| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs
on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that
problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security"
pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the
security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Smack doesn't have the need to create a private copy of the LSM "domain" when
setting NetLabel security attributes like SELinux, however, the current
NetLabel code requires a private copy of the LSM "domain". This patches fixes
that by letting the LSM determine how it wants to pass the domain value.
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
The current behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a copy and
frees it when done
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN
New, Smack-friendly behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a
reference to a string managed by the LSM and does not free it when done
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
|
|
Handle files opened with flags 3 by checking ioctl permission.
Default to returning FILE__IOCTL from file_to_av() if the f_mode has neither
FMODE_READ nor FMODE_WRITE, and thus check ioctl permission on exec or
transfer, thereby validating such descriptors early as with normal r/w
descriptors and catching leaks of them prior to attempted usage.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Introduce per-net_device inlines: dev_net(), dev_net_set().
Without CONFIG_NET_NS, no namespace other than &init_net exists.
Let's explicitly define them to help compiler optimizations.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
|
|
Older smackfs was parsing MAC rules by characters, thus a need of locking
write sessions on open() was needed. This lock is no longer useful now since
each rule is handled by a single write() call.
This is also a bugfix since seq_open() was not called if an open() O_RDWR flag
was given, leading to a seq_read() without an initialized seq_file, thus an
Oops.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().
One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Earlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In the SYSV ipc msgctl(),semctl(),shmctl() family, if the user passed *_INFO
as the desired operation, no specific object is meant to be controlled and
only system-wide information is returned. This leads to a NULL IPC object in
the LSM hooks if the _INFO flag is given.
Avoid dereferencing this NULL pointer in Smack ipc *ctl() methods.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch makes the needlessly global selinux_parse_opts_str() static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Smackfs write() implementation does not put a higher bound on the number of
bytes to copy from user-space. This may lead to a DOS attack if a malicious
`count' field is given.
Assure that given `count' is exactly the length needed for a /smack/load rule.
In case of /smack/cipso where the length is relative, assure that `count'
does not exceed the size needed for a buffer representing maximum possible
number of CIPSO 2.2 categories.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module"
as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based
capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Simplify the uid equivalence check in cap_task_kill(). Anyone can kill a
process owned by the same uid.
Without this patch wireshark is reported to fail.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets by
specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming unlabeled
packets.
Because the other end of the connection may dislike IP options, and ssh
is one know application that behaves thus, it is prudent to respond in
kind.
This patch changes the network labeling behavior such that an outgoing
packet that would be given a CIPSO label that matches the ambient label
is left unlabeled. An "unlbl" domain is added and the netlabel
defaulting mechanism invoked rather than assuming that everything is
CIPSO. Locking has been added around changes to the ambient label as
the mechanisms used to do so are more involved.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code. To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There's a small problem with smack and NFS. A similar report was also
sent here: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/27/85
I've also added similar checks in inode_{get/set}security(). Cheating from
SELinux post_create_socket(), it does the same.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove uneeded BUG_ON()]
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schuafler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fix SELinux to handle 64-bit capabilities correctly, and to catch
future extensions of capabilities beyond 64 bits to ensure that SELinux
is properly updated.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Convert instances of ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(p)) to ERR_CAST(p) using:
perl -spi -e 's/ERR_PTR[(]PTR_ERR[(](.*)[)][)]/ERR_CAST(\1)/' `grep -rl 'ERR_PTR[(]*PTR_ERR' fs crypto net security`
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The security_get_policycaps() functions has a couple of bugs in it and it
isn't currently used by any in-tree code, so get rid of it and all of it's
bugginess.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
|
|
Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't
be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to
set a default at compile time. This value is still tunable after boot
in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
Discussion:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow.
Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl,
but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By
default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.
This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are
enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements,
CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.
One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until
device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is
best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.
The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only
affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s. It also does not affect pI,
and exec() does not constrain pI'. So to really start a shell with no way
of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do
prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);
cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
cap_value_t caparray[1];
caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD;
cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);
cap_set_proc(cap);
cap_free(cap);
The following test program will get and set the bounding
set (but not pI). For instance
./bset get
(lists capabilities in bset)
./bset drop cap_net_raw
(starts shell with new bset)
(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
file capabilities to try to increase caps)
************************************************************
cap_bound.c
************************************************************
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#endif
#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
#endif
int usage(char *me)
{
printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
printf(" %s drop <capability>\n", me);
return 1;
}
#define numcaps 32
char *captable[numcaps] = {
"cap_chown",
"cap_dac_override",
"cap_dac_read_search",
"cap_fowner",
"cap_fsetid",
"cap_kill",
"cap_setgid",
"cap_setuid",
"cap_setpcap",
"cap_linux_immutable",
"cap_net_bind_service",
"cap_net_broadcast",
"cap_net_admin",
"cap_net_raw",
"cap_ipc_lock",
"cap_ipc_owner",
"cap_sys_module",
"cap_sys_rawio",
"cap_sys_chroot",
"cap_sys_ptrace",
"cap_sys_pacct",
"cap_sys_admin",
"cap_sys_boot",
"cap_sys_nice",
"cap_sys_resource",
"cap_sys_time",
"cap_sys_tty_config",
"cap_mknod",
"cap_lease",
"cap_audit_write",
"cap_audit_control",
"cap_setfcap"
};
int getbcap(void)
{
int comma=0;
unsigned long i;
int ret;
printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
printf("capability bounding set:");
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
if (ret < 0)
perror("prctl");
else if (ret==1)
printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
}
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
int capdrop(char *str)
{
unsigned long i;
int found=0;
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
found=1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return 1;
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
perror("prctl");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc<2)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0)
return getbcap();
if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
printf("unknown capability\n");
return 1;
}
return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
************************************************************
[serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a
Signed-off-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities. If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.
FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Revert b68680e4731abbd78863063aaa0dca2a6d8cc723 to make way for the next
patch: "Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel".
We want to keep the vfs_cap_data.data[] structure, using two 'data's for
64-bit caps (and later three for 96-bit caps), whereas
b68680e4731abbd78863063aaa0dca2a6d8cc723 had gotten rid of the 'data' struct
made its members inline.
The 64-bit caps patch keeps the stack abuse fix at get_file_caps(), which was
the more important part of that patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.
Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.
The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is
labeled ses= or oses=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
|
all callers pass something->audit_context
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
As pointed out by Adrian Bunk, commit
45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70 ("fix memory leak in netlabel
code") caused a double-free when security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
fails. This patch fixes this by removing the netlbl_secattr_destroy()
call from that function since we are already releasing the secattr
memory in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Capabilities have long been the default when CONFIG_SECURITY=n,
and its help text suggests turning it on when CONFIG_SECURITY=y.
But it is set to default n.
Default it to y instead.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
selinux_set_mnt_opts() can become static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Currently network traffic can be sliently dropped due to non-avc errors which
can lead to much confusion when trying to debug the problem. This patch adds
warning messages so that when these events occur there is a user visible
notification.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow
SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into
and out of the system. Currently SELinux does not have proper control over
forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.
Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased. In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed. These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.
NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.
This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and
additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes. Also,
bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies
by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
functions
This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information. However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff. This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
function
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
"static" or "fallback" labels. In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
NetLabel kernel API.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
The IPv4 and IPv6 hook values are identical, yet some code tries to figure
out the "correct" value by looking at the address family. Introduce NF_INET_*
values for both IPv4 and IPv6. The old values are kept in a #ifndef __KERNEL__
section for userspace compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel
the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials. Fix
security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied
by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...".
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
selinux: make mls_compute_sid always polyinstantiate
security/selinux: constify function pointer tables and fields
security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook
security: call security_file_permission from rw_verify_area
security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook
Security: remove security.h include from mm.h
Security: remove security_file_mmap hook sparse-warnings (NULL as 0).
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information
security/selinux: Add missing "space"
|
|
There is no need for kobject_unregister() anymore, thanks to Kay's
kobject cleanup changes, so replace all instances of it with
kobject_put().
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
kernel_kset does not need to be a kset, but a much simpler kobject now
that we have kobj_attributes.
We also rename kernel_kset to kernel_kobj to catch all users of this
symbol with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
Dynamically create the kset instead of declaring it statically. We also
rename kernel_subsys to kernel_kset to catch all users of this symbol
with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
|
We don't need a kset here, a simple kobject will do just fine, so
dynamically create the kobject and use it.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
