From 93544cc6486bea12e127ed58ca33477bb6ceafe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve French Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 22:30:52 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] CIFS: fix cifs_user_read oops when null SMB response on forcedirectio mount This patch fixes an oops reported by Adrian Bunk in cifs_user_read when a null read response is returned on a forcedirectio mount. Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/cifs/file.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/file.c b/fs/cifs/file.c index d17c97d07c8..675bd256829 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/file.c +++ b/fs/cifs/file.c @@ -1442,13 +1442,15 @@ ssize_t cifs_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *read_data, &bytes_read, &smb_read_data, &buf_type); pSMBr = (struct smb_com_read_rsp *)smb_read_data; - if (copy_to_user(current_offset, - smb_read_data + 4 /* RFC1001 hdr */ - + le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset), - bytes_read)) { - rc = -EFAULT; - } if (smb_read_data) { + if (copy_to_user(current_offset, + smb_read_data + + 4 /* RFC1001 length field */ + + le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset), + bytes_read)) { + rc = -EFAULT; + } + if(buf_type == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER) cifs_small_buf_release(smb_read_data); else if(buf_type == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER) -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From ee68cea2c26b7a8222f9020f54d22c6067011e8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 01:34:23 -0800 Subject: [NETFILTER]: Fix xfrm lookup after SNAT To find out if a packet needs to be handled by IPsec after SNAT, packets are currently rerouted in POST_ROUTING and a new xfrm lookup is done. This breaks SNAT of non-unicast packets to non-local addresses because the packet is routed as incoming packet and no neighbour entry is bound to the dst_entry. In general, it seems to be a bad idea to replace the dst_entry after the packet was already sent to the output routine because its state might not match what's expected. This patch changes the xfrm lookup in POST_ROUTING to re-use the original dst_entry without routing the packet again. This means no policy routing can be used for transport mode transforms (which keep the original route) when packets are SNATed to match the policy, but it looks like the best we can do for now. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_standalone.c | 6 ++--- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h index fdc4a952734..43c09d790b8 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ enum nf_ip_hook_priorities { #ifdef __KERNEL__ extern int ip_route_me_harder(struct sk_buff **pskb); - +extern int ip_xfrm_me_harder(struct sk_buff **pskb); #endif /*__KERNEL__*/ #endif /*__LINUX_IP_NETFILTER_H*/ diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter.c index 52a3d7c5790..ed42cdc57cd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter.c @@ -78,6 +78,47 @@ int ip_route_me_harder(struct sk_buff **pskb) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_route_me_harder); +#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM +int ip_xfrm_me_harder(struct sk_buff **pskb) +{ + struct flowi fl; + unsigned int hh_len; + struct dst_entry *dst; + + if (IPCB(*pskb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return 0; + if (xfrm_decode_session(*pskb, &fl, AF_INET) < 0) + return -1; + + dst = (*pskb)->dst; + if (dst->xfrm) + dst = ((struct xfrm_dst *)dst)->route; + dst_hold(dst); + + if (xfrm_lookup(&dst, &fl, (*pskb)->sk, 0) < 0) + return -1; + + dst_release((*pskb)->dst); + (*pskb)->dst = dst; + + /* Change in oif may mean change in hh_len. */ + hh_len = (*pskb)->dst->dev->hard_header_len; + if (skb_headroom(*pskb) < hh_len) { + struct sk_buff *nskb; + + nskb = skb_realloc_headroom(*pskb, hh_len); + if (!nskb) + return -1; + if ((*pskb)->sk) + skb_set_owner_w(nskb, (*pskb)->sk); + kfree_skb(*pskb); + *pskb = nskb; + } + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_xfrm_me_harder); +#endif + void (*ip_nat_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *, struct flowi *); EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_nat_decode_session); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_standalone.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_standalone.c index 92c54999a19..7c3f7d38024 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_standalone.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_standalone.c @@ -235,19 +235,19 @@ ip_nat_out(unsigned int hooknum, return NF_ACCEPT; ret = ip_nat_fn(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn); +#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM if (ret != NF_DROP && ret != NF_STOLEN && (ct = ip_conntrack_get(*pskb, &ctinfo)) != NULL) { enum ip_conntrack_dir dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); if (ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip != ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.ip -#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM || ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all != ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u.all -#endif ) - return ip_route_me_harder(pskb) == 0 ? ret : NF_DROP; + return ip_xfrm_me_harder(pskb) == 0 ? ret : NF_DROP; } +#endif return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 78872ccb68335b14f0d1ac7338ecfcbf1cba1df4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Drzewiecki Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 01:47:48 -0800 Subject: [BRIDGE]: Fix deadlock in br_stp_disable_bridge Looks like somebody forgot to use the _bh spin_lock variant. We ran into a deadlock where br->hello_timer expired while br_stp_disable_br() walked br->port_list. Signed-off-by: Adrian Drzewiecki Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_stp_if.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c b/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c index cc047f7fb6e..35cf3a07408 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void br_stp_disable_bridge(struct net_bridge *br) { struct net_bridge_port *p; - spin_lock(&br->lock); + spin_lock_bh(&br->lock); list_for_each_entry(p, &br->port_list, list) { if (p->state != BR_STATE_DISABLED) br_stp_disable_port(p); @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void br_stp_disable_bridge(struct net_bridge *br) br->topology_change = 0; br->topology_change_detected = 0; - spin_unlock(&br->lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&br->lock); del_timer_sync(&br->hello_timer); del_timer_sync(&br->topology_change_timer); -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 3f17da699431ec48540beabc55c54d4b5e66c8e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 22:13:24 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] fix kill_proc_info() vs CLONE_THREAD race There is a window after copy_process() unlocks ->sighand.siglock and before it adds the new thread to the thread list. In that window __group_complete_signal(SIGKILL) will not see the new thread yet, so this thread will start running while the whole thread group was supposed to exit. I beleive we have another good reason to place attach_pid(PID/TGID) under ->sighand.siglock. We can do the same for release_task()->__unhash_process() de_thread()->switch_exec_pids() After that we don't need tasklist_lock to iterate over the thread list, and we can simplify things, see for example do_sigaction() or sys_times(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Roland McGrath Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/fork.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 8e88b374cee..3683ce10f4a 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1123,8 +1123,8 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, p->real_parent = current; p->parent = p->real_parent; + spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock); if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) { - spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock); /* * Important: if an exit-all has been started then * do not create this new thread - the whole thread @@ -1162,8 +1162,6 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, */ p->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1); } - - spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock); } /* @@ -1189,6 +1187,7 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, nr_threads++; total_forks++; + spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); proc_fork_connector(p); return p; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From dadac81b1b86196fcc48fb87620403c4a7174f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 22:13:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] fix kill_proc_info() vs fork() theoretical race copy_process: attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, p->pid); attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID, p->tgid); What if kill_proc_info(p->pid) happens in between? copy_process() holds current->sighand.siglock, so we are safe in CLONE_THREAD case, because current->sighand == p->sighand. Otherwise, p->sighand is unlocked, the new process is already visible to the find_task_by_pid(), but have a copy of parent's 'struct pid' in ->pids[PIDTYPE_TGID]. This means that __group_complete_signal() may hang while doing do ... while (next_thread() != p) We can solve this problem if we reverse these 2 attach_pid()s: attach_pid() does wmb() group_send_sig_info() calls spin_lock(), which provides a read barrier. // Yes ? I don't think we can hit this race in practice, but still. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Roland McGrath Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/fork.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 3683ce10f4a..fbea12d7a94 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1173,8 +1173,6 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, if (unlikely(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) __ptrace_link(p, current->parent); - attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, p->pid); - attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID, p->tgid); if (thread_group_leader(p)) { p->signal->tty = current->signal->tty; p->signal->pgrp = process_group(current); @@ -1184,6 +1182,8 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, if (p->pid) __get_cpu_var(process_counts)++; } + attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID, p->tgid); + attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, p->pid); nr_threads++; total_forks++; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2 From 5ecfbae093f0c37311e89b29bfc0c9d586eace87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 22:50:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] fix zap_thread's ptrace related problems 1. The tracee can go from ptrace_stop() to do_signal_stop() after __ptrace_unlink(p). 2. It is unsafe to __ptrace_unlink(p) while p->parent may wait for tasklist_lock in ptrace_detach(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Roland McGrath Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/exec.c | 2 +- include/linux/ptrace.h | 1 + kernel/ptrace.c | 25 +++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 055378d2513..0e1c95074d4 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ static void zap_threads (struct mm_struct *mm) do_each_thread(g,p) { if (mm == p->mm && p != tsk && p->ptrace && p->parent->mm == mm) { - __ptrace_unlink(p); + __ptrace_detach(p, 0); } } while_each_thread(g,p); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index 9d5cd106b34..0d36750fc0f 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ extern int ptrace_readdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long src, char __us extern int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long dst, int len); extern int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *tsk); extern int ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *, unsigned int); +extern void __ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *, unsigned int); extern void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *); extern int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *task, int kill); extern int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, long addr, long data); diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index d2cf144d0af..d95a72c9279 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ void ptrace_untrace(task_t *child) */ void __ptrace_unlink(task_t *child) { - if (!child->ptrace) - BUG(); + BUG_ON(!child->ptrace); + child->ptrace = 0; if (!list_empty(&child->ptrace_list)) { list_del_init(&child->ptrace_list); @@ -184,22 +184,27 @@ bad: return retval; } +void __ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data) +{ + child->exit_code = data; + /* .. re-parent .. */ + __ptrace_unlink(child); + /* .. and wake it up. */ + if (child->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE) + wake_up_process(child); +} + int ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data) { if (!valid_signal(data)) - return -EIO; + return -EIO; /* Architecture-specific hardware disable .. */ ptrace_disable(child); - /* .. re-parent .. */ - child->exit_code = data; - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - __ptrace_unlink(child); - /* .. and wake it up. */ - if (child->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE) - wake_up_process(child); + if (child->ptrace) + __ptrace_detach(child, data); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3-70-g09d2