Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"This is basically a maintenance update for the TPM driver and EVM/IMA"
Fix up conflicts in lib/digsig.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (45 commits)
tpm/ibmvtpm: build only when IBM pseries is configured
ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys
ima: rename hash calculation functions
ima: use new crypto_shash API instead of old crypto_hash
ima: add policy support for file system uuid
evm: add file system uuid to EVM hmac
tpm_tis: check pnp_acpi_device return code
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: drop temporary variable for return value
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: remove dead assignment in tpm_st33_i2c_probe
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove __devexit attribute
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Don't use memcpy for one byte assignment
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: removed unused variables/code
TPM: Wait for TPM_ACCESS tpmRegValidSts to go high at startup
tpm: Fix cancellation of TPM commands (interrupt mode)
tpm: Fix cancellation of TPM commands (polling mode)
tpm: Store TPM vendor ID
TPM: Work around buggy TPMs that block during continue self test
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: fix oops when i2c client is unavailable
char/tpm: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
TPM: STMicroelectronics ST33 I2C BUILD STUFF
...
|
|
Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.
Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.
While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.
Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done
using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Rename hash calculation functions to reflect meaning
and change argument order in conventional way.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Old crypto hash API internally uses shash API.
Using shash API directly is more efficient.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
The IMA policy permits specifying rules to enable or disable
measurement/appraisal/audit based on the file system magic number.
If, for example, the policy contains an ext4 measurement rule,
the rule is enabled for all ext4 partitions.
Sometimes it might be necessary to enable measurement/appraisal/audit
only for one partition and disable it for another partition of the
same type. With the existing IMA policy syntax, this can not be done.
This patch provides support for IMA policy rules to specify the file
system by its UUID (eg. fsuuid=397449cd-687d-4145-8698-7fed4a3e0363).
For partitions not being appraised, it might be a good idea to mount
file systems with the 'noexec' option to prevent executing non-verified
binaries.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
EVM uses the same key for all file systems to calculate the HMAC,
making it possible to paste inodes from one file system on to another
one, without EVM being able to detect it. To prevent such an attack,
it is necessary to make the EVM HMAC file system specific.
This patch uses the file system UUID, a file system unique identifier,
to bind the EVM HMAC to the file system. The value inode->i_sb->s_uuid
is used for the HMAC hash calculation, instead of using it for deriving
the file system specific key. Initializing the key for every inode HMAC
calculation is a bit more expensive operation than adding the uuid to
the HMAC hash.
Changing the HMAC calculation method or adding additional info to the
calculation, requires existing EVM labeled file systems to be relabeled.
This patch adds a Kconfig HMAC version option for backwards compatability.
Changelog v1:
- squash "hmac version setting"
Changelog v0:
- add missing Kconfig depends (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Different hooks can require different methods for appraising a
file's integrity. As a result, an integrity appraisal status is
cached on a per hook basis.
Only a hook specific rule, requires the inode to be re-appraised.
This patch eliminates unnecessary appraisals.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
|
|
With the new IMA policy 'appraise_type=' option, different hooks
can require different methods for appraising a file's integrity.
For example, the existing 'ima_appraise_tcb' policy defines a
generic rule, requiring all root files to be appraised, without
specfying the appraisal method. A more specific rule could require
all kernel modules, for example, to be signed.
appraise fowner=0 func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
appraise fowner=0
As a result, the integrity appraisal results for the same inode, but
for different hooks, could differ. This patch caches the integrity
appraisal results on a per hook basis.
Changelog v2:
- Rename ima_cache_status() to ima_set_cache_status()
- Rename and move get_appraise_status() to ima_get_cache_status()
Changelog v0:
- include IMA_APPRAISE/APPRAISED_SUBMASK in IMA_DO/DONE_MASK (Dmitry)
- Support independent MODULE_CHECK appraise status.
- fixed IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE/APPRAISED flags
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
|
|
In preparation for hook specific appraise status results, increase
the iint flags size.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
|
|
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature. This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type. It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'. (Default is hash.)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
The following lines of code produce a kernel oops.
fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
fchmod(fd, 0666);
[ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000
[ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP
[ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button
[ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs
[ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0
[ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2
[ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4
[ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0
[ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000)
[ 139.924982] Stack:
[ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940
[ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3
[ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08
[ 139.924982] Call Trace:
[ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62
[ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26
[ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281
[ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76
[ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33
[ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c
[ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value.
This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation.
Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is
not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
This patch forbids write access to files with digital signatures, as they
are considered immutable.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Define a new function ima_d_path(), which returns the full pathname.
This function will be used further, for example, by the directory
verification code.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
This patch reduces size of the iint structure by 8 bytes.
It saves about 15% of iint cache memory.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Rename FILE_MMAP hook to MMAP_CHECK to be consistent with the other
hook names.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Hexdump is not really helping. Audit messages prints error messages.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Based on the IMA appraisal policy, files are appraised. For those
files appraised, the IMA hooks return the integrity appraisal result,
assuming IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode. This patch combines
both of these criteria (in policy and enforcing file integrity),
removing the checking duplication.
Changelog v1:
- Update hook comments
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
When a file system is mounted read-only, setting the xattr value in
fix mode fails with an error code -EROFS. The xattr should be fixed
after the file system is remounted read-write. This patch verifies
that the set xattr succeeds, before setting the appraise status value
to INTEGRITY_PASS.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
EVM cannot be built as a kernel module. Remove the unncessary __exit
functions.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
stale LSM policy. This patch updates the IMA LSM based rules
to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
Reported-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
tested-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
|
|
The new kernel module syscall appraises kernel modules based
on policy. If the IMA policy requires kernel module checking,
fallback to module signature enforcing for the existing syscall.
Without CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled, the kernel module's
integrity is unknown, return -EACCES.
Changelog v1:
- Fix ima_module_check() return result (Tetsuo Handa)
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two
arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL
terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and
appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system.
This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an
extensible and consistent manner.
To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional
patches could pass the signature as the first parameter.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
|
|
mask argument goes first, then func, like ima_must_measure
and ima_get_action. ima_inode_post_setattr() assumes that.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
|
|
Use kuid's in the IMA rules.
When reporting the current uid in audit logs use from_kuid
to get a usable value.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
IMA audit hashes patches introduced new IMA flags and required
space went beyond 8 bits. Currently the only flag is IMA_DIGSIG.
This patch use 16 bit short instead of 8 bit char.
Without this fix IMA signature will be replaced with hash, which
should not happen.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
This adds an 'audit' policy action which audit logs file measurements.
Changelog v6:
- use new action flag handling (Dmitry Kasatkin).
- removed whitespace (Mimi)
Changelog v5:
- use audit_log_untrustedstring.
Changelog v4:
- cleanup digest -> hash conversion.
- use filename rather than d_path in ima_audit_measurement.
Changelog v3:
- Use newly exported audit_log_task_info for logging pid/ppid/uid/etc.
- Update the ima_policy ABI documentation.
Changelog v2:
- Use 'audit' action rather than 'measure_and_audit' to permit
auditing in the absence of measuring..
Changelog v1:
- Initial posting.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Make the IMA action flag handling generic in order to support
additional new actions, without requiring changes to the base
implementation. New actions, like audit logging, will only
need to modify the define statements.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
When AUDIT action support is added to the IMA,
ima_must_appraise_or_measure() does not reflect the real meaning anymore.
Rename it to ima_get_action().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
This patch adds support for digital signature based integrity appraisal.
With this patch, 'security.ima' contains either the file data hash or
a digital signature of the file data hash. The file data hash provides
the security attribute of file integrity. In addition to file integrity,
a digital signature provides the security attribute of authenticity.
Unlike EVM, when the file metadata changes, the digital signature is
replaced with an HMAC, modification of the file data does not cause the
'security.ima' digital signature to be replaced with a hash. As a
result, after any modification, subsequent file integrity appraisals
would fail.
Although digitally signed files can be modified, but by not updating
'security.ima' to reflect these modifications, in essence digitally
signed files could be considered 'immutable'.
IMA uses a different keyring than EVM. While the EVM keyring should not
be updated after initialization and locked, the IMA keyring should allow
updating or adding new keys when upgrading or installing packages.
Changelog v4:
- Change IMA_DIGSIG to hex equivalent
Changelog v3:
- Permit files without any 'security.ima' xattr to be labeled properly.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
IMA-appraisal currently verifies the integrity of a file based on a
known 'good' measurement value. This patch reserves the first byte
of 'security.ima' as a place holder for the type of method used for
verifying file data integrity.
Changelog v1:
- Use the newly defined 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security'
xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone
can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
Changelog v1:
- Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr()
functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c)
Changelog:
- take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or
removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
(Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu)
- Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags,
forcing re-appraisal.
- Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs
- ima_protect_xattr should be static
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
|
|
For performance, replace the iint spinlock with rwlock/read_lock.
Eric Paris questioned this change, from spinlocks to rwlocks, saying
"rwlocks have been shown to actually be slower on multi processor
systems in a number of cases due to the cache line bouncing required."
Based on performance measurements compiling the kernel on a cold
boot with multiple jobs with/without this patch, Dmitry Kasatkin
and I found that rwlocks performed better than spinlocks, but very
insignificantly. For example with total compilation time around 6
minutes, with rwlocks time was 1 - 3 seconds shorter... but always
like that.
Changelog v2:
- new patch taken from the 'allocating iint improvements' patch
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
With IMA-appraisal's removal of the iint mutex and taking the i_mutex
instead, allocating the iint becomes a lot simplier, as we don't need
to be concerned with two processes racing to allocate the iint. This
patch cleans up and improves performance for allocating the iint.
- removed redundant double i_mutex locking
- combined iint allocation with tree search
Changelog v2:
- removed the rwlock/read_lock changes from this patch
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Unlike the IMA measurement policy, the appraise policy can not be dependent
on runtime process information, such as the task uid, as the 'security.ima'
xattr is written on file close and must be updated each time the file changes,
regardless of the current task uid.
This patch extends the policy language with 'fowner', defines an appraise
policy, which appraises all files owned by root, and defines 'ima_appraise_tcb',
a new boot command line option, to enable the appraise policy.
Changelog v3:
- separate the measure from the appraise rules in order to support measuring
without appraising and appraising without measuring.
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
- update default appraise policy for cgroups
Changelog v1:
- don't appraise RAMFS (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- merged rest of "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" commit
(Dmtiry Kasatkin)
ima_must_appraise_or_measure() called ima_match_policy twice, which
searched the policy for a matching rule. Once for a matching measurement
rule and subsequently for an appraisal rule. Searching the policy twice
is unnecessary overhead, which could be noticeable with a large policy.
The new version of ima_must_appraise_or_measure() does everything in a
single iteration using a new version of ima_match_policy(). It returns
IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
With the use of action mask only one efficient matching function
is enough. Removed other specific versions of matching functions.
Changelog:
- change 'owner' to 'fowner' to conform to the new LSM conditions posted by
Roberto Sassu.
- fix calls to ima_log_string()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
|
|
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
|
|
Enable tpm_ibmvtpm driver by default when IMA is enabled on PPC64
Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
IMA auditing code was compiled even when CONFIG_AUDIT was not enabled.
This patch compiles auditing code only when possible and enabled.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Set ima_initialized only if initialization was successful.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Exclude DEVPTS and BINFMT filesystems from the measurement policy.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
IMA cannot be used as module and does not need __exit functions.
Removed them.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
On ima_fs_init() error, free securityfs violations file.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
The IMA measurement list contains filename hints, which can be
ambigious without the full pathname. This patch replaces the
filename hint with the full pathname, simplifying for userspace
the correlating of file hash measurements with files.
Change log v1:
- Revert to short filenames, when full pathname is longer than IMA
measurement buffer size. (Based on Dmitry's review)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
When IMA was first upstreamed, the bprm filename and interp were
always the same. Currently, the bprm->filename and bprm->interp
are the same, except for when only bprm->interp contains the
interpreter name. So instead of using the bprm->filename as
the IMA filename hint in the measurement list, we could replace
it with bprm->interp, but this feels too fragil.
The following patch is not much better, but at least there is some
indication that sometimes we're passing the filename and other times
the interpreter name.
Reported-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
Fix IMA kconfig warning on non-X86 architectures:
warning: (IMA) selects TCG_TIS which has unmet direct dependencies
(TCG_TPM && X86)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
The audit res field ususally indicates success with a 1 and 0 for a
failure. So make IMA do it the same way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
|
|
Don't measure ramfs files.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|
|
Fix the following build warning:
warning: (IMA) selects TCG_TPM which has unmet direct dependencies
(HAS_IOMEM && EXPERIMENTAL)
Suggested-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
|