley <brian.haley@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As it stands it's impossible to use any authentication algorithms
with an ID above 31 portably. It just happens to work on x86 but
fails miserably on ppc64.
The reason is that we're using a bit mask to check the algorithm
ID but the mask is only 32 bits wide.
After looking at how this is used in the field, I have concluded
that in the long term we should phase out state matching by IDs
because this is made superfluous by the reqid feature. For current
applications, the best solution IMHO is to allow all algorithms when
the bit masks are all ~0.
The following patch does exactly that.
This bug was identified by IBM when testing on the ppc64 platform
using the NULL authentication algorithm which has an ID of 251.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs
on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that
problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security"
pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the
security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
Conflicts:
drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
drivers/net/wireless/b43/dma.c
net/ipv6/ndisc.c
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Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Stop dumping of entries when af_key socket receive queue is getting
full and continue it later when there is more room again.
This fixes dumping of large databases. Currently the entries not
fitting into the receive queue are just dropped (including the
end-of-dump message) which can confuse applications.
Signed-off-by: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Change xfrm_policy and xfrm_state walking algorithm from O(n^2) to O(n).
This is achieved adding the entries to one more list which is used
solely for walking the entries.
This also fixes some races where the dump can have duplicate or missing
entries when the SPD/SADB is modified during an ongoing dump.
Dumping SADB with 20000 entries using "time ip xfrm state" the sys
time dropped from 1.012s to 0.080s.
Signed-off-by: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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To make sure the procfs visibility occurs after the ->proc_fs ops are
setup, use proc_net_fops_create() and proc_net_remove().
This also fixes an OOPS after module unload in that the name string
for remove was wrong, so it wouldn't actually be removed. That bug
was introduced by commit 61145aa1a12401ac71bcc450a58c773dd6e2bfb9
("[KEY]: Clean up proc files creation a bit.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch fix a BUG when adding spds which have same selector.
Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The seq files API disposes the caller of the difficulty of
checking file position, the length of data to produce and
the size of provided buffer.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Mainly this removes ifdef-s from inside the ipsec_pfkey_init.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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all callers pass something->audit_context
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Since __xfrm_policy_destroy is used to destory the resources
allocated by xfrm_policy_alloc. So using the name
__xfrm_policy_destroy is not correspond with xfrm_policy_alloc.
Rename it to xfrm_policy_destroy.
And along with some instances that call xfrm_policy_alloc
but not using xfrm_policy_destroy to destroy the resource,
fix them.
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The aalgos/ealgos fields are only 32 bits wide. However, af_key tries
to test them with the expression 1 << id where id can be as large as
253. This produces different behaviour on different architectures.
The following patch explicitly checks whether ID is greater than 31
and fails the check if that's the case.
We cannot easily extend the mask to be longer than 32 bits due to
exposure to user-space. Besides, this whole interface is obsolete
anyway in favour of the xfrm_user interface which doesn't use this
bit mask in templates (well not within the kernel anyway).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The change 050f009e16f908932070313c1745d09dc69fd62b
[IPSEC]: Lock state when copying non-atomic fields to user-space
caused a regression.
Ingo Molnar reports that it causes a potential dead-lock found by the
lock validator as it tries to take x->lock within xfrm_state_lock while
numerous other sites take the locks in opposite order.
For 2.6.24, the best fix is to simply remove the added locks as that puts
us back in the same state as we've been in for years. For later kernels
a proper fix would be to reverse the locking order for every xfrm state
user such that if x->lock is taken together with xfrm_state_lock then
it is to be taken within it.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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From: Charles Hardin <chardin@2wire.com>
Kernel needs to respond to an SADB_GET with the same message type to
conform to the RFC 2367 Section 3.1.5
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Finally, the zero_it argument can be completely removed from
the callers and from the function prototype.
Besides, fix the checkpatch.pl warnings about using the
assignments inside if-s.
This patch is rather big, and it is a part of the previous one.
I splitted it wishing to make the patches more readable. Hope
this particular split helped.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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On PowerPC allmodconfig build we get this:
net/key/af_key.c:400: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch adds locking so that when we're copying non-atomic fields such as
life-time or coaddr to user-space we don't get a partial result.
For af_key I've changed every instance of pfkey_xfrm_state2msg apart from
expiration notification to include the keys and life-times. This is in-line
with XFRM behaviour.
The actual cases affected are:
* pfkey_getspi: No change as we don't have any keys to copy.
* key_notify_sa:
+ ADD/UPD: This wouldn't work otherwise.
+ DEL: It can't hurt.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch moves some common code that conceptually belongs to the xfrm core
from af_key/xfrm_user into xfrm_alloc_spi.
In particular, the spin lock on the state is now taken inside xfrm_alloc_spi.
Previously it also protected the construction of the response PF_KEY/XFRM
messages to user-space. This is inconsistent as other identical constructions
are not protected by the state lock. This is bad because they in fact should
be protected but only in certain spots (so as not to hold the lock for too
long which may cause packet drops).
The SPI byte order conversion has also been moved.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch passes in the namespace a new socket should be created in
and has the socket code do the appropriate reference counting. By
virtue of this all socket create methods are touched. In addition
the socket create methods are modified so that they will fail if
you attempt to create a socket in a non-default network namespace.
Failing if we attempt to create a socket outside of the default
network namespace ensures that as we incrementally make the network stack
network namespace aware we will not export functionality that someone
has not audited and made certain is network namespace safe.
Allowing us to partially enable network namespaces before all of the
exotic protocols are supported.
Any protocol layers I have missed will fail to compile because I now
pass an extra parameter into the socket creation code.
[ Integrated AF_IUCV build fixes from Andrew Morton... -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch makes /proc/net per network namespace. It modifies the global
variables proc_net and proc_net_stat to be per network namespace.
The proc_net file helpers are modified to take a network namespace argument,
and all of their callers are fixed to pass &init_net for that argument.
This ensures that all of the /proc/net files are only visible and
usable in the initial network namespace until the code behind them
has been updated to be handle multiple network namespaces.
Making /proc/net per namespace is necessary as at least some files
in /proc/net depend upon the set of network devices which is per
network namespace, and even more files in /proc/net have contents
that are relevant to a single network namespace.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch modifies the current ipsec audit layer
by breaking it up into purpose driven audit calls.
So far, the only audit calls made are when add/delete
an SA/policy. It had been discussed to give each
key manager it's own calls to do this, but I found
there to be much redundnacy since they did the exact
same things, except for how they got auid and sid, so I
combined them. The below audit calls can be made by any
key manager. Hopefully, this is ok.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Although an ipsec SA was established, kernel couldn't seem to find it.
I think since we are now using "x->sel.family" instead of "family" in
the xfrm_selector_match() called in xfrm_state_find(), af_key needs to
set this field too, just as xfrm_user.
In af_key.c, x->sel.family only gets set when there's an
ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY-1] which I think is for tunnel.
I think pfkey needs to also set the x->sel.family field when it is 0.
Tested with below patch, and ipsec worked when using pfkey.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and
SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete())
However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks
patch.
This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and
SPD. It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial.
If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the
entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error
without removing anything.
This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete
its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that
same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the
entire database.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This is a natural extension of the changeset
[XFRM]: Probe selected algorithm only.
which only removed the probe call for xfrm_user. This patch does exactly
the same thing for af_key. In other words, we load the algorithm requested
by the user rather than everything when adding xfrm states in af_key.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Spring cleaning time...
There seems to be a lot of places in the network code that have
extra bogus semicolons after conditionals. Most commonly is a
bogus semicolon after: switch() { }
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For the common, open coded 'skb->h.raw = skb->data' operation, so that we can
later turn skb->h.raw into a offset, reducing the size of struct sk_buff in
64bit land while possibly keeping it as a pointer on 32bit.
This one touches just the most simple cases:
skb->h.raw = skb->data;
skb->h.raw = {skb_push|[__]skb_pull}()
The next ones will handle the slightly more "complex" cases.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Make sure to actually assign the determined mode to
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode.
Noticed by Joe Perches.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We should not blindly convert between IPSEC_MODE_xxx and XFRM_MODE_xxx just
by incrementing / decrementing because the assumption is not true any longer.
Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Singed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
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Inside pfkey_delete and xfrm_del_sa the audit hooks were not called if
there was any permission/security failures in attempting to do the del
operation (such as permission denied from security_xfrm_state_delete).
This patch moves the audit hook to the exit path such that all failures
(and successes) will actually get audited.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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pfkey_spdget neither had an LSM security hook nor auditing for the
removal of xfrm_policy structs. The security hook was added when it was
moved into xfrm_policy_byid instead of the callers to that function by
my earlier patch and this patch adds the auditing hooks as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were
actually done after the policy was removed. Since the unlinking and
deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks
inside those 2 functions. There we have all the information needed to
do the security check and it can be done before the deletion. Since
auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed
back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions.
This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security
check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy
(xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken
by xfrm_policy_by*)
It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in
xfrm_add_pol_expire. In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err
wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the
initialization would cause err to be ENOENT. But since err has since
been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by*
function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT. Also
fixed some white space damage in the same area.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Make sure that this function is called correctly, and
add BUG() checking to ensure the arguments are sane.
Based upon a patch by Joy Latten.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Extend PF_KEYv2 framework so that user application can take advantage
of MIGRATE feature via PF_KEYv2 interface. User application can either
send or receive an MIGRATE message to/from PF_KEY socket.
Detail information can be found in the internet-draft
<draft-sugimoto-mip6-pfkey-migrate>.
Signed-off-by: Shinta Sugimoto <shinta.sugimoto@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Sub policy can be used through netlink socket.
PF_KEY uses main only and it is TODO to support sub.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Transformation mode is used as either IPsec transport or tunnel.
It is required to add two more items, route optimization and inbound trigger
for Mobile IPv6.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
This patch was also written by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the
same as the socket they are set on.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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